The creation of big business in the Swedish brewing industry during the aftermath of the Second World War

Abstract

Before the First World War, the Swedish brewing industry was organised into cartels that fixed prices and established distribution areas. During the inter-war years, the major combines in the three biggest cities strengthened their position, since they controlled the market in the most populated areas. Because of the agreements within the brewing cartel Bryggeriidkareförbundet, there was hardly any competition among the breweries and the only way to expand the business was to buy cartel-associated smaller breweries in the fixed ‘natural distribution area’. When the cartel ceased to exist in the mid 1950s, the agreements among AB Stockholms Bryggerier in Stockholm (StB), AB Pripp & Lyckholm in Göteborg (P&L) and AB Malmö Förenade Bryggerier in Malmö (MfB) were informally maintained. They managed to expand in their old distribution areas and beyond, but there was no interference in each other's home market.

This article examines why and how these agreements finally came to an end and the effects of the increased competition. The so-called ‘beer war’ between StB and P&L during the early sixties paved the way for negotiations, which in the end led to a merger of the breweries and a new big combine – Pripps – was created. We take up questions related to the formation of the company, its market expansion, the diversification and other organisational strategies. Pripps's monopolistic position on the Swedish market and the institutional pressure that followed started a process leading in the end to a reorganisation and a holding company, PRIBO, was formed in the early 1970s. A few years later the majority of PRIBO's brewing division (Pripps) was bought by the Swedish state and the rest of PRIBO was sold to one of the upcoming holding companies in Sweden during that time – Beijer Invest.     

Losing autonomy: the Norwegian central bank during the Second World War

In the mid‐twentieth century a number of central banks around the western world lost their operational autonomy and were placed under government control. The origin of these policy changes can be traced to the intellectual and political developments of the interwar era in addition to the introduction of the Bretton Woods monetary system. The Norwegian central bank offers a particularly stark example of this phenomenon: experiencing a rapid decline from its high level of autonomy in the interwar years, to a clear subordination to the government after 1945. Through an analysis of the correspondence between the main policy makers in the exiled Norwegian government and central bank management, this article contributes to the understanding of central bank autonomy by tracing the decisive factors that led to the Norwegian central bank's loss of agency.     

The Swedish iron industry during the First World War and the Post-War depression

Abstract

In a paper read at the annual meeting of Jernkontoret (The Swedish Ironmasters' Association) in 1912 Professor E. F. Heckscher gave an estimate of the proportion of the total annual outpout of the Swedish iron industry which was exported. Including material entering into the exports of steelusing industries, it was estimated at 65–70 %. Assuming this to be correct, then only the saw-milling and paper- and pulp-making industries were at that time more dependent upon foreign markets than the iron industry. ¹ Jernkontorets Annaler (hereafter cited JKA) 1912. p. 183 ff. Cf. E. F. Heckscher, Svenska produktionsproblem, p. 107 and JKA 1919, pp. 181–202.      

The Petroleum Industry in Indonesia before the Second World War

The present dependence on oil exports in Indonesia is not new. The oil industry also played a key role in the colonial economy. This article examines the development of the Indonesian oil industry up to the Second World War. It identifies producers and production centres and considers trends in Output and revenue, changes in the product mix and possible growth effects. Its main question concerns the possibilities and limitations of the oil sector for sustaining economic growth.     

Officer retention and military spending: the rise of the military-industrial complex during the Second World War

This article examines how the regional distribution of US military personnel contributed to military expenditures around the country. We first discuss a theory of political economy for military spending—officers who remain in service can eventually help channel military funds and employment to their respective regions of origin, through direct military spending decisions or indirect political channels. Further, if officer retention is positively related to less industrialization at home (fewer work opportunities at home induce greater service lengths), this channel will induce greater progressiveness in military spending. To test these ideas we use the personnel records of officers serving in the US Navy from 1870 to the late 1930s. Tracking the tenure of all officers, we construct measures of ‘military representation’ across US counties. Through ordinary least squares, Tobit, and instrumental variable approaches, we find that senior naval officer representation across regions positively and robustly predicts regional naval spending (but not spending from other branches) during the Second World War.     

二战后运抵重庆 美军登陆艇今安在?

1945年,世界第二次大战结束,美国政府在处理战略物资时,把一批登陆艇送给了当时的国民党政权。他们把获得的美军登陆艇,命名为中字艇和华字艇的系列编号,有的分给了海军,有的交给了招商局。解放后,这批美国登陆艇改作货船,编号从“人民1号”到“人民33号”,航行在重庆长江三峡上。解放初期,为了稳定上海经济和金融局面,中央政府启动了“川粮东运”计划,就靠这批货船完成任务。     

Monetization and financial development in Southeast Asia before the Second World War

Using new statistics, this article analyses financial development in Southeast Asia over the seven decades 1870–1939. The region experienced substantial, and in some instances rapid, vent-for-surplus economic growth based on a narrow range of primary commodities. But in 1939 all Southeast Asian countries still had relatively undeveloped financial infrastructures dominated by metropolitan interests, considerably reliant on informal finance, and geared towards primary commodity exports. The article suggests that a lack of opportunities and a variety of country-specific considerations were more important explanations than weak financial development for an absence of greater industrialization and agricultural modernization in Southeast Asia.     

Resourcing War While Containing Inflation: Debate among Australia's Second World War Economists

Early in the Second World War, Australian Government economists, including Financial and Economic Committee members, agreed that taxation was central to shifting resources from consumption to war spending and containing inflation. As Australia's war effort expanded in 1941–42, all advisers accepted the need for more economic controls. Differences emerged about the desired extent of controls. Some saw controls, including rationing and price stabilisation, as an alternative to higher taxation. In these debates and in policy determination, Keynes' views were influential, as to some extent were those of Kalecki and Balogh. Other influences included the policies of Australia's allies.     

Price formation on clandestine markets: the case of the Paris gold market during the Second World War

Because of the scarcity of data, there are few quantitative analyses dealing with clandestine markets, despite their prime importance during wartime. This article exploits a unique database of daily prices of gold coins traded in occupied Paris in order to gain insights into the price formation on such a market. First, using data from Switzerland, we show that arbitrage took place, despite the costs and risks involved, and led to a gradual (but incomplete) convergence of gold prices. Furthermore, a study of price seasonality reveals that less strict borders controls during the weekends made the volatility of returns higher at the start of the following week. Second, on the basis of an event study, we provide evidence that laws related to black markets did not have a significant impact on the gold price, except for the most severe law passed on 8 June 1943 which greatly increased the sentences for involvement. Finally, we assess whether the so‐called coin premiums existed on this clandestine market, and show that the large price variations for one gram of fine gold contained in different coins were due to market participants’ preferences for specific gold coins.     

Convergence since the Second World War: Blind Alleys and Misplaced Expectations

Abstract

The gap in income between the richest and the poorest countries is very large and increasing. But as we probe deeper the picture becomes less clear regarding the facts and more so the conceptual basis of the analysis. The growing gap hides substantial progress in most welfare indicators for most of the world's population. The theory beyond the expectations of convergence seems inadequate, especially for the case of Sub-Saharan Africa.     

The impact of the Second World War on US productivity growth1

This paper considers the productivity impact on the US economy of the period of war mobilization and demobilization lasting from 1941 to 1948. Optimists have pointed to learning by doing in military production and spin‐offs from military R & D as the basis for asserting a substantial positive effect of military conflict on potential output. Productivity data for the private non‐farm economy are not consistent with this view, as they show slower total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 1941 and 1948 than before or after. The paper argues for adopting a less rosy perspective on the supply side effects of the war.     

Fixed‐price contracts,learning, and outsourcing: explaining the continuous growth of output and labour productivity in the German aircraft industry during the Second World War1

In this article it is claimed that, at least in the aircraft industry, the development of German armament production and productivity was much more continuous than Wagenführ's armament index and both the Blitzkrieg thesis and the inefficiency thesis suggest. In order to prove this new thesis of continuity, we show on the basis of firm‐level data, firstly, that investment in production capacities had already started before the war and was especially high in the early phase of the war, and secondly, that the regulatory setting of aircraft production management was rather constant and was not dramatically changed after 1941. In addition, we demonstrate that the driving forces of productivity growth were primarily learning‐by‐doing and outsourcing, the latter being generally neglected by economic historians.     

War,food rationing,and socioeconomic inequality in Germany during the First World War

Germany experienced a devastating period during the First World War due to severely restricted import possibilities and a general shortage of foodstuffs. This study uses the heights of some 4,000 individuals who served during the Second World War to quantify biological living standards from the 1900s to the 1920s, and focuses primarily on socioeconomic inequality during this period. The results suggest that generally the upper social strata, measured by fathers' occupation, exhibited the tallest average height, followed by the middle and lower classes. These socioeconomic differences became more pronounced during the First World War when the rationing system provided a limited food supply. Wealthier individuals were able to purchase additional foodstuffs on black markets. Therefore, children from upper‐class families experienced only a small decline in average height compared to their counterparts from the middle and lower social strata.     

Post–World War Two industry policy: opportunities and constraints

There exists an entrenched conventional wisdom that, for the first seventy years of the twentieth century, Australia was closed to the global economy in the pursuit of an inward–looking and market–defying approach to development. This interpretation is neglectful of the broad forces at work and their evolution. The economic policy process inevitably embodies compromise between conflicting views and interests, including bureaucratic rivalries. An investigation of the role and treatment of the post–War industry bureaucracy provides some insight into the character of the contemporary balance of forces. Post–War development certainly involved dysfunctionalities, but the causes were located in a complex set of determinants rooted in culture rather than just inwardness or rent seeking. Thus, the importance of the protective tariff for the manufacturing sector in the 1960s deserves to be reinterpreted as a symptom rather than the cause of any underlying problems with policy character and policy priorities.     

Sustainability of public debt: evidence from Japan before the Second World War1

Japan defaulted on its public debt after the Second World War. This article addresses the question of how Japan lost its ability to sustain its public debt. We explore the sustainability of public debt in Japan before the War. We conduct statistical tests for the relationship between public debt and primary fiscal balance, and find that Japanese public debt was sustainable until 1931, and unsustainable in and after 1932. Narrative modes of analysis indicate that Japan lost its fiscal discipline because of the military's effective veto over budgetary processes and because of the absence of pressure for sound fiscal policy from international financial markets.     

Dutch and Danish agricultural exports during the First World War

Abstract

The Danish agricultural sector continued to maintain agricultural exports to Great Britain during the First World War, even when higher prices ruled on the German market. Dutch agricultural exporters, 011 the other hand. continued to sell to the highest bidder; until, in 1916, British pressure forced them to do otherwise. It was not the Danish government but the Danish cooperatives who were responsible for Danish agricultural export policy, especially in the first years of the war. More than was the case with the Dutch exporters, the Danes were highly dependent on the British market. The strong Danish cooperatives (in contrast to the weaker Dutch agricultural organizations) forced the Danish government to support their strategy in order not to lose their suppliers to the newly establishedfirms who were exporting to Germany.