Dispute Settlement at the WTO: Impacts of a No Deal in the US‐Brazil Cotton Dispute

On the day before Brazil was to start imposing retaliatory sanctions against the United States in the WTO dispute settlement case regarding unfair domestic and export upland cotton subsidies, the parties have reached a preliminary concession aimed at settling this eight‐year‐long trade dispute. In this paper, we explore the economywide impacts of a no deal with specific emphasis on intellectual property retaliation in a computable general equilibrium framework. As awarded by a WTO dispute settlement panel, Brazil would have been entitled to $591 million in retaliatory sanctions in goods sectors and $238 million in intellectual property sanctions. We find that retaliation by Brazil would have led to welfare gains for all countries except the United States. Most importantly, however, had Brazil not been allowed to retaliate in the form of suspension of intellectual property rights, the impact of trade retaliation alone would have been negative for both Brazil and the United States, a case of shooting oneself in the foot to shoot at the other person's foot.     

Strategic Trade Policy through the Tax System

If conventional instruments of strategic trade policy are unavailable, the system of foreign profit taxation and transfer price guidelines may serve as surrogate policy instruments. In this paper, I consider a model where firms from two countries compete with each other on a market in a third country. Both firms have affiliates in the third country where (part of) the production takes place. I analyse optimal policy choices of the firms' residence countries aiming at strategically manipulating the competitiveness of their firms. I show that, first, countries prefer the tax exemption system over the tax credit system if there is no intra‐firm trade. Second, if the headquarters provide inputs for production in the affiliate, countries prefer the tax exemption system if the transfer price for these inputs is close to the headquarters' variable cost and if the residence country's tax rate is high. However, if transfer prices are high and the residence country's tax rate is low, I show that the tax credit system is an optimal tax policy choice for both countries. From a policy perspective, the view that the tax exemption system is generally the best policy response if domestic firms' competitiveness is a policy goal has to be qualified.     

Curbing Agricultural Exceptionalism: The EU's Response to External Challenge

From 1948 to 1994, the agricultural sector was afforded special treatment in the GATT. We analyse the extent to which this agricultural exceptionalism was curbed as a result of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, discuss why it was curbed and finally explore the implication of this for EU policy making. We argue that, in particular, two major changes in GATT institutions brought about restrictions on agricultural exceptionalism. First, the Uruguay Round was a ‘single undertaking’ in which progress on other dossiers was contingent upon an outcome on agriculture. The EU had keenly supported this new decision rule in the GATT. Within the EU this led to the MacSharry reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992, paving the way for a trade agreement on agriculture within the GATT. Second, under the new quasi‐judicial dispute settlement procedure, countries are expected to bring their policies into conformity with WTO rules or face retaliatory trade sanctions. This has brought about a greater willingness on the part of the EU to submit its farm policy to WTO disciplines.     

Regionalism Within Multilateralism: The WTO Trade Policy Review of Canada

The World Trade Organisation published a Trade Policy Review of Canada in 2003. In this paper, we discuss the WTO Review and augment the discussion by presenting original data and reviewing the empirical literature. The WTO concludes that Canada's trade regime is open and transparent but maintains barriers in a few important sectors. We subject this claim to empirical scrutiny, comparing Canada's actual imports to a multilateral benchmark based on the gravity equation. We show that Canada imports about what should be expected given the size of its economy and its location. In a second benchmarking exercise, we show that Canada's anti‐dumping initiations are in proportion to its imports and that Canada's exports are targeted less by other countries’ anti‐dumping investigations than what might be expected based on Canadian export levels. Like many other countries, Canada has pursued trade liberalisation through the World Trade Organisation while simultaneously signing multiple regional trade agreements. Our summary of the recent literature indicates that Canada's regional trade agreements have generated more trade creation than trade diversion. Canada has also spurred imports from the least developed countries by unilaterally eliminating tariffs and quota barriers on 48 of the world's poorest countries in January 2003. We also discuss Canadian progress in opening its agriculture and clothing industries. Overall, we conclude that Canada appears committed to advancing globalisation through multilateral trade liberalisation supplemented by unilateral and bilateral initiatives.     

Tariff and quota equivalence in the presence of asymmetric information

This paper investigates the equivalence of optimal import tariffs and quotas in a Cournot duopoly model when firms have more information about demand than the domestic government. I consider a screening model in which the government offers the domestic firm different contracts from which to choose. I show that the availability and cost of obtaining correct information from the firm depends upon the choice of trade policy instrument. Asymmetric information thus destroys the equivalence of tariffs and quotas, which prevails under complete information, and has a profound impact on how government, firms, and consumers rank different trade policy instruments.     

中美欧贸易报复制度的比较研究

WTO体制下,贸易报复是争端解决的最后保障,但WTO争端机制旨在解决成员之间的争端,因此,要赋予私人请求本国政府对另一国家进行贸易报复的权利,仍然需要国内立法.目前,各主要大国都通过国内立法赋予本国国民权利,以请求本国政府对另一国家进行贸易报复,为争端解决的国内程序和国际程序的衔接提供了基础,使得本国国民可以通过国内程序启动WTO的争端解决程序.与美欧相比,我国关于贸易报复的立法和实践经验均不甚丰富,确实需要借鉴较为完备的美欧立法,完善我国的有关法律制度.     

R&D policies, trade and process innovation

We set up a simple trade model with two countries hosting one firm each. The firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, and each government may grant R&D subsidies to the domestic firm. We show that it is optimal for a government to provide higher R&D subsidies the lower the level of trade costs, even if the firms are independent monopolies. If firms produce imperfect substitutes, policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives. International policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures a symmetric outcome. However, it is shown that harmonization is not necessarily welfare maximizing. The optimal coordinated policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with R&D subsidies to only one of the firms.     

论我国政府在农产品进出口贸易中的促进作用

我国加入WTO后,推动了我国农产品进出口贸易发展,但不同发展阶段有不同的农业政策。近年来,贸易保护频频引发国际纠纷,农产品的贸易保护更是愈演愈烈,我国对外贸易正面临严峻的挑战。本文通过分析农产品进出口贸易现状及其面临的问题与挑战,结合WTO各主要成员国的对外贸易政策,讨论了我国政府在农产品进出口贸易中实施合理有效的政策而起到的平衡作用,以及为加快我国农产品对外贸易平稳发展政府应采取的措施。     

Impact of Environmental Regulations on Trade in the Main EU Countries: Conflict or Synergy?

In an increasingly integrated world with declining trade barriers, environmental regulations can have a decisive role in shaping countries’ comparative advantages. The conventional wisdom about environmental protection is that it comes at an additional cost on firms imposed by the government, which may erode their global competitiveness. However, this paradigm has been challenged by some analysts. In particular, Porter and van der Linde argue that pollution is often associated with a waste of resources and that more stringent environmental policies can stimulate innovations that may overcompensate for the costs of complying with these policies. This is known as the Porter hypothesis. While there is a broad empirical literature on the impact of trade on environment, the empirical literature on the impact of environmental regulations on trade flows is relatively scarce, very heterogeneous and presents mixed results. The innovative feature of this paper is its attempts to estimate, in a gravity setting, augmented with a proxi of environmental stringency, the impact of three major multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) on 15 EU countries’ bilateral exports. According to our estimates, in the period 1988–2008, to be member of MEAs had a positive average impact on EU‐15 bilateral exports. This evidence can be partly explained by a possible trade diversion effect with respect to countries that did not sign MEAs and a corresponding trade creation effect among members of the environmental agreements. Furthermore, evidence coming from interaction effects estimates seems to show that for exporting countries, having signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Montreal agreements partly mitigates (by the amount of the estimated coefficient) the negative impact of having a relatively more stringent environmental regulation on bilateral trade. This result could have important policy implications for the future international trade–environmental negotiations.     

The Evolution of Japan's Aggressive Legalism

Japan's recent trade policy is sometimes characterised as ‘aggressive legalism’ in the sense that it aggressively utilises the multilateral trade rules embodied in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation in dealing with disputes with its trade partners. This policy may appear to be a marked departure from Japan's past practice of favouring bilateral, non‐legal settlement of trade disputes. Upon closer examination, however, while Japan has been moderately active in using the WTO dispute settlement process for resolving its trade disputes, it behaves more like a country that resorts to surgical strikes on selected targets (usually the United States) under a powerful cover of the European Community. Compared to Japan, Korea's attitude in the WTO is more aggressive. While the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) is not content with the status quo and is seeking to expand its aggressiveness in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, it faces an uphill battle. One of the difficulties facing trade officials in Japan may be the lack of a national system for lodging WTO complaints, open to any citizens or firms, like Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974 or the European Trade Barriers Regulation. Nonetheless, in the historical context, Japan is far more aggressive than in the past in utilising the rules of the GATT/WTO to advance its national interests. It will never revert to the infamous practice of bilateralism and grey area measures.     

International trade policies,industrialization, and economic development

During the 1950s and 1960s, most developing nations, particularly the larger ones, strongly opted for a policy of import substitution industrialization (ISI). This was based on heavy protection and generally led to very inefficient industries. Since the early 1970s, an increasing number of developing countries deregulated their economies and liberalized trade, and this stimulated efficiency and growth. Some developing nations also tried strategic trade policies and to endogenize growth (as postulated by endogenous growth theory), but with only limited success. It seems impossible and inconsistent under the new international trade rules, however, for other developing countries to duplicate the East Asia “miracle,” which was based on strong government support for domestic industry while stimulating competition and efficiency among domestic firms. The successful completion of the Uruguay Round is expected to greatly benefit developing countries through continued deregulation and increased access to developed-country markets.     

Trade disputes and the implementation of protection under the GATT: an empirical assessment

This paper is a first attempt to empirically determine why countries choose to violate or adhere to GATT rules when making trade policy adjustments between negotiating rounds. We use a previously unexploited set of data in which countries implemented two ‘types’ of protection under the GATT system between 1973 and 1994: (i) ‘legal’ protection in which countries utilized the GATT’s safeguards provisions; and (ii) ‘illegal’ protection in which the protection was provided outside of the safeguards provisions, resulting in a formal trade dispute. We find substantial evidence that concerns for retaliation affect government policy decisions in ways which contribute to the explanation of the existence of trade disputes.     

Barbarians at the Gates: State Control of Global Mergers and Acquisitions

Cross‐border mergers and acquisitions are a major and often politicised component of foreign direct investment. Using data on individual transactions between 1970 and 2006, we examine the restrictions countries place on mergers and acquisitions, whether they use these controls to discriminate against foreigners seeking to acquire domestic firms, and what factors may predict the propensity to block foreign entry by this method of direct investment. Drawing partly on the existing literature, we test hypotheses that state intervention can be explained by characteristics of the countries whose firms are targeted by acquirers, including per capita income, democracy, trade exposure, market size, government share of national income and industrial structure. Although democracy, trade exposure and high government expenditure are associated with more stringent merger control laws, none of these attributes cause states to discriminate against cross‐border mergers. Countries with high per capita incomes, large markets and strict merger control laws, do use those regulations to discourage foreign acquirers. A second set of tests, based on observations of individual deals, rather than national aggregates, reveal that governments are particularly averse to foreigners acquiring firms that are bankrupt or in the defence sector. Overall, governments do treat cross‐border mergers and acquisitions differently, and use their merger control laws to discriminate against foreign investors, particularly with respect to certain types of transactions.     

Trade Policy and Global Corporate Strategy

This article is an investigation of the linkages between the international trade and investment strategies of firms faced with global competition and the structure of protectionism. The first section briefly reviews the problems faced by businesses competing in a global environment characterized by triad power. It also provides a new framework which describes the various strategic alternatives available to firms when dealing with government trade policy. In the second and third sections, this theoretical framework is applied to explain a new global trading phenomenon: the recent escalation os U.S. "administered" protection. It is demonstrated how such protection can severely affect the environment for corporations when used as a strategic weapon by U.S. firms against foreign rivals. The fourth section assesses the response of Canadian firms faced with the issue of U.S. administered protection. It demonstrates how they have been able to influence government policy in order to diminish the impact of U.S. protectionism. This section also addresses the question of why certain Canadian firms oppose trade liberalization between the United States and Canada, in spite of administered protection, and how they have been able to influence the Canadian government in order to maintain "artificial" competitive advantages.     

Multi Fibre Arrangement and Wage Inequality: Firm and State‐level Evidence from India and a Theoretical Model

The phased elimination of Multi Fibre Arrangements (MFA) for textile and apparel has been one of the most compelling trade policy reforms that removed a system of bilateral quotas. The reform brought in significant changes in the industrial structures for exporters from the south, including India. Has the labour‐intensive high‐employment textile and clothing industry in India benefited from this global move towards freer trade? For India, the industry has witnessed unprecedented market concentration of export‐oriented firms. Firm‐level empirical estimate illustrates that workers in the export‐oriented firms in India are adversely affected due to withdrawal of quota. Accumulation of net fixed assets and growth of sales impart positive impact on firm‐level wages that cannot outweigh negative impact due to fall in exports. We also find negative impact of profit on aggregate wage bill for the industry with firms spread over 11 major states in India. We show that the mean deviation of industry‐level wage is positively and significantly associated with mean deviation of the number of factories at the state level and negatively with profit. Finally, a brief analytical exercise obtains conditions under which joint withdrawal of quota and import tariff could raise the aggregate labour income in developing countries, in general.     

China Trade Policy Review: A Political Economy Approach

Chinese trade policy has experienced ‘great reversal’ in the year of 2008. A series of constraining measures taken previously have been loosened eventually. We investigate this situation using a political economy approach. Unlike in democratic countries, where interest groups play a crucial role in trade policy change, in China, given the political reality, leaders’ will and trade partners’ pressure are the determinant factors. We call this top‐down and outside‐in trade policy. Actually the idea of ‘harmonious society’ and ‘scientific development’ emphasised by top leaders in October 2006 paved the road for the following trade policy adjustment: i.e. reducing tax rebate, limiting processing trade, compressing the catalogue for foreign investment, etc. However, with the shock of a global financial tsunami, these measures get coastal areas relying on foreign trade heavily into trouble. The economic downturn in Pearl River Delta even astonished the decision‐making body, calling on a quick reversal in foreign trade policy. If interest groups had been allowed to express their demand formally and adequately from the very start, the cycle of ‘taking up first but giving up last’ in policy design would have not taken place. In other words, the bottom‐up and inside‐out trade policy should be more stable. Although flexibility is necessary in the face of uncertainty, frequent and discretionary trade policy change usually produces effects of ‘pro‐government’ not ‘pro‐market’. This is unfavourable for the transformation in China. The constraining trade policy in mid‐2007 to mid‐2008 has been a part of the government’s desire to seek healthier development. However, with the inside and outside surroundings getting worse, the structural adjustment (long‐run objective) has had to concede to the economic growth (short‐run objective).     

Carbon policy and the structure of global trade

Alternative perspectives on the structure of international trade have important implications for the evaluation of climate policy. In this paper, we assess climate policy in the context of three important alternative trade formulations. First is a Heckscher‐Ohlin model based on trade in homogeneous products, which establishes the traditional neoclassical view on comparative advantage. Second is an Armington model based on regionally differentiated goods, which is a popular specification for numerical simulations of trade policy. Third is a Melitz model based on monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity. This heterogeneous‐firms framework is adopted in many contemporary theoretic and empirical investigations in international trade. As we show in this paper, the three alternative trade formulations have important implications for the assessment of climate policy with respect to competitive effects for energy‐intensive production (and hence carbon leakage) as well as the transmission of policy burdens across countries.     

Anti‐dumping Protection in a Liberalising Country: Mexico's Anti‐dumping Policy and Practice

The use of anti‐dumping policy has been steadily growing in recent decades, and so has the theoretical and empirical literature on anti‐dumping. However, while developing countries as a whole have become at least as active as the ‘traditional’ anti‐dumping regimes (the USA, the EU, Canada and Australia), the literature is almost exclusively concerned with the latter group. This article gives an overview of anti‐dumping policy and practice in Mexico, one of the leading ‘new’ anti‐dumping regimes. It assesses how anti‐dumping has expanded since the country began liberalising trade in the mid‐1980s, and discusses how the policy has been applied in a protectionist way that is not dissimilar to policy practice in the traditional user countries.     

WTO Dispute Settlement and the EU–US Mini Trade Wars: A Commentary on Fritz Breuss

Economic theory suggests that some of the trade remedies allowed by the WTO may lead away from liberal trade and impose costs on those that apply them. Breuss has provided evidence in the case of four EU-US mini-wars that the policy that created the trade conflict was not clearly in the economic interest of the offending country and that the sanctions imposed exacerbated rather than alleviated the problem. Breuss builds a case for compensation payments rather than trade sanctions for rule violations and for targeting of the recipients of those payments.If trade policy were a matter of economic rationality then this approach would be convincing. For better or worse, the trade rules are an unruly mix of economic, political and legal constructs. The commentary expands on this to explore the role of the dispute settlement process itself and the sanctions designed to give it teeth. The conclusion is that the economic calculations, while a good measure of the costs of legal or political decisions, are not central to the dispute settlement and sanctions processes. The dispute settlement process is also about preserving the balance of political advantage from negotiated rules and schedules, and the sanctions process is as much to do with preventing abuse as correcting it. So a full economic analysis would have to compare politically balanced alternative scenarios and the incorporate the effect of the threat of sanctions on government behavior.