共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium outcomes can be unstable. We prove that any stable matching is obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the ‘rural hospital theorem’ cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences). 相似文献
2.
Constrained school choice 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures typically impede a student to submit a preference list that contains all his acceptable schools. We study the preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability and efficiency of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability or efficiency of either of the two mechanisms. This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston mechanism which has been abandoned in many US school districts but nevertheless yields stable Nash equilibrium outcomes. 相似文献
3.
Rodrigo A. Velez 《Journal of Economic Theory》2011,146(1):326-345
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains, but is not restricted to, quasi-linear preferences. We analyze the manipulability of the Generalized Money Rawlsian Fair (GMRF) solutions. (i) We show that the Nash and strong Nash equilibrium correspondences of the “preference revelation game form” associated with each GMRF solution coincide with the no-envy solution (in equilibrium, efficiency is preserved according to agents' true preferences). (ii) A corollary is that the GMRF solutions “naturally implement” the no-envy solution in Nash and strong Nash equilibria. 相似文献
4.
《Journal of public economics》2006,90(1-2):215-237
Many school districts in the U.S. use a student assignment mechanism that we refer to as the Boston mechanism. Under this mechanism, a student loses his priority at a school unless his parents rank it as their first choice. Therefore, parents are given incentives to rank high on their list the schools where the student has a good chance of getting in. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the induced preference revelation game. An important policy implication of our result is that a transition from the Boston mechanism to the student-optimal stable mechanism would lead to unambiguous efficiency gains. 相似文献
5.
We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson [The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: some engineering aspects of economic design, Amer. Econ. Rev. 89 (1999) 748-780] in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy most participants in the NRMP truthfully reveal their preferences. 相似文献
6.
高考录取机制的博弈分析 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
本文分析了高考招生中考后知分报考录取机制下的志愿填报博弈。完全信息时这个显示偏好博弈只有唯一的纳什均衡结果,均衡是帕累托有效和公平的。但是,真实的偏好并不一定是每个考生的均衡策略,达到均衡结果需要参与人之间的协调。使用文献中的Gale-Shapley学生最优机制,真实偏好是学生的优势策略,结果也是帕累托有效、公平的。本文介绍的录取机制,对于高考录取制度的改革提供了一种可行的思路。 相似文献
7.
本文分析了高考招生中考后知分报考录取机制下的志愿填报博弈。完全信息时这个显示偏好博弈只有唯一的纳什均衡结果,均衡是帕累托有效和公平的。但是,真实的偏好并不一定是每个考生的均衡策略,达到均衡结果需要参与人之间的协调。使用文献中的Gale-Shapley学生最优机制,真实偏好是学生的优势策略,结果也是帕累托有效、公平的。本文介绍的录取机制,对于高考录取制度的改革提供了一种可行的思路。 相似文献
8.
James Peck 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,109(2):283-299
We consider a market game with a continuum of consumers, where the measure of each type is stochastic. Nature selects the set of active consumers, who make bids and offers on ?−1 spot market trading posts. Existence of type-symmetric Nash equilibrium is proven. When facing price uncertainty, best responses are unique, and a Nash equilibrium to the sell-all game is typically not a Nash equilibrium to the original game. Under plausible circumstances, consumers strictly prefer to be on one side of the market. 相似文献
9.
A strong equilibrium is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy (SPoA) to be the ratio of the worst strong equilibrium to the social optimum. Differently from the Price of Anarchy (defined as the ratio of the worst Nash Equilibrium to the social optimum), it quantifies the loss incurred from the lack of a central designer in settings that allow for coordination.We study the SPoA in two settings, namely job scheduling and network creation. In the job scheduling game we show that for unrelated machines the SPoA can be bounded as a function of the number of machines and the size of the coalition. For the network creation game we show that the SPoA is at most 2. In both cases we show that a strong equilibrium always exists, except for a well defined subset of network creation games. 相似文献
10.
中国信贷市场匹配机制的再设计 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
我国的银行信贷市场呈现二元结构--目标客户与非目标客户信贷市场.两者有着不同的运行机制.目标客户信贷市场的议价过程存在一个类似企业"求婚"的递延接受程序,市场的运行结果稳定.非目标客户信贷市场不存在导致稳定结果的分散化匹配程序,市场广度和深度不够.为提高非目标客户信贷市场的稳定性和运行效率,我们建议通过公布银行信贷方案、设立非目标客户信贷中心、设立中央化的匹配清算所等,把分散化的议价过程变成中央化的匹配程序,从而完善和降低中小企业的交易成本,为中小企业的发展拓展广阔空间. 相似文献
11.
《Research in Economics》2017,71(1):43-50
Feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) play a central role in constructing social choice functions which have the following property: in the associated game form, for any preference profile there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondences resulting from applying feasible elimination procedures. The axioms are anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking. We also show that these axioms are logically independent. 相似文献
12.
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm. 相似文献
13.
《Ricerche Economiche》1993,47(4):363-383
This paper deals with the Walrasian property of Nash and strong equilibria of a specific strategic market game which refers to a pure exchange economy involving purely indivisible commodities and no money. The game is of sealed-bid auction type and it is shown that any Nash equilibrium at which no agent is in status quo is a strong equilibrium and implements a Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, it appears that two modifications of the game's rules ensure that any strong equilibrium outcome is Walrasian. These results are identical to those obtained by Svensson for markets involving purely indivisible goods and money. 相似文献
14.
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality 总被引:41,自引:0,他引:41
Eric Maskin 《The Review of economic studies》1999,66(1):23-38
If A is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals' preferences over A , where the subset is interpreted as the set of "welfare optima". A game form (or "mechanism") implements the social choice rule if, for any potential profile of preferences, (i) any welfare optimum can arise as a Nash equilibrium of the game form (implying, in particular, that a Nash equilibrium exists) and, (ii) all Nash equilibria are welfare optimal. The main result of this paper establishes that any SCR that satisfies two properties—monotonicity and no veto power—can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals. The proof is constructive. 相似文献
15.
本文利用完全信息混合战略动态博弈方法对中国城镇住房市场销售者与购买者交易过程进行博弈分析。根据精炼纳什均衡解,在销售者预期市场条件不变的情况下,住房最优定价由销售者交易时间贴现因子决定,且与贴现因子呈反向变化关系;在预期市场条件变化情况下,最优定价由贴现因子与市场条件变动系数共同决定。 相似文献
16.
A matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers, differing only in their reservation price, is analyzed. No subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies. We demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the good with large probability, even as friction becomes negligible. We investigate the relationship between the use of Nash and sequential bargaining. Nash bargaining seems applicable only when the sequential approach yields a unique stationary strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. 相似文献
17.
We study equilibrium and maximin play in supergames consisting of the sequential play of a finite collection of stage games, where each stage game has two outcomes for each player. We show that for two-player supergames in which each stage game is strictly competitive, in any Nash equilibrium of the supergame, play at each stage is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game provided preferences over certain supergame outcomes satisfy a natural monotonicity condition. In particular, equilibrium play does not depend on risk attitudes. We establish an invariance result for games with more than two players when the solution concept is subgame perfection. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C9. 相似文献
18.
On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar 《Economic Theory》1995,5(1):19-32
Summary The paper analyses the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in price competition (or Bertrand equilibrium) in a homogeneous product market when costs are strictly convex and proves that if output is demand determined such equilibrium always exists. This paper also characterises such equilibria and shows that if firms are identical such equilibria are necessarily non-unique. However for firms with asymmetric costs it can be unique or non-unique.I am greatly indebted to Anjan Mukherji and Kunal Sengupta for this paper. I also express my profound gratitude to a referee of this journal for a very helpful set of suggestions. 相似文献
19.
Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk–Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were matched in a two-population protocol with the same bimatrix, they showed clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the game. These findings support distinctive predictions of evolutionary game theory. 相似文献
20.
《Games and Economic Behavior》2013,77(2):355-374
We consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers (the cartel–fringe game à la Salant, 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe firms becomes arbitrarily large, the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop Nash game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop cartel–fringe game. Thus, the outcome of the cartel–fringe open-loop equilibrium can be supported as an outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. However the interpretation of the cartel–fringe model, where from the outset the fringe is assumed to be price taker, as a limit case of an asymmetric oligopoly with the agents playing Nash–Cournot, does not extend to the case where firms can use closed-loop strategies. 相似文献