Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games

Summary. The paper explores a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents from an infinite population stochastically adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. Instead of playing perturbed best-response, it is assumed that agents follow a rule of ‘switching to better strategies with higher probability’. This behavioral rule is related to bounded-rationality models of Rosenthal (1989) and Schlag (1998). Moreover, agents stay with their strategy in case they successfully coordinate with their local neighbors. Our main results show that both strict Nash equilibria of the coordination game correspond to invariant distributions of the process, hence evolution of play is not ergodic but instead depends on initial conditions. However, coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium occurs with probability one whenever the initial fraction contains infinitely many agents, independent of the spatial distribution of these agents. Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: June 21, 2001     

Competition and coordination in experimental minority games

This work presents experimental results on a coordination game in which agents must repeatedly choose between two sides, and a positive fixed payoff is assigned only to agents who pick the minoritarian side. We conduct laboratory experiments in which stationary groups of five players play the game for 100 periods, and manipulate two treatment variables: the amount of information about other players’ past choices and the salience of information regarding the game history (i.e., the length of the string of past outcomes that players can see on the screen while choosing). Our main findings can be summarized as follows: aggregate efficiency in the game is in most cases significantly higher than the level corresponding to the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, providing players with information about individual choices in the group does not improve aggregate efficiency with respect to when such information is absent. Displaying information about more rounds than just the previous one, on the other hand, seems to have a positive effect on aggregate efficiency. At the individual level, we find a stronger statistical relation between players’ current choices and their own past choices than between players’ choices and previous aggregate outcomes. In addition, the depth of the relation between present and past choices seems to be affected by the prompt availability of information about the game history. Finally, we detect evidence of a mutual co-adaptation between players’ choices over time that is partly responsible for the high level of efficiency observed.      

Advances in evolution and genetics: Implications for technology strategy

Genetic and evolutionary principles are of great importance to technology strategists, both directly (as in the forecasting of genetic engineering technologies) and as a source of metaphor and perspective on socio-technical change. Recent rapid progress in the molecular sciences have revealed new genetic mechanisms of evolution, and introduced new controversies of interpretation. How do these recent developments affect technology forecasting and our view of technological evolution? This paper provides a quick primer for TFSC readers on several new developments in evolution and genetics, comments upon a number of common misconceptions and pitfalls in evolutionary thinking, and critically describes some controversies and open questions, introducing key readings and sources. It relates genetic and evolutionary knowledge, analogies and metaphors to areas of interest to researchers in technology forecasting and assessment, noting possible future directions. The paper concludes with an overview of the other papers in this special section.     

Voice matters in a dictator game

We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’ anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator’s offer increases as the recipient’s request increases. Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient’s request.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

The powerless yet relevant third: a three-player ultimatum/dictator game with earned funds and roles

We report the first experiment to pair a three-player ultimatum/dictator game with a real effort task. The inclusion of the real effort task shifts the standard for division from simple egalitarianism towards relative performance; even in treatments in which roles and funds are exogenous. Additionally, we find proposers overcompensate themselves relative to their effort, and this additional compensation comes at the expense of powerless (third) players. Individual characteristics predict the nature of a proposals. Lastly, we find that responders’ choice to accept is based on their own and the powerless third party’s compensation.     

Moral self-licencing and social dilemmas: an experimental analysis from a taking game in Madagascar

This article explores whether previous good deeds may license antisocial behaviour, such as appropriating a social surplus for private benefits, in a developing country context, namely Madagascar. We design a two-step framed experiment, with one control treatment (a neutral task) and three test treatments (tasks enabling subjects to earn moral credits in three different ways), followed by a taking game in which subjects are given the opportunity to take an amount from a fund allocated to their University. On average, we find that participants in the three licencing conditions appropriate more than those in the control group and that further differences emerge according to the way the moral credits have been earned.     

Altruistic behavior in a representative dictator experiment

We conduct a representative dictator game in which students and random members of the community choose both what charity to support and how much to donate to the charity. We find systematic differences between the choices of students and community members. Community members are much more likely to write in their own charity, community members donate significantly more ($17), on average, and community members are much more likely (32%) to donate the entire $100 endowment. Based on this evidence, it does not appear that student behavior is very representative in the context of the charitable donations and the dictator game.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

The minority ethic: Rethinking religious denominations,minority status,and educational achievement across the globe

We test whether major religious denominations correlate with education in a uniform way across the world and the extent to which minority status contributes to the correlation. Using individual data from the World Values Survey for 77 countries, we first find that no denomination is consistently associated with education and, in fact, for each denomination we study there are countries where its correlation with education is significantly positive, significantly negative, or statistically insignificant. To explain this unexpected result, we relate our first finding to minority status and find that denominations that are a minority in a given country positively correlate with the level of education of their followers in that country. Both findings uphold a series of robustness checks, including changing the definition of minority religions, excluding outliers, and changing the measure of education.     

A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game

To any assignment market we associate the unique exact assignment game defined on the same set of agents and with a core that is a translation of the core of the initial market. As it happens with the core, the kernel and the nucleolus of an assignment game are proved to be the translation of the kernel and the nucleolus of its related exact assignment game by the vector of minimum core payoffs. Agents on each side of the market are classified by means of an equivalence relation and, when agents on the same class are ordered to be consecutive, the related exact assignment market is defined by a partitioned matrix, each block of the partition being a glove market.     

A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis

In this paper, we examine which auction format, first-price or second-price, a seller will choose when he can profitably cheat in a second price auction by observing all bids by possible buyers and submitting a shill bid as pretending to be a buyer. We model this choice of auction format in seller cheating as a signaling game in which the buyers may regard the selection of a second price auction by the seller as a signal that he is a shill bidder. By introducing trembling-hand perfectness as a refinement of signaling equilibrium, we find two possible strictly perfect signaling equilibria. One is a separating equilibrium in which a noncheating honest seller selects a first price auction and a cheating seller does a second price auction. In another pooling equilibrium, however, both cheating and non-cheating sellers select a second price auction. The conclusion that a seller chooses a second price auction even if he cannot cheat is in contrast to the previous literature, which focused on the case of independent values. We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments that have improved the paper. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) 15310023 and (C) 18530139.     

Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies

The Malthusian theory of evolution disregards a pervasive fact about human societies: they expand through conflict. When this is taken account of the long-run favors not a large population at the level of subsistence, nor yet institutions that maximize welfare or per capita output, but rather institutions that generate large amount of free resources and direct these towards state power. Free resources are the output available to society after deducting the payments necessary for subsistence and for the incentives needed to induce production, and the other claims to production such as transfer payments and resources absorbed by elites. We develop the evolutionary underpinnings of this model, and examine the implications for the evolution of societies in several applications. Since free resources are increasing both in per capita income and population, evolution will favor large rich societies. We will show how technological improvement can increase or decrease per capita output as well as increasing population.     

A spectrum of equilibration processes in game theory

In game theory, four dynamic processes converging towards an equilibrium are distinguished and ordered by way of agents' decreasing cognitive capacities. In the eductive process, each player has enough information to simulate perfectly the others' behavior and gets immediately to the equilibrium. In epistemic learning, each player updates his beliefs about others' future strategies, with regard to their sequentially observed actions. In behavioral learning, each player modifies his own strategies according to the observed payoffs obtained from his past actions. In the evolutionary process, each agent has a fixed strategy and reproduces in proportion to the utilities obtained through stochastic interactions. All along the spectrum, longer term dynamics makes up for weaker rationality, and physical relations substitute for mental interactions. Convergence, if any, is towards an always stronger equilibrium notion and selection of an equilibrium state becomes more sensitive to context and history. The processes can be mixed if associated to different periods, agents or mechanisms and deepened if obtained by formal reasoning principles.     

进一步加强民族地区旅游业人才队伍建设的探讨

最近中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅印发《关于进一步加强西部地区人才队伍建设意见》的文件,进一步强调了西部地区人才队伍建设的重要性。本文在分析民族地区旅游业人才建设现状的基础上,提出要科学制定适合民族地区旅游人才建设的战略规划、提高旅游人才队伍素质和能力、建立考核制度和激励机制、建立防止人才流失机制等解决措施,对进一步加强我国民族地区旅游人才队伍建设有一定的指导意义。     

Cross-national and cross-industrial comparison of two strategy approaches for global industrial evolution

This research focuses on analyzing the two prime science and technology (S&T) strategy approaches for industrial evolution based on the concept of S&T gap, namely, the optimist and pragmatist approaches. Particularly, the cases of global IC, pharmaceutical, and computer industries, are used to make cross-national and cross-industrial comparison of these two approaches. The optimist approach is developed based on the product life cycle theory which envisions technology transcending everyday limitations. With this perspective, market demand is the most critical factor in selecting the S&T strategy approaches. The pragmatist approach is formed based on the new trade theory which recognizes the power of science and technology but seeks to fit it into structures that already exist, and government must manage resources pouring into science and technology. Case studies of global IC, pharmaceutical, and computer industries during the 2nd half of the 20th century are used as research targets to reflect policy impacts on the technological evolution. The results of this study reveal that, strategy approaches have to be adapted and turned to the specific stage, technology level, and market segment that have been selected for intervention. This result of comparison also offers the criteria of strategy selection for developing different industry based on distinct national base.     

Cheating in markets: A laboratory experiment

We develop a two-market model under three conditions: autarky, frictionless free trade, and free trade with cheating. With cheating, buyers can underpay by π% in cross-market trades and sellers can deliver π% of full value. We solve for competitive equilibrium with cheating and obtain novel testable predictions on price, volume and surplus. We test these in a laboratory experiment using parameters intended to challenge the theory. The results are generally consistent with competitive equilibrium. We find evidence of price unification, market segmentation, a cross-market volume of trade lower under cheating than in frictionless free trade, but a higher overall volume.     

Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: An experimental study

We experimentally investigate if free information disadvantages a player relative to when information is unavailable. We study an Ultimatum game where the Proposer, before making an offer, can obtain free information about the Responder's minimum acceptable offer. Theoretically, the Proposer should obtain the information and play a best reply to the Responder's minimum acceptable offer. Thus the Responder should get the largest share of the surplus. We find that an increasing number of Proposers become informed over time. Moreover, the proportion of Proposers who use the information to maximize money earnings increases over time. The majority of information-acquiring Proposers, however, refuse to offer more than one-half and play a best reply only to Responders who accept offers of one-half or less. This, together with a substantial proportion of Proposers who choose to remain uninformed, means that the availability of free information backfires for Proposers only by a little. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C70, D63, D80     

高等学校实施专利战略的重要性及保护策略

高校专利战略是高校发展进程中面临的一个重要问题。指出高校当前存在专利战略意识较淡薄、专利管理制度不健全、激励机制不够完善、专利技术转化率不高等问题,论述了高校专利战略的重要性,提出从构筑严密外围专利网、加强专利管理、搭建专利转化平台、加大对专利的资金投入、鼓励风险投资参与高校专利技术转化5个方面制定专利保护策略,促进高等学校专利战略的全面实施,进而提升高校的竞争力。     

The brief history of game theory and the dissemination in China

After the year of 1944, Von Neumann and Morgenstem published the book ＂Theory of Games and Economic Behavior＂, the game theory had gradually become an emerging discipline. At present, game theory has already penetrated to every industry and widespread application in economy, politics and military and so on. The paper introduces the history and the developed situation of game theory about the foreign and domestic state.     

Positive versus negative incentives for loan repayment in microfinance: A game theory approach

In most of the methodologies used so far by microfinance institutions, negative incentives are predominant, which can contrast with these institutions’ social mission. This paper investigates whether the microfinance industry could benefit from using more positive incentives. The main results of our game model are twofold. First, (positive or negative) incentives increase “on‐time” repayments. Second, the client is more likely to repay her loan with the encouragement of a bonus scheme rather than under the pressure of a sanction, regardless of the amount. This paper therefore argues for the increased use of positive incentives in the industry.