A note on the feasibility of incomes policies

It has been argued recently that collective bargaining reform will contribute towards a successful incomes policy. The author in this note suggests that it is too soon to predict the demise of decentralised bargaining and the emergence of co-ordinated private sector bargaining with favourable outcomes for incomes policy.     

Collectivism versus individualism in Dutch employment relations

From a very centralistic and collectivistic tradition after World War Two, Dutch employment relations now show a trend towards radical decentralisation and individualisation. What might be the consequences of this trend for labour relations? Do developments still fit within a movement towards ‘organised decentralisation’ or will the existing system of labour relations be hollowed out and destroyed? And what will be the consequences for ER management at company level? We present empirical data on how companies deal with their decentralised and individualised employment relations. It appears that, in the main areas such as labour contracts, working time arrangements, reward systems and development plans, decentralisation and individualisation are taking place. It has also become clear that management as well as workers support this and that a new form of negotiation between them is developing at workplace level, resulting in what we call ‘third contracts’ that are additional to the initial labour contract and the collective agreement. Our results also highlight the pragmatic way in which companies deal with these decentralised and individualised employment relations, which, nevertheless, remain linked to the national and collective levels of bargaining. Within the multilevel system of Dutch employment relations a new balance between collectivism and individualism is emerging.     

A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution

We consider a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model with heterogeneous time preferences in which the first rejector of a proposal in the current round becomes the proposer in the next round. We show the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE), characterize SSPEs and show the efficiency of SSPEs. We show that any sequence of SSPE payoff profiles converges to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution weighted by the inverses of discount rates as the bargaining friction vanishes.     

A bargaining set for roommate problems

Since stable matchings may not exist, we propose a weaker notion of stability based on the credibility of blocking pairs. We adopt the weak stability notion of Klijn and Massó (2003) for the marriage problem and we extend it to the roommate problem. We first show that although stable matchings may not exist, a weakly stable matching always exists in a roommate problem. Then, we adopt a solution concept based on the credibility of the deviations for the roommate problem: the bargaining set. We show that weak stability is not sufficient for a matching to be in the bargaining set. We generalize the coincidence result for marriage problems of Klijn and Massó (2003) between the bargaining set and the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings to roommate problems. Finally, we prove that the bargaining set for roommate problems is always non-empty by making use of the coincidence result.     

A property rights approach to legislative delegation

This paper applies the property rights theory to study both positive and normative aspects of legislative delegation in a setup where interest groups directly influence lawmaking by initiating regulatory bargaining. A self-interested legislature choosing between the direct exercise of its legislative authority and delegation to an administrative agency must therefore trade off the value of bureaucratic competence against bureaucratic drift and, importantly, loss of control over bargaining. Our analysis, first, clarifies when the legislature’s choice between delegation and no delegation is socially efficient or socially inefficient; second, highlights the role of political bargaining and shows that precluding interest group influence through bargaining may actually increase the scope for socially inefficient outcomes; and, third, illustrates the model’s predictions in light of selected stylized facts and the practice of scant empirical work on legislative delegation.     

‘Unbound’ employers' associations and derogations: erosion and renewal of collective bargaining in the German metalworking industry

Declining union density, the reduction in coverage or informal derogations from collective agreements are signs of erosion of the corporatist German system of collective bargaining. However, new developments can be observed like ‘unbound’ employers' associations or derogations from collective agreements. These new developments make it necessary to reassess the prospects of collective bargaining. At the first sight they seem to be little more than indicators of erosion or exhaustion, but the in‐depth analysis reveals that these developments can be starting points of renewal because they give stimuli to increase the associational power of employers' associations and, even more important for collective bargaining, unions. As a result, however, collective bargaining will become less corporatist in style.     

Money and economic development: A long-run perspective

This article explores the association between money and long-run economic growth in a panel of 27 countries over 200 years. It presents evidence of a complementarity between freedom and decentralisation of the monetary system in terms of their contribution to growth in GDP per capita. The significant and positive association between freedom and economic growth is found to be significantly stronger in a decentralised (market-based) than in a centralised (government-controlled) monetary system. For the average level of freedom across the 27 countries today, shifting from a centralised to a decentralised monetary system is predicted to almost double growth rates.     

Trading bargaining weights

We consider a model, in which two agents are engaged in two separate bargaining problems. We introduce a notion of bargaining weights (bargaining power), which is basically given by asymmetric versions of the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution. Thereby, we view bargaining power as ordinary goods that can be traded in an exchange economy. With equal initial endowment of bargaining power there exists a Walrasian equilibrium in this exchange economy such that the utility allocation in equilibrium coincides with the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution of the aggregate bargaining problem. Equilibrium prices are given by the primitives of the two bargaining problems.     

Trading bargaining weights

We consider a model, in which two agents are engaged in two separate bargaining problems. We introduce a notion of bargaining weights (bargaining power), which is basically given by asymmetric versions of the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution. Thereby, we view bargaining power as ordinary goods that can be traded in an exchange economy. With equal initial endowment of bargaining power there exists a Walrasian equilibrium in this exchange economy such that the utility allocation in equilibrium coincides with the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution of the aggregate bargaining problem. Equilibrium prices are given by the primitives of the two bargaining problems.     

The resurgence of national‐level bargaining: union strategies in Spain

Spain has witnessed an oscillating pattern of bargaining in which national‐level agreements were first present, then declined, and have since resurfaced. While economic pressures may have motivated changing union responses, the specifics of the bargaining patterns can be better understood if domestic institutions are included in an explanation of union strategies.     

Collective bargaining: crisis and its consequences for American society

The term ‘collective bargaining’ was first used extensively and developed in full form by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. As the intellectual father and mother of British industrial relations and through their multiple contributions to research, government and policy making, and university affairs, the Webbs served as role models for multiple generations of British scholars. Willy Brown, scholar, educational leader and active public servant, stands as our generation's Webbs' equivalent. In all three domains he has carried on the Webbs' legacy with the highest distinction. So it is fitting that one essay in this collection honouring Willy be devoted to an examination of the current state of this institution the Webbs called collective bargaining. I am honoured to present an analysis of collective bargaining, albeit one limited to its effects, the consequences of its decline and its potential future in the United States.     

Bargaining through Approval

The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their mean utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.     

Trade unions,collective bargaining and macroeconomic performance: a review

Coordination through collective bargaining is recognised as an influential determinant of labour market outcomes and macroeconomic performance. This article provides a systematic review of the empirical literature on the subject. What emerges from the review is that it is different types and coverage of bargaining coordination, rather than cross‐country variation in trade union density, that matter for economic performance. High levels of bargaining coverage tend to be associated with relatively poor economic performance, but this adverse relationship can be at least mitigated by high levels of bargaining coordination. In the absence of formal bargaining arrangements, economies often develop informal bargaining mechanisms whose effects are similar to those arising from formal bargaining provided they both operate at similar levels of coordination. The consequences of labour market coordination or absence thereof depend on the monetary policy regime as non‐accommodating monetary policy can eliminate some of the adverse unemployment consequences otherwise associated with industry‐level collective bargaining. Finally, bargaining coordination seems to matter most in times of rapid economic change rather than under more stable conditions. Overall, we conclude that it is the total ‘package’ of (formal and informal) labour market institutions that matters for the performance of the economy rather than unionisation as such or individual aspects of unionism.     

SWITZERLAND: GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT, GROWTH OF CENTRALISATION

Switzerland has a tradition of decentralised government, decentralised tax setting and direct reference to the voters through referendums. Such mechanisms should give rise to lower taxes, better provision of public goods and higher economic growth. However, these mechanisms have not been effective in the last 30 years at preventing the growth in government spending and centralisation. This is partly because of the consensus in favour of centralisation that exists among institutionalised politicians. The performance of the Swiss economy since 1970 has consequently been dismal. Real per capita post-tax incomes have been stagnant. There is now an opportunity for the growth of centralisation to be reversed.     

Wage versus efficient bargaining in oligopoly

This paper combines internal bargaining between firms and their employees with a situation of imperfect competition, in particular a Cournot‐oligopoly. Wage bargaining is compared with simultaneous negotiations on wages and employment (efficient bargaining). It turns out that for a large range of parameter values a prisoner's dilemma concerning profits exists. The dominant strategy is efficient bargaining, while the joint profits are maximized with wage negotiations. A simplified example considers economic welfare and utility of the unions. Different welfare measures are considered like the usual IO measure of consumer and producer surplus as well as others. The term ‘efficient bargaining’ is not justified (at least for the present example) if the profits and the rents of the unions are considered, as these are maximized with wage bargaining. However, consumer and producer surplus are highest with efficient bargaining. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Endogenous scope of bargaining in a union–oligopoly model: when will firms and unions bargain over employment?

The scope of firm–union bargaining is shown to be endogenously determined in a union–oligopoly model with decentralized negotiations. If the unions' power is sufficiently high, all bargaining units choose to negotiate over wages alone, i.e., universal right-to-manage bargaining emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, wage/employment bargaining and right-to-manage bargaining coexist in the same industry. In equilibrium, some firm–union pairs will always choose to bargain over employment as well, since the firms become Stackelberg leaders in the market by committing to a particular output during the negotiations. The firms and their unions both benefit from the additional Stackelberg rents, provided that the unions' power is small enough. Our analysis suggests that there is not necessarily a negative relationship between unions' power and sectoral employment rates.     

Unionisation structures, productivity and firm performance: New insights from a heterogeneous firm model

This paper introduces collective bargaining at the firm and at the sector level into the heterogeneous firm model of Melitz and Ottaviano (Melitz, M. J., Ottaviano, G. I. P., 2008. Market size, trade, and productivity. Review of Economic Studies 75 (1), 295-316). It then analyses how the two bargaining regimes change aggregate industry productivity and firm performance relative to a competitive labour market. While sector-level bargaining forces the least productive firms to exit and thus increases average productivity relative to the competitive benchmark, firm-level bargaining allows less productive firms to stay in the market and thus reduces average productivity. Sector-level bargaining also results in higher average output and profit levels than either firm-level bargaining or a competitive labour market. The paper also shows that the choice between sector- and firm-level bargaining can involve a trade-off between product variety and product prices: Not only the average price level but also product variety tends to be lower under sector-level bargaining than under firm-level bargaining.     

The effects of bargaining power on trade credit in a supply network

We develop a multi-tier supply network model, rooted in social network theory, to evaluate the effect of bargaining power on trade credit and to track the effect of buyers' trade credit on suppliers' trade credit. We apply social network analysis to measure companies' bargaining power in the supply network of Hennes & Mauritz AB (H&M, the Swedish clothing retailer). The results show that the buyer's bargaining power significantly affects the choice of trade credit, and that the supplier's “upstreamness” is significantly associated with its trade credit. We find limited evidence to support the notion of a financial bullwhip effect, a result that merits further research, since this study is limited to the network of one company up to its fourth tier of suppliers in one financial year. Our results can be applied by companies seeking to control their cash flow and, therefore, the financial pressure within their supply network. This study contributes to the literature by bringing social network measures into the buyer–supplier financial flow, as well as offering one of the first empirical examinations of the propagation of financial pressure in a multi-tier supply network.     

Game theoretical analysis of wage bargaining in a simple business cycle model

We consider a simple business cycle model of the multiplier–accelerator type with an infinite time horizon. The result of present wage bargaining influences not only present incomes but also the future bargaining positions. Although the bargaining parties pursue long-run goals, they cannot commit themselves for more than one period. The solution concept combines the local application of Nash's bargaining theory with the idea of subgame consistency. It is shown that the game theoretic solution exists and is unique. There is a surprising similarity between extremely myopic and extremely far-sighted bargaining behavior.     

A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set

We propose an extensive form game to give a noncooperative interpretation of the Mas-Colell bargaining set for transferable utility games. Based on the objection and counterobjection in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, a bilateral negotiation is designed in our model. We show that the equilibrium outcomes of our extensive form game coincide with the Mas-Colell bargaining set in the supperadditive environments.