Welfare Implications of EU Enlargement under the CAP

The qualitative impacts of European Union (EU) enlargement on intervention prices, variable import levies, and export restitution payments for cereal under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are analyzed using a partial equilibrium framework for EU cereal crops. The welfare implications are developed for both a net exporter and net importer. Consumer surplus, producer surplus, government revenue, and total welfare are compared and contrasted for the EU and the new entrant, both before and after enlargement. Dans le présent article, les répercussions qualitatives de l'élargissement de l'UE sur les prix d'intervention, les prélèvements variables à l'importation et les paiements de restitution à l'exportation des céréales dans le cadre de la Politique agricole commune (PAC) sont analysés à l'aide d'un modèle d'équilibre partiel pour les cultures céréalières de l'UE. Les répercussions sur le bien–être sont élaborées dans le cas d'un exportateur net et d'un importateur net. Le surplus des consommateurs, le surplus des producteurs, les recettes publiques et le bien–être total sont comparés pour l'UE et le nouveau venu, et ce, avant et après l'élargissement de l'UE.     

辉煌成就 宝贵经验 深刻教训 宏伟愿景

<正>60年一个甲子,一个轮回已经过去。我国粮食由过去温饱不足到现在总体小康;由过去青黄不接到现在衣食无忧;由过去统购统销到现在市场自由选择,发生了翻天覆地的巨变,取得了举世瞩目的成就。     

Efficiency, subsidies, and environmental adaptation of animal farming under CAP

The purpose of this article is to model the interaction between the targets of the current Comman Agriculture Politic (CAP): environmental adaptation, subsidies, and efficiency of animal farming. To this end we first have to identify the production frontier and relative efficiency level for each animal‐oriented farm in the sample. The production frontier and efficiency index for each type of farm (assuming no specific production functions) are identified using Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) techniques. We then address the relationship between relative efficiency, farm size, and environmentally friendly behavior by carrying out a nonparametric regression of efficiency, on economic size, a proxy for the degree of environmental appropriateness, and regional dummies. Calculations of the efficiency of the farms including direct subsidies are compared with the counterfactual exercise in the case in which direct subsidies are not considered. Finally, we look for relations between subsidies and factors such as farm size, efficiency, and environmentally friendly behavior. One key result shows that, on average direct payments generally tend to increase efficiency. However, in most of the cases the mean efficiency decreases as the percentage of direct payments rises. Direct payments are found to be positively related to environmentally friendly production, at least in Germany. However, in general, the direct payment system is not sufficient to offset the fact that the less environmentally friendly farms as well as the larger farms are more efficient.     

CAP BONDS: A SCEPTICAL VIEW

Comment Doubt is cast on the feasibility of a bond scheme for reforming the CAP; as advocated by Swinbank and Tangermann (EuroChoices, Premier Issue). Attention is drawn to the unsatisfactory outcome of the recent American experiment with discarding stabilising price support in favour of tapering decoupled payments. The inherent instability of agriculture is such that in times of acute financial stress farmers are always going to turn to the government for relief. With the US now considering the possibility of re‐introducing some form of countercyclical farm price support, there may be a case for the ELI to follow suit. In that event, pre‐1973 UK experience with deficiency payments could usefully be drawn on. An outstanding advantage of DPs is that market prices continue to prevail for consumers and markets clear. Commentaire On peut douter de la faisabilité du projet de titres obligataires préconisé par Swinbank et Tangermann pour réformer la PAC (EuroChoices, Premier numéro). Nous nous proposons d'attirer 1'attention sur le résultat ram satisfaisant de l'expérience américaine récente qui substitue des paiements découplés dégressifs au soutien permettant de stabiliser les prix. L'instabilité propre a l'agriculture est telle qu'en période de difficulté financière aiguë, les agriculteurs se tournent toujours vers le gouvernement pour ehercher de l'aide. Comme les Etats‐Unis cherchent maintenant la possibilité de réintroduire une certaine forme de politique anti‐cyclique tie soutien des prix agricoles, l'Union Européenne pourrait leur emboîater le pas. Dans ce cas, l'expérience des paiements compensatoires menée au Royaume‐Uni avant 1973 pourrait servir de leçon. En effet, les paiements compensatoires présentent l'avantage remarquable de permettre aux marchés de fonctionner et aux prix de marché de continuer à servir de signal aux consommateurs. Kommentar Der Vorschlag von Swinbank und Tangermann (EuroChoices, Frühjahr 2001), die Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik (GAP) mit Hilfe von Bonds zu reformieren, wird kritisch betrachtet. Das Augenmerk wird auf das unbefriedigende Ergebnis des jüngsten amerikanischen Experiments gelenkt, in welchem die sich stabilisierend auswirkende Preisstützung durch abnehmende entkoppelte Zahlungen ersetzt wurde. Die der Landwirtschaft innewohnende Instabilität äußert sich clarin, dass sich Landwirte in Zeiten akuter finanzieller Not Hilfe suchend an den Staat wenden. Da die USA zur Zeit die Wiedereinführung von antizyklischen Agrarpreissubventionen in Betracht Ziehen, könnte die EU womöglich nachziehen. In diesem Fall könnten die Erfahrungen mit Produktsubventionen herangezogen werden, welche in den Jahren vor 1973 in Großbritannien gemacht wurden. Ein bemerkenswerter Vorteil von Produktsubventionen besteht darin, dass sich der Verbraucher weiterhin an clen Marktpreisen orientiert und dass die Märkte geräumt werden. Reply We have three difficulties with Ingersent's concerns. First, he takes our comments out of context. We advocated that existing area and headage payments be replaced by a fully decoupled transferable bond; but envisaged this operating in the context of other policy instruments to deal with the legitimate concerns of society. Second, Ingersent misinterprets the stability implications of our proposals. Decoupling payments from production and conversion into bonds does not as such result in less stability; and he forgets about policy uncertainty. Third, deficiency payments will tend to raise, as well as stabilise, producer prices; and will export price instability to world markets. Reponse Les propos d'Ingersent nous posent trois problèmes. D'abord, il prend nos commentaires hors contexte. Nous avons préconisé le remplacement des paiements existants par région et par tête par une obligation transférable entitièrement découplée, mais nous avons envisagé son fonctionnement au sein d'un ensemble d'autres mesures répondant aux inquiétudes légitimes de la société. Deuxièmement, Ingersent interpréte mal les conséquences de nos propositions sur la stabilité des prix. Les paiements découplés de la production et la conversion en obligations n'entraînent pas en tant que tels une stabilité moindre et il ne tient pas compte des aléas politiques. Troisièmement, les paiements compensatoires tendront autant à faire augmenter les prix à la production qu'à les stabiliser et ils transfèreront l'instabilité des prix à la production sur les marchés mondiaux. Antwort Wir sehen Ingersents Einwände an drei Stellen als problematisch an. Erstens wurden unsere Anmerkungen aus clem Kontext gerissen. Wir haben eine Umwandlung der vorhandenen Flächen‐ und Kopfzahlungen in vollständig entkoppelte, übertragbare Bonds befürwortet; dies sollte jedoch in den Kontext weiterer Politikinstrumente zur Berücksichtigung der legitimen Anliegen der Gesellschaft etngebettet werden. Zweitens fehlinterpretiert Ingersent die Implikationen unserer Vorschläge auf die Stabilität. Die Entkopplung der Zahlungen von der Produktion und die Umwandlung in Bonds führt nicht zwangsläufig zu weniger Stabilität. Ingersent lässt außerdem die Politikunsicherheit außer Acht. Drittens weisen Produktsubventionen neben ihrem stabilisierenden Effekt eine Tendenz zur Erhöhung der Produzentenpreise auf Weiterhin wird die Preisinstabilität auf die Weltmärkte exportiert.     

The Impact of Direct Income Transfers of CAP on Greek Olive Farms’ Performance: Using a Non‐Monotonic Inefficiency Effects Model

We analyse the impacts of direct income transfers on the technical efficiency of Greek olive farms. We use a production frontier function and a non‐monotonic inefficiency effects model, which incorporates the influences of exogenous variables (subsidies, farm characteristics, etc.) on technical efficiency. The model is applied to 1995–2004 FADN data. The results show that direct transfers of the CAP had a negative and monotonic effect on technical efficiency, whereas the degree of specialisation had a non‐monotonic effect on technical efficiency.     

The EU Budget and the CAP: An Agenda for the Review?

The promised review of the EU Budget in 2008 offers an opportunity to bring CAP financing into line with logic, justice and the rest of EU policy. Currently, the CAP is unique amongst European policies in being both mandatory and requiring 100 per cent financing by the EU budget. While this made good sense at the policy's inception, it is now an obsolete anachronism. A sensible and defensible agenda for financial reform, which is all that is on the reform agenda at present, is to make the EU budget responsible for only a fraction (say 25 per cent) of the costs of the current CAP, instead of the present 100 per cent. This would bring CAP financing into line with other EU policies, and make member states separately responsible for the balance for their own farmers, as they so wish, up to the CAP budgetary ceiling already agreed. Any resulting competition between member states in the extent and means by which they continue (or not) to support farmers through direct payments would be controlled through EU Competition and single market policies. Such competition would also provide a good opportunity for experiments with policy development, to the advantage of all, since different policies are required for the different stages of development and different local conditions now evident within the EU.     

Strengths and Weaknesses of Crosscompliance in the CAP

Cross-compliance has increasingly been used to integrate environmental considerations into the CAP. From 2005 it became compulsory for all Member States to ensure that recipients of Single Farm Payments adhered to Statutory Management Requirements (SMRs), stemming from 19 EU regulations and directives, and kept their whole agricultural holding in 'Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition' (GAEC), to be defined by Member States or regional authorities. The potential for cross-compliance to enhance implementation of EU environmental legislation and reach a large area of farmland seems good, although there are some questions remaining over whether it will reach the agricultural land at most risk of environmental damage or with the highest nature value. In addition, farmers could react in several ways to exempt themselves or some area of their holding from cross-compliance conditions. Member States or regional authorities have taken a variety of approaches to setting cross-compliance standards, some of which seem minimal and vague. There is scope for the SMRs and GAEC to cover more environmental issues. Better guidance at EU level and increased communication could enhance implementation of cross-compliance. Self-audits, co-operation with private assurance schemes or other methods of monitoring should be explored to maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of administrative efforts.     

Learning from the other: Benefit sharing lessons for REDD+ implementation based on CBFM experience in Northern Tanzania

A key challenge facing interventions in forestry sector is how to ensure that benefit-sharing arrangements meet the needs and aspirations of poor rural people. In particular, as interest and effort builds around REDD+, it is important to remember that it, and any other intervention, are likely to be shaped by the history of Tanzania’s forestry sector, especially community based forest management. This paper examines benefit lessons for REDD+ from a well-known Tanzanian Forest Reserve which has begun to participate in selling carbon. The example is particularly important as it is one of the oldest cases of village-based forest management in the country. To explore this case a total of 101 households from two reserve-adjacent villages were randomly interviewed along with key informant interviews, transect walks, participant observation, and focus group discussions. Findings of the study revealed that majority of respondents felt benefits are concentrated on an elite due to weak governance mechanisms. We argue that local governance and central oversight will enhance good benefit sharing under REDD+ and future interventions in the forest sector.     

CAP Subsidies and Productivity of the EU Farms

The paper investigates the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies on farm total factor productivity (TFP) in the European Union (EU). We employ a structural semi‐parametric estimation algorithm directly incorporating the effect of subsidies into a model of unobserved productivity. We empirically study the effects using the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) samples for the EU‐15 countries. Our main findings are clear: subsidies impact negatively on farm productivity in the period before the decoupling reform was implemented; after decoupling the effect of subsidies on productivity is more nuanced and in several countries it turned positive.     

EU Enlargement,the CAP and the Cost of Direct Payments: A Note

Negotiations over EU enlargement have highlighted difficulties in extending the CAP – and in particular direct payments ‐ to the applicant countries, given the spending limits agreed in Berlin in 1999. This note presents estimates of direct payment costs in the Eastern European applicants. It argues that the only way all member states in an enlarged EU can receive the same level of payments is if the payments currently prevailing in the EU15 are reduced.