Digital innovation and transformation: An institutional perspective

In this conceptual piece we suggest that the institutional perspective is a prolific lens to study digital innovation and transformation. Digital innovation is about the creation and putting into action of novel products and services; by digital transformation we mean the combined effects of several digital innovations bringing about novel actors (and actor constellations), structures, practices, values, and beliefs that change, threaten, replace or complement existing rules of the game within organizations and fields. We identify three types of novel institutional arrangements critical for digital transformation: digital organizational forms, digital institutional infrastructures, and digital institutional building blocks. From this vantage point, an institutional perspective invites us to examine how these novel arrangements gain social approval (i.e. legitimacy) in the eyes of critical stakeholders and their interplay with existing institutional arrangements. Questioning the disruptive talk associated with digital transformation, we draw on the institutional change literature to illustrate the institutionalization challenges and that existing institutional arrangements are pivotal arbiters in deciding whether and how novel arrangements gain acceptance. We close this essay with discussing the implications of an institutional perspective on digital transformation for policy, practice and research.     

Hybrid governance and governance performance in industrial purchasing relationships

Hybrid governance arrangements (e.g. joint action, long-term contracting and vertical coordination) feature regularly as an effective response to inter-firm dependence in the literature of business-to-business relationships. However, current empirical work has paid little attention to whether such governance arrangements really do improve governance efficacy and reduce transaction costs. The present study focuses on the governance efficacy of vertical coordination in industrial business-to-business relationships. Building on transaction costs arguments, the author examines whether vertical coordination is an effective means for adapting to inter-firm dependence, realized as the substantial employment of specific assets.Empirical findings from a survey of 170 industrial supplier–buyer relationships demonstrate that when asset specificity reaches a certain level, greater vertical coordination reduces ex post transaction costs significantly. On the other hand, this efficacy pattern is modest or non-existent in relationships with low asset specificity.The research findings support the basic TCA assumption that the performance of hybrid governance arrangements is highly dependent on a situation of substantial inter-firm dependence with subsequent small-number conditions.     

Signifying Williamson's Contribution to the Transaction Cost Approach: An Agent‐Based Simulation of Coasean Transaction Costs and Specialization

This article simulates Ronald Coase's transaction cost approach to firm organizing using agent‐based modelling, and contextualizes and contrasts it with a division‐of‐labour/specialization view of the firm that Coase challenged and sought to replace. The simulation tests the firm formation process based on the different implications of transaction costs and specialization as drivers of integration, focusing especially on Coase's rejection of specialization as an explanation for integration in the firm. The results show little support for, and suggest an important shortcoming to, Coase's transaction cost theory. My findings thereby indicate a potential relationship between the specialization theory and Williamson's Transaction Cost Economics, especially the latter's emphasis on co‐specialization through relationship‐specific investments, which helps shed light on TCE's significant influence in the theory of the firm literature.     

Product Differentiation through Exclusivity: Is there a One‐Market‐Power‐Rent Theorem?

In systems industries, combinations of components are consumed together to generate user benefits. Arrangements among component providers sometimes limit consumers’ ability to mix‐and‐match components, and such exclusive arrangements have been highly controversial. We examine the competitive and welfare effects of exclusive arrangements among system components in a model of relatively differentiated applications that run on relatively undifferentiated platforms. We show that there is no “One‐Market‐Power‐Rent Theorem.” Specifically, exclusive deals with providers of differentiated applications can raise platforms’ margins without reducing applications’ margins, so that overall industry profits rise. Hence, for a given set of components and prices, exclusive arrangements can reduce consumer welfare by limiting consumer choice and raising equilibrium prices. In some cases, however, exclusivity can raise consumer welfare by increasing the equilibrium number of platforms, which leads to lower prices relative to the monopoly outcome that would prevail absent exclusivity.     

Outsourcing and the HR function: an examination of trends and developments within North American firms

As increased use of outsourcing by a number of firms within North American has produced significant changes over the last decade in how the human resource function delivers services. In this article, we draw on transaction cost economics, the resource-based view, the HR architecture literature, and institutional theory to examine why these changes have been observed. Following this, we use these same theoretical perspectives to examine how different types of firms are likely to make use of outsourcing in the future to provide human resource services and programmes.     

Explaining Downstream Integration

We examine the downstream integration decision by businesses, deriving hypotheses from the transaction cost literature which are empirically tested for a sample of 1392 businesses operating in a wide spectrum of industries. Our results provide corroboration for each dimension of the transaction cost framework in explaining why firms might integrate their downstream business activities. Given the large cross-sectional sample, our results provide some evidence of the general validity of the transaction cost framework within the context of downstream integration.     

Does transaction activity predict Bitcoin returns? Evidence from quantile-on-quantile analysis

This paper uses the quantile-on-quantile regression to examine the predictive power of transaction activity for Bitcoin returns over the period from January 2013 to December 2018. We measure the Bitcoin transaction activity using trading volumes, the number of unique Bitcoin transactions, and the number of unique Bitcoin addresses. Considering the onset of structural breaks, we identify considerable effects of the heterogeneity concerning the quantiles of transaction activity, which cannot be depicted fully by the traditional quantile regression method. The empirical results show that higher transaction activity tends to predict higher/lower Bitcoin returns when the market is in a bullish/bearish state. We find that the nexus is asymmetric across quantiles, depending on the sign and size of the transaction activity, and the predictive relationship intensifies in the upper or lower quantiles of the conditional distribution. In addition, this empirical evidence is in line with the volume-return association in the equity market due to private informative and noninformative trading actions. Overall, our findings suggest that transaction activity-based strategies should be made with respect to Bitcoin market performance, specifically during extreme conditions.     

THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

Abstract.  The types of contracts arising in a typical vertical manufacturer–retailer relationship are more sophisticated than a simple uniform price. In addition to setting per unit prices, manufacturers and retailers also revert to non-linear pricing and non-price instruments. These instruments or contracts are referred to as vertical restraints and can take the form of franchise fees, resale-price maintenance, exclusive dealing, exclusive territories and slotting allowances. The use and the effects of one type of instrument versus another depend crucially on specific market assumptions upstream and downstream and on the division of bargaining power between manufacturers and retailers. This paper surveys the industrial organization literature on retail pricing and shows that vertical restraint instruments have important effects on producer and consumer prices, market structure, efficiency and welfare.     

Franchise network restructuring: Pressures,constraints and mechanisms

Franchised businesses operate on the basis of granting individual franchisees trading rights to serve territories or market areas on either an exclusive or a non-exclusive basis. The design of these territories is generally undertaken during the roll-out phase of the franchise. However, these territories and market areas may become sub-optimal over time, necessitating restructuring. However, if the franchisor has granted exclusive rights to a territory then this is likely to involve a breach in the franchise contract. In cases where existing franchisees do not have exclusive territories they may nevertheless make a legal challenge to the creation of additional franchises on the grounds of encroachment. This paper – which is based on a study of 40 franchisors in the UK – examines how franchisors go about network restructuring in constrained and non-constrained situations. Franchisors typically did not act on their legal rights, echoing findings of earlier franchising studies which reveal a divergence between contractual rights and operational behaviour. This focus on network restructuring also provides new perspectives on the reasons for ownership reversion and the growth of multi-unit franchisees.     

Determinants of contractual restraints in franchise contracting

Although an efficient design of franchise contracts requires from the franchisor to choose a bundle of contractual restraints as safeguarding and control mechanism, previous research has not explored the antecedents of contractual restraints as a bundle of contractual clauses. To address this gap, the aim of this study is to explain the determinants of the most important contractual restraints (i.e., exclusive dealing, exclusive territory, tying, resale price maintenance, call option, leasing, alienation, and noncompetition clauses), using transaction cost and relational governance reasoning. The regression results based on primary data from German and Swiss franchise systems provide support of hypotheses.     

Evaluation of similarity models for expected utility violations

A body of work proposes a decision cost argument to explain expected utility (EU) violations based on pair similarity. These similarity models suggest various measures over the risky pairs that define decision costs and benefits. This paper assesses the empirical modeling success of these similarity measures in explaining risky choice patterns showing EU independence violations. We also compare model fit for these similarity models relative to EU and to a selected generalized EU model. Although the candidate models exhibit some degree of substitutability, our results indicate support for models that use relatively simple measures as instruments for similarity.     

Real Options, International Entry Mode Choice and Performance

abstract    Recent scholarship suggests that combining insights from real option theory with transaction cost economics may improve decision-making models. In response to this suggestion we develop and test a model of international entry mode choice that draws from both perspectives. Examining samples of Dutch and Greek firms entering Central and Eastern European markets, we found that adding real option variables to a transaction cost model significantly improved its explanatory power. Additionally, firms that used the combined real option/transaction cost predicted choices had significantly higher levels of subsidiary performance satisfaction than firms that did not. Our results suggest that effective managerial decision-making may involve more than mere transaction cost minimization considerations; real option value creation insights also appear to influence the success of decision outcomes.     

Antecedents and relative performance of sourcing choices for new product development projects

Given the complexity of sourcing choices in R&D, driven by conflicting points of difference, scholars have struggled to formulate clear theoretical predictions about which sourcing choices lead to superior performance. Our study contributes to the elucidation of this question by studying both the antecedents and performance consequences (project cost and duration) of alternative sourcing choices in the context of new product development, thus bridging two rarely intersecting streams of research to discover unique insights. We draw from the transaction cost economics (TCE) and organizational learning theory to account for the interdependence of cost- and non-cost related factors in firms’ sourcing choices. Results from our empirical analysis, using data on clinical trials in the global biopharmaceutical industry, show that greater project complexity, project stage uncertainty, and prior sourcing experience determine the sourcing choices a firm makes. We also establish that alternative sourcing choices vary in their ability to minimize project cost versus project duration, and show that prior experience with a sourcing choice is an important moderator of project performance, in addition to being one of the determinants of sourcing choice.     

A Transaction Cost Perspective of Alliance Portfolio Diversity

Alliance portfolio diversity (APD) helps firms access diverse capabilities and knowledge. APD can also increase transaction costs, but it is unknown whether and how transaction cost theory’s (TCT’s) insights about hierarchical integration operate at the portfolio level. We adapt TCT to the portfolio level to suggest that the transaction costs from APD encourage integration into alliance partners’ industries, and we introduce the concept of shared-specific investments to pinpoint one source of transaction costs within portfolios and predict which industries will be integrated. Using data from 1996–2013 on S&P 500 firms, we find evidence in support of our theorising. Juxtaposing results with other theoretical perspectives suggests that TCT offers complementary insights about which activities to perform in the firm versus the alliance portfolio.     

On the choice between two delta-hedging strategies

This paper studies the choice between two popular hedging strategies by assuming that the hedge position (delta) follows a Markov chain with boundary conditions. We give the formula for long-run cost per unit time under two different cost structures: (I) a fixed transaction cost and (II) a non-fixed transaction cost. Then, we consider the case where the hedge position follows a random walk; we show that (i) re-balancing delta to the initial position is always more cost-efficient than re-balancing it to the edge for a fixed transaction cost; (ii) under certain conditions, re-balancing delta to the initial position is less cost-efficient than re-balancing it to the edge for a non-fixed transaction cost. In addition, we quantify the magnitude of the efficiency in both cases.     

Towards A Synthesis of Transaction Cost Economics and a Feminist Oriented Network Analysis

A bstract This paper suggests the possibility of an interdisciplinary, tripartite merger of transaction cost economics and the concept of embeddedness, with feminist insights. It demonstrates that in isolation, a simple application of transaction cost analysis can offer an adequate explanation of economic activity. The explanatory power of this approach however, is enhanced when complemented by greater recognition of the importance of the social context in which economic activity occurs. This paper uses research from New Zealand's largest street market to examine women's work in street commerce, a sub-sector of the informal sector. Aspects of transaction cost analysis are applied to activities of women market vendors. It is proposed however, that the approach we take which considers the embeddedness of economic activity in ongoing networks of social relations, and the intertwining of economic with non-economic goals, is compatible with aspects of feminism. Novel features of the analysis include the application of transaction cost analysis to informal sector activity and a synthesis of this approach with a feminist oriented network analysis.     

市场营销起源的交易成本经济学解释

信息不对称和交易成本的存在严重影响了市场交易活动的有效进行,不利于分工的深化和生产效率的提高,进而又影响了社会整体利益的提高。市场营销正是为了解决以上交易难题而产生的,营销组合同样是通过降低信息不对称的程度和减少交易成本而发挥其作用的。从交易成本经济学的角度解释市场营销的起源,可以揭示出营销学与经济学之间的内在联系,为营销理论的深化提供了一个新的切入点,并且为营销实践提供了理论支撑。     

Transaction Costs in the Trading System of Cashew Nuts in the North of Benin: A Field Study

Cashew nut trading is an activity with growing economic importance in the north of Benin. Among the cost categories supported by the trading actors are transaction costs to which rare empirical studies have been devoted. Therefore, based on the theoretical concept this article empirically analyzes the importance of the transaction costs generated by cashew nut trading in the north of Benin. The empirical data were collected in two villages. Using a paired‐sample T test this study shows that the transaction costs are relatively important, but are not the major cost category. The average “production cost” is higher than the average transaction cost incurred by the trading actors. Although the transaction costs are on average lower than the other costs category, they are viewed by most actors (82 percent) as a serious constraint in the trading system due to moral hazard problems arising from the existence of these costs. By analyzing the specific factors that influence the magnitude of the transaction costs borne by the actors, the article shows that some socio‐cultural and environmental characteristics of the actors are determinant of the level of transaction costs incurred.     

Supplier relationship-specific investments and the role of safeguards for supplier innovation sharing

The vast majority of the supplier innovation literature has focused on how buying firms can effectively “pull” innovations from their suppliers. Yet, we know remarkably little about the factors that contribute to a supplier voluntarily “pushing” innovations to its customers. The present study addresses this research gap in the context of industrial buyer–supplier relationships and with a specific focus on relationship-specific investments. Drawing on theory from the relationship-marketing literature and on transaction cost theory, we devise and test a proposed theoretical model that links the level of a supplier's relationship-specific investments to its sharing of innovative ideas regarding products and processes with customers. The model also considers the role of contract length, relationship age, and buyer–supplier cooperation as possible safeguards. The empirical results suggest that a supplier's relationship-specific investments encourage a supplier to suggest ideas of process innovations but to refrain from suggestions about product innovations. The latter effect, however, can be attenuated by appropriate formal and informal safeguards.     

实时财务报告技术采纳与资本成本——基于“创新接受”视角的理论模

在资本市场中,公司与其对手为获得更低的资本成本展开竞争。为了达成目标,公司都尝试采用新的信息技术来提高信息披露的透明度。扩展组织"创新接受"理论的内容并整合影响实时财务报告技术采纳和资本成本的主要因素,利用数学模型建构两者之间的约束关系,结果发现,资本成本的节省、不确定性、风险规避、交易、转换成本以及公司治理政策等都对公司何时以及是否采纳实时财务报告技术产生影响。