Insider Trading in the Hong Kong Stock Market

Many previous studies on insider trading are based ondata in the U.S. capital market and conclude thatinsiders can earn abnormal profits. This paperexamines abnormal price performance associated withinsider trading in the Hong Kong stock market. We findthat abnormal profits associated with insider tradingare all concentrated on small firms. Trading volumedoes matter in determining the magnitude of thoseabnormal profits. Our results show that insiders ofmedium-sized and large firms do not earn abnormalprofits. Finally, it is found that outsiders who mimicthe information of insider trades associated withmedium-sized and large firms cannot earn abnormalprofits.     

Bankruptcy and Insider Trading: Differences Between Exchange-Listed and OTC Firms

Over the two-year period prior to the bankruptcy announcement, insider trading is significantly greater for OTC bankrupt firms, but not for exchange-listed firms, than for an industry-size matched sample of nonbankrupt firms. In addition, the level of insider selling increases over the final five months leading to the first public announcement of OTC firms. Finally, firms displaying the most negative price reaction over the announcement period are found to have a significantly larger proportion of insider selling than other firms.     

我国证券市场内幕交易的法学实证分析——来自31起内幕交易成案的统计分析

内幕交易是证券法学界炙手可热、经久不衰的热门课题,关于内幕交易的各种概念、学说、理论被学术界翻炒得烂熟,解剖个案麻雀的精彩论著也不鲜见,但受制于案例、资料和相关数据的局限,少有学者从实证角度,系统性地研究我国内幕交易成案的总体特征。本文力图在传统证券法学研究途径之外,独辟蹊径,通过运用统计、数量分析等经济学科工具,对证券市场成立以来查处的全部31起内幕交易案件加以实证分析,以期得出我国内幕交易案件的发案特征与规律,为打击和防范内幕交易违法行为,修订内幕交易法制提供数据支持和实证参考。     

股权分置改革中的机构合谋与内幕交易

本文考察了股权分置改革过程中机构投资者与非流通股股东之间的合谋问题以及合谋的可能途径——内幕交易。文章的基本发现有两个:第一,在控制了影响股改对价水平的主要因素之后,机构投资者对方案的赞成比例与股改对价水平之间存在显著的负相关关系,而全体流通股股东以及大个体流通股股东对方案的赞成比例与对价水平之间呈现显著的正相关关系;第二,机构投资者对方案的赞成比例越高,公司的内幕交易程度也越高,而其他流通股股东的表决意见与内幕交易程度之间没有显著关系。这意味着机构投资者与非流通股股东利用内幕交易进行了合谋,合谋的结果使得非流通股股东得以支付一个较低的对价水平,而机构投资者则通过内幕交易获得额外收益。     

Product Market Competition, Insider Trading, and Stock Market Efficiency

How does competition in firms' product markets influence their behavior in equity markets? Do product market imperfections spread to equity markets? We examine these questions in a noisy rational expectations model in which firms operate under monopolistic competition while their shares trade in perfectly competitive markets. Firms use their monopoly power to pass on shocks to customers, thereby insulating their profits. This encourages stock trading, expedites the capitalization of private information into stock prices and improves the allocation of capital. Several implications are derived and tested.     

期货内幕交易罪立法之国际比较

期货内幕交易行为是期货市场的病毒,严重扰乱了期货市场秩序,其危害是导致了不公平竞争和非诚实信用.分析内幕交易行为的犯罪构成,比较各国(地区)禁止期货内幕交易行为的立法例.对于内幕交易行为的惩处方式,可增设剥夺从业资格.     

美国的内线交易法

<正>从事股票交易的人都知道,他投资的公司任何可能影响股票价格的动态都是极其宝贵的,因为它或是带来丰厚的利润,或是造成巨大的损失。因此,股票持有人要随时把握公司的财政动态,及时买入或卖出股票。但是,如果有人利用工作之     

卖空者与内幕交易——来自中国证券市场的证据

本文研究上市公司内部人减持、年报、诉讼、分析师评级、停复牌以及高送转等重大公告前后卖空交易行为的变化,系统考察卖空者是否参与内幕交易以及何种因素影响卖空者参与内幕交易,发现卖空率较高的股票具有较低的未来收益,表明卖空者拥有信息优势,属知情交易者;卖空者拥有非常精确的择时交易能力,在重大利空公告前显著增加卖空量,而在利好公告前则显著减少卖空头寸,表明卖空者作为知情交易者的信息优势源自内幕消息;公司内、外部投资者的信息不对称程度越低或公司所在地的法治水平越高,卖空者参与内幕交易的行为就越少。因此,监管机构应密切关注公司重大消息发布前后卖空量的异常变动,同时,完善信息披露规则、健全证券分析师制度并强化法律法规的执行力度,才能有效防范卖空者参与内幕交易。     

Insider Trading Activity,Different Market Regimens,and Abnormal Returns

This paper show that corporate insiders earn abnormal returns by adjusting their own firm's stock trading to future market movements. Insider trading activity in bear markets is characterized by decreases in insider sales and increases in purchases, consistent with the view that those markets are followed by improved economic conditions. Conversely, insider sales increase and purchases decrease in bull markets, consistent with the view that inferior market conditions tend to follow those periods.     

Analysts' Forecasts: Low-Balling,Market Efficiency,and Insider Trading

The phenomenon of low-balling reported in the financial press involves downward biased projections of earnings by managers or analysts, thereby artificially lowering market expectations and creating a positive earnings surprise when actual earnings are announced. This study reports that the stock market does respond to such surprises relative to analysts' reported forecasts. Further, the proportion of insider buy-transactions in the period prior to the earnings forecast is significantly higher for the sample with high positive earnings surprise than for the control sample with zero forecast errors. The study cannot distinguish whether managers or analysts are the source of the low-balling and therefore makes no statement on the legality of such insider trades.     

法律完备度与证券市场内幕交易监管有效性分析

本文从执法者的行动策略和内幕交易监管制度这两个方面,分析了我国内幕交易法律的完备度,并寻找我国内幕交易监管有效性相对较弱的原因。通过与发达国家证券市场执法策略和制度安排的比较,发现内幕交易法律的不完备性将直接影响到内幕交易监管的有效性。一个国家的内幕交易法律越完备,其内幕交易监管的有效性也就越强。     

Insider Trading and Firm Performance Following Open Market Share Repurchase Announcements

The long‐run performance of equity securities subsequent to announcements of open market repurchases (OMR) remains a contentious topic. In this paper we propose the “dichotomous expectations hypothesis” which posits that insider trading following share repurchase announcements reveals private information concerning the future operating performance of announcing firms. In particular, insider abnormal purchases (abnormal sales) should predict an improvement (decline) in operating performance that leads to higher (lower) long‐run stock returns. Our hypothesis offers a credible economic link between insider trading and subsequent long‐run stock performance through the intervening variable of operating performance. The empirical results show consistency with this linkage.     

Dividends and Market Signalling: an Analysis of Corporate Insider Trading

This study tests the multiple‐signal theory of dividends of John and Lang (1991) in the context of a European market. Our evidence shows that investors are more sensitive to insider trading signals than to signalled changes in existing dividends. In effect, the insider sales signal is universally understood as bad news. After controlling for the quality of a firm's investment opportunities, investors are found to penalise dividend outflows by mature firms that exhibit more informed insider sales activity. Finally, we offer an innovative exploration of the role of earnings announcements in market reaction to the dividend signal.     

Insider Trading,Ownership Structure,and the Market Assessment of Corporate Sell-Offs

This paper finds that the generally favorable assessment of corporate sell-off decisions is most apparent for closely held firms where insider net-buy activity is prevalent during the prior six-month period. This suggests that insider trader activity and ownership structure information are used by the market in the characterization of sell-off decisions as favorable or unfavorable for investors.     

Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread

This study examines the intertemporal and cross-sectional association between the bid-ask spread and insider trading. Empirical results from the cross-sectional regression analysis reveal that market makers establish larger spreads for stocks with a greater extent of insider trading. The time-series regression analysis, however, finds no evidence of spread changes on insider trading days. These results suggest that although market makers may not be able to detect insider trading when it occurs, they protect themselves by maintaining larger spreads for stocks with a greater tendency of insider trading. The results also reveal that market makers establish larger spreads when there are unusually large transactions. In addition, this study finds that spreads are positively associated with risk and negatively with trading volume, the number of exchange listings, share price, and firm size.     

Insider Trading in Financial Signaling Models

We study the impact of voluntary trade by the manager. We find that, in contrast to standard signaling models, an action is good news for some firms and bad news for others, depending on observable characteristics of the firm, its managers, and their compensation plans. Further, voluntary trade eliminates separating equilibria and thus the possibility of exactly inferring the manager's private information. This may cause the manager to take inefficient actions so as to earn trading profits. Such undesirable behavior can be more effectively constrained by compensation contracts based on phantom shares or nontradeable options instead of large stockholdings.     

Insider Trading and Earnings Management

Abstract:  This paper analyzes the relationship between earnings management and insider trading, specifically investigating whether discretionary accruals are related to insider trading and valuation. We find strong evidence of insiders managing earnings downward when buying and managing earnings upward when selling. On the marginal basis, value (high book-to-market value) firms manage their earnings upward compared to growth (low book-to-market value) firms, consistent with a signaling hypothesis. However, the opposite is true on the average basis, consistent with an opportunistic hypothesis.     

Insider Trading and Voluntary Disclosures

We hypothesize that insiders strategically choose disclosure policies and the timing of their equity trades to maximize trading profits, subject to the litigation costs associated with disclosure and insider trading. Accounting for endogeneity between disclosures and trading, we find that when managers plan to purchase shares, they increase the number of bad news forecasts to reduce the purchase price. In addition, this relation is stronger for trades initiated by chief executive officers than for those initiated by other executives. Confirming this strategic behavior, we find that managers successfully time their trades around bad news forecasts, buying fewer shares beforehand and more afterwards. We do not find that managers adjust their forecasting activity when they are selling shares, consistent with higher litigation concerns associated with insider sales. Overall, our evidence suggests that insiders do exploit voluntary disclosure opportunities for personal gain, but only selectively, when litigation risk is sufficiently low.     

Insider Trading and Financing Constraints

Insider trading may alleviate financing constraints by conveying value‐relevant information to the market (the information effect) or may exacerbate financing constraints by impairing market liquidity and distorting insiders’ incentives to disclose value‐relevant information (the confidence effect). We examine the significance of these two contrasting effects by investigating the link between insider trading and financing constraints as measured by the investment‐cash flow sensitivity. We find that, overall insider trading exacerbates financing constraints; however the information effect dominates the confidence effect for insider purchases. Only trades by executive directors are significantly related to financing constraints.     

台湾证券柜台交易市场结构及其混合交易模式研究

台湾证券柜台交易市场在促进台湾中小型高科技企业的快速成长和规范非上市公开发行公司的股权报价转让等方面发挥着不可替代的重要作用。本文详细考察了台湾证券柜台交易市场上柜股票和兴柜股票的交易模式,研究表明兴柜市场实行的以分散报价、集中成交的竞争性做市商交易模式具有内在的制度优势,是适宜个人投资者为主的柜台交易市场。台湾柜台交易中心取得成功的关键在于,以满足柜台交易市场交易性需求、流动性需求、波动性需求和透明度需求为基础,通过构建合理的市场结构创造性地引入包括竞价交易机制在内、与市场功能和交易对象的风险特性相适应的混合交易模式。