A theory of socially inefficient patent holdout

This paper proposes a framework to analyze holdout in patent licensing negotiations. We show that when the validity of a patent is probabilistic, a potential downstream user has incentives to shun to pay the price offered by a patent holder to license the technology and risk being brought to court. These incentives are exacerbated when jurisdictions are local, and the downstream producer can approach courts sequentially. The informational spillovers across trials imply that this firm often finds optimal to go to court aiming to invalidate the patent in a jurisdiction due to the knock-on effect on future jurisdictions. This process results in excessive litigation compared to when the jurisdiction is global. The distortions from sequential litigation are likely to be aggravated when final competition is accounted for or when patent injunctions are not allowed.     

Welfare improving licensing with endogenous choice of prices versus quantities

This paper investigates the endogenous choice of prices versus quantities by taking into account patent licensing where the patent holder, which is itself a producer within the industry, licenses its cost-reducing innovation to the rival firm through a two-part tariff contract. For substitute products we find that both Cournot and mixed price-quantity competition may constitute the equilibrium outcomes, depending on the innovation size. Contrary to the results in Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002), we show that the optimal licensing contract definitely leads to an increase in social welfare. Our result reinforces the positive welfare effect of patent licensing.     

Licensing standard-essential patents with costly enforcement

We study the interaction between the holder of a standard-essential patent (SEP) and two downstream firms using the patented technology to design standard-compliant products. The SEP holder approaches the downstream firms simultaneously in the shadow of patent litigation and is subject to fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing requirements. We show that the patent holder faces a litigation credibility constraint and a license acceptability constraint when setting its licensing terms. For patents of intermediate strength, there is no royalty that allows the patent holder to reconcile these constraints. Consequently, it cannot license its technology and must go to court against infringers. We show that the availability of an injunction improves the patent holder's ability to license its technology, but it tends to inflate the royalty rate for implementers.     

Is the Competitor of my Competitor also my Competitor?

This paper presents several results on multimarket competition. First, whenever a firm faces multimarket competitors that sell goods in markets to which the firm itself has no access, the firm gains a strong incentive to expand production in its own market(s). In the capacity choice model, such a firm builds larger than Cournot capacity and pushes its competitors towards other markets. Consumers always benefit from multimarket competition. In asymmetric market structures, some firms may also benefit from multimarket arrangements, but in symmetric ones, all firms are necessarily harmed by it. Second, the intensification of indirect competition is not necessarily bad for the firm. It may be the case that, the more competitors its competitors have, the higher the firm’s profit. Finally, this model also has a multiproduct interpretation which suggests that a merger of single‐product firms may be beneficial or harmful from a social welfare perspective, depending on whether the new entity will compete with several single‐product firms or another multiproduct one.     

Patent Settlements as a Barrier to Entry

We formulate a model of entry with two incumbent firms—a patent holder and an infringer—and a potential entrant, with asymmetric information about the validity of the infringed patent (patent strength) between incumbent firms and the entrant. Within this framework we show that patent settlements between the incumbent firms can be mutually beneficial even when the cost of trial is zero and the settlement agreement takes the form of a simple fixed license fee. For patents of intermediate strength, settlements are a tool for entry deterrence. The two parties agree on a high settlement amount which sends a credible signal to “outsiders” that the patent is not weak and therefore entry will not be profitable. This provides a novel explanation for the role of settlements and to the recent observation of high license fees negotiated in settlement agreements. It suggests that firms should disclose the settlement amount if they want to keep out further entrants. We also show that even nonreverse settlements that entail only a fixed fee can be anticompetitive because they are used to block entry.     

Choosing the partners in the licensing alliance

I consider a situation in which the incumbent strategically adopts the licensing alliance, facing potential entrants. The queue of entrants consists of two firms, the ‘strong’ entrant and the ‘weak’ entrant, who differ in their productivities. The incumbent sets a licensing fee and offers it to the entrants. Each entrant decides whether or not to buy the licensing alliance. After the set of the licensing alliance is determined, they engage in the Cournot competition. I examine the optimal licensing fee, and show that the optimal licensing fee is to charge a discriminatory royalty to each licensee. I also examine the licensing policy on the partner(s): To whom should the licensor license its technology? By comparing the equilibrium expected payoffs for the licensor, I show that licensing to both entrants would be preferred to licensing to a single entrant. But, if the licensor faces the problem on choosing the partner, he prefers the licensing of the weak entrant to the strong entrant. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entry limiting agreements: First‐mover advantage,authorized generics,and pay‐for‐delay deals

During patent litigation, pay‐for‐delay (P4D) deals involve a payment from a patent holder of a branded drug to a generic drug manufacturer to delay entry and withdraw the patent challenge. In return for staying out of the market, the generic firm receives a payment, and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date, but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable when there are multiple potential entrants. We combine the first‐mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic (AG) to show when P4D deals are an equilibrium outcome. We further show that limiting a branded firm's ability to launch an AG before entry by a successful challenger will deter such deals. However, removing exclusivity period for the first generic challenger will not.     

On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly

An innovative firm with private information about its indivisible process innovation chooses strategically whether to apply for a patent with probabilistic validity or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the firm manages its rivals’ beliefs about the size of the innovation, and affects the incentives in the product market. A Cournot competitor tends to patent big innovations, and keep small innovations secret, while a Bertrand competitor adopts the reverse strategy. Increasing the number of firms gives a greater (smaller) patenting incentive for Cournot (Bertrand) competitors. Increasing the degree of product substitutability increases the incentives to patent the innovation.     

Technology Adoption with Multiple Alternative Designs and the Option to Wait

Technology adoption is one the most important elements of a firm's strategy. In this paper, we address an essential, yet largely overlooked, question: What should a firm do when faced with several alternative proprietary designs of a new technology? In our base case we assume there are two technology designs, each described by an independent stochastic process of technology evolution. We show that, in equilibrium, a buyer chooses the leading technology design as soon as the discounted payoff from doing so is positive. When the option value of waiting is very high, it is jointly optimal to delay adoption. But because sellers cannot commit not to extract all of the buyer's future rents, inefficiently early adoption takes place. Strategies that improve commitment to low future license fees, such as increasing the number of competitors or cross‐licensing, may alleviate the hold up problem. Although previous research stressed the benefit of such commitments in terms of increasing the rate of technology adoption, we present a class of cases when the benefit from commitment is efficiently to delay adoption.     

The stock market response to changing drug patent legislation: The case of compulsory licensing in Canada

Between 1969 and 1987 pharmaceutical companies holding patents in Canada were subject to immediate compulsory licensing. This study evaluates the stock market response to both the imposition of immediate compulsory licensing in 1969 as well as its subsequent revocation in 1987. Since the affected companies were multinational enterprises, we analyse the movement of share prices on the New York Stock Exchange. The results indicate that patent protection is viewed positively by the stock market, but only when measured with hindsight (in 1987). Our results are consistent with other studies that suggest that patent protection does allow the appropriation of gains from knowledge by firms in the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, pharmaceutical companies would benefit from international agreements to provide more stringent levels of patent protection.     

Broad Cross‐License Negotiations

In many industries, broad cross‐license agreements are considered a useful method to obtain freedom to operate and to avoid patent litigation. In this paper, I study firm incentives to sign a broad cross‐license as well as the duration of broad cross‐license negotiations. I develop a model of bargaining with learning, which predicts that two firms will enter a broad cross‐license agreement only if their capital intensities are large enough. The model also predicts faster negotiations when firms have high capital intensities and when the frequency of future disputes is low. I confirm these predictions empirically using a novel data set on cross‐licensing and litigation in the US semiconductor industry.     

Collaboration in the Shadow of the Technology Frontier: Evidence from the Flat Panel Display Industry

The literature on competition through innovation tends to emphasize the benefits of technological leadership. However, we explain why a capable firm might prefer to shadow the technology leader—remaining slightly behind rather than competing directly at the frontier. On the basis of a formal model and the competitive dynamics literature, we propose that the more benefits a firm gains from collaboration with a technological leader through licensing and supply agreements, the more likely the firm is to take a shadowing position. Our hypotheses, particularly regarding licensing from a technological leader, receive support from a large sample in the flat panel display industry. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Implementation of competitive nonlinear pricing: tariffs with inclusive consumption

The paper studies how the optimal nonlinear quantity-payment allocation can be truthfully implemented by optional tariffs in a differentiated goods duopoly. Consumers choose from a menu of tariffs and are subsequently billed according to this. We find that implementation by simple two part tariffs may not be a feasible strategy in a duopoly because the optimal nonlinear tariff exhibits a convexity for lower quantities. We show that the optimal outcome can be implemented if the firms can use two part tariffs with inclusive consumption. The fixed fee includes a free consumption allowance, whereas subsequent consumption is charged according to a steep unit price. That way the firm is able to secure voluntary participation without violating the incentive constraint. The paper shows some examples from the telecommunications industry where firms offer two part tariffs with free call minutes to low demand segments.     

Choice of Accounting Method for Valuation of Investment Securities: Evidence from Hong Kong Firms

This study examines whether Hong Kong managers choose “benchmark” or “alternative” valuation method for investment securities, after the Hong Kong SSAP 24 became effective starting with fiscal‐year ending December 31, 1999. Tests are conducted on a sample of 292 firms, out of which 155 Hong Kong firms reported unrealized gains and losses and 128 firms that did not report holding gains/losses, but reported investment securities. The findings indicate that firms with strong relative performance, i.e. current year's EPS higher than that of the last year, chose the alternative valuation method when the investment securities had holding gains and recognized the unrealized holding gains in the equity section of the balance sheet. This finding is consistent with the Cookie Jar hypothesis because these holding gains would be used in the income statement in future periods, when needed. With regard to firms with strong relative performance and holding losses, the findings indicate that the benchmark valuation was used. The losses were reported in the income statement to the extent that they did not reduce the EPS below that of the last year. This finding is consistent with the Income Smoothing Hypothesis, because the use of benchmark valuation reduced EPS of the current year to bring it in line with that of the last year. Evidence on firms with weak economic performance and holding gains or losses provided weak support to the Income Smoothing Hypothesis and Big Bath Hypothesis. Additionally, the results indicate that the firms with high debt‐equity ratio preferred the benchmark method and recorded securities at cost. This treatment provided managers with an opportunity to liquidate or reclassify the securities in future periods and use the accrued gains, when needed. The findings are inconclusive with regard to the impact of bonus plan on the choice of valuation method.     

Optimality and consistency in a differential game with non-renewable resources

Imperfect competition amongst buyers for a non-renewable resource is modeled as a Stackelberg differential game. The buyers may act as a cartel or behave non-cooperatively in setting tariffs, which the sellers take as given. The buyer's optimal policy is not consistent when extraction costs depend on the stock level. Both optimal and consistent, unit and ad valorem tariff's are analyzed. When a buyers' cartel uses a consistent tariff, the sellers may prefer to behave as perfect competitors or a monopolist, depending on the functional form of demand and cost. Non-cooperative buyers who are constrained to act consistently are unable to extract any rent from competitive sellers.     

奇虎360科技有限公司专利管理地图分析

专利战略对于企业取得经济利益、获取竞争优势有着重要作用。本文运用专利管理地图分析方法,对奇虎360科技有限公司的专利类型、专利年代趋势、技术领域构成、主要发明人和主要竞争对手进行了分析:奇虎科技专利申请以发明专利为主,专利申请质量较高;主要集中在电学和物理两大技术领域;奇虎360发明人研发实力较强,其专利技术生命周期正处在由发展期向成熟期转变阶段。在互联网安全专利竞争领域,奇虎科技相对直接竞争对手占较大优势。文章最后对未来360专利战略的专利申请数量质量、专利人力资源管理、专利竞争对手监控、以及应对专利侵权纠纷方面提出相关建议。     

General Equilibrium Analysis of India's Trade Reforms

WTO membership for India implies cutting tariffs in a phased manner. A general equilibrium approach is used to evaluate its impacts. The study analyses both the reduction and elimination of tariffs. With a small country assumption, there are welfare gains by liberalizing trade. With a large country assumption, welfare gains are observed when a CET transformation function is used and welfare loss in its absence.     

Should tariff-rate quotas mimic quotas?: Implications for trade liberalization under a supply management policy

This article compares price-equivalent import tariffs and quotas when domestic production is controlled by a marketing board with the power to restrict domestic supply through production quotas. Canada's dairy industry is supply-managed and protected by TRQs to achieve a domestic price target. TRQs are currently set to mimic the import quotas they replaced. However, they could be set to mimic tariffs instead. We provide welfare rankings between (domestic) price-equivalent quotas and tariffs under various assumptions regarding the powers of the marketing board to shed new light on liberalization in the Canadian dairy industry. When the marketing board is allowed to export, quotas can never be welfare-inferior to price-equivalent tariffs when transport costs between the two markets are insignificant. Import licensing methods have important implications for the ranking of the two trade instruments and the ranges of feasible domestic prices. If the marketing board controlled all import licenses and there was no rule preventing it from sleeping on part or all of its import licenses, the quota regime would support a small range of high feasible prices. In contrast, when the quota is a minimum access commitment, there are high prices under the tariff regime that are not feasible under the quota regime.     

The dark side of competition: Modeling status games

Though “teams” are supposed to work together for the benefit of the firm, suboptimal outcomes may emerge when individuals within a team are more concerned with their own status and outcomes relative to their “teammates,” behaving as if they are competitors. Using a version of the stag hunt coordination game, we develop hypotheses regarding the role of status and competitiveness on coordination on Pareto optimal solutions. We test these hypotheses using three studies, with manipulations for both role and status. Status is found to play a significant role, resulting in suboptimal outcomes for competitors but not teammates.     

Valuing technological synergies in mergers

Technological synergy in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is achieved when there is an increase in value generated by combining the stock of complementary technologies of acquirers and targets, as well as utilizing target’s patents to initiate or defend lawsuits against competitors. Using U.S. patent data, we provide quantitative measures of these two sources of technological synergy. We find that these measures of technological synergy are important considerations of acquiring firms and capital market in valuing target firms’ innovative assets, as the measures are positive determinants of merger premium and total synergy gain. The expected total gains of acquirers’ and targets’ shareholders from technological synergy decrease with the difficulties of post-merger integration as proxied by geographical distance between acquirer and target. Our technological synergy measures are also good predictors of post-merger realized synergy, i.e., increase in patent outputs in the overlapped technology classes and market share.