Incentives in decentralized random matching markets

Decentralized markets are modeled by means of a sequential game where, starting from any matching situation, firms are randomly given the opportunity to make job offers. In this random context, we prove the existence of ordinal subgame perfect equilibria where firms act according to a list of preferences. Moreover, every such equilibrium preserves stability for a particular profile of preferences. In particular, when firms best reply by acting truthfully, every equilibrium outcome is stable for the true preferences. Conversely, when the initial matching is the empty matching, every stable matching can be reached as the outcome of an ordinal equilibrium play of the game.     

Preemptive entry in differentiated product markets

Summary. Models of spatial competition are typically static, and exhibit multiple free-entry equilibria. Incumbent firms can earn rents in equilibrium because any potential entrant expects a significantly lower market share (since it must fit into a niche between incumbent firms) along with fiercer price competition. Previous research has usually concentrated on the zero-profit equilibrium, at which there is normally excessive entry, and so an entry tax would improve the allocation of resources. At the other extreme, the equilibrium with the greatest rent per firm normally entails insufficient entry, so an entry subsidy should be prescribed. A model of sequential firm entry (with an exogenous order of moves) resolves the multiplicity problem but raises a new difficulty: firms that enter earlier can expect higher spatial rents, and so firms prefer to be earlier in the entry order. This tension disappears when firms can compete for entry positions. We therefore suppose that firms can commit capital early to the market in order to lay claim to a particular location. This temporal competition dissipates spatial rents in equilibrium and justifies the sequential move structure. However, the policy implications are quite different once time is introduced. An atemporal analysis of the sequential entry process would prescribe an entry subsidy, but once proper account is taken of the entry dynamics, a tax may be preferable. Received: April 26, 1999; revised version: September 22, 1999     

Stability,sequential rationality,and subgame consistency

In this paper we analyze dynamic strategic behavior by means of the idea of "stability." We develop a solution concept of "sequentially stable equilibrium (SSE)" that satisfies subgame consistency. All SSEs are characterized by the largest stable set that yields exactly all the backward induction outcomes. We also provide a refinement of the SSE. We compare the SSE and its refinement with some existing solution concepts in the literature We are grateful to the editor and two anonymous referees for very useful comments and suggestions that led to this revision. We thank Chih Chang, Yi-Chun Chen, Chenying Huang, Huiwen Koo, Man-Chung Ng, Shyh-fang Ueng, and Chun-Hsien Yeh for helpful comments and discussions. We also thank participants in seminars at Academia Sinica, National Dong Hwa University, and the Third Pan-Pacific Game Theory Conference. Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), the National Science Council of Taiwan, and the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Inducing liquidity in thin financial markets through combined-value trading mechanisms

Asset pricing theory hypothesizes that investors are only interested in portfolios; individual securities are evaluated only in terms of their contribution to portfolio risk and return. Yet, standard financial market design is that of parallel, unconnected markets, whereby investors cannot submit orders in one market conditional on events in others. When markets are thin, this exposes them to substantial execution risk. Fear of ending up with unbalanced portfolios after trading may even keep investors from submitting orders, further eroding liquidity and the ability of markets to equilibrate. The suggested solution is a portfolio trading mechanism referred to as combined-value trading (CVT). Investors are allowed to submit orders for packages of securities and the system matches trades and computes prices by optimally combining portfolio orders in an open book. We study the performance of the CVT mechanism experimentally and compare it to the performance of parallel, unconnected double auctions in experiments with similar parametrization and either a similar number of subjects or substantially thicker markets. We present evidence that our portfolio trading mechanism facilitates equilibration to the extent that the thicker markets do. Inspection of order submission and trade activity reveals that subjects manage to exploit the direct linkages between markets enabled by the CVT system.     

Communication in financial markets with several informed traders

This paper investigates the incentives for informed traders in financial markets to reveal their information truthfully to the public. In the model, a subset of traders receive noisy signals about the value of a risky asset. The signals are composed of a directional component (“high” vs. “low”) as well as a precision component that represents the quality of the directional component. Between trading periods, the informed agents make public announcements to the uninformed traders. With a sufficiently large number of informed traders, an equilibrium exists in which the directional components are credibly revealed, but not the precision components. Even though the informed traders retain some of their rivate information, the post-communication estimate of the asset value converges in probability to the full-information estimate as the number of informed traders increases. The paper is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Western Ontario and was circulated previously under the title “Public Communication Devices in Financial Markets.” I thank my dissertation committee Arthur Robson, Hari Govindan, and Al Slivinski for their guidance and support. I also thank Murali Agastya, Roland Benabou, Philippe Grégoire, Rick Harbaugh, Mike Peters, an anonymous referee and an associate editor, and seminar participants at various universities and conferences at which this paper was presented.     

Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations—The anonymous case

This paper addresses the question of multi-party computation in a model with asymmetric information. Each agent has a private value (secret), but in contrast to standard models, the agent incurs a cost when retrieving the secret. There is a social choice function the agents would like to compute and implement. All agents would like to perform a joint computation, which input is their vector of secrets. However, agents would like to free-ride on others' contribution.A mechanism which elicits players' secrets and performs the desired computation defines a game. A mechanism is ‘appropriate’ if it (weakly) implements the social choice function for all secret vectors. namely, if there exists an equilibrium in which it is able to elicit (sufficiently many) agents' secrets and perform the computation, for all possible secret vectors. We show that ‘appropriate’ mechanisms approach agents sequentially and that they have low communication complexity.     

Dynamic yardstick mechanisms

This paper shows that the inability of principals to commit to long-term contracts is irrelevant when dealing with several agents whose private information is correlated. This sharply contrasts with the dynamics of contracting without such correlation. The paper also explores what limitations on yardstick mechanisms can justify the use of long-term contracts. We found that the inability of a principal to commit not to renegotiate long-term contracts is without consequence even if there is a bound on transfers that an agent can be asked to pay. In contrast, short-term contracting fails to implement the commitment solution with constraints on transfers. Second, absent current yardstick, the possibility of using correlated mechanisms in the future allows the principal to implement the first-best with a renegotiation-proof long-term contract whereas this cannot be achieved with short-term contracting.     

A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure

Summary. For a two-sided multipartner matching model where agents are given by path-independent choice functions and no quota restrictions, Blair [7] had shown that stable matchings always exist and form a lattice. However, the lattice operations were not simple and not distributive. Recently Alkan [3] showed that if one introduces quotas together with a monotonicity condition then the set of stable matchings is a distributive lattice under a natural definition of supremum and infimum for matchings. In this study we show that the quota restriction can be removed and replaced by a more general condition named cardinal monotonicity and all the structural properties derived in [3] still hold. In particular, although there are no exogenous quotas in the model there is endogenously a sort of quota; more precisely, each agent has the same number of partners in every stable matching. Stable matchings also have the polarity property (supremum with respect to one side is identical to infimum with respect to the other side) and a property we call {\it complementarity}. Received: May 5, 2000; revised version: January 25, 2001     

Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources

A number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents. Agents have linear utility in money. The designer wants to assign objects to agents that possess specific traits, but the allocation can only be conditioned on the willingness to pay and on observable characteristics. I solve for the optimal mechanism. The choice between market or non-market mechanisms depends on the statistical linkage between characteristics valued by the designer and willingness to pay.     

Statistical tests for the universality of youth employment mechanisms in segmented labour markets

Patterns of youth employment among manual workers by sex in 47 industrial sectors in the six leading EEC economies in three years (1966, 1972 and 1978) are analysed statistically with a model which relates youth employment share to two aspects of national pay structures: the degree of labour market segmentation (indicated by pay dispersion for adult employees of the same sex) and the importance of wage for age rules (indicated by youth relative pay). Each pay variable proves influential, with the partial exception of female relative pay. Tests for similarity of pay coefficients across countries and time lead to the rejection of both a universal relationship and the national dichotomy in the relative pay relationship which was suggested by earlier results. At the same time, as the economic importance of differences in pay coefficients by country is secondary, major differences between countries in outcomes in the youth labour market arise more from the attributes of national payment systems than from the parameters of employment share functions.     

Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we characterize the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Second, we identify the Pareto undominated subset in the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. These characterizations can be interpreted as envy-free selections of Groves mechanisms.JEL Classification Numbers C72, D63, D71, D82I would like to thank Jun Matsuyama, Hervé Moulin, Satoko Okuyama, Takehiko Yamato, Naoki Yoshihara, an associate editor, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Rice University and Tokyo Institute of Technology for helpful suggestions and detailed comments. Research was partially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research 17730126 of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in Japan.     

A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations

Summary. We present a family of mechanisms which implement Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibrium. With quasilinear utility functions this family of mechanisms are supermodular games, which implies that they converge to Nash equilibrium under a wide class of learning dynamics. Received: April 27, 2000; revised version: January 16, 2001     

A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms

Summary. A mechanism that is both efficient and incentive compatible in the Bayesian-Nash sense is shown to be payoff-equivalent to a Groves mechanism at the point in time when each agent has just acquired his private information. This equivalence result simplifies the question of whether or not an efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism can satisfy other desired objectives, for the search for an appropriate mechanism can be restricted to the family of Groves mechanisms. The method is used to extend the result of Myerson and Satterthwaite on the inefficiency of bilateral bargaining to a multilateral setting. Received: June 30, 1997; revised version: May 22, 1998     

Temporal and thermodynamic irreversibility in production theory

Summary. The two notions of temporal and thermodynamic irreversibility are distinguished. It is shown that the irreversibility concept of Arrow-Debreu, while establishing temporal irreversibility, does not encompass thermodynamic irreversibility. This means, the standard irreversibility concept of production theory is too weak to be in full accordance with the laws of nature.Received: 8 October 2001, Revised: 5 April 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D20,D51,D92.For helpful comments and discussion I am grateful to Malte Faber, Andreas Lange, Martin Quaas, Armin Schmutzler and seminar participants at Berkeley, Il Ciocco, Delft, Strasbourg and Rethymno.     

Networks in markets and the propensity of companies to collaborate: An empirical test of three mechanisms

We propose and test hypotheses about three endogenous mechanisms that may be driving the observed network structure of producers’ markets. We use data that we have collected on collaborative network ties among producers. Estimates of Exponential Random Graphs Models (ERGM) support our hypotheses.     

Tracing emerging irreversibilities in emerging technologies: The case of nanotubes

This paper contributes to the development of methods for mapping and understanding the dynamics of emerging technologies. Our key concept is the notion of irreversibilities that emerge in the ongoing activities of researchers, institutes, policy makers and firms. Emerging irreversibilities denote the first socio-cognitive patterns that decrease the fluidity and openness, and that, eventually constrain and enable future activities. To trace the emerging irreversibilities we focus on the dynamics of expectations and the agenda building processes. A three-level framework is presented to analyse and visualise the dynamics in three interrelated contexts: the level of the research groups, the technological field and the society. This three-level framework allows the analyst to study different perspectives of a specific case and at the same time retain overview of the situation. By applying it to a particular application in nanotechnology, we will show that it is possible to trace the emerged irreversibilities. To conclude, we will discuss how the analysis of early dynamics is a vital ingredient of technology assessment studies that, indirectly (by means of the involved actors), seeks to influence the technological development at stake. By placing the constructive technology assessment (CTA) approach in a historical perspective of technology assessment, we will show the relevance of our method for CTA studies.     

Incentive mechanisms for cost revelation with intermodal competition

To set regulated utility prices that are sustainable against uneconomic bypass alternatives, regulators must estimate the costs of the alternative bypass technologies; this entails a series of theoretical and institutional problems that regulators cannot practically resolve. This paper now develops a simple incentive mechanism that effectively solves those problems associated with producing an optimal amount of bypass. In the suggested procedure, regulators use readily available accounting data to specify one two-part tariff that covers the utility's revenue requirements and is deemed fair by regulators and consumers; as long as it offers this fair tariff, the company may subsequently offer as many alternative tariffs as it sees fit, including some particularly aimed to deter bypass. This procedure gives a utility the correct incentive to determine its own and its rivals' cost structures; with accurate cost information, the utility will design a menu of tariffs that would eliminate uneconomic bypass and would be responsive to changing cost conditions in the emerging bypass markets.     

Finite allocation mechanisms: approximate Walrasian versus approximate Direct Revelation

Summary. This paper obtains finite counterparts of previous results that showed the informational efficiency of the Walrasian mechanism among all mechanisms yielding Pareto-optimal individually rational trades in exchange economies while using a continuum of possible messages. In particular, we develop finite counterparts of the superiority, with respect to message-space dimension, of the Walrasian mechanism over Direct Revelation (DR). We measure a finite mechanism's cost by the number of its (equilibrium) messages. Our two main results are as follows: (1) For exchange economies we find that the overall (maximum) error of a (sufficiently fine) approximate Walrasian mechanism is less than the overall error of a not-more-costly approximate DR mechanism whose equilibrium outcomes are trades that are (approximately) Pareto optimal and individually rational; more generally, approximate Walrasian mechanisms are superior, in the same sense, to approximations of any continuum mechanism whose outcomes are Pareto optimal individ ually rational trades and whose message space has higher dimension than that of the Walrasian mechanism. (2) As we increase without limit the dimension of the set of environments (characteristics) defining our class of exchange economies, the extra cost of DR approximations relative to Walrasian approximations, when both achieve the same overall error, also grows without limit. Thus the informational superiority of the Walrasian mechanism emerges again when we approximate it and take the finite number of messages in the approximation as our cost measure. Received: June 16, 2002; revised version: July 22, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The second author is grateful for support from National Science Foundation grant #IIS-0118600. Correspondence to: T. Marschak     

Getting post-M&A integration mechanisms tuned in to technological relatedness and innovation synergy realisation

Studies on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) typically relate innovation synergies to either context characteristics or post-M&A integration. There is little research on how to tune the relevant practices to the benefit of realising specific innovation synergies. It is the purpose of this paper to develop a conceptual framework on innovation synergy realisation in large M&As, that relates the following components: (1) strategic M&A characteristics; and (2) post-M&A integration mechanisms; to (3) innovation synergy realisation. The research explored how different innovation synergies were achieved in nine large medium-tech and high-tech M&As in the life sciences. From this case studies research, it turns out that higher degrees of technological relatedness allow for the realisation of more types of innovation synergy, brought about by the more demanding integration mechanisms structural linking and process re-design.