Insider Trading in the Hong Kong Stock Market

Many previous studies on insider trading are based ondata in the U.S. capital market and conclude thatinsiders can earn abnormal profits. This paperexamines abnormal price performance associated withinsider trading in the Hong Kong stock market. We findthat abnormal profits associated with insider tradingare all concentrated on small firms. Trading volumedoes matter in determining the magnitude of thoseabnormal profits. Our results show that insiders ofmedium-sized and large firms do not earn abnormalprofits. Finally, it is found that outsiders who mimicthe information of insider trades associated withmedium-sized and large firms cannot earn abnormalprofits.     

我国证券市场内幕交易的法学实证分析——来自31起内幕交易成案的统计分析

内幕交易是证券法学界炙手可热、经久不衰的热门课题,关于内幕交易的各种概念、学说、理论被学术界翻炒得烂熟,解剖个案麻雀的精彩论著也不鲜见,但受制于案例、资料和相关数据的局限,少有学者从实证角度,系统性地研究我国内幕交易成案的总体特征。本文力图在传统证券法学研究途径之外,独辟蹊径,通过运用统计、数量分析等经济学科工具,对证券市场成立以来查处的全部31起内幕交易案件加以实证分析,以期得出我国内幕交易案件的发案特征与规律,为打击和防范内幕交易违法行为,修订内幕交易法制提供数据支持和实证参考。     

股权分置改革中的机构合谋与内幕交易

本文考察了股权分置改革过程中机构投资者与非流通股股东之间的合谋问题以及合谋的可能途径——内幕交易。文章的基本发现有两个:第一,在控制了影响股改对价水平的主要因素之后,机构投资者对方案的赞成比例与股改对价水平之间存在显著的负相关关系,而全体流通股股东以及大个体流通股股东对方案的赞成比例与对价水平之间呈现显著的正相关关系;第二,机构投资者对方案的赞成比例越高,公司的内幕交易程度也越高,而其他流通股股东的表决意见与内幕交易程度之间没有显著关系。这意味着机构投资者与非流通股股东利用内幕交易进行了合谋,合谋的结果使得非流通股股东得以支付一个较低的对价水平,而机构投资者则通过内幕交易获得额外收益。     

Product Market Competition, Insider Trading, and Stock Market Efficiency

How does competition in firms' product markets influence their behavior in equity markets? Do product market imperfections spread to equity markets? We examine these questions in a noisy rational expectations model in which firms operate under monopolistic competition while their shares trade in perfectly competitive markets. Firms use their monopoly power to pass on shocks to customers, thereby insulating their profits. This encourages stock trading, expedites the capitalization of private information into stock prices and improves the allocation of capital. Several implications are derived and tested.     

美国的内线交易法

<正>从事股票交易的人都知道,他投资的公司任何可能影响股票价格的动态都是极其宝贵的,因为它或是带来丰厚的利润,或是造成巨大的损失。因此,股票持有人要随时把握公司的财政动态,及时买入或卖出股票。但是,如果有人利用工作之     

Analysts' Forecasts: Low-Balling,Market Efficiency,and Insider Trading

The phenomenon of low-balling reported in the financial press involves downward biased projections of earnings by managers or analysts, thereby artificially lowering market expectations and creating a positive earnings surprise when actual earnings are announced. This study reports that the stock market does respond to such surprises relative to analysts' reported forecasts. Further, the proportion of insider buy-transactions in the period prior to the earnings forecast is significantly higher for the sample with high positive earnings surprise than for the control sample with zero forecast errors. The study cannot distinguish whether managers or analysts are the source of the low-balling and therefore makes no statement on the legality of such insider trades.     

法律完备度与证券市场内幕交易监管有效性分析

本文从执法者的行动策略和内幕交易监管制度这两个方面,分析了我国内幕交易法律的完备度,并寻找我国内幕交易监管有效性相对较弱的原因。通过与发达国家证券市场执法策略和制度安排的比较,发现内幕交易法律的不完备性将直接影响到内幕交易监管的有效性。一个国家的内幕交易法律越完备,其内幕交易监管的有效性也就越强。     

Insider Trading and Voluntary Disclosures

We hypothesize that insiders strategically choose disclosure policies and the timing of their equity trades to maximize trading profits, subject to the litigation costs associated with disclosure and insider trading. Accounting for endogeneity between disclosures and trading, we find that when managers plan to purchase shares, they increase the number of bad news forecasts to reduce the purchase price. In addition, this relation is stronger for trades initiated by chief executive officers than for those initiated by other executives. Confirming this strategic behavior, we find that managers successfully time their trades around bad news forecasts, buying fewer shares beforehand and more afterwards. We do not find that managers adjust their forecasting activity when they are selling shares, consistent with higher litigation concerns associated with insider sales. Overall, our evidence suggests that insiders do exploit voluntary disclosure opportunities for personal gain, but only selectively, when litigation risk is sufficiently low.     

Insider Trading in Financial Signaling Models

We study the impact of voluntary trade by the manager. We find that, in contrast to standard signaling models, an action is good news for some firms and bad news for others, depending on observable characteristics of the firm, its managers, and their compensation plans. Further, voluntary trade eliminates separating equilibria and thus the possibility of exactly inferring the manager's private information. This may cause the manager to take inefficient actions so as to earn trading profits. Such undesirable behavior can be more effectively constrained by compensation contracts based on phantom shares or nontradeable options instead of large stockholdings.     

内幕交易监管与监管困境研究综述

各国对内幕交易的监管基本采取立法的形式，许多学者都探讨了实施内幕交易监管的有效性以及监管效率问题。本文对相关文献进行了梳理，发现从内幕交易监管有效性的纵向比较分析，内幕交易监管并不能达到预期的效果；从横向比较分析，内幕交易监管越严格，越有利于降低内幕交易程度。总体而言，内幕交易监管是必要与相对有效的。因交易者策略与量价甄别指标的主观性而产生了监管困境，降低了监管效率。但是监管总体上可以带给市场的效益高于成本，那么内幕交易监管的实施与不断完善是非常有必要的。     

Insider Trading and Earnings Management

Abstract:  This paper analyzes the relationship between earnings management and insider trading, specifically investigating whether discretionary accruals are related to insider trading and valuation. We find strong evidence of insiders managing earnings downward when buying and managing earnings upward when selling. On the marginal basis, value (high book-to-market value) firms manage their earnings upward compared to growth (low book-to-market value) firms, consistent with a signaling hypothesis. However, the opposite is true on the average basis, consistent with an opportunistic hypothesis.     

台湾证券柜台交易市场结构及其混合交易模式研究

台湾证券柜台交易市场在促进台湾中小型高科技企业的快速成长和规范非上市公开发行公司的股权报价转让等方面发挥着不可替代的重要作用。本文详细考察了台湾证券柜台交易市场上柜股票和兴柜股票的交易模式,研究表明兴柜市场实行的以分散报价、集中成交的竞争性做市商交易模式具有内在的制度优势,是适宜个人投资者为主的柜台交易市场。台湾柜台交易中心取得成功的关键在于,以满足柜台交易市场交易性需求、流动性需求、波动性需求和透明度需求为基础,通过构建合理的市场结构创造性地引入包括竞价交易机制在内、与市场功能和交易对象的风险特性相适应的混合交易模式。     

内幕交易理论的普通法基础

本文以美国最高法院的重要判例为主线,讨论内幕交易的"特定事实"学说、经典理论和盗用理论,分析这些理论的普通法基础及其演变过程,以图说明内幕交易法的移植是一件非常困难的事,各国(地区)只有以自己的基本法律、执法机制和司法体制为依归,才能发展出合用的内幕交易法.     

The Persistence of Opportunistic Insider Trading

We study the drivers of persistent insider trading profitability by examining the trades of insiders whose past trades have been profitable. We find that the current transactions of these persistently profitable (PP) insiders better predict firm performance than those of other insiders. The relative abnormal performance is more pronounced for trades of insiders who are managers rather than large shareholders or unaffiliated insiders and for trades in firms with weaker governance and greater information asymmetry. The trades of PP insiders also better predict earnings surprises, major corporate news, and analyst revisions. Collectively, these results indicate that PP insider transactions provide valid signals regarding future firm performance and that persistence in profitability is driven by informational advantages.     

The World Price of Insider Trading

The existence and the enforcement of insider trading laws in stock markets is a phenomenon of the 1990s. A study of the 103 countries that have stock markets reveals that insider trading laws exist in 87 of them, but enforcement—as evidenced by prosecutions—has taken place in only 38 of them. Before 1990, the respective numbers were 34 and 9. We find that the cost of equity in a country, after controlling for a number of other variables, does not change after the introduction of insider trading laws, but decreases significantly after the first prosecution.     

Optimal Contracting and Insider Trading Restrictions

Restrictions on trading by insider agents are analyzed using an optimal contracting framework. Prohibition of insider trading is shown to be Pareto preferred if, and only if, a revelation or moral hazard problem exists. If prohibition of insider trading is valuable, then trade registration with a delay is shown to be as valuable as complete prohibition. Short selling restrictions, however, are generally of less value than complete prohibition. Finally, regulation of insider agent trading by governmental institutions and/or professional associations is discussed.     

完善我国内幕交易法律控制的思考

美国作家马歇尔在揭露华尔街内幕的一本书中写道:“内幕交易每天、每小时、甚至每 分钟都发生”。作为证券市场的天然副产品,内幕交易与反内幕交易的斗争将伴随着证券市场的始 终。对于刚告别摸着石头过河的试点阶段,逐步走向规范、成熟的发展新时期的中国证券市场来说, 在特定的政治、经济、文化历史环境中,如何系统地通过宏观、中观、微观方面对内暮交易进行控 制,协调各系统的功能,发挥各系统应有的作用,以形成防范和控制内幕交易的强大整合力,将是 一项复杂而长期的工作。     

上市公司内部人亲属股票交易行为研究

中国的《证券法》等法律法规禁止内部人短线交易,并设置了内部人禁止股票买卖的敏感期,但内部人亲属不受此限制。本文对深圳证券交易所2007年5月至2010年5月的内部人亲属股票交易数据分析发现:(1)上市公司的内部人亲属对内部人任职企业的股票交易次数已经远远多于内部人自身的交易次数;(2)内部人亲属的交易存在很多的短线交易行为与敏感期交易行为;(3)内部人亲属股票交易整体而言能够获得超额收益;(4)短线交易与敏感期交易有助于内部人亲属获得超额收益;(5)董事长或总经理的亲属获得的收益比其他内部人亲属更高。据此,本文认为证券交易监管机构需要关注内部人亲属股票交易行为,尤其警惕内部人亲属交易可能成为规避内部人交易管制的替代方式。     

浅析单位内幕交易违法的认定与处罚

近年,单位作为主体从事内幕交易的案例呈增加之势。本文结合行政执法与刑事司法实践,结合近年典型单位内幕交易案例,并借鉴海外监管查处经验,着重讨论了单位内幕交易认定的一些疑难法律问题,诸如是否将单位作为违法主体以及是否处罚、如何认定单位知悉与利用内幕信息、如何区分单位内幕交易行为与个人内幕交易行为等问题。     

证券市场内幕交易监管的有效性分析

在对内幕交易监管有效性的分析上,由于研究方法和目标的不同,研究的结果也出现了很多分歧。本文对已有的研究进行了纵向比较和横向比较,从内幕交易法律的实施和国际监管的角度入手,对内幕交易监管的有效性进行分析,认为内幕交易监管是相对有效的。投资者信心、市场与法律的测度方法,以及投资者交易策略等因素都会影响到内幕交易监管的有效性。