Auditor underreporting of time and moral reasoning: An experimental lab study*

Abstract. This paper introduces the theory of moral reasoning as a valid determinant of the underreporting of audit time. In an experimental lab design for a sample of 88 auditors from a national public accounting firm, actual underreporting on an audit task was observed. Findings show that underreporting is systematically related to the auditor's level of moral reasoning as measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT). Here those with relatively low DIT scores were shown to underreport most severely. Results also show that although an unattainable time budget affects behavior, peer pressure has the most significant impact on underreporting. The present study makes three important contributions to the auditing and psychology literature. First, it establishes the significance of peer pressure as an antecedent to underreporting. Second, it shows that an auditor's moral reasoning explains actual underreporting behavior under conditions of work-related pressure. Third, it reveals marked underreporting under simulated audit conditions.     

A Bargaining Model of Auditor Reporting*

In this paper, I demonstrate that the quasi-rents earned in audits undermine an auditor's independence By considering the incentives of the auditor and the client and the interaction between them, I conclude that auditor will maintain his or her independence if the firm-specific quasi-rents are zero, but compromise his or her independence if the quasi-rents are positive. The extent of the compromise is an increasing function of the quasi-rents, since the auditor will propose that a higher value be reported in the financial statements when the quasi-rents increase. I also show that disputes between the auditor and the client increase as the scope for errors for an auditor's test increases. When the error scope is large, the client becomes more aggressive in preparing a proposal while the auditor becomes more cautious.     

Auditor Liability and Business Investment*

We model a firm's investment decision, an auditor's effort‐rendering behavior, audit fees, and prices of the firms under two auditor liability rules: strict liability and negligence liability. We show that an auditor's effort level is socially optimal under strict liability, while it is not generally so under negligence liability. Furthermore, both the firm owner's expected benefit and the audit fee are higher under strict liability than under negligence liability. We define the legal error under negligence liability as the difference between the assessed audit effort (that is, the estimate of audit effort made by the court) and the actual audit effort and prove that the greater the variance of the legal error, the more incentive an auditor has to exert effort under negligence liability compared with strict liability. Finally, the number of investments being undertaken could be higher under strict liability because more firm owners are willing to hire auditors to go public.     

Legal Damages and Auditor Efforts*

Abstract. Conventional wisdom holds that an auditor's optimal response to an increase in legal exposure is to double his efforts in finding errors in his client's financial reports. This paper's main result is that in a market setting where clients shop for opinions and auditors must compete for clients, the conventional wisdom may fail. Increased damages: affect all auditors reducing the competition among auditors for clients. Thus, an auditor can reduce his legal exposure by reporting more conservatively, instead of working harder. The main result is mitigated if client firms also face legal damages and if clients themselves are more conservative in preparing their unaudited financial statements. If it is more likely that a client claiming “good news” is truly good, the auditor has an incentive to work harder to confirm this good report and satisfy his client. This incentive to work harder to please his client may prevent the auditor from retreating into conservatism when damages are increased. Finally, if the auditors' report space were continuous, as with a continuum of client types, the main result would be reversed: additional damages would (weakly) increase the auditor's efforts. With a continuum of possible reports, the competition is not eliminated as damages increase; only the range of reports that the auditors offer is reduced. Because the competition cannot be eliminated and the incumbent cannot resort to conservatism to reduce his legal exposure, the auditor works hard. Résumé. Par tradition, la sagesse veut que la réaction la plus appropriée d'un vérificateur à une augmentation des risques juridiques soit un redoublement d'efforts pour déceler les erreurs dans les rapports financiers de ses clients. L'auteur en arrive pourtant à la principale conclusion que, dans le contexte d'un marché où les clients font du «magasinage» d'opinion et où les vérificateurs doivent se disputer les clients, la sagesse nous amène à faire fausse route. L'augmentation des dommages touche tous les vérificateurs et atténue la rivalité qui les oppose dans la recherche de clients. Ainsi, un vérificateur peut diminuer le risque juridique auquel il est exposé en usant d'une plus grande prudence dans ses rapports plutôt qu'en travaillant avec plus d'acharnement. L'auteur est cependant moins catégorique à ce sujet lorsque l'entreprise cliente fait aussi l'objet de poursuites en dommages et qu'elle est donc plus prudente dans la préparation de ses états financiers non vérifiés. Il est davantage probable que les nouvelles positives qu'une telle entreprise publie le soient véritablement, de sorte que le vérificateur est, lui, davantage enclin à déployer les efforts nécessaires pour confirmer ces nouvelles positives et satisfaire son client. Cette incitation à travailler avec plus d'énergie pour satisfaire le client peut faire en sorte que le vérificateur ne se replie pas derrière la prudence lorsque les dommages augmentent. Enfin, s'il existe un large éventail de rapports de vérification, comme dans le cas d'une multiplicité de types d'entreprises, la conclusion principale se trouve inversée; l'augmentation des montants de dommages entraîne une (faible) hausse de l'intensité du travail du vérificateur. Dans le cas d'un large éventail de rapports possibles, la concurrence ne s'atténue pas avec l'augmentation des montants de dommages; seul l'éventail des rapports qu'offrent les vérificateurs est réduit. Étant donné que la concurrence ne peut être éliminée, et que le vérificateur attitré ne peut recourir à la prudence pour réduire le risque juridique auquel il est exposé, il redouble d'effort.     

Accounting Accruals and Auditor Reporting Conservatism*

Accounting accruals are managers' subjective estimates of future outcomes and cannot, by definition, be objectively verified by auditors prior to occurrence. This causes audits of high-accrual firms to pose more uncertainty than audits of low-accrual firms because of potential estimation error and a greater chance that high-accrual firms have undetected asset realization and/or going concern problems that are related to the high level of accruals. One way that auditors can compensate for this risk exposure is to lower their threshold for issuing modified audit reports, an action that will increase modified reports and, therefore, lessen the likelihood of failing to issue a modified report when appropriate. We call this auditor reporting conservatism and test if high-accrual firms in the United States, are more likely to receive modified audit reports for asset realization uncertainties and going concern problems. Empirical results for a large sample of U.S. publicly listed companies support the hypothesis that auditors are more conservative, that is, more likely to issue both types of modified audit reports for high-accrual firms. Further analyses show that income-increasing accruals are somewhat more likely to result in reporting conservatism than income-decreasing accruals, and that only the Big Six group of auditors show evidence of reporting conservatism. These findings add to our understanding of the audit report formation process and the potentially important role played by accounting accruals in that process.     

The Association Between Auditor Changes and Reporting Lags*

Abstract. This paper examines audit report lags and earnings announcement lags for a sample of firms that switched auditors. We investigate whether audit report and earnings announcement lags are associated with the timing of auditor changes in relation to firms' fiscal year-ends. It is hypothesized that firms which replace their auditor early (late) in the fiscal year do so for positive (negative) reasons and experience shorter (longer) reporting lags. Conflicts over reporting issues can be difficult to resolve and consequently lead to reporting delays. In other cases, clients may be more concerned about adhering to customary reporting practices or improving reporting timeliness. These are likely to be considerations in auditor realignment decisions and are predictably reflected in the timing of the auditor change. Résumé. Les auteurs s'intéressent aux décalages dans la production des rapports des vérificateurs et dans la publication des bénéfices, pour un échantillon d'entreprises ayant changé de vérificateurs. Ils se demandent si ces décalages sont reliés au choix du moment du changement de vérificateurs par rapport à la date de clôture de l'exercice. Selon leur hypothèse, les entreprises qui remplacent leurs vérificateurs tôt (tard) dans l'exercice le font pour des raisons positives (négatives), et les décalages enregistrés dans la production de l'information sont plus courts (plus longs). Les conflits touchant les questions relatives à l'information à fournir peuvent être difficiles à résoudre et, en conséquence, conduire à des retards dans la publication de l'information. Dans d'autres cas, les entreprises clientes peuvent être davantage préoccupées par le respect des méthodes coutumières de présentation de l'information ou par l'accélération de la publication de l'information. Ces facteurs sont susceptibles d'entrer en ligne de compte dans les décisions de réorientation des vérificateurs, et il est à prévoir qu'ils se refléteront dans le choix du moment du changement de vérificateurs.     

Investor Sentiment,Misstatements, and Auditor Behavior*

High investor sentiment has been linked with opportunistic managerial behavior in the face of more optimistic investors and analysts. We extend this line of work by documenting that the likelihood of misstatements is higher when sentiment is high. Although this would suggest elevated audit risk, we posit that a contemporaneous reduction in auditors' litigation cost could drive down audit fees and going concern opinion (GCO) reporting conservatism in order to please clientele. Consistent with this notion, we document that auditors charge lower fees and report GCOs less conservatively when sentiment is high. However, this reduction in reporting conservatism is unwarranted; results reveal that auditors are less likely to issue GCOs to clients which subsequently file for bankruptcy during high sentiment periods. We conduct additional tests to examine whether auditors' litigation costs indeed vary with sentiment and document that auditors are less likely to be sued and the market reacts less negatively to misstatement announcements when sentiment is high. Collectively, our findings suggest that, although misstatement risk is increasing with sentiment, auditors' litigation risk actually declines.     

Auditor Conservatism,Asymmetric Monitoring,and Earnings Management*

In this paper, we investigate whether, and how, audit effectiveness differentiation between Big 6 and non‐Big 6 auditors is influenced by a conflict or convergence of reporting incentives faced by corporate managers and external auditors. In so doing, we incorporate into our analysis the possibility that managers self‐select both external auditors and discretionary accruals, using the two stage “treatment effects” model. Our results show that only when managers have incentives to prefer income‐increasing accrual choices are Big 6 auditors more effective than non‐Big 6 auditors in deterring/monitoring opportunistic earnings management. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find Big 6 auditors are less effective than non‐Big 6 auditors when both managers and auditors have incentives to prefer income‐decreasing accrual choices and thus no conflict of reporting incentives exists between the two parties. The above findings are robust to different proxies for opportunistic earnings management and different proxies for the direction of earnings management incentives.     

Auditor Quality and the Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts*

In this study, we appeal to insights and results from Davidson and Neu 1993 and McConomy 1998 to motivate empirical analyses designed to gain a better understanding of the relationship between auditor quality and forecast accuracy. We extend and refine Davidson and Neu's analysis of this relationship by introducing additional controls for business risk and by considering data from two distinct time periods: one in which the audit firm's responsibility respecting the earnings forecast was to provide review‐level assurance, and one in which its responsibility was to provide audit‐level assurance. Our sample data consist of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) initial public offerings (IPOs). The earnings forecast we consider is the one‐year‐ahead management earnings forecast included in the IPO offering prospectus. The results suggest that after the additional controls for business risk are introduced, the relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality for the review‐level assurance period is no longer significant. The results also indicate that the shift in regimes alters the fundamental nature of the relationship. Using data from the audit‐level assurance regime, we find a negative and significant relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality (i.e., we find Big 6 auditors to be associated with smaller absolute forecast errors than non‐Big 6 auditors), and further, that the difference in the relationship between the two regimes is statistically significant.     

Debt Covenant Restriction,Financial Misreporting,and Auditor Monitoring*

Theory suggests that financial report-based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false-positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income-increasing and non–income-increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible-inclusive versus intangible-exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.     

Auditor Experience and the Timeliness of Litigation Loss Contingency Disclosures*

This paper hypothesizes and finds that firms audited by city‐industry specialists have more timely disclosures of contingent losses from litigation when there is no news coverage relating to the legal case prior to management disclosures. A closer examination reveals that this result is explained by the specialist auditors’ prior experience auditing clients in the same office and industry who are involved with litigation. In our setting, disclosures of litigation‐related contingent losses, we identify two kinds of knowledge generated from experience: industry knowledge and litigation knowledge. Industry knowledge helps auditors detect and correct poor implementation of guidance for litigation loss contingency disclosures. Auditors gain litigation knowledge from auditing clients in a given office and industry with previous involvement as defendants. Thus, the two types of knowledge interact in their effects on reporting outcomes.     

Auditor Reputation,Auditor Independence,and the Stock‐Market Impact of Andersen's Indictment on Its Client Firms*

In this paper, we study a broad sample of Arthur Andersen clients and investigate whether the decline in Andersen's reputation, due to its criminal indictment on March 14, 2002, adversely affected the stock market's perception of its audit quality. Because these reputa‐tional concerns are more of an issue if an auditor's independence is impaired, we investigate the relationship between the abnormal market returns for Andersen clients around the time of the indictment announcement and several fee‐based measures of auditor independence. Our results suggest that when news about Andersen's indictment was released, the market reacted negatively to Andersen clients. More importantly, we find that the indictment period abnormal return is significantly more negative when the market perceived the auditor's independence to be threatened. We also examine the abnormal returns when firms announced the dismissal of Andersen as an auditor. Consistent with the audit quality explanation, we document that when firms quickly dismissed Andersen, the announcement returns are significantly higher when firms switched to a Big 4 auditor than when they either switched to non‐Big 4 auditors or did not announce the identity of the replacement auditor. Our empirical results support the notion that auditor reputation and independence have a material impact on perceived audit quality and the credibility of audited financial statements, and that the market prices this.     

A Reexamination of Auditor versus Model Accuracy within the Context of the Going-Concern Opinion Decision*

Abstract. The Cohen Commission and previous research have suggested that auditors' opinions are inferior indicators of bankruptcy relative to the predictions of statistical models. This research reexamines this question in light of two important considerations that make the comparison between audit opinions and model predictions considerably more reflective of the auditors' real-world decision environment. First, the sample is partitioned into stressed and nonstressed observations and the importance of doing so is demonstrated; second, the statistical models and the forecast errors are adjusted so that they reflect the proportion of bankrupt firms actually faced by auditors. The empirical results provide convincing evidence suggesting that the notion established in previous research that auditors' opinions are interior to models in predicting bankruptcy is unfounded. It should be noted, however, that neither the auditors' opinions nor the bankruptcy prediction model are very good predictors of bankruptcy when population proportions, differences in misclassification costs, and financial stress levels are considered. Résumé. Les travaux de recherche de la Commission Cohen et d'autres travaux qui les ont précédés semblent indiquer que les opinions des vérificateurs sont des indicateurs de faillite moins efficaces que les prédictions des modèles statistiques. Les auteurs se penchent à leur tour sur cette question, à la lumière de deux éléments importants qui font en sorte que la comparaison entre les opinions des vérificateurs et les modèles prévisionnels s'inscrit beaucoup plus dans le contexte décisionnel véritable dans lequel travaillent les vérificateurs. D'abord, l'échantillon est scindé en deux groupes d'observations selon la présence ou l'absence de contrainte financière, partage dont les auteurs expliquent l'importance; ensuite, les modèles statistiques et les erreurs prévisionnelles sont ajustés de manière & refléter la proportion des sociétés dont la faillite a été envisagée par le vérificateur. Les résultats empiriques démontrent de façon probante que les conclusions tirées des travaux précédents selon lesquelles les opinions des vérificateurs sont moins efficaces que les modèles en matière de prévision des faillites ne sont pas fondées. Il convient de noter, cependant, que ni les opinions des vérificateurs ni les modèles prévisionnels ne sont des prédicteurs très efficaces des faillites si l'on tient compte des proportions de la population, des différences dans le coût des erreurs de classification et du niveau de contrainte financière.     

Two Models of the Auditor - Client Interaction: Tests with United Kingdom Data*

Abstract. Accounting research contains two distinct approaches to the interaction between accounting management and the independent auditor. Game theory suggests that the auditor's testing strategy will affect the manager's reporting strategy and that the two strategies form an equilibrium. The game-theoretic approach views the auditor as active, in that the auditor acknowledges the effect that his or her testing strategy has on the manager's reporting. In contrast, in the decision-theoretic approach, the auditor tests reports, but ignores the effect that such testing might have on the manager's reporting behavior. Essentially, the decision-theoretic approach views the auditor as passive, taking the reporting strategy as given when designing tests. We use United Kingdom data to estimate both models and test their validity using nested hypothesis tests. Our results demonstrate that the active, game-theoretic model better describes the auditor-manager interaction. This is the first empirical validation of the game-theoretic model using archival accounting data.