Characterization of additive cost sharing methods

The set of additive cost sharing methods when individual demands are integer valued and cost shares are non negative is characterized by its extreme points and by a network flow representation. The extreme methods allocate costs incrementally along a chain of demand vectors independent of the cost function. The result generalizes Wang’s characterization in that we do not assume the Dummy axiom.     

Estimating the economic benefits of acidic rock drainage clean up using cost shares

This paper reports the results of a stated preference study that estimates the economic value for cleaning up acid rock drainage in Colorado's Snake River watershed. In contrast to much of the existing literature, the present study emphasizes benefit estimation for three implementing projects rather than benefit estimation for general changes in water quality or large scale water quality policy. The focus on implementing projects delivers information that is specifically relevant to current decisions being faced in the watershed. While valuation questions in most stated preference studies present costs that have no relation to actual project costs, this study presents a new cost share approach. Project costs are estimated and then valuation questions present different local cost shares to subjects. This approach facilitates stated cost variation necessary for estimating the mean of the distribution of project values without resorting to experimentally designed, fictitious stated costs. In addition to estimating the mean value, which facilitates benefit cost analysis, the study also provides median value estimates, which provide insights into the political feasibility of these projects. Study results suggest that local cost shares on the order of 20%-40%, depending on the project, are politically feasible.     

Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences

Every agent reports his willingness to pay for one unit of a good. A mechanism allocates goods and cost shares to some agents. We characterize the group strategyproof (GSP) mechanisms under two alternative continuity conditions interpreted as tie-breaking rules. With the maximalist rule (MAX) an indifferent agent is always served. With the minimalist rule (MIN) an indifferent agent does not get a unit of the good.GSP and MAX characterize the cross-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever symmetry is required. On the other hand, GSP and MIN characterize the sequential mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever there is scarcity of the good.Our results are independent of an underlying cost function; they unify and strengthen earlier results for particular classes of cost functions.     

On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information

A type structure is non-redundant if no two types of a player represent the same hierarchy of beliefs over the given set of basic uncertainties, and it is redundant otherwise. Under a mild necessary and sufficient condition termed separativity, we show that any redundant structure can be identified with a non-redundant structure with an extended space of basic uncertainties. The belief hierarchies induced by the latter structure, when “marginalized,” coincide with those induced by the former. We argue that redundant structures can provide different Bayesian equilibrium predictions only because they reflect a richer set of uncertainties entertained by players but unspecified by the analyst. The analyst shall make use of a non-redundant structure, unless he believes that he misspecified the players' space of basic uncertainties. We also consider bounding the extra uncertainties by the action space for Bayesian equilibrium predictions.     

Minimum cost spanning tree problems with indifferent agents

We consider an extension of minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems in which some agents do not need to be connected to the source, but might reduce the cost of others to do so. Even if the cost usually cannot be computed in polynomial time, we extend the characterization of the Kar solution (Kar, 2002) for classic mcst problems. It is obtained by adapting the Equal treatment property: if the cost of the edge between two agents changes, their cost shares are affected in the same manner if they have the same demand. If not, their changes are proportional to each other. We obtain a family of weighted Shapley values. Three interesting solutions in that family are characterized using stability, fairness and manipulation-proofness properties.     

产业网络环境下企业知识共享与保护的权衡机制

“知识”资源作为一项战略资源,在产业网络中发挥着关键的作用。产业网络环境下企业的知识共享与保护既有优势同时也面临着困境,一个核心的问题就是如何在知识的共享与保护之间寻求一种平衡。在产业网络环境下企业知识共享与保护的权衡机制应视产业网络中参与者之间的不同关系性质进行考虑并制定相应的策略。     

The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing

We compute the price of anarchy (PoA) of three familiar demand games, i.e., the smallest ratio of the equilibrium to efficient surplus, over all convex preferences quasi-linear in money. For any convex cost, the PoA is at least in the average and serial games, where n is the number of users. It is zero in the incremental game for piecewise linear cost functions. With quadratic costs, the PoA of the serial game is , and for the average and incremental games. This generalizes if the marginal cost is convex or concave, and its elasticity is bounded.      

Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games

We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games—FCG's) or arbitrarily (in General Connection Games—GCG's). We study the existence and quality of strong equilibria (SE)—strategy profiles from which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members—in these settings. We show that SE always exist in the following games: (1) Single source and sink FCG's and GCG's. (2) Single source multiple sinks FCG's and GCG's on series parallel graphs. (3) Multi source and sink FCG's on extension parallel graphs. As for the quality of the SE, in any FCG with n players, the cost of any SE is bounded by H(n) (i.e., the harmonic sum), contrasted with the Θ(n) price of anarchy. For any GCG, any SE is optimal.     

Influence of market-level and inter-firm differences in costs on product positioning and pricing

The objective of this article is to study the impact of differentiation and firm positioning on firm’s pricing decisions in a horizontally differentiated competitive market. We build a parsimonious game-theoretic model and analyse simultaneous entry of firms. The effect of differentiation is modelled as an additional cost incurred by both firms based on the degree of differentiation between the firms. The cost of positioning is modelled as a market level cost affecting both firms whereby firms incur a cost if they want to position themselves away from the centre of distribution of consumers. Our analysis provides some surprising results, explains some conflicting empirical observations documented in previous research and may also be useful for further empirical research in this area by providing sharper predictions about the impact of various types of costs on market outcomes. For example, we find that if the cost of positioning is sufficiently high, then a firm with lower cost of differentiation charges a higher price in equilibrium, even when no differences in exogenous costs exist. We also find that under some circumstances the cost disadvantaged firm can enjoy higher price-cost margins compared to the cost leader thereby suggesting that higher costs could be a blessing in disguise.     

以目标为导向的政府信息资源共享的研究

阐述了政府信息资源共享的内涵、中国政府信息资源共享存在的问题,对政府信息资源共享影响因素进行了分析,提出了以目标为导向的政府信息资源共享模式。     

A note on the energy-efficiency investments of an expected cost minimizer

This paper analyzes a consumer's choice between a high-efficiency and a low-efficiency version of an energy-using durable when the expected lifetimes of the two versions differ. A (small) difference in expected lifetimes may induce entirely different implications for the behavior of a cost minimizing consumer, as compared to the case with equal expected lifetimes. The result supplements the explanations for the extremely high discount rates that have been reported for energy efficiency investments. We also provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a reservation property, both in the case of deterministic and of random lifetimes.     

核心能力共享的逻辑

首先给出了核心能力共享的定义，继而从核心能力共享可行性的基础分析、学者对于核心能力共享的论述和企业共享实践等多方面论证了核心能力共享的逻辑，以期澄清人们对于核心能力共享的一些错误认识，为核心能力理论研究开拓新的视角和领域提供重要参考。     

共享经济下消费者信任形成机制的实证研究

基于传统的信任理论研究,考虑共享主体的个人特征,建立了共享经济下信任形成机制的基本框架。以房屋共享领域的小猪短租为实例,通过基于SPSS软件的相关分析和基于LISREL软件的路径分析,研究了共享主体的个人特征对信任形成机制的影响。得出如下结论:在线评分趋于同质性,不能有效决定共享信任;短租日记和预定历史显著相关,即房东参与积极性影响共享信任;被催促数与预定历史正相关,产品信息已不能满足消费者需求,共享主体个人特征才是影响信任形成的关键因素。     

The cost of labor adjustment: Inferences from the gap

This paper studies the aggregate implications of micro-level labor adjustment costs. Caballero and Engel [Caballero, R., Engel, E., 1993. Microeconomic adjustment hazards and aggregate dynamics. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 313–358] find a dependence of aggregate employment growth on the cross sectional distribution of “employment gaps.” This paper uses those results as moments in an indirect inference procedure to infer the underlying labor adjustment costs. We specify a dynamic optimization problem at the plant level, allowing for both convex and non-convex adjustment costs. Consistent with evidence at the micro level, our findings indicate that non-convex adjustment costs are necessary to match these aggregate moments.     

Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule

The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs “fairly” and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.     

论中国农村土地产权制度股份制改革

根据中国国有企业"股份制改革"以及农业"股份合作制改革"实践的分析,针对当前农村土地产权不明晰这一问题,应对农村土地产权制度"股份制改革",以探索中国传统农业向现代农业的市场化改革新的思路。     

对我国企业成本管理模式选择的探讨

当今的经济环境已经发生很大变化，世界范围内的竞争压力，服务产业的增长，以及信息和生产技术的进步已经改变了经济的性质，并引起众多企业经营经济业务的方式发生显著的改变。经济环境的变化同样催生和加速了新的成本管理模式的诞生，面对复杂的竞争环境，企业如何在传统的成本管理方式和新的成本管理模式之间进行取舍和过渡，已经成为大多数国内企业面临的重要课题、本文围绕我国企业如何建立和运作新的成本管理模式，在全面分析全面成本管理、作业成本管理和成本企画三种成本管理模式的特点和当前我国企业成本管理现状及存在的问题的基础上，提出了我国企业成本管理模式应该以作业成本核算与全面成本管理融合的成本管理新模式，从新的角度给出了问题的解决思路。     

Multi-dimensional risk and the cost of business cycles

This paper analyzes the welfare costs of business cycles when workers face uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income risk. In accordance with the previous literature, this paper decomposes labor income risk into an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component, but in contrast to the previous literature, this paper allows for multiple sources of idiosyncratic labor income risk. Using the multi-dimensional approach to idiosyncratic risk, this paper provides a general characterization of the welfare cost of business cycles when preferences and the (marginal) process of individual labor income in the economy with business cycles are given. The general analysis shows that the introduction of multiple sources of idiosyncratic risk never decreases the cost of business cycles, and strictly increases it if there are cyclical fluctuations across the different sources of risk. This paper also provides a quantitative analysis based on a version of the model that is calibrated to match US labor market data. The quantitative analysis suggests that realistic variations across two particular dimensions of idiosyncratic labor income risk increase the welfare cost of business cycles by a substantial amount.     

战略联盟中的知识共享研究

知识经济时代的到来,知识将取代资本成为重要的资源。本文主要对战略联盟中知识共享(Knowledge Sharing)进行了模型论证,得到了当企业认为合作而获得联盟租金及学习剩余所付的边际成本和为此得到的边际收益相等时,企业不但愿意联合,而且所获得的收益最大的结论;对知识共享策略进行了博弈模型分析,指出企业应该如何进行知识共享,其结论将对企业正确探索战略发展方向提供理论依据。