Ownership structure and firm performance: Evidence from the Chinese corporate reform

We employ a new classification of ownership identity to analyze the impact of ownership structure on enterprise performance in China. Using both fixed effects model and Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM), this study finds that marketized state-owned enterprises outperform firms controlled by the government, indicating that partial privatization of state-owned Chinese firms improves corporate governance. Non-controlling large shareholders of marketized state-owned enterprises and private enterprises are found to play active roles in corporate governance. Lastly, there is evidence that ownership concentration of a controlling shareholder decreases the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders.     

Corporate governance and the cost of public debt financing: Evidence from Japan

This paper explores the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the cost of public debt financing in Japan. Using a sample of corporate bonds newly issued in Japan during the period 2005–2008, I find that CEO ownership is associated with higher yield spreads after controlling for other governance, bond, and firm characteristics. Founding family ownership is also positively related to yield spreads. In contrast, firms with large corporate shareholders enjoy lower yield spreads. These results are robust to various alternative specifications. Overall, my results indicate the importance of corporate governance mechanisms in Japanese corporate bond markets.     

上市促进了企业创新吗?——来自创业板制造业企业的经验证据

本研究利用手工收集的2009-2013年在创业板市场申请上市的制造业企业样本以及企业创新专利变量,经过对成功上市企业与终止上市企业的样本匹配,运用双重差分模型考察了上市是否促进我国创业板制造业企业创新,研究结果表明,上市显著促进了企业专利创新。进一步地,我们探讨了上市促进企业创新的机制,结果发现,上市通过改善融资约束显著促进了企业创新,而上市没能通过影响代理问题作用于企业创新。该结果意味着直接金融发展有助于推动企业创新;资本市场的风险分担及融资机制能够降低企业融资约束、进而促进企业创新。这不仅为直接金融促进企业创新提供了新的证据,也为我国进一步发展与完善资本市场,进而促进经济转型、创新发展提供了新的政策启示。     

制度视角的家族治理与企业绩效研究——来自中德上市家族企业的对比证据

家族集中所有权、控制权和家族涉入管理对企业绩效到底有利还是有弊？相对于发达资本主义国家的企业,处于转型经济中的中国企业面临的外部不确定性更高,上述关系在不同经济体之间是否有区别？企业的治理效果取决于内外两种机制,内部的家族治理系统是对外部制度环境的不完善的补充。我们选取处于成熟市场经济的德国上市家族企业与处于转型经济中的中国上市家族企业进行实证对比,从制度的视角来探讨上述问题。研究结果显示两国上市家族企业的家族治理与企业绩效之间的关系是不一样的。结论表明治理结构并不一定对企业绩效产生直接影响,不同的制度环境会导致不同的作用机制产生。     

Discretion in Financial Reporting: The Voluntary Disclosure of Compensation Peer Groups in Proxy Statement Performance Graphs*

We examine the 49 Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 firms that voluntarily disclosed in their 1993 proxy statements, the composition of the comparison group used by each board's compensation committee to set executive compensation policies. We hypothesize that the net benefits of this disclosure are largest when (1) there is a high degree of stakeholder concern about compensation, (2) compensation policies are defensible, and (3) corporate governance is strong. Consistent with our stakeholder concern prediction, disclosing firms have higher compensation levels and are more apt to have received prior shareholder proposals about executive compensation. Contrary to this prediction, we find a negative association between financial press coverage of compensation policies and the probability of disclosure. Additionally, the disclosure decision is unrelated to the defensibility of compensation policies and the firm's corporate governance profile. Industry-adjusted firm performance, managerial entrenchment, CEO tenure, institutional holdings, and compensation committee independence variables are insignificant. We also compare the financial performance and compensation practices of compensation peers to two yardsticks — performance and pay practices at the sample firms and the corresponding S&P industry index firms. The compensation levels of compensation peers exceed those of the firms in the corresponding S&P industry indexes. Because (1) compensation levels and performance sensitivities at sample firms are more similar to those at compensation peers than to those at S&P industry index firms, and (2) the superior financial performance and higher performance sensitivities of disclosing firms justify high pay, this evidence suggests that the compensation peers of disclosing firms are an appropriate comparison group.     

股权结构异质性与治理效率：前沿理论与实证研究评述

股权结构是公司治理制度安排对外部环境不确定性的一个动态反应过程,其异质性特征影响企业的治理行为,产生收益与成本。在经济转型背景下,基于股权结构的公司治理效应研究非常普及,通过影响和塑造公司治理行为选择而影响整个经济系统。本文以股权结构异质性为主线,对股权结构类型、非控制性大股东、股东合谋和终极股权四个维度,结合中国情境下的股权结构异质性的应用研究进行文献梳理与述评,以期为我国公司治理制度下发挥股权结构的治理效应提供借鉴与启示。     

试论IRM、公司治理与公司战略的关系

良好的投资者关系管理通过双向沟通,能够有效保护投资者的知情权,有助于吸引机构投资者和长期投资者,利于公司制订长期战略;对投资者类别的划分也有助于调整和完善股权结构。借助资本市场,投资者关系管理能够对公司治理和公司战略产生互动作用,帮助企业在资本市场上获取竞争优势。投资者关系管理既是公司治理的重要内容,也是一项重要的公司战略行为。     

Small firm internationalization,innovation, and growth

This paper studies the effect of internationalization on innovation and firm performance (employment growth and sales growth) taking the interdependencies among the variables into account. Given the potential endogeneity, this study uses theory-driven instrumental variables and structural equation modelling to estimate the direct and indirect effects of internationalization. Firm-level data is obtained from a survey of 150 Dutch small firms that took part in an export promotion program. The main results show that internationalization has a positive impact on innovation. Internationalization increases firm performance directly and indirectly through innovation, while the direct impact of innovation on firm performance is insignificant. We contribute to the literature of export promotion programs as our results suggest that they not only increase small firm internationalization but also affect innovation and firm growth.     

The Role of Pension Business Benefits in Institutional Block Ownership and Corporate Governance*

We investigate whether potential pension contracting benefits lead institutions that provide pension services to acquire ownership blocks in firms and the implications of such blockholdings on the firms' corporate governance. We use the 2006 Pension Protection Act, which expanded pension participation in certain states, as a quasi-exogenous shock and find an increase in block ownership by pension-providing institutions in firms with substantial operations in affected states. Further, we find that the acquisition of a large block increases the likelihood that the institution will provide future pension services to the firm. With regard to corporate governance, we find that the acquisition of large pension blockholdings is associated with higher CEO pay and lower CEO turnover following poor financial performance. However, contrary to the prediction of the private benefits hypothesis, we do not find consistent evidence that large pension blockholdings are associated with declining firm profitability, suggesting that pension institutions are incentivized to exert monitoring to preserve the investment value of their blockholdings. Overall, our evidence is consistent with pension service institutions acquiring ownership blocks to obtain pension contracts, but our evidence does not support the prediction that they use their influence to compromise shareholder value.     

An empirical assessment of the effects of trade in innovative tasks on innovation output

Multinational firms are increasingly sending their innovative tasks abroad. This article examines whether offshoring research and development, design, and engineering activities provides any gains in terms of firm‐level innovation output. The effects of trade in innovative tasks on the probability of firms being innovative and the share of innovative product sales in total turnover are examined using an instrumental variable approach. The data in use come from a recent survey, which provides cross‐section observations for more than 14,750 firms in seven European countries. The results suggest that those firms that offshore their innovative activities are 60% more likely to successfully innovate. Also, offshoring innovative activities increases the share of innovative product sales in total turnover up to 35%. Furthermore, firms in this sample appear to gain from trade in innovative tasks when such trade is in product innovation but not when such trade is in process innovation.     

Foreign Ownership and Firm Innovation: Evidence from Korea

ABSTRACT

This study examines whether foreign equity investment promotes domestic firms’ innovation activities. Using panel data on the Korean firms during the 1999–2013 period, we find that foreign ownership has a positive effect on firms’ innovation activities. Furthermore, we also show that, as compared to non-chaebol firms, chaebol firms’ innovation activity becomes much greater with the increase of foreign ownership. Finally, we investigate industry-level spillover effects of innovation. Specifically, we find that foreign ownership promotes innovation activities via forward linkage, the effect of which is also more pronounced in chaebol firms.     

家族涉入方式的差异如何影响企业双元创新意愿?

文章以2012-2017 年中国上市家族企业的数据,基于社会情感财富理论,分析了家族在股权与管理层两种不同涉入方式下的战略偏好与目标导向,进而探究出其对于双元创新的影响,并结合产品市场竞争环境下的情形,进一步分析了市场竞争的加剧对于股权涉入和管理层涉入与双元创新关系的调节效应。结果发现：家族在股权涉入与利用式创新呈显著的正相关,但与开发式创新呈负相关,而家族管理层涉入与利用式创新和开发式创新均呈现显著的正相关;产品市场环境的竞争能够加强家族股权涉入与利用式创新的正向关系和家族管理层涉入与开发式创新的正向关系。     

Residual government ownership and corporate investment efficiency in privatised firms: evidence from a transition country

This paper delves into the link between residual government ownership and investment efficiency in privatised firms in a transitional economy. The study uses a data set covering firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange, Vietnam, over the period from 2007 to 2015. It is found that firms with higher residual government ownership are associated with lower levels of investment efficiency. The finding suggests that government ownership is less beneficial than private ownership in privatised firms. The paper has important implications for policymakers in supporting privatisation policy and in designing a framework to promote better corporate governance in privatised firms after privatisation.     

Financial performance and corporate governance in microfinance: Evidence from Asia

Good corporate governance is considered a building block of success for microfinance institutions (MFIs) as it is presumed to help them in achieving their social and financial goals. This paper analyzes the corporate governance and financial performance relationship for MFIs in Asia. We make use of a panel dataset involving 173 MFIs in 18 Asian countries for the period 2007–2011. We construct a corporate governance index based on seven measures pertaining to board size and composition, CEO characteristics, and ownership type. We then estimate the two-way relationship between this index and each of five different financial performance indicators. To address the likely simultaneity between corporate governance and financial performance, we adopt a two-stage least squares estimation approach with instrumental variables. Our results confirm the endogenous nature of corporate governance and financial performance. We conclude that profitability and sustainability of MFIs improve with good governance practices and conversely that more profitable and sustainable MFIs have better governance systems.     

The impact of family ownership and capital structures on productivity performance of Korean manufacturing firms: Corporate governance and the “chaebol problem”

This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance and productivity performance, focusing on family ownership and capital structure. Paying particular attention to chaebols, or large business groups with entrenched family control, diversified business structure, and heavy debt-dependence, we find the positive relationship between family ownership concentration and productivity performance to be much stronger in chaebol firms than in non-chaebol firms. Moreover, high debt reliance (or low equity–asset ratio) is shown to be negatively related to productivity performance in non-chaebol firms but positively in chaebol firms. J. Japanese Int. Economies 20 (2) (2006) 209–233.     

Corporate Governance and CEO Innovation

A fundamental concern emerging from the corporate literature is the agency problem of innovation. While innovation is considered as a major driver of corporate growth and profitability, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has an intrinsic reluctance to pursue innovation projects. The thrust of this paper is to identify the mechanisms of corporate governance which help attenuate this problem, thereby encouraging the CEO to have the propensity to innovate. The empirical results suggest that firms with a widespread dispersion of shares among shareholders are less likely to encourage the CEO to innovate. The likelihood of innovation appears to increase, however, in the presence of a large shareholder. Contrary to prevailing beliefs, there appears to be no association between innovation and board independence. The same result holds for board size. Also, a diverse board appears to negate CEO predisposition to innovate. On the other hand, innovation increases when the CEO is not the Board Chair but has equity ownership, although the incentive effect is economically small. The paper uses a sample of domestically-owned, publicly-listed Australian firms over the period 1994–2003.     

文化多样性与企业绿色创新

中国具有5000 多年的历史沉淀，文化是影响企业行为的重要非正式制度因素之一。基于此，聚焦中国情境，从文化多样性视角，选取2007-2018 年沪深两市A 股上市公司，利用城市方言分化指数度量地域文化多样性，探究非正式制度对企业绿色创新的影响。通过检验发现，文化多样性通过抑制企业高管的短视行为、激发本地人力资本创造力促进绿色创新。在非重点监控的污染企业、短期机构投资者持股比例更高的企业以及民营企业中文化多样性对绿色创新的促进作用表现的更加明显。同时，进一步考察了可能的内生性问题及可能的遗漏变量等问题后，研究发现依然稳健。研究有助于探究文化多样性的本质在企业治理场景中的映射，为从非正式制度角度理解企业绿色发展差异性提供了实证证据。     

Independent directors and firm performance in family controlled firms: evidence from Indonesia

We analyse the relationship between board structure and firm performance in family‐controlled firms using a sample of Indonesian non‐financial companies. We find that the share of independent directors on the board has an insignificant relationship with firm performance. We suspect that the result is driven by the lack of institutional reforms in relation to the appointment of independent directors. Our analysis shows strong empirical support for the proposition that family control (family ownership and family involvement on the board) is negatively related to firm performance. However, the significant effect of family ownership disappears when family involvement on the board is taken into the model. This result indicates that family ownership is more detrimental to firm performance whenever the family is highly involved in control decisions. Our results suggest that Indonesia needs to implement governance reforms that prevent majority owners from exercising excessive control over firms.     

Post‐IFRS Revaluation Adjustments and Executive Compensation

International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) allow firms to record adjustments (gains or losses) from the revaluation of investment properties in their income statements. After Hong Kong adopted IFRS in 2005, property companies were required to move their revaluation gains and losses (RGL) from equity to income. We find RGL to be a significant determinant of executive compensation in these firms after 2005, but not before. We further find evidence that the RGL‐compensation association is driven by firms with relative weak corporate governance structure, such as firms in which the controlling shareholders own a relatively small percentage of shares, firms in which the controlling shareholders have control rights that exceed ownership rights, and firms that are no longer run by their founders.     

夫妻共同持股、公司治理与家族企业社会责任

婚姻和家庭关系可以通过家庭成员的嵌入而深刻影响家族企业的公司治理及战略决策。文章采用手工搜集的2010-2018年中国A股上市家族企业实际控制人及其配偶持股数据，检验了夫妻共同持股的治理模式对家族企业社会责任的影响。结果发现：相比丈夫单独持股企业，夫妻共同持股家族企业的社会责任表现更差，其CSR总得分与CSR评级均显著更低。机制检验表明，夫妻共同持股时，双方家族成员会更多的介入企业经营治理并担任董监高职务、企业内部控制质量更差、大股东利益侵占更加严重，低效的公司治理水平抑制了家族企业的社会责任表现。文章结论在采用工具变量法、PSM、安慰剂检验、实际控制人婚变等一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立。文章研究表明女性“她力量”未能在家族企业社会责任领域发挥决定性作用。