对贷款承诺会计处理若干问题的认识

贷款承诺(loancommitment)是重要的表外信用工具。比如在美国,80%以上的商业贷款是通过贷款承诺形式作出的。此外,贷款承诺费也是商业银行重要的收入来源。在银行监管方面,贷款承诺是计算和考核商业银行资本充足率的重要表外风险项目。本文拟对贷款承诺有关会计处理问题作一探讨。一、对贷款承诺内涵和性质的认识贷款承诺是指商业银行等金融机构作出的在一定期间内以确定条款和条件向承诺持有者(潜在借款人)提供贷款的承诺。1993年12月,美国联邦储备系统理事会发布修订后的条例H(RegulationH《)联邦储备系统中的州成员银行》。条例H在附录…     

Information Revelation, Lock-In, and Bank Loan Commitments

This paper considers the extent to which loan commitments mitigate the problems of information monopolies that arise when the firm contracts with a private lender. Loan commitments in conjunction with short-term debt often provide the firm with superior investment incentives by influencing both the states in which bargaining occurs as well as the outcomes from bargaining. Commitment contracts are particularly valuable when there is a high likelihood that information about the firm will be publicly revealed ex post. We also identify circumstances under which the firm foregoes commitment financing, relying on short-term debt instead. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers G21, G32, D82.     

Pricing of Loan Commitments for Facilitating Stochastic Liquidity Needs

A bank loan commitment is often priced as a European-style put option that is used by a company with a known borrowing need on a known future date to lock in an interest rate. The literature has abstracted some of the important institutional features of a loan commitment contract. First, the timing, number, and size of the loan takedowns under such a contract are often random, rather than fixed. Second, companies often use loan commitment contracts to reduce the transaction costs of frequent borrowing and to serve as a guarantee for large and immediate random liquidity needs. Third, commercial banks maintain liquidity reserves for making random spot loans or random committed loans. Partial loan takedowns raise, rather than lower, the opportunity cost of a committed bank??s holding of excess capacity. This paper introduces a ??stochastic needs-based?? pricing model that incorporates these features. Simulations are conducted to illustrate the effects of various parameters on the fair price of a loan commitment.     

Taxing Mobile Capital with Labor Market Imperfections

Taxing internationally mobile factors of production has been dismissed as an inefficient means of raising tax revenue. This paper addresses the question of whether it is efficient to tax capital at source when labor markets and the taxation of lumpsum income suffer from imperfections. Four reasons for taxing capital are identified: (i) institutional constraints rendering any taxation of profit income infeasible; (ii) market power in the demand for labor; (iii) market power in the supply of labor if it increases with the employment of capital; (iv) unemployment benefits that are not tied to net real wages. It is argued that the case for taxing capital is not particularly strong. By reinterpreting capital as energy the results are applicable to the discussion about ecological tax reforms.     

Market Imperfections, Investment Flexibility, and Default Spreads

This paper develops a structural model that determines default spreads in a setting where the debt's collateral is endogenously determined by the borrower's investment choice, and a demand variable with permanent and temporary components. We also consider the possibility that the borrower cannot commit to taking the value‐maximizing investment choice, and may, in addition, be constrained in its ability to raise external capital. Based on a model calibrated to data on office buildings and commercial mortgages, we present numerical simulations that quantify the extent to which investment flexibility, incentive problems, and credit constraints affect default spreads.     

Primes and Scores: An Essay on Market Imperfections

This paper investigates the reported relative mispricing of primes and scores to the underlying stock. Given transaction costs, we establish arbitrage-based bounds on prime and score prices. We then develop a new nonparametric statistical technique to test whether prime and score prices violate these bounds. We find that prime and score prices do exceed stock prices, and often by a considerable amount. We demonstrate that this increased value is most likely due to the score's ability to save on the costs of dynamic hedging. We also show how short sale and trust size constraints impede the ability to arbitrage price disparities.     

Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking

Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, J Finance 60:1329–1343, 2005) has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. Using a model where competition arises from falling switching costs for entrepreneurs, we show that the impact of loan market competition on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks want to offset the effect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives.     

Stock Market Participation: Family Responses to Housing Consumption Commitments

As of 2007, many households had taken on very substantial commitments to housing and companion mortgage payments. At the same time they held little in the way of a traditional buffer stock of safer liquid assets but were more likely to have opened stock market accounts. Many of these families when experiencing subsequent mortgage payment difficulties are shown to have been more likely to exit the stock market. Mortgage difficulties also inhibited families from becoming new stock market participants. In this way stocks seem to have likely experienced some direct and indirect “collateral damage” from the housing market, 2007–9.     

个贷市场"战国硝烟"

北京个人住房贷款已突破1000亿元 <国际金融报> 2002-10-15 "截至2002年8月末,北京市个人住房贷款已经突破了1000亿元."10月14日,人民银行营业管理部货币信贷处处长刘晔向记者证实.     

我国银团贷款市场发展策略

国际银团贷款市场发展趋势 银团贷款(syndicated loan)普遍存在于国际主要金融市场中,通常指两家或两家以上的银行,依据同样的贷款条件,并使用共同的贷款协议,向借款人发放并由一家共同的代理行管理的贷款.     

中国的金融市场开发与贷款证券化

随着金融市场竞争压力的加大,传统的融资方式已经不能满足投资者的需要。贷款证券化可以使资金拥有者通过这一渠道将资金转移到贷款者手中,能很好地解决当今社会许多融资难的问题。这种形式如果能够在我国的金融体系中得到完善,会极大地促进我国的经济建设,也能较好地解决投融资体系的现实问题。     

Small Firm Capital Structure and the Syndicated Loan Market

We show that small firms using syndicated loans for their mid- and long-term financial needs have significantly higher leverage than firms that do not borrow in this market. This difference cannot be attributed to firm characteristics like the availability of growth opportunities, asset tangibility, R&D spending, profitability and net sales that are known to influence capital structure. We also find that the capital structure of other firms that borrow in the syndicated loan market is not different from those that do not. We show that already highly leveraged small firms are more likely to borrow in the syndicated loan market than other firms. The higher debt in the capital structure of small firms that rely on syndicated loans consequently can be attributed to the availability of capital rather than demand for capital, as shown more generally by Faulkender and Petersen (Rev Financ Stud 19(1):45?C79, 2006).     

Market Imperfections,Macroeconomic Conditions,and Capital Structure Dynamics: A Cross-Country Study

This article investigates how “systematic” adjustment costs proxied by market imperfections, and macroeconomic conditions affect capital structure dynamics in a cross-country setting. We document substantial variations in firms’ capital structure adjustments across countries and, particularly, over time. Consistent with adjustment costs impeding firms from rebalancing their capital structures, worse market imperfections are associated with slower speeds of adjustment (SOA) and larger leverage deviations. Intertemporally, capital structure adjustment is procyclical, with SOA increasing by 0.9 percentage point for a one-percentage-point increase in GDP growth rate. The procyclicality is attributable to good macroeconomic conditions mitigating market imperfections through channels of 1) facilitating free-ride restructuring and 2) uncertainty alleviation. Our investigation features a bootstrapping-based estimation method that addresses the mechanical mean reversion of leverage ratio.     

Bank Quality,Loan Demand,and Market Discipline

In this paper, we examine the disciplinary role of borrowers, who are one of the key stakeholders in Turkish banks and are heavily affected when their banks experience difficulty. In the theoretical model, we show that borrowers prefer to have a relationship with less risky banks although it increases their cost of getting funds. Empirically, we examine the relationship between quality of a bank and its loan demand and find that as riskiness of a bank decreases, its loan demand increases significantly, suggesting the disciplinary role of borrowers in Turkey.     

Screening, Bidding, and the Loan Market Tightness

Bank loans are more available and cheaper for new and small businesses inthe U.S. in concentrated banking areas than in competitive banking areas. Weexplain this anomaly by analyzing banks' decisions to screen projects andtheir competition in loan provisions. It is shown that, by exacerbating thewinner's curse, an increase in the number of banks can reduce banks'screening probability by so much that the number of banks that activelycompete in loan provisions falls and the expected loan rate rises. This isthe case when the screening cost is low, which induces all active bidders tobe informed. The opposite outcome occurs when the screening cost is high, inwhich case there are sufficiently many uninformed banks in bidding toattenuate the winner's curse. We also examine the social optimum     

个人住房抵押贷款市场的机构组成

本文通过各方资料收集,归纳了构成个人住房抵押贷款业务链的主要环节及其收益和风险特征,介绍了美国个人住房抵押贷款市场的主要参与机构,分析了不同类型的机构在不同业务环节的优势和劣势,以此为我国个人住房抵押贷款市场的业务细分和机构组成提供参考。     

呼唤房贷证券化

伴随着个人住房贷款需求的不断上升,大量期限长、流动性差的住房贷款资金的出现,给商业银行资产负债管理埋下风险“地雷”。在这一背景下,社会各界纷纷把目光投向一种金融创新工具——住房贷款证券化