Trade Credit Risk Management: The Role of Executive Risk‐Taking Incentives

In this study we investigate how executive equity incentives affect companies’ risk‐taking behavior in relationships with their customers. We hypothesize and find that executive risk‐taking incentives provided by options are positively related to the degree of trade credit riskiness measured both as the amount of total trade credit a firm extends to all its customers and as the amount of trade credit a firm extends to customers with a high probability of default. We also find that the measures of trade credit riskiness are positively related to the firm's future stock return volatility, suggesting that the customer default risk inherent in customer‐supplier trade credit relationships represents an important economic source of the overall supplier‐firm riskiness. The findings of the study provide insights into why firms facing financial difficulties are not denied trade credit.     

Controlling Risk in Accounts Receivable Management

In granting trade credit, the credit manager must weigh the expected profit from a sale against the risk of customer default. A common procedure is to sell on credit only to those customers whose risk of default is below some critical level. This procedure does not effectively control a firm's ratio of bad debt to sales. In this paper, formulas are derived for the variance of this ratio under various assumptions regarding the number and size distribution of customers. Knowledge of this variance enables the credit manager to more accurately control his credit losses.     

Optimal clearing margin,capital and price limits for futures clearinghouses

We provide a model for a futures clearinghouse to use for setting optimal levels of clearing margin, capital and price limits, which minimizes the costs to clearing firms and simultaneously protects the clearinghouse from default by clearing firms. We show how to estimate the capital requirement, which supports the clearinghouse’s residual default risk that is not covered by the clearing margin. We apply our model to the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange and demonstrate that price limits reduce the sum of optimal clearing margin and capital to a level that is substantially lower than that required in the absence of price limits.     

民营企业债务违约是内因驱动吗？——基于短贷长投和多元化经营视角的分析

不同于以往从外部因素的角度关注民营企业债务问题,本文从企业自身行为出发分析了民企债务违约是否由内因驱动。具体地,本文考察了短贷长投和多元化经营对民营企业债务违约的影响。结果发现,总体上短贷长投以及多元化程度提高了民企债务违约的可能性。从传导机制上看,短贷长投和多元化降低了企业的盈利水平、提高了过度负债、增加了代理成本,并通过以上三个渠道提高了企业债务违约的可能性。从异质性结果来看,信贷紧缩会加大短贷长投对债务违约的促进作用。对于政府支持的行业而言,短贷长投和多元化引发的债务违约问题更严重。最后,更多的短贷长投和多元化在决策得当情况下不会引发债务违约风险。本文的结果表明,民营企业债务违约主要是由内因驱动,即由企业在“求大”“上层次”的心理下实施的粗放式发展模式驱动。本文对于追溯民企违约的根源、精准施策进而更好地支持民企发展具有一定的启示。     

The benefits and costs of geographic diversification in banking

We estimate the benefits of geographic diversification within states and across states for bank risk and return for all U.S. bank holding companies from 1994 to 2008, and assess whether such benefits depend on bank size. For small banks, only intrastate diversification increases risk-adjusted returns and reduces default risk while for very large institutions only interstate expansions are beneficial but only in terms of default risk. In all cases the relationship is hump-shaped indicating that at some point, the possible agency costs associated with banks getting wider and more geographically diversified outweigh the benefits. Our results indicate that small banks and very large banks could still benefit from further geographic diversification.     

Gender stereotyping in financial advisors’ assessment of customers

This article presents the results of a comparison of male and female advisors’ assessment of their customers. The findings from the empirical material, consisting of 361 advisors’ answers to a questionnaire, show significant evidence that advisors assess their customers differently depending not only on customer gender, but also according to their own gender. The investigated variables are the advisors’ assessment of consumers’ perception of their own risk tolerance, customer satisfaction with the advisor, customer trust in the advisor, customer likelihood to follow the advice given and advisors’ ratings of customer financial literacy. Male advisors rated consumers’ answers higher than did their female colleagues for all variables, with the exception of advisors’ ratings of consumer financial literacy. Advisors and their employers in the financial services industry, as well as policymakers, should be aware of the possible association between advisor gender and potential gender stereotyping of clients.     

Mergers increase default risk

We examine the impact of mergers on default risk. Despite the potential for asset diversification, we find that, on average, a merger increases the default risk of the acquiring firm. This result cannot solely be explained by the tendency for generally safe acquirers to purchase riskier targets or by the tendency of acquiring firms to increase leverage post-merger. Our evidence suggests that managerial motivations may play an important role. In particular, we find larger merger-related increases in risk at firms where CEOs have large option-based compensation, where recent stock performance is poor, and where idiosyncratic equity volatility is high. These results suggest that the increased default risk may arise from aggressive managerial actions affecting risk enough to outweigh the strong risk-reducing asset diversification expected from a typical merger.     

Derivatives Clearing,Default Risk,and Insurance

Using daily data on margins and variation margins for all clearing members of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, we analyze the clearing house exposure to the risk of default by clearing members. We find that the major source of default risk for a clearing member is proprietary trading rather than trading by customers. Additionally, we show that extreme losses suffered by important clearing firms tend to cluster, which raises systemic risk concerns. Finally, we discuss how private insurance could be used to cover the loss from defaults by clearing members.     

The quest for customer focus

Companies have poured enormous amounts of money into customer relationship management, but in many cases the investment hasn't really paid off. That's because getting closer to customers isn't about building an information technology system. It's a learning journey-one that unfolds over four stages, requiring people and business units to coordinate in progressively more sophisticated ways. The journey begins with the creation of a companywide repository containing each interaction a customer has with the company, organized not by product, purchase, or location, but by customer. Communal coordination is what's called for at this stage, as each group contributes its information to the data pool separately from the others and then taps into it as needed. In the second stage, one-way serial coordination from centralized IT through analytical units and out to the operating units allows companies to go beyond just assembling data to drawing inferences. In stage three, companies shift their focus from past relationships to future behavior. Through symbiotic coordination, information flows back and forth between central analytic units and various organizational units like marketing, sales, and operations, as together they seek answers to questions like "How can we prevent customers from switching to a competitor?" and "Who would be most likely to buy a new product in the future"? In stage four, firms begin to move past discrete, formal initiatives and, through integral coordination, bring an increasingly sophisticated understanding oftheir customers to bear in all day-to-day operations. Skipping stages denies organizations the sure foundation they need to build a lasting customer-focused mind-set. Those that recognize this will invest their customer relationship dollars much more wisely-and will see their customer-focusing efforts pay offon the bottom line.     

Customers and investors: A framework for understanding the evolution of financial institutions

Financial institutions are financed by both investors and customers. Investors expect an appropriate risk-adjusted return for providing financing and risk bearing. Customers, in contrast, provide financing in exchange for specific services, and want the service fulfillment to be free of the intermediary's credit risk. We develop a framework that defines the roles of customers and investors in intermediaries, and use it to build an economic theory that has the following main findings. First, with positive net social surplus in the intermediary-customer relationship, the efficient (first best) contract completely insulates the customer from the intermediary's credit risk, thereby exposing the customer only to the risk inherent in the contract terms. Second, when intermediaries face financing frictions, the second-best contract may expose the customer to some intermediary credit risk, generating “customer contract fulfillment” costs. Third, the efficiency loss associated with these costs in the second best rationalizes government guarantees like deposit insurance even when there is no threat of bank runs. We further discuss the implications of this customer-investor nexus for numerous issues related to the design of contracts between financial intermediaries and their customers, the sharing of risks between them, ex ante efficient institutional design, regulatory practices, and the evolving boundaries between banks and financial markets.     

The four faces of mass customization

Virtually all executives today recognize the need to provide outstanding service to customers. Focusing on the customer, however, is both an imperative and a potential curse. In their desire to become customer driven, many companies have resorted to inventing new programs and procedures to meet every customer's request. But as customers and their needs grow increasingly diverse, such an approach has become a surefire way to add unnecessary cost and complexity to operations. Companies around the world have embraced mass customization in an attempt to avoid those pitfalls. Readily available information technology and flexible work processes permit them to customize goods or services for individual customers in high volumes at low cost. But many managers have discovered that mass customization itself can produce unnecessary cost and complexity. They are realizing that they did not examine thoroughly enough what kind of customization their customers would value before they plunged ahead. That is understandable. Until now, no framework has existed to help managers determine the type of customization they should pursue. James Gilmore and Joseph Pine provide managers with just such a framework. They have identified four distinct approaches to customization. When designing or redesigning a product, process, or business unit, managers should examine each approach for possible insights into how to serve their customers best. In some cases, a single approach will dominate the design. More often, however, managers will need a mix of some or all of the four approaches to serve their own particular set of customers.     

What do a million observations have to say about loan defaults? Opening the black box of relationships

Using a unique dataset of more than 1 million loans made by 296 German banks, we evaluate the impact of many aspects of customer–bank relationships on loan default rates. Our research suggests a practical solution to reducing loan defaults for new customers: Have the customer open a simple transactions account – savings or checking account. Observe for some time and then decide whether to make a loan. Loans made under this model have lower default, as banks can use historical data about their borrowers to establish a baseline against which new client-related information can be evaluated. Banks assemble this historical information through relationships of different forms. We define relationships in many different ways to capture non-credit relationships, transaction accounts, as well as the depth and intensity of relationships, and find each of these can provide information that helps reduce default – even establishing a simple savings or checking account and observing the activity prior to loan granting can help reduce loan defaults. Our results show that banks with relationship-specific information act differently compared with banks that do not have this information both in screening and subsequent monitoring borrowers which helps reduce loan defaults.     

手机分期消费贷款信用风险研究——基于RF-Logistic模型的实证分析

识别手机分期消费贷款违约因子是防范手机消费贷款业务信用风险的关键所在。为此,基于融合随机森林（RF）和逻辑回归（Logistics）两阶段模型,通过数据挖掘揭示风险特征重要性含义,并结合经济计量方法诠释异质性客户信用违约的基准逻辑。结果表明：入网时长、终端个数、客户月流量、终端时长是影响手机分期消费贷款客户信用风险的重要性特征变量,且边际影响分别为-0.039%、3.18%、-0.01%、-1.06%,模型泛化能力强,准确率达到74%。所以,要完善手机分期消费贷款信用风险管理应从交叉数据获取、社交网络、兴趣热点和消费习惯等方面着手。     

Manage customer-centric innovation--systematically

No matter how hard companies try, their approaches to innovation often don't grow the top line in the sustained, profitable way investors expect. For many companies, there's a huge difference between what's in their business plans and the market's expectations for growth (as reflected in firms' share prices, market capitalizations, and P/E ratios). This growth gap springs from the fact that companies are pouring money into their insular R&D labs instead of working to understand what the customer wants and using that understanding to drive innovation. As a result, even companies that spend the most on R&D remain starved for both customer innovation and market-capitalization growth. In this article, the authors spell out a systematic approach to innovation that continuously fuels sustained, profitable growth. They call this approach customer-centric innovation, or CCI. At the heart of CCI is a rigorous customer R&D process that helps companies to continually improve their understanding of who their customers are and what they need. By so doing, they consistently create or improve their customer value proposition. Customer R&D also focuses on better ways of communicating value propositions and delivering the complete experience to real customers. Since so much of the learning about customers and so much of the experimentation with different segmentations, value propositions, and delivery mechanisms involve the people who regularly deal with customers, it is absolutely essential for frontline employees to be at the center of the CCI process. Simply put, customer R&D propels the innovation effort away from headquarters and the traditional R&D lab out to those closest to the customer. Using the example of the luggage manufacturer Tumi, the authors provide a step-by-step approach for achieving true customer-centric innovation.     

What price loyalty? A fresh look at loyalty programs in the credit card industry

There is controversy about the effects of loyalty programs in the customer relationship management literature. Although some managers and researchers believe that customer loyalty created through loyalty programs leads to higher firm profits, others have found evidence that loyalty programs do not have a positive effect on firm's profits. In this article, we present our findings regarding the effect of reward cards and affinity cards on customer profitability in the context of credit card industry. We find surprising evidence that customers who own either a reward card or an affinity card generate significantly less profit than those customers who do not have these cards. Equally puzzling is the fact that these customers also have lower average lifetime with the firm. This leads us to a puzzle as to why these practices are widely prevalent in the industry. We find that loyalty cards provide value to the issuers in terms of risk management. They serve as a mechanism to reduce the risk associated with more profitable customers by attracting less risky customers. Thus, through loyalty cards the financial institution is able to balance out the total risk of the portfolio of customers by acquiring customers, who although less profitable, are less risky.     

The impact of geographical factors on churn prediction: an application to an insurance company in Madrid's urban area

Geography has previously been noted as a decisive factor in business literature. This paper provides evidence of the significant role geography plays in customer lapse behaviour in an urban environment. This novel approach is based on the idea that the customers who cancel all policies and leave the company are not randomly distributed; rather, a mimetic performance of close individuals is noted. The physical proximity of the customer to the geographical focus (strategical centre, as insurance offices) and the interaction with nearby customer are spatial factors that increase (or decrease) the probability of churning. An empirical analysis using more than 7000 spatially georeferenced offline customers of a Spanish insurance company in the urban area of Madrid (Spain) demonstrated that the customer's proximity to offices of such insurance company under study decreases the probability of churning, whereas high lapse risk was detected in customers in the surroundings of the company's competitor branches. In addition, we identified spatial autocorrelation in churn probability, thus demonstrating that the probability of churn of a customer increases if nearby customers churn.     

The one number you need to grow

Companies spend lots of time and money on complex tools to assess customer satisfaction. But they're measuring the wrong thing. The best predictor of top-line growth can usually be captured in a single survey question: Would you recommend this company to a friend? This finding is based on two years of research in which a variety of survey questions were tested by linking the responses with actual customer behavior--purchasing patterns and referrals--and ultimately with company growth. Surprisingly, the most effective question wasn't about customer satisfaction or even loyalty per se. In most of the industries studied, the percentage of customers enthusiastic enough about a company to refer it to a friend or colleague directly correlated with growth rates among competitors. Willingness to talk up a company or product to friends, family, and colleagues is one of the best indicators of loyalty because of the customer's sacrifice in making the recommendation. When customers act as references, they do more than indicate they've received good economic value from a company; they put their own reputations on the line. And they will risk their reputations only if they feel intense loyalty. The findings point to a new, simpler approach to customer research, one directly linked to a company's results. By substituting a single question--blunt tool though it may appear to be--for the complex black box of the customer satisfaction survey, companies can actually put consumer survey results to use and focus employees on the task of stimulating growth.     

The term structure of sovereign default risk in EMU member countries and its determinants

We analyze the determinants of sovereign default risk of EMU member states using government bond yield spreads as risk indicators. We focus on default risk for different time spans indicated by spreads for different maturities. Using a panel framework we analyze whether there are different drivers of default risk for different maturities. We find that lower economic growth and larger openness increase default risk for all maturities. Higher indebtedness only increases short-term risk, whereas net lending, trade balance and interest rate costs only drive long-term default risk.     

商业银行集团客户信贷风险管理研究

近年来,一系列集团客户先后爆发债务危机,给银行信贷资产带来重大损失和负面影响。本文针对集团客户的风险特征和我国商业银行的管理缺陷,指出集团客户信贷风险的成因。文中指出构建完善的集团客户风险管理体系主要在于:一是建立集中的信贷风险管理体制;二是建立集团客户风险管理长效机制,包括基础信贷风险管理制度、风险联动监督机制、风险信息预警提示制度、差别化的客户管理机制、有效的风险预警指标体系、双轨互动的风险管理机制、账户资金收支监测分析、内部风险评级体系建设等;三是构建社会监督机制,主要包括行际信息沟通机制、社会信息监督平台及完善银行同业协会功能等。     

The (dis)advantages of clearinghouses before the Fed

Operating in individual cities, US clearinghouses were the closest thing to a central bank before 1914, but they only assisted banks that chose to join the association. Using an annual bank-level database for seven states between 1880 and 1910, this paper shows that after the entry of a clearinghouse member banks were less likely and nonmember banks in the same city were more likely to close. The results are driven by the fact that the presence of clearinghouses led all banks to become more exposed to systemic liquidity risk, yet provided liquidity only to member banks during panics.