Are contributions of time and money substitutes or complements?

This article empirically investigates the relationship between donations of time and money using Canadian tax policy reforms that changed the tax price of charitable donations. The 1988 reform where a charitable tax deduction was converted to a credit and the 2000 reform in provincial income taxes provide tax price variations plausibly exogenous to individuals’ unobserved heterogeneity. Our estimates on cross-price effects imply that individuals make more time donations as the tax price of charitable donations increases and hence money and time donations are substitutes, as some theories would imply. This contrasts with earlier findings using cross-sectional data.     

How giving affects giving: a long-term analysis of donations

Social preferences theories suggest that at least some people show altruistic behaviour. However, this philanthropic behaviour ranges from pure altruistic preferences to reluctant altruists. The fact that a subset of contributors has impure preferences raises questions regarding the stability of prosocial contributions. Assuming differences in other regarding preferences, we examine whether at an aggregated level monetary contributions are stable or fragile over time. We study the aggregated donations in the US from 1973 to 2013 using ARIMA and ARMAX models. The significant autoregressive and moving average coefficients in our estimations suggest that aggregated donations are highly autocorrelated. Our estimated impulse response functions indicate that aggregated donations converge to their historic mean quickly after an exogenous shock, which shows the stickiness of the inclination to donate.     

Does It Matter if You Are Observed by Others? Evidence from Donations in the Field*

We investigate whether people's donations in the field are affected by the presence of others. In the analysis, we distinguish between individuals who arrived at a national park alone and those who arrived as members of a group. We also investigated the effect of donations being made in the presence of a third party made in the presence of a third party. We find that donations are significantly more frequent for individuals who are members of a group. When a third party is present, we find that the total donations by individuals who are a part of a group are significantly higher than those of lone travelers, mainly because of the increased probability of donating.     

Time vs. money — The supply of voluntary labor and charitable donations across Europe

In spite of its importance for civil society, we know relatively little about the way in which individuals spend their time and money in the charitable provision of goods and services. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive picture of the philanthropic behavior in Europe by analyzing both, the correlates of individuals' charitable cash donations and volunteer labor as well as their interdependence. Using data from the European Social Survey, we document a positive correlation between time and money contributions on the individual as well as on the country level. In addition, we find evidence that individuals substitute time donations by money donations as their time offered to the market increases. Moreover, analyzing philanthropic behavior on the disaggregated level reveals large differences in the determinants and the relationship of time and money donations in Europe – both across different types of voluntary organizations and across different welfare regimes.     

The impact of taxes and wasteful government spending on giving

We examine how taxes impact charitable giving and how this relationship is affected by the degree of wasteful government spending. In our model, individuals make donations to charities knowing that the government collects a flat-rate tax on income (net of charitable donations) and redistributes part of the tax revenue. The rest of the tax revenue is wasted. The model predicts that a higher tax rate increases charitable donations. Surprisingly, the model shows that a higher degree of waste decreases donations (when the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption is high enough). We test the model’s predictions using a laboratory experiment with actual donations to charities and find that the tax rate has an insignificant effect on giving. The degree of waste, however, has a large, negative and highly significant effect on giving.

     

Family model of contributions to non-profit organizations and labour supply

In this article a model is presented in which the family decides the labour supply of both spouses and their time donations to non-profit organizations. For the estimation, Spanish data was used which showed that family size and pre-school children influence decisions made about time distribution of husband and wife. Women with fewer family responsibilities work longer hours and donate more time, whilst the effect on men is the contrary. Also, monetary donations by the family are directly related to time donations by the spouses.     

Is the income elasticity of environmental improvements less than one?

We estimated the income elasticity of environmental improvements for a number of European data-sets. The value of this parameter is consistently found to be less than one, with few exceptions. Our findings are compared with state-of-the-art contingent valuation studies from other countries. We also compared our findings with those reported in the literature on charitable donations and corporate donations. These studies show a similar pattern; donations decrease as a percentage of income, as income increases.     

Paying the price of sweetening your donation: Evidence from a natural field experiment

We add a gift in appreciation of the subject’s contribution to a social reference treatment successfully proven to trigger higher donations, and find that the share of people contributing decreases significantly, thereby eroding the original treatment’s capacity to increase donations.     

Competition, Contractibility, and the Market for Donors to Nonprofits

This article investigates theoretically and empirically theeffects of competition for donors on the behavior of nonprofitorganizations. Theoretically, we consider a situation in whichnonprofit organizations use donations to produce some commodity,but the use of donations is only partially contractible. Themain results of the model indicate that an increase in competition(i) decreases the fraction of donations allocated to perquisiteconsumption and (ii) increases the fraction of donations allocatedto promotional expenditures. Moreover, the effects of competitionare magnified by the ability to contract on the use of donations.These hypotheses are tested with data on the expenditures ofnonprofit organizations in a number of subsectors where competitionis primarily local. We use across–metropolitan statisticalareas' variation to measure differences in competition and proxycontractibility by the importance of tangible assets, whichare more easily observed by donors. The estimated effects ofcompetition and contractibility are consistent with our model.     

AN EVALUATION OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVE POLICIES FOR ORGAN DONATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

This paper examines the association between financial incentives and organ donations. Although the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 prohibits financial compensation for organs for transplant, we focus on the impact of laws that influence the relative cost of deceased and live organ donations on the supply of organs for transplant. First, we hypothesize that states that have relatively stringent funeral regulations, which have been associated with higher whole‐body donations, will have fewer organ donations. Second, we examine the impact of two common state laws that offer financial compensation to live donors: one that allows a tax deduction for costs incurred and the other which entitles government employees up to 30 days of paid leave. We find no evidence to support that these laws affect organ donations. (JEL I11, I18)     

Strategic Complements, Substitutes, and Ambiguity: The Implications for Public Goods

We examine the effect of ambiguity in symmetric games with aggregate externalities. We find that ambiguity will increase/decrease the equilibrium strategy in games with strategic complements/substitutes and positive externalities. These effects are reversed in games with negative externalities. We consider some economic applications of these results to Cournot oligopoly, bargaining, macroeconomic coordination, and voluntary donations to a public good. In particular we show that ambiguity may reduce free-riding. Comparative statics analysis shows that increases in uncertainty will increase donations, to a public good. Journal of Economic Literature C72, D81, H41.     

政治关联、慈善捐赠与政府补助*--来自中国亏损上市公司的经验证据

文章以2009－2012年中国亏损上市公司作为研究样本,运用社会网络理论,分析和检验了高管的政治关联对亏损企业通过慈善捐赠行为获得政府补助的影响。研究结果表明：第一,有政治关联的亏损企业比无政治关联的亏损企业更容易出于获取政府支持而进行慈善捐赠,高管的政治关联广度相对于其政治关联深度对亏损企业慈善捐赠的正向影响更大,同时高管的地方政治关联相对于其中央政治关联对亏损企业慈善捐赠的正向影响也更大;第二,基于“利益互惠”的原则以及对企业积极履行社会责任的鼓励,政府通常会倾向于对进行慈善捐赠的企业给予更多的补助;第三,相对于无政治关联的亏损企业,有政治关联的亏损企业的慈善捐赠能够帮助其获得更多的政府补助,相对于中央政治关联,地方政治关联对亏损企业通过慈善捐赠获得政府补助的“支持效应”更加明显,同时政治关联广度更宽的亏损企业也通过慈善捐赠获得了更多的政府补助。文章的研究结论深化了对中国亏损上市公司慈善捐赠的动机及其经济后果的认识,为相关部门规范企业慈善行为也提供了有益的启示。     

Precautionary savings and the governance of nonprofit organizations

We present a model of nonprofit governance built on two assumptions: (1) organizations wish to hold precautionary savings in order to smooth expenditures; and (2) it is relatively easy for managers to divert these funds for personal use. Hence, donors face a trade off between expenditure smoothing and donation dissipation. We examine the model's predictions using panel data on U.S. nonprofits. We show that organizations in states with poor government oversight have managerial compensation that is more highly correlated with inflows of donations and allocate a smaller percentage of donations to the endowment for future expenditures relative to organizations in strong oversight states.     

Market structure and corporate charitable donations: some Canadian evidence for 1976 and 1981

The business of business, not charity.

Say eleemosynary its more confusing.

Whatever, as long as we don't given 'em any cash.

Harv Antione, ‘The Buzz Words of Entrepreneurship’

in Apocryphal Northern Tales

This paper investigates the general determinants of corporate charitable donations in Canada and, in particular, the impact of imperfectly-competitive market structure. We utilize a profit-maximizing model and assume that charitable donations occur only if, by performing an advertising/public relations function, they increase revenue; or if, by acting as a fringe benefit, they result in a reduction in wage costs. In this context, because only firms in imperfect markets generate the rents from which donations can be made, we anticipate a positive relationship between donations and a measure of imperfect competition (concentration). The data is a cross-section sample of 38, 3- and 4-digit SIC manufacturing industries pooled for 1976 and 1981. The major findings are that: the results are generally compatible with the predictions of the model; concentration is a significant determinant of donations although non-linear; the cost of giving (the tax rate) is appropriately positive; and there are significant negative relationships for measures of foreign ownership and wage rates.     

Choosing Your Object of Benevolence: A Field Experiment on Donation Options*

In a large natural field experiment, we explore the effect of providing donors with the opportunity of choosing the target country for their donations. We find that our treatment manipulation affects neither the average donation size nor the response rate. Only a small fraction of donors (3.5 percent) actually choose their object of benevolence. These donors give more than those who do not specify a recipient. However, based on previous donations, we can only provide indicative evidence that this might be a causal effect rather than a mere selection effect.     

Subliminal influence on generosity

We experimentally subliminally prime subjects prior to charity donation decisions by showing words that have connotations of pro-social values for a very brief time (17 ms). Our main finding is that, compared to a baseline condition, the pro-social prime increases donations by approximately 10–17 % among subjects with strong pro-social preferences (universalism values). We find a similar effect when interacting the prime with the Big 5 personality characteristic of agreeableness. We furthermore introduce a novel method for testing for priming, “subliminity”. This method reveals that some subjects are capable of recognizing prime words, and the overall results are weaker when we control for this capacity.     

Social communication and discrimination: a video experiment

We report on an experiment using video technology to study effects of communication on donations to and discrimination between potential receivers. The experimental design eliminates strategic factors by allowing two receivers to unilaterally communicate with an anonymous dictator before the latter decides on her gifts. Through the use of three communication setups (none, audio, and audio-visual) we analyze purely social effects of communication. A silent video channel leads to discrimination between potential receivers based on impression formation, but does not affect average levels of donations. When the auditory channel is added, average donations increase. The social processes invoked by the visual and audio channels are heterogeneous and communicator-specific but not unsystematic.     

中美两国基础研究社会捐赠比较及对我国的启示

鼓励多元化投入基础研究的国家政策频繁出台，使社会捐赠作为基础研究投入来源引起学者普遍关注。美国运用社会资本进行科研捐赠具有多年发展经验，在支持生命科学、数学、物理学等前沿基础研究领域取得较好成效。为考察我国基础研究社会捐赠现状，对中美两国社会捐赠框架、科研投入多元化格局、捐赠激励政策、非营利机构布局及社会捐赠瓶颈等内容进行对比，从增设基础研究捐赠类目、成立基础研究专项基金会、完善基础研究捐赠税收优惠政策和积极吸收社会小额捐款4个方面提出适合我国国情的基础研究社会捐赠政策措施。     

Appropriate Payment Vehicles in Stated Preference Studies in Developing Economies

Selecting appropriate payment vehicles is critical for the perceived consequentiality and incentive compatibility of stated preferences surveys. We analyze the performance of three different payment vehicles in a Malaysian case of valuing wetland conservation. Two are well-known: voluntary donations and income taxes. The third is new: reductions in government subsidies for daily consumer goods. Using donations is common, but this payment vehicle is prone to issues of free-riding. An income tax usually has favorable properties and is commonly used in environmental valuation. However, in Malaysia as well as in many other low- to middle-income economies, large proportions of people do not pay income taxes, putting the validity of this payment vehicle into question. Instead, citizens in Malaysia and many other countries benefit from subsidies for a range of consumer goods. We find that price sensitivity is higher and the unexplained variance smaller when using subsidies rather than donations or income taxes. Importantly, this approach translates into completely different conclusions concerning policy advice. Our results suggest that in developing countries, using reduced subsidies as a payment vehicle may have favorable properties in terms of improved payment consequentiality compared to alternative payment vehicles, thus enhancing the external validity of stated preference surveys.     

The Impact of Direct Cash Payments on Whole Blood Supply

This paper investigates the impact of monetary incentives on whole blood donations. We take advantage of a quasi‐natural experiment in Germany, in which one blood donation site changes its payment scheme from remunerated to non‐remunerated. All other donation sites maintain their payment schemes. We show that donation volumes drop significantly after the pay drop and do not recuperate. At the same time, donation volumes increase at other paid donation sites, which is partly due to donor migration to these sites. We do not find any impact of the changed payment scheme on blood quality. Our results offer additional insight into the complex question whether it is efficient to ensure blood supply by paying donors a direct monetary compensation.