Multiple lead underwriting syndicate and IPO pricing

This paper examines the role of multiple lead underwriters (MLUs) in pricing initial public offerings (IPOs) by considering certification and market power hypotheses. Consistent with the notion that MLUs provide certification to the issue, we find that IPOs backed by MLUs price the offer closer to the intrinsic value of the firm than firms backed by single lead underwriters. Our results also indicate that IPOs led by MLUs experience lower initial return, lower variability of initial returns and better long-run performance. The results are robust to self-selection and omitted variable biases. MLU led offerings also exhibit a lower risk of withdrawal and are more likely to conduct a larger secondary equity offering.     

Global trends in IPO methods: Book building versus auctions with endogenous entry

The U.S. book-building method has become increasingly popular for initial public offerings (IPOs) worldwide over the last decade, whereas sealed-bid IPO auctions have been abandoned in nearly all of the many countries in which they have been tried. I model book building, discriminatory auctions, and uniform price auctions in an environment in which the number of investors and the accuracy of investors’ information are endogenous. Book building lets underwriters manage investor access to shares, allowing them to reduce risk for both issuers and investors and to control spending on information acquisition, thereby limiting either underpricing or aftermarket volatility. Because more control and less risk are beneficial to all issuers, the advantages of book building's allocational flexibility could explain why global patterns of issuer choice are surprisingly consistent. My models also predict that offerings with higher expected underpricing have lower expected aftermarket volatility; that an auction open to large numbers of potential bidders is vulnerable to inaccurate pricing and to fluctuations in the number of bidders; and that both book-built and auctioned IPOs will exhibit partial adjustment to both private and public information.     

Underwriter Quality and Long‐Run IPO Performance

We analyze the relationship between the quality of underwriters and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in light of underwriter marketing, certification and screening, and information production. We find that higher underwriter quality (measured by the number of managing underwriters, underwriter reputation, and absolute price adjustment) predicts better long‐run performance, even when returns are value weighted. We compare underwriter quality measures and find that the effects of the number of managing underwriters and underwriter reputation are mutually complementary and are especially strong among IPOs with high uncertainty, while absolute price adjustment, which is more likely to be associated with information production than marketing or certification/screening, loses significance. Our findings are consistent with the marketing and certification and screening roles of investment banks but lend little support for the information production role of underwriters.     

The Underpricing of Venture and Nonventure Capital IPOs: An Empirical Investigation

In this paper, we examine the premarket underpricing phenomenon within a group of venture-backed and a group of non-venture-backed initial public offerings (IPOs), using a stochastic frontier approach. Consistent with previous research, we find that venture-backed IPOs are managed by more reputable underwriters and generally are associated with less underwriter compensation. However, unlike other papers in the literature, we find that the initial-day returns of venture-backed IPOs on average, are, higher than the non-venture-backed group. We observe a significantly higher degree of premarket pricing inefficiency in the initial offer price of venture-backed IPOs. Further, our results show that a significant portion of the initial day returns is due to deliberate underpricing in the premarket.     

Are IPO Allocations for Sale? Evidence from Mutual Funds

Combining data on brokerage commissions that mutual fund families paid for trade execution between 1996 and 1999 with data on mutual fund holdings of initial public offerings (IPOs), I document a robust, positive correlation between commissions paid to lead underwriters and reported holdings of the IPOs they underwrite. Moreover, I find that the correlation is limited to IPOs with nonnegative first‐day returns and strongest for IPOs that occur shortly before mutual funds report their holdings, when the noise introduced by flipping is smallest. Overall, the evidence suggests that business relationships with lead underwriters increase investor access to underpriced IPOs.     

Underwriter reputation,earnings management and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings

This study contributes to the extant literature on the nature of earnings management surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the role of underwriter reputation. We argue that prestigious underwriters will protect their reputation by carefully monitoring and certifying financial information on IPO firms, thereby limiting any potential earnings manipulation. As a result, those IPO firms that are associated with more prestigious underwriters are likely to exhibit substantially less‐aggressive earnings management. Conversely, we find the existence of a negative relationship between earnings management and the post‐offer performance of an IPO firm’s stocks only for those firms associated with less‐prestigious underwriters.     

Management Quality and Equity Issue Characteristics: A Comparison of SEOs and IPOs

We use hand-collected data on the management quality of firms making seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) or initial public offerings (IPOs) to analyze the relationship between management quality and equity issue characteristics, and to compare the effect of management quality on SEOs versus IPOs. We hypothesize that higher quality managers are more credible to equity market investors, thereby reducing the information asymmetry they face in the market and outsiders’ information production costs. Therefore, the equity issues of higher management quality firms will have more reputable underwriters, smaller underwriting spreads, and other expenses, and smaller SEO discounts. Further, since better managers will be able to select better projects, higher management quality firms will have larger offer sizes. Finally, since SEO firms are likely to suffer from less information asymmetry compared to IPO firms, these effects will be smaller for SEOs than for IPOs. Our findings support the above hypotheses. Our direct tests of the relationship between management quality and information asymmetry, and our comparison of information asymmetry in SEOs versus IPOs provide further support for these hypotheses.     

REGULATORY AND PROCEDURAL EFFECTS ON THE UNDERPRICING OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

In this paper, the pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) is examined from the underwriter's point of view. It is shown that because of the regulations and procedures governing the underwriting and pricing of IPOs, underwriters can maximize expected income by underpricing IPOs. Thus, it is argued that in addition to other feasible explanations of the underpricing phenomenon (e.g., compensation to uninformed investors, insurance against legal liability, etc.), regulatory and procedural factors contribute to the underpricing of IPOs. This is shown to be true both when uninformed investors are present and absent from the market for IPOs.     

UNDERWRITER REPUTATION AND REPETITIVE PUBLIC OFFERINGS

A recent examination of underwriter reputation and initial public offerings (IPOs) suggests that one of the reasons prestigious underwriters market low-risk IPOs is to increase the expected present value of subsequent offerings. There is a greater likelihood that a firm issuing low-risk IPOs will be a viable future operation with the potential for subsequent offerings than a firm issuing high-risk IPOs. I examine the hypothesis that the likelihood of subsequent offerings is negatively related to IPO risk. In addition to finding support for this hypothesis, I show that the likelihood of subsequent offerings is positively related to the IPO underwriter's reputation and negatively related to the IPO gross spread. Finally, I find that the likelihood of firms switching IPO underwriters for subsequent offerings decreases with increasing IPO underwriter reputation.     

Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks

We find that the underperformance of IPO stocks relative to the market over a three-year holding period is less severe for IPOs handled by more prestigious underwriters. Consistent with prior studies, we also find that IPOs managed by more reputable underwriters are associated with less short-run underpricing. Among the various existing proxies for underwriter reputation, the Carter–Manaster measure is the most significant in the context of initial returns and also in the context of the three-year performance of IPOs. The study also provides an updated list of the Carter–Manaster measure for various underwriters.     

Allocation of shares to foreign and domestic investors: Firm and ownership characteristics in Swedish IPOs

In this article, we analyze underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) and holdings following offerings in Sweden. By exploiting a unique hand-collected data set with information on the ultimate holdings by institutional and individual investors, as well as boards of directors, we find, as most prior studies, that IPOs on average are underpriced. IPOs with low (high) initial return have higher (lower) holdings by individual investors. Institutional investors are, to a greater extent than individual investors, also able to identify underpriced firms.     

The Distribution of Information among Institutional and Retail Investors in IPOs

This study examines investor performance in IPOs using a unique database comprising 85,384 investors and 29 offerings from Finland. The evidence indicates that on average institutional investors do not obtain larger initial returns than retail investors, as the incentive to acquire information is limited by allocation rules which favour small orders. This result is in contrast to findings by Aggarwal et al . (2002), who show that institutional investors perform better in a bookbuilding environment. Within each investor category, however, large orders are associated with the best performance, suggesting that information differences figure more importantly within rather than between categories.     

Noise from online discussion forums: Evidence from IPOs in China

In this study, we use initial public offerings (IPOs) in China to investigate how online stock forums influence information asymmetry and IPO valuation. The empirical analysis isolates the underpricing and overvaluation components of initial returns. The number of forum comments, postings, and readings are positively associated with initial returns and the degree of underpricing, implying that forums create noise that exacerbates information asymmetry during IPOs. This effect is amplified by the quiet period regulation, which drives investors to rely on online discussion forums to obtain information. Through sentiment analyses of forum posts and media coverage, we find that the negative effect of online forums is more prominent when bad news prevails. We clarify the role of online stock forums in IPO pricing and information asymmetry by separating underpricing from overvaluation in initial returns.     

Stock vs. stock-warrant units: evidence from seasoned offerings

Recent theories based on sequential financing and information signaling reveal a special role for warrants. Data from initial public offerings (IPOs) of stock-warrant units have been used to test the theories, and we extend the analysis to seasoned offerings. Consistent with predictions from both families of theories, we find that issues made by smaller and younger firms are more likely to involve stock-warrant units, and firms with greater stock price volatility are more likely to issue units in seasoned offerings. Moreover, firms with relatively high levels of long-term debt, and those whose issues are underwritten by less prestigious underwriters are more likely to employ stock-warrant unit financing. Consistent with information signaling, we find that firms with high managerial ownership are more likely to issue units. Firms that include warrants in their stock offerings are predicted to have experienced higher abnormal stock returns than if they had issued shares alone. Thus, consistent with both theoretical explanations, some firms can reduce capital costs by adding warrants to shares in seasoned offerings.     

A new spread estimator

A cynosure of the academic literature relating to initial public offerings (IPOs) is the question of why they are “mispriced” so frequently. The large and growing literature addressing this question is evidence as to its intractability. This paper develops a theory of underwriters’ behavior suggesting that they will exploit their private information to minimize the bilateral risks to themselves of firm-commitment IPOs. That minimization may cause them to knowingly underprice the issue. The main result in this paper is based, in part, on the premise that the random character of the investors’ demand for shares in the secondary market, given the spread, is governed by an estimable conditional probability distribution. The underwriters exploit their private knowledge of that probability distribution to influence the number of shares in the offering in such a way as to minimize their expected loss function.     

Underpricing of homecoming A-share IPOs by Chinese firms already listed abroad

Many Chinese firms have pursued overseas listings in Hong Kong or US without being first listed in China’s domestic market, mainly due to the regulatory constraints imposed by the Chinese government. Some of them eventually returned to mainland China through an A-share offering to Chinese investors. This unique feature of cross-listed Chinese stocks offers an experiment field to test some of the conventional theories of initial public offerings (IPOs) underpricing. Homebound IPOs are expected to be less underpriced than domestic only IPOs that are not cross-listed because being already listed in a developed market can mitigate the information asymmetry and issue uncertainty associated with their A-share IPOs. Nevertheless, we find that homecoming A-share IPOs are still substantially underpriced, with an average market adjusted first-day return of 96.53 %. Furthermore, their first-day returns are not significantly different from those of domestic only IPOs once firm- and offer-characteristics are controlled. This is in sharp contrast to the lukewarm aftermarket performance experienced in their overseas debuts. The mean market adjusted first-day return is merely 5.35 % in their US ADR offerings and 11.63 % in their Hong Kong H-share IPOs. Overall, our results suggest the importance of local market structures and norms as influential factors of IPO underpricing.     

Impact of legal institutions on IPO survival: A global perspective

Around the world, investors, practitioners, regulators and policy makers seek to understand whether, when and why recently listed stocks, initial public offerings (IPOs) are delisted rather than continue trading (survive). Using data on 7,627 IPOs issued during 2000–2008 across 32 countries, we explore the impact of the legal system on IPO survival. We find that IPOs in countries with better investor protections remain listed for longer. This suggests that better legal systems increase the net benefits companies derive from staying listed. We also provide evidence that better legal systems increase the effectiveness of IPO certification by venture capitalists, underwriters and auditors.     

The underpricing of gold mining initial public offerings

This study is motivated by How [How, J., 2000. The initial and long run performances of mining IPOs in Australia. Aust. J. Manage. 25, 95-118] who examined 100 Australian gold mining initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1979 to 1990 to report an average 119.51% underpricing return by those IPOs. This study updates that analysis by investigating 114 Australian gold mining IPOs from 1994 to 2004 and finds a significantly lower 13.3% average first day return. Options offered to underwriters can in part explain these returns as can the change in either the Gold Index or the All Ordinaries Index from the date of the prospectus to the date of listing.     

The Benefit of Excluding Institutional Investors from Fixed-Price IPOs: Evidence from Taiwan

A simple way to mitigate the winner's curse in initial public offerings (IPOs) is to reduce the number of informed investors in IPO markets. In Taiwan, institutional investors are not permitted to subscribe to fixed-price IPOs. Excluding institutional investors raises uninformed investors' allocation rates. We show that the winner's curse is still present in Taiwan's fixed-price IPO markets even without the participation of institutional investors, but that IPO underpricing is reduced by at least 4 percent due to alleviating the winner's curse, as institutional investors are excluded from the fixed-price offerings.     

An empirical investigation of whether Australian capital gains tax reforms influence individual investor behaviour

This paper examines whether an asset's qualification for discounted tax treatment is associated with positive abnormal trading volumes and negative abnormal returns, as would be predicted if investors modified their behaviour to reduce their tax liability. Our examination of 152 initial public offerings (IPOs) documents that there is an incremental increase in abnormal trading volume for those IPOs that have experienced a significant increase in price since listing over those IPOs that have increased only marginally. Although we provide only limited evidence to suggest that this increase in trading volume is accompanied by a decrease in returns, this is not unexpected in a market that has anticipated this type of behaviour by the relatively small proportion of individual investors able to benefit from the discounted tax treatment.