Breaking the norm: An empirical investigation into the unraveling of good behavior

We present results from an artefactual field experiment conducted in rural Peru that considers whether observing non-reciprocal behavior influences an individual's decision to reciprocate. Specifically, we consider the behavior of second movers in a trust game, assessing whether their decision to reciprocate is influenced by the observed reciprocity of others. In documenting the impact of an external shock to observed reciprocity, this paper shows that small increases in non-reciprocal behavior result in an unraveling of the norm of reciprocity. Survey data is used to explore mechanisms by which this occurred. Results are not consistent with learning effects, suggesting that preferences may be changed by observing others deviating from a norm of reciprocity. These results suggest that investing in encouraging trustworthy behavior can have large benefits in situations where individuals are observing each other's behavior, such as may be the case in a new market institution.     

Reciprocity and voting

In this paper we present a two-period model where a left-wing and a right-wing political party are solely interested in the policies they pursue. We assume that voters display reciprocal behavior. By contrast, political parties are not motivated by reciprocity. We show that reciprocity may have dramatic consequences for models of voting behavior. The incentive to be kind to the median voter may ensure that a position closer to the median voter's position is adopted even if political parties are not directly interested in being elected and cannot commit to a political stance during an election campaign. Moreover, reciprocity increases incumbency advantages.     

Reciprocity and voting

In this paper we present a two-period model where a left-wing and a right-wing political party are solely interested in the policies they pursue. We assume that voters display reciprocal behavior. By contrast, political parties are not motivated by reciprocity. We show that reciprocity may have dramatic consequences for models of voting behavior. The incentive to be kind to the median voter may ensure that a position closer to the median voter's position is adopted even if political parties are not directly interested in being elected and cannot commit to a political stance during an election campaign. Moreover, reciprocity increases incumbency advantages.     

Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence

Can a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerge among strangers? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects repeatedly play a two-player binary “trust” game. Players are randomly and anonymously paired with one another in each period. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerges under the most extreme information restriction (anonymous community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past history of play and whether that information must be provided freely or at some cost. In the absence of such reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of reputational information on past individual decisions significantly increases trust and reciprocity, with longer histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not choose to purchase this information.     

Trust and reciprocity: extensions and robustness of triadic design

Our paper reconsiders the triadic design proposed by Cox (Games and Economic Behavior 46:260–281, 2004) to identify trust and reciprocity in investment games. Specifically, we extend the design in two directions. First, we collect information on investors’ choices by using both the direct-response (as does Cox) and strategy methods. Using the latter, we are able to condition reciprocity on initial inequality, which is endogenous when investigating reciprocity. We demonstrate that the triadic design provides evidence for reciprocity once that initial inequality is considered. Second, we elicit expectations and test their coherence with the triadic outcomes. By examining the relationship between trust actions and expected gains, we analyze whether investors’ expectations are consistent with their behavior. Finally, we test for the existence of an emotional bias, i.e., whether expectation mismatches induce trustees to change actual choices from the planned ones.     

Testing theories of reciprocity: Do motivations matter?

One of the key issues for understanding reciprocity is how agents evaluate the kindness of an action. In this paper we investigate experimentally the hypothesis that the motivation driving an action is relevant for its perceived kindness and, as a consequence, for reciprocal behavior. In particular, we examine the hypothesis that, for a given distributional outcome, positive reciprocity is less strong in response to strategically motivated actions than to non-strategically motivated actions. Our results indicate that, both at the aggregate and the individual level, reciprocity is significantly stronger when strategic motivations can be ruled out. These findings suggest that intentions matter and, in particular, that models of intention-based reciprocity should take into account the nature of the motivations behind choices.     

The Behavioral Foundations of Retaliatory Justice

Synopsis Norms of positive and negative reciprocity constitute important constraints that affect human behavior. While much attention has been devoted to the economics of reciprocity in cooperation, the stylized fact that humans have a natural predisposition towards negative reciprocity and retaliation has received little consideration in the literature. In this study we investigate the behavioral foundations of retaliatory justice by considering the conditions under which norms of retaliation may constitute instruments for promoting desirable cooperation. The results suggest that human instincts for revenge may an important ingredient for the sustainability of peaceful social behavior.JEL classification: K10, D70, C7, Z13     

Forward-looking versus recursive-dynamic modeling in climate policy analysis: A comparison

This paper develops a multi-regional general equilibrium model for climate policy analysis based on the latest version of the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model. We develop two versions so that we can solve the model either as a fully inter-temporal optimization problem (forward-looking, perfect foresight) or recursively. The standard EPPA model on which these models are based is solved recursively, and it is necessary to simplify some aspects of it to make inter-temporal solution possible. The forward-looking capability allows one to better address economic and policy issues such as borrowing and banking of GHG allowances, efficiency implications of environmental tax recycling, endogenous depletion of fossil resources, international capital flows, and optimal emissions abatement paths among others. To evaluate the solution approaches, we benchmark each version to the same macroeconomic path, and then compare the behavior of the two versions under a climate policy that restricts greenhouse gas emissions. We find that the energy sector and CO₂ price behavior are similar in both versions (in the recursive version of the model we force the inter-temporal theoretical efficiency result that abatement through time should be allocated such that the CO₂ price rises at the interest rate.) The main difference that arises is that the macroeconomic costs are substantially lower in the forward-looking version of the model, since it allows consumption shifting as an additional avenue of adjustment to the policy. On the other hand, the simplifications required for solving the model as an optimization problem, such as dropping the full vintaging of the capital stock and fewer explicit technological options, likely have effects on the results. Moreover, inter-temporal optimization with perfect foresight poorly represents the real economy where agents face high levels of uncertainty that likely lead to higher costs than if they knew the future with certainty. We conclude that while the forward-looking model has value for some problems, the recursive model produces similar behavior in the energy sector and provides greater flexibility in the details of the system that can be represented.     

Trust and reciprocity in inter-individual versus inter-group interactions: The effects of social influence, group dynamics, and perspective biases

Using an experimental trust game, I examine whether the perspectives and behavior of group representatives and consensus groups differ from those of the same individuals in an analogous inter-individual situation. A primary goal of this research is to extend past work on trust and reciprocity by examining the impact of the social contexts within which social interactions are characteristically embedded. Specifically, this research concerns whether norms and dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in the contexts of inter-individual and inter-group interactions. First, I examine whether dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in various inter-group interactions where inter-group decisions are operationalized as 1) autonomous group representatives, i.e., individuals who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making a decision on behalf of a three-person group engaging with a group representative of another such group; and 2) consensus groups, i.e., group members making a consensus trust or reciprocity decision for their groups via a collective process with another such group. Results of these studies show that 1) people trust less and reciprocate less when responsible for a group or organizational decision as autonomous group representatives; 2) consensus groups do not differ from individuals in their level of trust but show dramatically less reciprocity. The group consensus mechanism in fact produced by far the lowest reciprocity level, significantly lower than that exhibited by either individuals or autonomous group representatives. Thus, inter-group trust and reciprocity dynamics are not readily inferable from their inter-individual counterparts. Moreover, an important implication is emerging here: the extent and direction of the discrepancy between individual and group choices in regard to trust and reciprocity levels and possibly other social preferences in general may depend importantly on the precise details of the group decision-making mechanism, for example whether decisions are made consensually, by majority vote, or by a group leader or representative. In addition to examining the level of trust and reciprocity that occur in these various situations, I also studied, using both behavioral and questionnaire data, the roles of self-interest, social influence, and group dynamics in trust and reciprocity perceptions and behavior. The results showed that there exist discrepancies between behavioral forecasts and the actual behavior, and that trusting behavior is driven strongly by expectation of level of reciprocation, while reciprocating behavior is driven strongly by the difference between trust expectation and actual trust received.     

Reciprocity in the workplace

Using combined experimental and survey data, this paper provides empirical evidence that firm productivity is related to worker’s pro-social behavior in the workplace. At the firm level, we find a strong positive relationship between firm productivity and reciprocating behavior among workers. Investigating workers’ individual behavior we find a similar, strong relationship when regressing earnings, a proxy for productivity, on reciprocity. To address simultaneity we use an instrumental variable approach and find that the initial estimate was upwards biased, presumably because it did not take into account the positive feedback from earnings to reciprocity. The new coefficient remains substantially above zero, but it is statistically insignificant.      

Favor trading in public good provision

Favor trading is common. We do something nice for someone and they do something nice in return. Several motives might underlie such behavior, including altruism, strategic motives, and direct or indirect positive reciprocity. It is not yet well-understood how these fit together to affect behavior, how they interact in various institutional structures, and how they play out over time. We use a laboratory experiment to study the elements and dynamics of favor trading in a particular setting: the private provision of a public good. In our experiment, giving subjects the ability to practice targeted reciprocity by making a simple, low-cost change in information provision increases contributions to the public good by 14 %. Subjects reward group members who have previously been generous to them and withhold rewards from ungenerous group members. Strategic concerns cannot explain all of this behavior, and it must be at least partly due to direct reciprocity. When someone cannot directly benefit from favor trading, he gives much less to the public good. People thus excluded from the “circle of reciprocity” provide a clean and strict test of indirect reciprocity. Contrary to previous studies in the literature, we do not observe indirect reciprocity.     

Indirect reciprocity and money

Using an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy as a basis, we argue that a monetary system can be more stable than one would expect from individual rationality. We show that positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system, provided every participant considers the feedback of his choice to the stationary equilibrium. If, however, the participants do not play stationary strategies and some participants notoriously refuse to accept money, then due to negative reciprocity their behavior will eventually induce a break-down of the monetary system.     

A generalized logistic model for technological forecasting

Resulting from a predominantly forward-looking behavior of the producers, a generalized logistic model is developed and tested here as an approximation of engineering-design process.     

Social division,trust, and reciprocity among Chinese inmates

Social capital promotes cooperation between people and, in turn, economic growth and stability. Trust and trustworthiness are components of social capital that are associated with economic success. This paper provides insight into the impact of social division on cooperative behavior. We use the one-shot investment game to measure trust and reciprocity among inmates in a Chinese prison, which offers an institutional setting that allows us to examine how social interaction, or a lack thereof, fosters cooperation. Results show that the variation in social division through physical separation does not have a significant impact on cooperative behavior among inmates. However, inmates are more trusting than our benchmark group of university students even though inmates have faced significant life challenges. While social interaction fails to boost trust and reciprocity, childhood experience and family environment mold social preferences. In particular, reciprocity deteriorates for those who have migrant mothers.     

A Theory of Bureaucratization Based on Reciprocity and Collusive Behavior

This paper addresses how an organization becomes a bureaucracy . Bureaucratization emerges from a self-enforced norm of reciprocity between agents in an organization who exchange favors and promote subgoals which differ from the objective of the firm. Such collusive behavior becomes harder and harder to prevent over time. As a result, incentive schemes lose their flexibility and bureaucratization becomes a necessary equilibrium phenomenon in the long run. The distribution of agents' private information, their preferences for the future and the force of the social norm of reciprocity are analyzed in terms of their effects on the long-run behavior of the organization and on the speed of the bureaucratization process.     

How to identify trust and reciprocity

This paper uses a three-games (or triadic) design to identify trusting and reciprocating behavior. A large literature on single-game trust and reciprocity experiments is based on the implicit assumption that subjects do not have altruistic or inequality-averse other-regarding preferences. Such experimental designs test compound hypotheses that include the hypothesis that other-regarding preferences do not affect behavior. In contrast, experiments with the triadic design do discriminate between transfers resulting from trust or reciprocity and transfers resulting from other-regarding preferences that are not conditional on the behavior of others. Decomposing trust from altruism and reciprocity from altruism or inequality aversion is critical to obtaining empirical information that can guide the process of constructing models that can increase the empirical validity of game theory.     

Economic Development and the Relative Price of Nontradables: Global Dynamics of the Krueger-Deardorff-Leamer Model*

This paper employs a three-factor model of economic development to model forward-looking nontraded investment as a determinant of the relative price of nontradables. A capital-intensity. reversal of nontraded output relative to manufactured output-arising from a switch toward a capital-intensive manufacturing technique from a labor-intensive technique-produces a bifurcation in the model's dynamics. the two resulting saddlepath trajectories are each consistent with optimizing behavior and transversality conditions at infinity. History, as embodied in the economy's capital stock, as well as forward-looking expectations determine whether the economy chooses the low-investment or high-investment trajectory.     

The dynamics of responder behavior in ultimatum games: a meta-study

Using data aggregated from seven papers that study repeated play in standard ultimatum games with either stranger or absolute stranger matching, we show that the behavior of responders changes with experience. High offers are more likely to be accepted with experience and low offers are more likely to be rejected. At the individual level, there is a negative relationship between the likelihood that a given offer is accepted and the size of the preceding offer. We compare the results with predictions generated by static models of distributional preferences, implicitly dynamic models of preferences with reciprocity, and explicitly dynamic models of adaptive learning. The data is most consistent with models of preferences with reciprocity.     

Forward-looking and myopic regional Computable General Equilibrium models: How significant is the distinction?

We present a stylized intertemporal forward-looking model that accommodates key regional economic features, an area where the literature is not well developed. The main difference, from the standard applications, is the role of saving and its implication for the balance of payments. Though maintaining dynamic forward-looking behaviour for agents, the rate of private saving is exogenously determined and so no neoclassical financial adjustment is needed. Also, we focus on the similarities and the differences between myopic and forward-looking models, highlighting the divergences amongst the main adjustment equations and the resulting simulation outcomes.     

How to motivate people to put their money where their mouth is: What makes employees participate in electronic prediction markets?

Although prediction markets are widely acknowledged to be as effective as other institutions predicting future events, little is known regarding their application in organizational settings. For organizations, prediction markets offer a new technical possibility to make use of the beliefs, information and knowledge of their employees for organizational decisions and forecasts. Based on survey data of 147 users in German-speaking Europe, we show that expected rewards increase user satisfaction. While contribution effort and general reciprocity in isolation have no impact on satisfaction, perceived general reciprocity in conjunction with high rewards is likely to increase user satisfaction. Our findings extend our knowledge on user behavior and emphasize the importance of incentives in prediction markets.