Money is an experience good: Competition and trust in the private provision of money

The interplay between competition and trust as efficiency-enhancing mechanisms in the private provision of money is studied. With commitment, trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures efficiency. Without commitment, competition plays no role. Trust does play a role but requires a bound on efficiency. Stationary inflation must be non-negative and, therefore, the Friedman rule cannot be achieved. The quality of money can be observed only after its purchasing capacity is realized. In this sense, money is an experience good.     

The Friedman rule: Old and new

In overlapping generations models, money growth creates intergenerational wealth effects and leads to the breakdown of the Friedman rule; the rule can be restored via lump-sum tax and transfers that neutralize these wealth transfers. Additionally, and in contrast to money-in-the-utility-function models, the Friedman rule is not the unique first-best solution in cash-in-advance-constraint models of money: a continuum of combinations of money growth rates and consumption taxes implement the first-best allocation. This paper traces through the intellectual origins of the first (old) result, which was recently restated in Bhattacharya, et al. [2005. Monetary policy, fiscal policy, and the inflation tax: equivalence results. Macroeconomic Dynamics 7, 647-669.] and formally demonstrates the second (new) result.     

The Friedman Rule in a Model with Endogenous Growth and Cash‐in‐Advance Constraint

This paper introduces money into an overlapping‐generations model with endogenous growth. The main message of the paper is that as long as the modified golden rule is attained, the Friedman rule is optimal. The result holds regardless of the ability of the government to internalize the externality and control the level of human capital. Other results include: (i) violation of the Friedman rule for a different second‐best environment wherein human capital accumulation is controlled but not physical capital accumulation and (ii) existence of a negative relationship between money growth rate and the economy’s endogenous growth rate.     

Fiscal Requirements for Dynamic and Real Determinacies in Economies with Private Provision of Liquidity: A Monetarist Assessment

We study the impact of fiscal policies on the inherent links between inflation, unemployment, and asset prices in an environment where firms provide liquidity and the central bank follows a constant money growth rate rule. Firms, other than hiring workers, also supply private assets that are not only useful as a store of value but also as collateral. When firms are not taxed and public debt is scarce, the economy is non-Ricardian so that real indeterminacies can be observed. Moreover, labor market characteristics do not affect the demand for government liabilities. However, when agents face public and private asset scarcity, labor market conditions then impact asset prices and inflation. We further show that irrespective of the type of asset scarcity agents face, when firms are taxed non-ad valorem, not only the level of tax revenues but also its composition matter for real allocations. Moreover, we show that labor market conditions directly affect the dynamics of all government liabilities and inflation.     

Model Uncertainty and Delegation: A Case for Friedman's k-Percent Money Growth Rule?

Model uncertainty affects the monetary policy delegation problem. If there is uncertainty with regards to the determination of the delegated objective variables, the central bank will want robustness against potential model misspecifications. We show that with plausible degree of model uncertainty, delegation of the Friedman rule of increasing the money stock by k percent to the central bank will outperform commitment to the social loss function (flexible inflation targeting). The reason is that the price paid for robustness under flexible inflation targeting outweighs the inefficiency of money growth targeting. Imperfect control of money growth does not change this conclusion.     

A model of money with multilateral matching

We develop a model of decentralized monetary exchange to examine the distributional effects of inflation across heterogeneous agents. The agents have private information about their productivity, preferences, or money holdings. Matching is multilateral and each seller is visited by a stochastic number of buyers. The good is allocated according to a second-price auction in money. In equilibrium, homogeneous buyers hold different amounts of money leading to price dispersion. We find the closed-form solution for the distribution of money holdings. Entry of sellers is suboptimal except at the Friedman rule. Inflation acts as a regressive tax.     

确定情形下的货币、利率与内生经济增长

通过对消费和资本投入施加预付现金约束,在内生经济增长框架（AK模型）下建立了一个封闭的货币经济体,并构建了以利率为核心的分析框架。研究表明,在确定情形下,利率的改变会影响代理人的消费与投资,并进而对价格和经济总体的消费与投资产生影响,货币当局可以通过利率以间接控制货币供给;当货币供给变化时,经济总体的消费与投资等变量也会发生变化,货币不是中性的;通过比较最优利率政策与Friedman法则,发现两者惟一的区别仅在于最初期利率的不同。     

Optimality of the Friedman Rule in an Overlapping Generations Model with Spatial Separation

Recent models with spatial separation and limited communication suggest that the Friedman rule may not be optimal. This is important in light of the disparity between theory and practice concerning optimal monetary policy. We take a close look at these models and show that intergenerational transfers are key to the suboptimality of the Friedman rule. The Friedman rule is a necessary condition for achieving the efficient allocation in equilibrium. We also show that the Friedman rule is chosen whenever agents can implement mutually beneficial arrangements.     

Monetary policy and distribution

A segmented markets model of monetary policy is constructed, in which a novel feature is goods market segmentation, and its relationship to conventional asset market segmentation. The implications of the model for the response of prices, interest rates, consumption, labor supply, and output to monetary policy are determined. As well, optimal monetary policy is studied, as are the costs of inflation. The model features persistent nonneutralities of money, relative price effects of increases in the money supply, persistent liquidity effects, and a negative Fisher effect from a money supply increase. A Friedman rule is in general suboptimal.     

Has government any role in money?

Recent interest in monetary reform has been sparked by the emergence of a world irredeemable paper money system. In light of this interest, we review the current validity of four ‘good reasons’ Friedman advanced in 1960 to rationalize government intervention. We conclude that the forces that produced government involvement in the past will persist. Deregulation of financial intermediaries is desirable on grounds of market efficiency, though it is an open question whether government should continue as lender of last resort. We expect that the present world fiat money standard will neither degenerate into hyperinflation nor revert to a commodity standard.     

In Old Chicago: Simons,Friedman, and the Development of Monetary‐Policy Rules

This paper examines the different policy rules proposed by Henry Simons, who, beginning in the mid‐1930s, advocated a price‐level stabilization rule, and by Milton Friedman, who, beginning in the late‐1950s, advocated a rule that targeted a constant growth rate of the money supply. Although both rules shared the objective of eliminating the policy uncertainty emanating from discretion, they differed because of the different views of Simons and Friedman about the stability of secular relationships. Simons’ rule relates to modern rules that emphasize the pursuit of price stability as representing optimal monetary policy.     

Inflation and Welfare: A Search Approach

This paper uses a search model of monetary exchange to provide new insights for evaluating the welfare costs of inflation. We first show that the search model of money can rationalize the estimates of the welfare cost of inflation based on the "welfare triangle" methodology of Bailey (1956) and Lucas (2000) provided that buyers appropriate the social marginal benefit of their real balances. For other mechanisms, the measure given by the welfare triangle has to be scaled up by a factor that increases with sellers' market power. We introduce capital and endogenous participation decisions and study how the cost of inflation is affected. We provide calibrated examples in which a deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal.     

A Proposal to Improve the VAT Treatment of Housing in the European Union*

The treatment of housing is one of the most difficult issues under the VATs in the EU. Ideally, rents and rental values should be taxed just like other consumer goods and services, but doing so would present formidable practical and political difficulties. Under a second‐best approach, the value of newly created residential (and other) property is taxed as a proxy for the VAT that should be payable on the flow of housing (building) services. This implies, however, that future increases (and decreases) in the value of the exempt property are left out of the VAT base. To remedy this defect, this paper recommends taxing the increases (refunding the tax related to decreases) realised at the time of sale of the exempt used property. This VAT should replace the current transfer, registration and stamp duties, which are highly distortionary. Beyond that, the VATs in various member states can be improved by limiting the exemption for all used immovable property to housing, by taxing land and by applying the standard rate more widely than is currently the case.     

The Friedman rule and inflation targeting

We use concepts from the financial economics discipline – and in particular the methods of continuous time finance – to develop a monetarist model under which the rate of inflation evolves in terms of a first-order mean reversion process based on a ‘white noise’ error structure. The Fokker–Planck (i.e. the Chapman–Kolmogorov) equation is then invoked to retrieve the steady-state (i.e. unconditional) probability distribution for the rate of inflation. Monthly data for the UK Consumer Price Index (CPI) covering the period from 1988 until 2012 are then used to estimate the parameters of the probability distribution for the UK inflation rate. The parameter estimates are compatible with the hypothesis that the UK inflation rate evolves in terms of a slightly skewed and highly leptokurtic probability distribution that encompasses non-convergent higher moments. We then determine the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman fundamental equation of optimality corresponding to a monetary policy loss function defined in terms of the squared difference between the targeted rate of inflation and the actual inflation rate. Optimising and then solving the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation shows that the optimal control for the rate of increase in the money supply will be a linear function of the difference between the current rate of inflation and the targeted inflation rate. The conditions under which the optimal control will lead to the Friedman rule are then determined. These conditions are used in conjunction with the Fokker–Planck equation and the mean reversion process describing the evolution of the inflation rate to determine the probability distribution for the inflation rate under the Friedman rule. This shows that whilst the empirically determined probability distribution for the UK inflation rate meets some of the conditions required for the application of the Friedman rule, it does not meet them all.     

A proposal to apply the Kiwi-VAT to insurance services in the European Union

In the spirit of the European Commission’s call for a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system, this article proposes to integrate exempt insurance services into the European VAT, and to abolish the discriminatory, excise-type insurance premium taxes levied by the various Member States. The current VAT exemption (no taxation of insurance services and no credit for the VAT on inputs) is administratively complex and economically distortionary. Instead, the value added of property and casualty insurance companies can be taxed on a transactions basis by applying the VAT to insurance premiums (creditable by VAT-liable businesses) and allowing a presumptive tax credit for the VAT imputable to payouts (plus a credit for the actual VAT on purchases). The presumptive tax credit should be taxed at the level of business recipients, but individuals would receive the VAT along with indemnity payments without having to file a return. Exceptionally, the tax-credit VAT would not be applied to life and health insurance premiums, but insurers would be taxed on an accounts basis on the sum of wages and business cash flow.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital

This paper is concerned with the structure and time-consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital. In a dynamic context, optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare-maximizing way. For a barter economy, our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure, an optimal policy, if one exists, is time-consistent. In a monetary economy, the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an ‘inflation tax’, and we find that time-consistency does not carry over. An optimal ‘inflation tax’ requires commitment by ‘rules’ in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes. The reason time-consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should, from a welfare-maximizing point of view, always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of ‘capital levy’. This emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital.     

Mixed Integer Programming Revealed Preference Tests of Utility Maximization and Weak Separability of Consumption,Leisure, and Money

Swofford and Whitney (1987, 1988, 1994) investigated the validity of two key assumptions underlying representative agent models of macroeconomics. These assumptions are utility maximization and weak separability. Using mixed integer programming, we check revealed preference conditions for these assumptions. We find that M1, money defined by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), and a broad aggregate are weakly separable. We find that consumption goods and leisure and nondurables and services are weakly separable. We find that M2, M3, and MZM are not weakly separable. Finally, we find three categories of consumption, durables, nondurables and services, do not form an aggregate.     

Efficient monetary allocations and the illiquidity of bonds

We construct a monetary economy with heterogeneity in discounting and consumption risk. Agents can insure against this risk with money and nominal government bonds, but all trades must be monetary. We demonstrate that a deflationary policy à la Friedman cannot sustain the constrained-efficient allocation as no-arbitrage imposes too stringent a bound on the return money can pay. The constrained-efficient allocation can be sustained when bonds have positive yields and, under certain conditions, only if they are illiquid. Illiquidity, meaning that bonds cannot be transformed into consumption as easily as cash, is necessary to eliminate arbitrage opportunities due to disparities in shadow interest rates.