How much does a single graduation cohort from further education colleges contribute to an open regional economy?

How much does a single graduation cohort from further education colleges contribute to an open regional economy? Spatial Economic Analysis. This paper combines elements of growth accounting and numerical general equilibrium analysis to produce an alternative micro-to-macro modelling approach. This is used to evaluate the macroeconomic impact on the Scottish economy of the human capital generated by a single graduation cohort from further education colleges. The macroeconomic impact is found to be significant and larger than growth accounting would suggest due to the associated endogenous investment, employment and competitiveness effects. From a policy perspective this identifies the importance of the conventional teaching role of education institutions and the key function played by further education colleges in this process.     

Capitalization of Costs and Expected Earnings Growth

Abstract

This paper offers a model that shows how the capitalization of costs affects contemporaneous earnings and the growth path of expected earnings. It makes three points. First, reported earnings under successful efforts are more price relevant than earnings under full costing or full expensing. Second, whether conditional or unconditional, conservatism always enhances the growth rate of expected earnings. Third, independent of capitalization policy, the long-run expected earnings growth rate converges either to the long-run expected free cash flow growth rate or to the depreciation rate. Therefore, while capitalization policy affects the price relevance of earnings and short-run expected earnings growth, it does not affect long-run expected earnings growth.     

An Examination of Proposals for a U.S. Industrial Policy

Abstract . An “industrial policy” for the U.S. appears from the writings and statements of its advocates to involve modification of federal tax laws and expenditures to allow a largely unchanged set of business institutions to better serve the public interest. It employs planning but it is planning of the sort the U.S. has always had. Those who oppose all government activity in the private sector oppose it, not realizing that the anti-trust laws, for example, do not interfere with the economy's operation but aid it to function beneficently. It is those whose activities are anti social who are loudest in their demands for business “freedom.” Does the U.S. need a more efficient economic system? Intercountry comparisons show that in many areas it lags. To achieve stability of income and employment as well as productive efficiency, the U.S. has many policy options it can consider—and it must.     

生产资料价格与国民经济运行指标关联关系的实证研究

当前,我国宏观经济调控处于"稳增长"与"稳物价"的微妙平衡,而生产资料作为国家经济建设的基础物质条件,其供需变化不仅与经济增长相关,也与社会物价水平密切相关。本文依据2001年至2010年10年间的生产资料价格数据,对生产资料价格与主要宏观经济指标的关联关系及其与PPI、CPI等价格指标的传导规律进行了实证研究,并在此基础上提出了有利于我国稳定通胀预期、把握价格规律的政策建议。     

Chain-Store Pricing Across Local Markets

Chain‐stores now dominate most areas of retailing. While retailers may operate nationally or even internationally, the markets they compete in are largely local. How should they best operate pricing policy in respect of the different markets served—price uniformly across the local markets or on a local basis according to market conditions? We model this by allowing local market differences, with retail markets differing by their size and the number of players present. We show that practising price discrimination is not always best for a chain‐store. Competitive conditions exist under which uniform pricing can raise profits.     

Combining monetary policy and prudential regulation: an agent-based modeling approach

This paper explores the interaction between monetary policy and prudential regulation in an agent-based modeling framework. Firms borrow funds from the banking system in an economy regulated by a central bank. The central bank carries out monetary policy, by setting the interest rate, and prudential regulation, by establishing the banking capital requirement. Different combinations of interest rate rule and capital requirement rule are evaluated with respect to both macroeconomic and financial stability. Several relevant policy implications were drawn. First, the efficacy of a given capital requirement rule or interest rate rule depends on the specification of the rule of the other type it is combined with. More precisely, less aggressive interest rate rules perform better when the range of variation of the capital requirement is narrower. Second, interest rate smoothing is more effective than the other interest rate rules assessed, as it outperforms those other rules with respect to financial stability and macroeconomic stability. Third, there is no tradeoff between financial and macroeconomic stability associated with a variation of either the capital requirement or the smoothing interest rate parameter. Finally, our results reinforce the cautionary finding of other studies regarding how output can be ravaged by a low inflation targeting.

     

An Incomes Policy for the Professions: the Dutch Experience

Abstract . In 1951 the United States began moving toward an incomes policy, an attempt to end postwar wage and price inflation by linking changes in these prices to gains in productivity. Other countries later followed suit; some countries had already adopted wage and price control policies. The Netherlands moved toward an incomes policy immediately after World War II. Initially, the Dutch program involved wages only, but in the 1970s it became an accepted principle that private professional income should be comparable with the salaries of government officials and civil servants with comparable training and responsibilities. In the Netherlands (as in the United States and, before medicine was socialized, the United Kingdom) health professionals operate on a fee-for service basis and their incomes escalated as a result of both inflation and monopoly power. So they were subjected to the incomes policy. The policy's effectiveness in curbing income escalation cannot be determined with certainty—reliable data are lacking. However, the evidence indicates that the policy failed to achieve its original purpose.     

How low can U go?

• ? Although there is growing evidence that wage growth is building in response to low and falling unemployment in the advanced economies, there is scope for unemployment rates to fall further without triggering a pay surge.
• ? For a start, current unemployment rates in comparison to past cyclical troughs overstate the tightness of labour markets. Demographic trends associated with the ageing ‘baby boomer’ bulge have pushed down the headline unemployment rate – unemployment rates among older workers are lower than those of younger cohorts. And in a historical context, Europe still has a large pool of involuntary part‐timers.
• ? In addition, rising participation rates mean that demographics are less of a constraint on employment growth than widely assumed. In both 2017 and 2018, had it not been for increased activity rates (mainly for older cohorts), unemployment would have had to fall more sharply to accommodate the same employment increase. We expect rising participation rates to continue to act as a pressure valve for the labour market.
• ? Finally, unemployment rates were generally far lower during the 1950s and 1960s than now. If wages stay low relative to productivity, as was the case during that prior era, employment growth may remain strong, with unemployment falling further. In the post‐war era, low wages were partly a function of a grand bargain in which policy‐makers provided full employment in return for low wage growth.
• ? There is evidence to suggest that many post‐crisis workers have opted for the security of their existing full‐time job and its associated benefits despite lower wage growth, rather than change job and potentially earn more; the rise of the ‘gig economy’ has led some workers to value what they already have more. Put another way, the non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) has fallen. So, the role of labour market tightness in pushing wage growth higher may continue to surprise to the downside.

     

Control Theory and Macroeconomic Policy

This Briefing Paper examines the contribution that control theory can make to our understanding of macroeconomic policy. Control theory is an area of study, orginally developed in engineering, which has since been applied to a very wide range of problems not only in engineering but also in biology. ecology, physiology, space exploration and economics. The kinds of questions in economics which conrrol theory could help us to answer include: what objectives should the government be pursuing, infation or unemployment or both, and by what means? what instruments should be used and in what combinations? should the government adopt targets for the money supply or the exchange rate, or concentrate on unemployment and the balance of payments?     

Nominal rigidities equilibria in a non-Ricardian economy

I consider a cash-in-advance economy with nominal price rigidities. Nominal interest rates are the cost of liquidity and fiscal policy sets nominal transfers that affect the distribution of wealth. Under a fiscal policy associated with an unequal distribution of wealth and for policies of low or even zero interest rates, coordination failures exist, that is, involuntary unemployment persist even if prices are set at full employment levels. Coordination failures exist if and only if nominal rates are below a threshold. Moreover, I demonstrate the following result on welfare: full employment allocations at a nominal rate equal to the threshold (high liquidity costs) are better, in terms of welfare, from unemployment allocations at any non-negative interest rates below the threshold. On the other hand, under a sufficiently progressive fiscal system that reduces the inequality in the wealth distribution, coordination failures do not exist.     

Mineral-led Economic Growth, Drought Relief, and Incomes Policy

Abstract . Some analysts have hypothesized that rapid mineral led economic growth and drought in the rural economy have led to a severe worsening of the plight of the rural population in Botswana, with rural household income collapsing and income inequality worsening pronouncedly. Contrary to these hypotheses, Botswana's income data show that income distribution remained stable, since rural household incomes did not experience significant decline as a result of drought conditions. The government's incomes policy, the direct and indirect benefits of rapid employment growth, and the government's comprehensive drought relief support are seen as explanatory factors in this macroeconomic policy success.     

Monetary policy in open economies: Practical perspectives for pragmatic central bankers

This paper reviews and interprets some of the key policy implications that flow from a class of DSGE models for optimal monetary policy in the open economy. The framework suggests that good macroeconomic outcomes in open economies are possible by focusing inflation targeting that is implemented by a Taylor type rule, a rule that in equilibrium is reflected in the exchange rate as an asset price. Optimal monetary policy will not be able deliver a stationary (‘stable’) nominal exchange rate – let alone a fixed exchange rate or one that remains inside a target zone – because, absent a commitment device, optimal monetary can’t deliver a stationary domestic price level. Another feature in the data for inflation targeting countries that is consistent with monetary policy via Taylor type rule is that it will tend push the nominal exchange rate in the opposite direction from PPP in response to an ‘inflation’ shock—the ‘bad news god news’ result of Clarida and Waldman (2008. Is Bad News about Inflation Good News for the Exchange Rate. In: John Campbell, (Ed.), Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press), Clarida and Waldman (2014. Bad News About Inflation is Good News for the Nominal Exchange Rate Under Optimal Monetary Policy: DSGE Theory and a Decade of Empirical Evidence). This is so even though in the long run of these models the nominal exchange rate must in expectation obey PPP.     

Could unemployment go back to the post‐war heyday?

• ? The current ‘low’ rate of unemployment looks less impressive when compared with the 2–3% rates averaged in the 1950s and 1960s. But both then and now share a common driver of low joblessness – pay growth falling unusually short of productivity gains. While the chances of this continuing look stretching, a return to genuine full employment is not completely implausible .
• ? Why was unemployment so low in the early post‐war period? Given the current uncertainty over how far joblessness can sustainably drop and how this affects monetary policy, our analysis provides useful insights for the situation today.
• ? Several explanations have been mooted. A political commitment to full employment is one, although aspiration alone cannot provide a cause. And demand management using fiscal policy is hard to square with the period's modest budget deficits. Meanwhile, booming post‐war investment and trade and shortages of labour fail to explain why low joblessness did not quickly trigger rapid rises in pay and inflation.
• ? The cause of very low unemployment appears to have sat with wage restraint relative to productivity gains. Unlike most of the last 70 years, real pay growth consistently fell short of productivity rises in the 1950s and part of the 1960s, cutting the cost of workers and ensuring a low ‘equilibrium’ rate of unemployment.
• ? This explanation has parallels with the present day. Since 2010, productivity growth has outstripped real pay rises to an extent not seen since the 1950s. We do not expect this pattern to continue – our forecasts show real pay running slightly ahead of productivity growth over the next five years. But if the factors holding back pay were to persist, alongside a catch‐up in UK productivity, a return to a 1950s/60s‐style jobless rate is possible, if the MPC did not take fright at further declines in unemployment.

     

Can money matter for interest rate policy?

In this paper it is shown that money can matter for macroeconomic stability under interest rate policy when transactions frictions are non-negligible. We develop a sticky price model with a shopping time function, which induces the marginal utility of consumption to depend on the (predetermined) stock of money held at the beginning of the period. Equilibrium stability and uniqueness are then ensured by a passive interest rate policy, whereas activeness is associated with an explosive equilibrium. By reacting to changes in beginning-of-period real balances, the central bank can restore stability. Interest rates further depend on lagged real balances even if the central bank acts in an entirely forward-looking way, as under discretionary optimization. If the model is revised such that end-of-period money provides transaction services, money can in principle be neglected for a stabilizing interest rate policy. Discretionary monetary policy is, however, likely to be associated with equilibrium indeterminacy, which can be avoided if interest rates are set contingent on beginning-of-period real balances.     

Leaning into the Wind: A Structural VAR Investigation of UK Monetary Policy*

This paper adapts Uhlig's [Journal of Monetary Economics (2005) forthcoming] sign restriction identification methodology to investigate the effects of UK monetary policy using a structural vector autoregression (VAR). It shows that shocks which can reasonably be described as monetary policy shocks have played only a small role in the total variation of UK monetary and macroeconomic variables. Most of the variation in UK monetary variables has been due to their systematic reaction to other macroeconomic shocks, namely non‐monetary aggregate demand, aggregate supply, and oil price shocks. We also find, without imposing any long run identifying restrictions, that aggregate supply shocks have permanent effects on output.     

Blame the baby boomers for depressed wage growth

• ? While ‘blame’ may sound harsh, the reality is that in an ageing society, the over‐60s accounting for a bigger share of the workforce equals lower wage growth. This is particularly pertinent for the eurozone right now with the baby boomer generation entering the last phase of their working life. Our analysis shows that the very sizeable over‐60 cohort is depressing aggregate wage growth by up to 0.3 ppts annually. That may also help explain why inflation is still subdued .
• ? European policy makers are scratching their heads about why wage growth has not picked up in line with economic growth over the past two years. For the ECB this is relevant as it tries to understand why inflation remains low. While much of the debate centres around unemployment and the Phillips curve, this article looks at the impact of an ageing society on wage growth.
• ? Even though this is more of a structural, rather than a cyclical, perspective, it is particularly important for the eurozone economies right now, because the large post‐World War II baby boomer generation is strongly pushing up the elderly share of employment (measured as those aged 60 and above). As the share of the over 60s in total employment grows, so does their weight in aggregate wage growth.
• ? The crucial point is that wages increase with age, but at a decreasing rate, and stay essentially flat above 55. The main reasons are that the elderly invest much less in continued education and are less inclined to switch to better‐paying jobs.
• ? Our analysis shows how substantial the negative impact of an ageing workforce is on wage growth in the eurozone. By simulating an alternative demographic scenario, we estimate that wage growth in 2015–17 would have been 0.3 ppts per year higher had it not been for the ageing baby‐boomers. Similarly, forecasts for 2018–20 not accounting for the baby‐boomers may overstate wage growth by some 0.2 ppts or more annually.

     

On the forecasting performance of a small-scale DSGE model

Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have recently become standard tools for policy analysis. Nevertheless, their forecasting properties have still barely been explored. In this article, we address this problem by examining the quality of forecasts of the key U.S. economic variables: the three-month Treasury bill yield, the GDP growth rate and GDP price index inflation, from a small-size DSGE model, trivariate vector autoregression (VAR) models and the Philadelphia Fed Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The ex post forecast errors are evaluated on the basis of the data from the period 1994–2006. We apply the Philadelphia Fed “Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists” to ensure that the data used in estimating the DSGE and VAR models was comparable to the information available to the SPF.Overall, the results are mixed. When comparing the root mean squared errors for some forecast horizons, it appears that the DSGE model outperforms the other methods in forecasting the GDP growth rate. However, this characteristic turned out to be statistically insignificant. Most of the SPF's forecasts of GDP price index inflation and the short-term interest rate are better than those from the DSGE and VAR models.     

国际金融危机与中国财政政策设计：功能、目标、力度

本文结合国际金融危机,从理论和实践两方面探讨了中国财政政策设计和实施中存在的一些重要问题。一是从财政政策的维持和纠偏两方面,揭示了财政政策的基本功能,提出财政政策应该分为稳定和再稳定两类政策;二是从财政政策的经济和社会目标两方面,分析了财政政策目标错位问题,提出了财政政策目标应从实现经济增长调整为促进充分就业;三是从财政政策力度计量方面,考察了政府预算账户存在的问题,提出了单独设立稳定账户的设想。     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Financial turmoil will not derail expansion

• ? The further run of broadly positive economic news has been overshadowed by the recent financial market turmoil. We do not expect the latter to be the catalyst for any notable economic slowdown and have left our world GDP growth forecast for 2018 unchanged at 3.2%, which would be the strongest result since 2011, up from an estimated 3.0% in 2017.
• ? January survey data continued to strike a positive tone. Indeed, the global composite PMI rose to its highest level during the current upswing and points to a further acceleration in global GDP growth. Meanwhile, less timely world trade data showed strong growth in November after a weaker performance in September and October.
• ? Of course, these developments predate recent financial market developments. The key issue is whether the equity market sell‐off triggers significant spillovers to the wider economy. If the market reversal is to have notable repercussions, it will need to morph from a tantrum into a full‐blown crisis. For now, we still expect interest rates generally to edge higher, with three rate hikes still seen in the US this year.
• ? Despite the recent fall, equity prices are still up sharply compared with a few months ago and earnings growth remains solid. Against this backdrop, further weakness would probably require an additional trigger, such as a sustained rise in bond yields in response to a reassessment of the inflation and monetary policy outlook. Although inflation concerns have risen recently, our view remains that price pressures will rise only gradually in the advanced economies and that the upside risks to both inflation and bond yields remain well contained.
• ? The upshot is that recent events have not prompted us to reassess the outlook for this year or beyond. We continue to expect world GDP growth to pick up to 3.2% this year, reflecting strong growth in both the advanced economies and the emerging markets. And our forecast for 2019 is also unchanged at 2.9%. In turn, world trade growth remains quite strong, helped by the weaker US$, but is seen slowing to 5% this year from just over 6% in 2017, with a further modest easing to 4.3% in 2019.

     

Animal spirits and unemployment: a disequilibrium analysis

The past decade has seen a number of advances in modelling disequilibrium dynamics. This paper draws on separate approaches to disequilibrium dynamics to demonstrate a Keynesian result concerning the formal relevance of “animal spirits” in production economies. Specifically, it is shown that a parameter that can be associated with the “animal spirits” of firms is crucial to the stability of full employment equilibrium in a production economy. This approach to “animal spirits” is different to that taken by recent New Keynesian DSGE-type models, but similar in spirit to “Old Keynesian” approaches, including that of the General Theory. The corollary of the main conclusion is that price flexibility is not a sufficient condition for convergence on full employment equilibrium.