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1.
In this paper we analyze an adverse selection model with one principal and one agent, who are both risk neutral and have private information. We assume that the private information of the principal is correlated with that of the agent. The main result of the paper is that the principal can extract a larger share of the surplus from the agent than in the case where her information is public. The principal can design such a contract because she exploits the fact that her type is an informative signal on the agent's one. We fully characterize the equilibrium of the game in which different types of principal offer the same menu of contracts that leaves the agent uninformed about the principal's type. This gives more freedom to the principal when setting the transfers because the agent's constraints need to hold only at an interim stage. 相似文献
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The prevalent term “auction fever” visualizes that ascending auctions – inconsistent with theory – are likely to provoke higher bids than one-shot auctions. To explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally, we design four different strategy-proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo-endowment effect arguments (psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept). Observed revenues in the experiment in the four formats rank as expected if bidders have private uncertain values (the private information of a bidder is the distribution of her value). A control treatment supports our view that the traditional private certain values approach prevents auction fever in the laboratory. Another control treatment with a procurement auction relates the auction fever bids to bids in a one-shot auction with real endowments. We conclude that, when bidders are uncertain about their valuations, auctions that foster pseudo-endowment may raise bids and revenues. 相似文献
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We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments. An example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible. Equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed. 相似文献
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Katsuhiko Nishizaki 《Research in Economics》2018,72(3):379-383
This paper studies secure implementability (Saijo et al. (2007) “Secure Implementation,” Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203–229) in linear production economies with classical preferences. Although secure implementability is in general stronger than the combination of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) “Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points,” Review of Economic Studies 48, pp.587–597), this paper shows that both properties are equivalent under Pareto-efficient rules in the economies. In addition, this paper characterizes securely implementable and Pareto-efficient rules in the economies when the number of agents is two. 相似文献
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We study the performance of the English auction under different assumptions about the seller's degree of “Bayesian sophistication.” We define the effectiveness of an auction as the ratio between the expected revenue it generates for the seller and the expected valuation of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation (total surplus). We identify tight lower bounds on the effectiveness of the English auction for general private-values environments, and for private-values environments where bidders' valuations are non-negatively correlated. For example, when the seller faces 12 bidders who the seller believes have non-negatively correlated valuations whose expectations are at least as high as 60% of the maximal possible valuation, an English auction with no reserve price generates an expected price that is more than 80% of the value of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation. 相似文献
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Timothy N. Cason Tatsuyoshi Saijo Tomas Sjstrm Takehiko Yamato 《Games and Economic Behavior》2006,57(2):206-235
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo, Sjöström and Yamato [Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., Yamato, T., 2003. Secure implementation: Strategy-proof mechanisms reconsidered. Working paper 4-03-1. Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University] argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria other than dominant strategy equilibria. For only a subset of strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked. We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms. One of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium. We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two. 相似文献
7.
We study the effects of the recent economic crisis on firms׳ bidding behavior and markups in sealed bid auctions. Using data from Austrian construction procurements, we estimate bidders׳ construction costs within a private value auction model. We find that markups of all bids submitted decrease by 1.5 percentage points in the recent economic crisis, markups of winning bids decrease by 3.3 percentage points. We also find that without the government stimulus package this decrease would have been larger. These two pieces of evidence point to pro-cyclical markups. 相似文献
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We study a private-values buyer–seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way. 相似文献
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随着全球次级债危机日渐严重和中国经济持续高速增长,中国作为新兴经济体所孕育的私募股权投资市场,对于全球资本正显示出越来越大的吸引力。私募基金在我国并不是新鲜事物,但由于诸多不规范操作,一直行走在灰色地带。私募基金的特性决定其具有很大发展空间,但也存在很大风险,积极探索私募股权市场的构建模式,有利于经济持续健康发展。 相似文献
12.
Tadashi Sekiguchi 《Games and Economic Behavior》2002,40(2):382
We consider finitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, and provide several sufficient conditions for such a game to have an equilibrium whose outcome is different from repetition of Nash equilibria of the stage game. Surprisingly, the conditions are consistent with uniqueness of the stage game equilibrium. A class of repeated chicken is shown to satisfy the condition. 相似文献
14.
私募基金是相对于公募的共同基金而言的一种基金类型,这种基金属于一种合伙人制的小型私人投资公司,主要投资于公开交易的证券和衍生金融产品,是一种高风线的投机基金。随着证券市场改革的深入,私募基金面临的环境发生了重大变换,本文从研究美国私募基金运作机制入手,探讨适合中国私募基金运作的机制,以规范和发展我国的私募基金。 相似文献
15.
Jonathan L. Burke 《Economics Letters》1996,50(3):349-354
We generally establish equilibrium asset prices than can include price bubbles yet (a) be robust to truncations of the economy and (b) exclude trade in non-consumables, like money, stock certificates, or land deeds. 相似文献
16.
We study bilateral matching under private information about agents' characteristics. Assortative matching is the only equilibrium outcome in the absence of private information. When an information friction is present, the matching process can be improved if a payoff-irrelevant variable which we term “fashion” is introduced. Informed agents choose to adopt fashion as a signaling device. If success in matching is observed, other agents can imitate the signal. Thus, for fashion to be useful, it must constantly change. If there are more than two types of agents, both “high” and “low” fashion are needed to facilitate assortative matching. 相似文献
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How do middle-aged children allocate time and money transfers to their older parents in Europe? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Eric Bonsang 《Empirica》2007,34(2):171-188
This paper analyses the determinants of financial and time transfers from adult children to their older parents using the
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). It is the first survey containing rich comparable interdisciplinary
information about individuals aged 50+ from ten European countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland). The first part of the paper highlights the differences in the provision of upward
private intergenerational transfers (in terms of both time and money) across the ten European countries. The second part describes
the different determinants in the decision to provide time or money transfers to parents and evaluates whether these two types
of assistance are substitutes or complements. Results highlight the existence of a substitution between time and money in
relation to geographical distance and the existence of a weak substitution regarding the employment status of the middle-aged
children.
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Eric BonsangEmail: |
20.
In the context of a seller with private information about product quality, I show that revelation of information on product quality is sometimes, but not always, socially valuable. When it is socially valuable, there is generally a tradeoff between the acquisition and revelation of finer, but more costly information and the revelation of coarser, but less costly information. As a result, it can be socially optimal for firms to reveal only coarse private information. 相似文献