卖空管制放松与上市公司现金股利：促进还是抑制？

基于2006—2020年中国A股上市公司的数据,验证卖空管制放松对上市公司现金股利分配的影响。研究发现,相比于不可卖空的公司,可卖空公司在被列入卖空标的后,其现金股利分配意愿、分配规模与分配平稳性均显著提升。机制检验发现,卖空管制放松对现金股利分配的促进在代理问题严重、投资机会少的公司中更显著,这支持了代理成本机制;同时,在信号传递能力强、信号传递需求大的公司中,卖空管制放松对现金股利分配的促进更显著,这支持了信号传递机制。进一步分析发现,现金股利分配能力不足的公司在应对卖空压力时并未使用“高送转”作为替代。而对于我国资本市场中广泛存在的达标式分配,卖空管制放松能够产生抑制作用,且抑制作用体现在没有再融资需求的公司中。研究表明,卖空管制放松促进了上市公司现金股利分配,卖空机制能够为我国资本市场中的现金股利监管提供市场化路径。     

Time to build capital: Revisiting investment-cash-flow sensitivities

A large body of empirical work has established the significance of cash flow in explaining investment dynamics. This finding is further taken as evidence of capital market imperfections. We show, using a perfect capital markets model, that time-to-build for capital projects creates an investment-cash-flow sensitivity as found in empirical studies that may not be indicative of capital market frictions. The result is due to mis-specification present in empirical investment-q equations under time-to-build investment. In addition, time aggregation error can give rise to cash-flow effects independently of the time-to-build effect. Importantly, both errors arise independently of potential measurement error in q. Evidence from a large panel of U.K. manufacturing firms confirms the validity of the time-to-build investment channel.     

Capital Market Imperfections, Uncertainty and Corporate Investment in the Czech Republic

In this study we examine private investment behavior of firms in the Czech Republic. A special feature of the study is that the investment equations include variables which may give some more insights into the role of capital market imperfections as well as the effect of uncertainty. Our results find support for the accelerator model. We find evidence for cash-flow effects on Czech corporate investment. It is striking that indeed smaller longer privatized firms face relatively less cash flow restrictions. Financial structure doesn't matter as much as we expected. We find that smaller firms react positively to more uncertainty.     

Capital expenditure announcements and anti-takeover barriers

In this paper, we compare capital budget announcements by firms with anti-takeover mechanisms in place to announcements by firms without takeover barriers during the period 1980 to 1995. We find that anti-takeover provisions do not affect investors’ average reactions to investment choices. Market responses are heterogeneous; however, and differ according to size, growth opportunity, the availability of free cash flow and exposure to the capital markets. We find evidence consistent with managerial entrenchment when firms are insulated from the threat of takeover and have enough free cash flow to avoid raising external capital. We also find that for small firms, the reaction to capital investment announcements are positively related to free cash flow when managers have high growth opportunities, but negatively related when investment opportunity is small. This result is consistent with Noe (1988), who shows that restricting managers’ investment choices to positive NPV projects is necessary to obtain the pecking order results of Myers and Majluf (1984).     

管理者过度自信与企业投资现金敏感度——基于英国上市公司的实证研究

本文以英国上市公司为样本,发现融资约束公司普遍表现出管理者过度自信与投资现金流敏感性之间显著的正相关关系。与此相反,这种积极的关系不能在融资无约束公司中找到。这个结果和预期相一致,即在融资约束公司中过度自信的管理者的投资决策应该比非过度自信的管理者投资决策对现金流更加敏感。因为,现金流的增加能够促使过度自信的管理者加大投资并达到他们想要的水平。     

融资约束、资本投资与公司现金持有竞争效应

以我国上市公司2003-2012年数据为样本,基于产权性质和金融发展水平,从资本投资中介效应视角检验了融资约束对现金持有竞争效应的影响。研究发现:公司现金持有通过资本投资中介效应实现的竞争效应在融资约束公司、民营公司以及金融发展水平较低地区的公司中更加显著。进一步检验表明,现金持有的竞争效应提高了现金价值,而且在金融发展水平较低地区的公司、融资约束公司和民营公司中更高。     

Do adjustment costs explain investment-cash flow insensitivity?

In this paper, I explain two “puzzles” that have been observed in firm level data. First, firms that display a high sensitivity of investment to cash flow (commonly believed to be an indicator of liquidity constraints) usually have large unutilized lines of credit which, presumably, could be used to overcome the shortage of funds. Second, firms that are perceived to be extremely liquidity constrained actually show very little sensitivity of investment to cash flow.I show how a dynamic model of firm investment with liquidity constraints and non-convex costs of adjustment of capital can explain these facts. These two features together imply that firms need to have a certain threshold level of financial resources before they can afford to increase investment. Once they cross this threshold, firms’ investment will be positively correlated with their financial resources until they reach their desired level of capital stock. However, even if investment is sensitive to cash flow, firms may borrow below their credit limit to guard against future bankruptcy or binding liquidity constraints.     

金融资产配置、金融杠杆与现金流风险

金融资产会计安排是企业执行金融工具准则的重要环节,具有显著的经济后果。基于实体企业金融化现象,研究金融资产配置与现金流风险关系,分析金融杠杆的调节功能,探讨非效率资本配置的传导作用,研究发现：金融资产配置与现金流风险之间存在U型关系;金融杠杆能够调节金融资产配置与现金流风险的关系,使关系曲线拐点右移与扁平化。区分金融资产配置类型后发现：交易类金融资产与现金流风险呈U型关系;委托贷款等新兴金融资产负向影响现金流风险;投资性房地产和长期金融股权投资未显著影响现金流风险。考虑企业生命周期后发现,成长期与衰退期企业金融资产配置与现金流风险呈U型关系,成熟期企业金融资产配置负向影响现金流风险;按照产权性质分组检验发现,金融资产配置与现金流风险的关系以及金融杠杆的调节效应在非国有企业中更显著;机制检验发现,非效率资本配置在金融资产配置影响现金流风险的过程中发挥中介作用。     

Credit vs. demand constraints: The determinants of US firm-level investment over the business cycles from 1977 to 2011

The paper studies empirically how relative supply and demand conditions on the capital market affected US firm-level investment over the business cycles from 1977 to 2011. A dynamic econometric specification of capital accumulation including sales growth, Tobin's q, the cash flow-capital ratio and the cost of capital as covariates is fitted by a rolling window System GMM estimator using quarterly data on publicly traded US corporations in order to obtain time-varying coefficients. We find that the investment effects of the variables capturing the demand-side of the capital market, i.e. sales growth and Tobin's q, behave counter-cyclically, whereas this does not hold for the investment effects of supply-side variables such as cash flow or the cost of capital. Our results suggest that investment was typically driven by adverse demand rather than supply conditions on the capital market during the most severe recessions.     

Exogenous cash: testing financing constraints on inventory investment using dynamic panels with additional information from annual reports

In spite of the literature’s great interests in firms’ financing constraints on investment, the endogeneity problem between investment and cash flow have long plagued the empirical endeavor. To avoid the problem, we use firms’ nonoperating income, which is shown to be exogenous to profitability, both as a direct measure of liquidity and as an instrumental variable to control for the endogeneity problem of cash flow. Estimation results do not support the financing constraint hypothesis. We also conduct a narrative analysis on firms’ Annual Reports to identify factors causing inventory reduction. We find that accounting adjustments and decreases in market demand are two important factors in investment disinvestment, and financial difficulty does not play an important role in this regard.     

Financial Constraints on German Firms after the Crisis: Evidence from Threshold Panel Estimation

This article studies the existence and magnitude of financial investment constraints in Germany between 2006 and 2012 with a special emphasis on small and medium‐sized firms. The core contention is that the sensitivity of the investment rate to the cash flow rate is a function of a firm's financial position contributing to its access to external finance. The application of a nonlinear panel threshold model reveals that the marginal effect of the cash flow rate on the investment rate is almost twice as strong for ‘high debt’ firms compared to ‘low debt’ firms. This result holds for six out of seven balance sheet threshold variables. For a single specification, the results reveal a non‐monotonic relationship between the cash flow rate and investment rate. Firm size, however, does not explain differences in the cash‐flow‐investment nexus.     

基于自由现金流的投资组合研究

本文运用我国股市1998～2006年间的财务报表数据,选择正自由现金流、低自由现金流乘数和低财务杠杆的大公司,对其以自由现金流为基础的投资组合进行了检验。结果显示,以自由现金流为基础的投资组合回报始终优于市场指数,说明在我国股市实行基于自由现金流的投资组合是积极可行的。     

Director co-option and future market share growth

This paper examines the effect of director co-option on product market outcomes. We find that future market share growth declines as executives co-opt more of the board. Co-opted directors also inhibit the product market benefits from cash reserves. These findings hold in a variety of robustness tests, sustaining the view that director co-option reduces product market performance. Our results further show that co-option leads to lower market share gains among firms whose industry rivals intensely change products and have higher borrowing capacity. Compared to their competitors, firms with more co-opted directors also allocate less internal resources to potential product differentiation strategies, but award executives more cash-based pay. Overall, our findings support the agency theory supposition that firms with co-opted boards lose market share ex-post.     

A patent race in a real options setting: Investment strategy, valuation, CAPM beta, and return volatility

In this paper, we study financial properties of R&D intensive firms through a continuous-time real-options patent-race model. Numerical analysis in this study shows that intense competition drives a firm to invest more aggressively, which then pushes up its cost of capital and return volatility while introducing negative return correlation with its competitor. Furthermore, we find that a firm's position in competition has important impacts on its financial properties. For instance, a firm's cost of capital is a non-monotonic function of its relative position in the race. In addition, the relationship between cash flow uncertainty and investment can be negative when a firm is far ahead or far behind, or positive when firms are close in the race.     

Corporate diversification and innovation: Managerial myopia or inefficient internal capital markets?

Which is more innovative: the decentralized, diversified firm, or the centralized, more narrowly focused firm? The economics and finance literatures argue that diversified firms have innovation advantages as their operating units have access to an internal capital market. In contrast, the strategy and entrepreneurship literatures argue that managers of these firms suffer from “managerial myopia,” discouraging them from investing in projects with long-term, uncertain payoffs. We take a fresh look at the relationship between innovation and diversification using a comprehensive sample of diversified and nondiversified firms and a novel approach that teases out the mechanisms influencing the relationship between diversification and innovation. Consistent with conceptual and empirical work in strategy, we find a robust negative correlation between diversification and R&D intensity, suggesting that diversification reduces innovation by discouraging investment. However, our analysis suggests that internal capital market inefficiencies, rather than managerial myopia, is responsible for this observed negative relationship.     

Financial factors and company investment decisions in transitional China

We investigate the propensity of Chinese publicly listed firms to invest in response to financial factors, according to the a priori degree of a firm's information problems: industry sector, ownership structure and firm size. The firms in primary and tertiary industries are found to be liquidity‐constrained in their investment decisions. The investment‐cash flow sensitivity of the firms in secondary industry indicates that they lost privileged access to credit in the course of China's market transition. However, we find no evidence that financial liberalization resulted in an easing of financing constraints for small‐ and medium‐sized firms. Our result indicates that agency problems, stemming from a state‐controlling pyramidal ownership structure, are responsible for the misallocation of internal funds. The importance of bankruptcy and agency costs in relation to debt finance for certain types of borrowers reflects the transitional nature of the financial environment facing Chinese firms. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Working Capital Management,the Credit Crisis,and Hedging Strategies: Canadian Evidence

This study uses a sample of Canadian natural resource firms during the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2008 to examine the influence of firm hedging strategies on their working capital management. Our evidence implies that increased cash holdings and derivatives are alternative ways of hedging risk, and also provides another perspective on the U.S. “trapped cash” controversy as our sample firms are not R&D intensive and do not face the same tax regime as U.S. multinationals.     

苏州中小民营企业融资问题研究

本文首先分析了苏州民营中小企业融资难的原因,其中主要原因是融资渠道单一,根本原因是信用障碍。针对原因,本文提出要根本性的解决民营中小企业融资难的问题必须要完善民营企业的公司治理,建立规范的治理结构,培育良好的信用环境。最后提出了具体解决融资难的的措施,主要有拓宽融资渠道、推动直接融资,规范非正规金融,引进风险资本,构建适宜的担保结构。     

Investment committees and corporate cash holdings

We investigate the association between the voluntary formation of a board investment committee (IC) and corporate cash holdings for a large sample of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) firms over the 2005–2013 period. We provide evidence that the existence of a specialized IC increases corporate cash holdings. We also find that several IC characteristics, i.e., member experience, independence, number of meetings, and committee size, are associated with an increase in firms’ cash holdings. Furthermore, the local and foreign institutional ownership of GCC firms moderates the IC-cash holdings relationship. These results remain robust to alternative specifications of cash holdings and endogeneity tests. We contribute to the literature on firms’ incentives to hold cash and to the literature on governance in emerging market contexts.     

Do managerial behaviors trigger firm exit? The case of hyperactive bidders

This paper investigates the effects of managerial mergers- and acquisitions-related investment strategies on the exit risk of firms. Using a sample of hyperactive bidders, I show that managerial excessive acquisitiveness can precipitate firm exit. Overbidding is associated with weak corporate governance and lower disclosure quality within firms. I find that hyperactive bidders take more risk compared to conservative bidders. Such bidders also misallocate firms’ resources and dent firms’ reputational capital. Eventually, the external corporate control market is more effective compared to mechanisms such as bankruptcy reorganization, forced liquidation, leveraged buy-out, and expulsion from stock exchanges in disciplining hyperactive bidders by turning them into targets of takeover. These results suggest that a hyper acquisition-induced growth strategy is, on average, detrimental to the long-term survivability of firms and that the internal and external corporate-control mechanisms may not be effective enough to forestall falling value of an excessively acquisitive firm.