GROWTH ACCOUNTING AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT*

This paper compares the growth accounting approaches to aggregate productivity measurement and analysis of three major researchers: E. F. Denison, D. W. Jorgenson, and J. W. Kendrick. The investigetors are compared in terms of their treatment of a number of crucial elements, including measurement of output and of capital and labor inputs (including composition or quality changes), total factor productivity growth, economies of scale, and intensity of demand (for output). Judged by the standard of the neoclassical economic theory of production-the only generally accepted basis for input aggregation-Denison departs significantly from the production theory framework in his measurement of output and capital input, Kendrick to some degree in his measure of capital input, and Jorgenson not at all. The effects of these departures are illustrated with reference to the recent productivity slowdown. The probable near-term future utility of growth accounting methods for productivity analysis is assessed, and some related econometric modeling issues are noted.     

A Generalized Exactly Additive Decomposition of Aggregate Labor Productivity Growth

Aggregate labor productivity (ALP) growth—i.e., growth of output per unit of labor—may be decomposed into additive contributions due to within‐sector productivity growth effect, dynamic structural reallocation effect (Baumol effect), and static structural reallocation effect (Denison effect) of cross‐sectional components (e.g., industry or region) of output and labor. This paper implements ALP growth decomposition that is “generalized” to output in constant prices and to output in chained prices (i.e., chained volume measure or CVM) and “exactly additive” since with either output the sum of contributions exactly equals “actual” ALP growth. It compares this “generalized exactly additive” decomposition (GEAD) to the “traditional” (TRAD) ALP growth decomposition devised for output in constant prices. The results show GEAD and TRAD are exactly additive when output is in constant prices, but GEAD is exactly additive while TRAD is not when output is in CVM. Also, GEAD components are empirically purer than or analytically superior to those from TRAD. Moreover, considering that contributions to ALP growth can be classified by industry or region each year over many years, GEAD provides a more well‐grounded picture over time of industrial or regional transformation than TRAD. Therefore, GEAD should replace TRAD in practice.     

ESTIMATING VALUE ADDED OF ILLEGAL PRODUCTION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Several economists continue to assert that the official national accounts of many countries do not cover a large “hidden” or “underground” economy. This article looks at one component of the underground economy, namely illegal activities. According to the UN System of National Accounts, production of goods and services that are illegal should be included in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) if both the producers and consumers are willing partners to the transactions involved. We examine the estimates of illegal production recently made by several countries in the Western Balkans and conclude that, if illegal activities were fully included in their official GDP estimates, they would increase by about 1 percent. Trade in narcotics and prostitution are the two most important kinds of illegal activities in most countries and we look in detail at how estimates for these activities were made by the Western Balkan countries.     

INTANGIBLE CAPITAL AND U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH

Published macroeconomic data traditionally exclude most intangible investment from measured GDP. This situation is beginning to change, but our estimates suggest that as much as $800 billion is still excluded from U.S. published data (as of 2003), and that this leads to the exclusion of more than $3 trillion of business intangible capital stock. To assess the importance of this omission, we add intangible capital to the standard sources-of-growth framework used by the BLS, and find that the inclusion of our list of intangible assets makes a significant difference in the observed patterns of U.S. economic growth. The rate of change of output per worker increases more rapidly when intangibles are counted as capital, and capital deepening becomes the unambiguously dominant source of growth in labor productivity. The role of multifactor productivity is correspondingly diminished, and labor's income share is found to have decreased significantly over the last 50 years.     

Technology Adoption Costs and Productivity Growth: The Transition to Information Technology

Using two panels of U.S. manufacturing industries, this paper estimates capital adjustment costs from 1961 to 1996. I find that from 1974–1983 adjustment costs rose sharply—they more than doubled from about 3% of output to around 7%. Moreover, this increase is specifically associated with a shift to investment in information technology. But such large adoption costs imply that the Solow residual mismeasures productivity growth: Adoption costs are resource costs representing an unmeasured investment. I find that when this investment is included, productivity grew about 0.4% per annum faster than official measures during the 1970's and early 1980's, reducing the size of the productivity “slowdown.” Indeed, estimated productivity growth rates were roughly the same from 1974–1988 as from 1949–1973. Thus technology transitions critically affect productivity growth measurement. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: O30, O47, E22.     

制造业部门劳动生产率比较研究——基于浙江地区与国内外制造业的实证分析

劳动生产率提高是经济增长的主要源泉,是内生型增长的决定性因素,也是实现收入翻番的基本支撑。处于沿海发达地区的浙江制造业劳动生产率,不及全国平均水平,也仅为美日韩等先进国家的1/4或1/5左右,劳动生产率提升较为滞后。在当前制度红利和"人口红利"逐渐消失的背景下,抓住城镇化、信息化和全球生产制造方式变革机遇,注重发挥"三个效应",即追赶效应、丹尼森效应和鲍默效应,着力创造"劳动生产率红利",继续形成对发达经济体的较快追赶步伐和推动增长模式升级。     

TESTING THE BAUMOL–NORDHAUS MODEL WITH EU KLEMS DATA

Baumol's (1967 ) seminal model of structural change predicts that large service industries financed mainly through taxes and social contributions—like health care and education, for instance—will acquire ever‐larger shares of total expenditures and that, concomitantly, overall productivity growth will decline. Applying a new testing strategy for Baumol's model, Nordhaus (2008 ) finds strong evidence in favor of the “cost and growth diseases” in U.S. GDP‐by‐industry data (published by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis). The aim of the present paper is twofold. The first is to check whether Nordhaus's results can be reproduced using U.S. industry data from the EU KLEMS database. Second, Nordhaus's testing methodology is applied to European Union data from the same database. The results suggest that—although there are differences vis‐à‐vis the U.S.—the EU also shows symptoms of “Baumol's diseases.”     

Future generations and economic activities: The case of the social discount rate

The objective of this article is to show the difficulties economists have when they try to answer the following question: What can economists do to promote a fair and “safe” economic development? Or otherwise said: what should we do to promote more equity between generations in an environmental perspective? The purpose of this article is not to develop new tools or policies but to give an overview of some theoretical and practical problems linked to the connection between environment, intergenerational justice and economic activities. The first section focuses on the reasons for the need to develop a reflection about intergenerational equity in the economics of the environment. The second section investigates some related theoretical problems, and the third section shows the practical difficulties economists have when dealing with intertemporal economic decisions; that is, trying to take intergenerational equity into account—in particular the choice of a discount rate for public investments.     

Life Cycle and Cohort Productivity in Economic Research: The Case of Germany

Abstract. We examine the research productivity of German academic economists over their life cycles. It turns out that the career patterns of research productivity as measured by journal publications are characterized by marked cohort effects. Moreover, the life cycles of younger German economists are hump shaped and resemble the life cycles identified for US economists, whereas the life cycles of older German economists are much flatter. Finally, we find that not only productivity, but also research quality follows distinct life cycles. Our study employs econometric techniques that are likely to produce estimates that are more trustworthy than previous estimates.     

Epistemology and the tasks of feminist economics

This paper examines the implications of current epistemological debates for the work of feminist economists. Feminist economists must acknowledge (in accordance with recent developments in the study of science) that (a) inquirers can never be certain whether claims about the world are true; (b) scientific inquiry is permeated with “internal” and “external” values; and (c) beliefs are affected by inquirers' social locations. But feminists should not, it argues, embrace the “relativist” stance of some postmodern thinkers, or reject the ideal of “truth,” or argue that beliefs are strictly determined by inquirers' identities and interests. It seeks to outline an epistemological “middle ground” for feminist economics, between the extremes of exaggerated claims of certainty and a disempowering relativism.     

Lagging productivity growth: Measurement,technology, and shock effects

One of the most important problems about which economists have professional knowledge is lagging productivity growth. After illustrating some significant developments this paper addresses three questions: (1) To what extent does R&;D activity drive productivity growth, (2) how do alternative measures of productivity affect the conclusions and (3) how did the oil price shocks and the increased openness of the U.S. economy affect productivity growth? After removing the influence of the extremely dynamic computer industry, average manufacturing industry productivity in the U.S. throughout the 80s grew at a disappointing pace. And it didn't improve in the most dynamic industries. But there is good news as well. First, part of the 1970s productivity slump is clearly attributable to the 1973–74 oil price shock. Second and more important, technological innovation does not appear to have lost its power in driving productivity growth forward. Indeed there is evidence of stronger and more consistent productivity effects from R&;D investment during the 1980s, although the exact channels through which R&;D enhances manufacturing sector productivity are left in doubt. Estimates of the role inter-industry technology flows play are sensitive to aggregation and the conventions used to construct the industry price deflators underlying productivity measures.     

A NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR THE U.S. NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

The key elements of a new architecture for the U.S. national accounts have been developed in a prototype system constructed by Dale W. Jorgenson and J. Steven Landefeld, Director of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. The focus of the U.S. national accounts is shifting from economic stabilization policy toward enhancing the economy's growth potential. A second motivation for the new architecture is to integrate the different components of the decentralized U.S. statistical system and make them consistent.     

IMPLEMENTATION CYCLES,INVESTMENT, AND GROWTH*

We develop a model of “intrinsic” cycles, driven by the decentralized behavior of entrepreneurs and firms making continuous, divisible improvements in their productivity. We show that when the introduction of productivity improvements is endogenous, implementation cycles arise even in the presence of reversible investment and consumption smoothing. The implied cyclical equilibrium is unique within its class and shares several features in common with actual business cycles. In particular, its predictions are qualitatively consistent with the joint behavior of the investment rate and Tobin's Q during U.S. recessions.     

Learning,capital-embodied technology and aggregate fluctuations

Recent cyclical episodes in the U.S. and G-7 economies are asymmetric: recoveries and expansions tend to be long and gradual and busts tend to be short and sharp. A large body of work views the two recent cyclical U.S. episodes, namely, the “new economy” boom in the late 1990s, and the 2000s housing boom-bust as episodes where over-optimistic beliefs have played a significant role. These episodes have revived interest in expectations driven business cycles models. However, previous work in this area has not addressed the important asymmetry feature of business cycles. This paper takes a step towards addressing this limitation of expectations driven business cycle models. We propose a generalization of the Greenwood et al. (1988) model with vintage capital and learning about capital embodied productivity and show it can deliver fluctuations that are asymmetric as in the U.S. data. Learning, calibrated to match the procyclical forecast precision from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, is crucial for the model?s ability to generate asymmetries. Forecast errors generated by the model are shown to trigger recessions that mimic in magnitude, duration and depth the typical post WW II U.S. recession.     

Scientific misconduct and research ethics in economics: an introduction

Abstract

Since the screening of Inside Job in movie theatres around the world in 2010, research integrity in economics has been questioned by scholars and public intellectuals. Prestigious economists and policy makers are accused of conflicts of interest while prominent economists are charged with plagiarism and self-plagiarism. Some of these economists replied to accusations about themselves while many others have preferred not to respond at all. These days, economists hear the following question more often than before: “what is wrong with economics?”     

Income Polarization of the U.S. Working Class: An Institutionalist View

We provide an institutional insight into the trend of income polarization within the U.S. working class. In contrast to the previous industrial waves, the current and ongoing industrial revolution is characterized by the replacement of “creative destruction” with jobless growth. Instead of replacing the lost jobs with new ones, new disruptive technologies eliminate more jobs in traditional labor and capital-intensive sectors than create jobs in new idea-intensive sectors. By examining the relationship between the income share of the bottom 50 percent, the middle 40 percent, and the top 10 percent and technological progress, we obtain robust econometric results. According to our results, the income polarization among U.S. workers can be associated with the shift of R&D activities from the public to the corporate sector. The concentration of innovations by corporate capital limits the power of society to reduce inequality and to provide greater social stability through “the incredible productivity” of technological progress.     

Mill versus Jevons on traditional sexual division of labour: Is gender equality efficient?

Abstract

The question of the legitimacy of traditional sexual division of labour receives growing attention from contemporary economists. In particular, a debate takes place between the “New Home Economics”, which stresses the efficiency of the traditional arrangement and economists questioning the justice of the relations between sexes. The same kind of opposition appears between two Victorian economists: J.S. Mill and W.S. Jevons. Although both are utilitarian, they adopt contrary views about the relative importance of efficiency and justice in the definition of appropriate gender relations. While Mill aims at conciliating justice and utility, Jevons considers that utility outweighs justice.     

THE FISCAL MULTIPLIER AND ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STATES

The Great Recession sparked wide interest in the economic effects of fiscal policy. That interest is reflected in an ongoing debate over the size of the fiscal multiplier. This survey article addresses three questions: What models do economists use to estimate that multiplier? Why do estimates of it vary widely? How can economists use those estimates to judiciously analyze U.S. economic policy? (JEL E62, H30, H50)     

From Judicial Sovereignty to Collective Democracy: The Development of J.R. Commons’ Perspective on Progressive Institutional Change

Abstract:

This article clarifies the significance of “collective democracy” in the works of John R. Commons by comparing it with “judicial sovereignty” in terms of its contribution to “progress.” We can thus answer two issues that Paul D. Bush does not clearly address: (i) what setup for policy formation contributes to progress and (ii) what is the role of economists within a collective democracy? Based on the comparison, the answer to the first question is collective democracy, and regarding the second question, the roles of economists as both economists and “institutional” economists are extrapolated.     

Computers And Growth

The purpose of this paper is to describe the impact of investment in computers on the growth of the U.S. economy. The economic literature on computers is relatively rich in information on the decline in computer prices and the growth of computer investment. Constant quality price indices for computers have been included in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) since 1986. These indices employ state of the art methodology to capture the rapid evolution of computer technology.

While the annual inflation rate for overall investment has been 3.66 percent for the period 1958 to 1992, computer prices have declined by 19.13 percent per year! Similarly, overall investment grew at 3.82 percent, while investment in computers increased at an astounding 44.34 percent! These familiar facts describe growth in the output of computers. The objective of this paper is to complete the picture by analyzing the growth of computer services as inputs.

In a pioneering paper Bresnahan (1986) has focused on pecuniary externalities arising from the rapid decline in computer prices. Griliches (1992, 1994) has emphasized the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary externalities in the impact of computer investment on growth. This paper is limited to pecuniary externalities or the impact of reductions in computer prices on the substitution of computer services for other inputs. As Griliches (1992) points out, this is an essential first step in identifying nonpecuniary externalities or ‘spill-overs’ through the impact of a decline in computer prices on productivity growth. ^{* *}Brynjolfsson (1993) has proveded a detailed survey of studies of nonpecuniary externalities or ‘spill overs’. Recent studies include those of Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1994a, 1994b) and Lichtenberg (1993).

In two important papers Stephen D. Oliner (1993, 1994) has introduced a model of computer technology that greatly facilitates the measurement of computer services as inputs. In this paper we estimate computer stocks and flows of computer services for all forms of computer investment included in NIPA. We construct estimates of computer services parallel to NIPA data on computer investment by combining these data with information on computer inventories. For example, the International Data Corporation (IDC) Census of Computer Processors includes an annual inventory of processors in the U.S.

In Section 1 we present data on investment in computers and constant quality price indices from NIPA. These data incorporate important innovations in modeling computer technology stemming from a joint study by IBM and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) completed in 1985. This study utilized a ‘hedonic’ methodology for constructing an econometric model of computer prices that accurately reflects rapid changes in computer technology. This methodology generates an index of computer prices that holds the quality of computers constant.

In Section 2 we present the model of computer services originated by Oliner (1993,1994). This differs in important respects from the model of capital services used in the previous studies of U.S. economic growth surveyed by Jorgenson (1989,1990). The model employed in previous studies is based on the decline in productive capacity with the chronological age of a capital good. Oliner assumes that computers maintain their productive capacity until they are retired. Decline in productive capacity occurs only through removal of used computers from the inventory through retirement.

In Section 3 we construct estimates of stocks of computers that incorporate IDC data on computer inventories and derive the implied flow of computer services. While output of computer investments has grown very rapidly, the input of computer services has grown even faster. The price of these services has declined at 23.22 percent per year over the period 1958 to 1992, while the input of these services has grown at 52.82 percent! This is prima facie evidence of an important role for computer price declines as a source of pecuniary externalities.

In Section 4 we combine computer services with the services of other types of capital to produce a measure of capital input into the U.S. economy. We link this with labor input to obtain the contributions of both inputs to U.S. economic growth, arriving at the growth of productivity as a residual. We find that the contribution of computer services to input into the U.S. economy is far more important than the contribution of computer investments to output. This is a significant step toward resolution of the Solow paradox: ‘We see computers everywhere except in the productivity statistics. ^{* *}Robert M. Solow, quoted by Brynjolfsson (1993). Declines in computer prices generate very sizable pecuniary externalities through the substitution of computer services for other inputs. By contrast Solow focuses on nonpecuniary externalities that would appear as productivity growth.

In Section 5 we conclude that information on inventories of computers is critical in quantifying the role of computer services as inputs. The constant quality price indices for computers incorporated into NIPA are also essential. A price index for computers that reflects only general trends in inflation would result in a highly distorted perspective on the growth of GDP and capital services, especially during the past decade. To capture the contribution of all forms of investment to U.S. economic growth, similar price indices should be included in NIPA for capital goods with rapidly evolving technologies, as proposed by Gordon (1990).

The long term goal should be a unified system of income. product, and wealth accounts, like that proposed by Laurits Christensen and Jorgenson (1973) and Jorgenson (1980). This incorporates capital stocks, capital services, and their prices. Achieving this goal will necessitate much greater elaboration of the accounting system described in Section 3. These accounts would incorporate data on prices and quantities of investment, stocks of assets, and capital services for all forms of capital employed in the U.S. economy.