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1.
We assume an imperfectly competitive world with n commodities and address the question of whether or not (regional) trade blocs are viable. To answer this fundamental question, we use a notion of stability, offered by Greenberg (1990) , and show that regional trade blocs are not viable as they are not stable. On the other hand, we demonstrate that a global trade bloc is viable. Therefore, our results provide theoretical support for advocates of global free trade.  相似文献   

2.
We theoretically study the impact of two innovation policies on economic growth in a region that is creative in the sense of Richard Florida and that uses digital technologies to produce a final consumption good. The use of these digital technologies in our creative region gives rise to incomplete knowledge spillovers. Our analysis generates three salient findings. First, we characterize the balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium. Second, we solve the social planner's problem, describe the Pareto optimal allocation of resources, and then compare the Pareto optimal allocation with the BGP equilibrium allocation. Finally, we study the impacts that a research subsidy and a particular patent policy have on economic growth in our creative region and then we relate our findings to the incompleteness of the above-mentioned knowledge spillovers.  相似文献   

3.
The impact of downward social information on contribution decisions   总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1  
In this paper we study the effect of downward social information in contribution decisions to fund public goods. We describe the results of a field experiment run in conjunction with the fundraising campaigns of a public radio station. Renewing members are presented with social information (information about another donor’s contribution) which is either above or below their previous (last year’s) contribution. We find that respondents change their contribution in the direction of the social information; increasing their contribution when the social information is above their previous contribution, and decreasing their contribution when the social information is below. We hypothesize about the psychological motivations that may cause the results and test these hypotheses by comparing the relative size of the upward and downward shifts. These results improve our understanding of cooperation in public good provision and suggest differential costs and benefits to fundraisers in providing social information.   相似文献   

4.
We develop a game‐theoretic model of private–public contribution to a long‐term project with sequential actions and moral hazard. A private agent is one who is in charge of both the financial contribution and the management effort, these two actions entailing private costs and uncertain ex‐post private and social benefits. A public agent is one who decides the amount of public funding to this quasi‐public good, knowing that the size and the probability of attaining a surplus ex post depend on the private agent's effort. We consider four public‐funding scenarios: benefit‐sharing versus cost‐sharing crossed with ex‐ante versus ex‐interim government intervention. We test our theoretical predictions by means of an experiment that confirms the main result of the model: Cost‐sharing public intervention is more effective than benefit‐sharing in boosting private financial contribution to the project. Furthermore, when public intervention comes after private contribution ( ex‐interim government intervention), both public‐funding scenarios have a negative impact on the private management effort. In our model, the latter result is explained by the private agent's high degree of risk aversion. These results have policy implications for strategic investments with long‐term social consequences. In deciding the optimal timing and method of the contribution, governments should also consider the indirect effects on agents’ long‐term management efforts.  相似文献   

5.
In this paper, we first rely on small area techniques to derive from EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU‐SILC) survey new indicators of compensatory and social‐investment policies at regional level. While compensatory policies have mainly the goal of protecting individuals from “old” risks (e.g., old‐age), investment‐related social policies tend to focus more on “new social risks” (e.g., skill deficits). We rely on these new indicators to perform a data‐driven structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) analysis to investigate the causal relationships between youth labor market outcomes and these two types of spending. Our results support the view that social‐investment policies are effective for tackling new social challenges. (JEL C18, C54, E02)  相似文献   

6.
Abstract

Objectives:

The main aim of this study was to describe the effects of regional organization and performance in managing vaccinations, in the light of the institutional devolution recently introduced in Italy.

Methods:

We analysed (1) the general organization of regions for vaccination programmes, (2) the management of four vaccination programmes (combined measles-rubella-parotitis, varicella for children, influenza, and pneumococcal 23-valent for adults).

First, we conducted preliminary face-to-face interviews with 16 regional managers of the infective disease prevention departments. Subsequently, we sent them a standardized questionnaire to obtain comparable information on general organization and on the four specific vaccination programmes considered. In all, 14 regions were eventually included.

Results:

The survey showed a widespread lack of regional staff involved in the management of vaccinations and a geographical variation in the availability of computerized data collection. We recorded poor coverage for varicella and pneumococcal 23-valent vaccinations compared to MRP and influenza. Prices of the four vaccines varied widely among regions, with only a weak correlation between prices and volumes.

Limitations and conclusions:

The major limitation of the survey was the lack of information available at regional level. The piecemeal diffusion of computerized systems and the widespread lack of sufficient staff should mainly explain this.

Economic incentives could be offered to regions that achieve national targets. Such incentives should encourage collaboration between central and regional authorities consistent with institutional trends in regional devolution.  相似文献   

7.
We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies. Therein, agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. We focus on market‐based allocation rules that impose a two‐step procedure: assignment of rights based on claims first and voluntary exchange based on the assigned rights afterward. We characterize three focal egalitarian rights‐assignment rules that guarantee that the allocation rules are fair. We apply our results to problems of greenhouse gas emissions and contested water rights.  相似文献   

8.
This paper is on social capital and the meaning that Bourdieu has given to this concept in his Notes provisoires, published in 1980. He considered social capital as one of the most important forms of capital, along with economic capital and cultural capital. Even though he did not propose an explicit measure of social capital, so it remained in a conceptual state, he promoted an innovative research programme. Our contribution is to propose a generic method to empirically measure and test hypotheses on social capital, based on Bourdieu's work. We aim at creating an analytical framework that places this concept at the centre of the Bourdieusian theoretical approach. For this purpose, we combine two sociological tools that relate to two different sociological traditions, namely social network analysis and multiple correspondence analyses. Thus, our paper describes the ways to combine field and network analyses, and illustrates this with an empirical study.  相似文献   

9.
This paper aims to show how a region's constant level of social capital may have a very different impact on its economic growth depending on whether the central or the local level of government is responsible for regional policy.Our case study is the economic performance of Northern and Southern Italy in the post-World War II period, when a long phase of regional convergence came to a sudden halt in the early 1970s. We focus on the economic effects of the 1970s institutional reforms on government decentralization and wage bargaining. Our main hypothesis is that decentralization allocates the provision of public capital to institutions, the local ones, more exposed to a territory's social capital. Since social capital is lower in the Southern regions, decentralization made their developmental policies less effective from 1970 onwards, and regional inequality increased.We build an endogenous growth model augmented to include the interaction between social capital and public investment as well as the reform of the Italian labour market. We calibrate our model using data of the Italian regions for 1951–71. Our quantitative results indicate that decentralization triggered the influence of local social capital on growth and played a central role in halting the convergence path of the low-social-capital regions.  相似文献   

10.
In this paper, we explore the potential benefits of uncertainty that may arise in a two‐moment model of the voluntary provision of a pure public good. We find that an increase in a given contributor i’s risk associated with the aggregate contribution level of the other contributors (i.e., an increase in social uncertainty) induces that contributor to increase his own contribution level if and only if the uncertainty's incremental effect on the expected value of his net marginal utility is negative. Contributor i’s welfare likewise increases when a closely related condition is met, namely that the uncertainty's marginal effect on his expected marginal utility value of the public good exceeds its countervailing effect on the numeraire. Further, the corresponding aggregate contribution to the public good increases in the presence of free‐riding if and only if the incremental effect of contributor i’s contribution on the aggregate expected value of all other contributors’ net marginal utilities is small‐enough positive. We derive similar conditions for the case of private uncertainty, where the increase in contributor i’s risk is associated with his own marginal valuation of the public good. A simple example illustrates these conceptual results. Numerical analysis demonstrates that an increase in private uncertainty can have a nonmonotonic impact on contributor i’s welfare.  相似文献   

11.
Endemic to a small island off the coast of China, the Shedao pit viper, Gloydius shedaoensis, is known for its ‘accidental altruism.’ Juvenile pit vipers often kill passerine birds too large to swallow. Large prey carcasses are scavenged by neighboring adults. In turn, adult pit vipers kill hawks that prey on juvenile pit-vipers, but are not a threat to the adults themselves. Using agent-based computer simulations, we quantified the lifetime fitness of pit viper breeders with one of three genotypes: selfish, altruistic or both selfish and altruistic. Our simulation was based on a four-dimensional (4D) model of social behavior which included interactions of pit viper offspring with predators and prey as well as conspecifics. Results showed that, over ten breeding seasons, pit viper breeders with flexible altruistic and selfish genotypes averaged seven times the number of surviving offspring relative to breeders with pure-selfish genotypes, and 23 times the number of surviving offspring as breeders with pure-altruistic genotypes. In summary, viewing animal behavior through the lens of the 4D model will extend our understanding of the evolutionary pathway to social behaviors through natural selection processes.  相似文献   

12.
Combining information from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions and the European Social Survey, we investigate the relationship between subjective well-being and income inequality using regional inequality indicators and individual data. We assume that inequality aversion and perception of social mobility affect the impact of regional inequality on subjective well-being in opposite directions. We find evidence of an inverse U-shaped effect of inequality, where inequality starts to have a positive effect on subjective well-being that becomes negative with a switch point before the average of the Gini index for the entire sample. The rationale for our nonlinear finding is that Hirschman's tunnel effect (and the positive effect of perceived social mobility) prevails for low levels of inequality, while inequality aversion and negative relative income effects are relatively stronger when inequality is higher. Robustness checks on different sample splits are consistent with the hypothesis of the two drivers.  相似文献   

13.
We present the results of an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good with a unique dominant strategy equilibrium in the interior of the strategy space. The treatment variable is the equilibrium contribution level. By increasing the equilibrium contribution level, we reduce the strength of the social dilemma. Though we observe that the average level of contribution rises with the equilibrium contribution level, the average rate of over-contribution is not affected in a systematic way. Over-contribution is statistically significant only at the lower level of equilibrium contribution but not at the higher levels. We show that the Anderson et al. (1998, Journal of Public Economics. 70, 297–323) logit equilibrium model which combines altruism and decision errors fits quite well our laboratory data.  相似文献   

14.
We introduce a theoretical framework that contributes to the understanding of noncommunicable chronic diseases (NCDs) epidemics: even if NCDs are noninfectious diseases, they may spread due to the social transmission of unhealthy activities such as unhealthy diet, physical inactivity, and smoking. In particular, we study the intergenerational dimension of this mechanism. We find that, due to the social transmission of NCDs, agents choose lower health conditions and higher unhealthy activities than what is socially optimal. Taxes on unhealthy activities, that may subsidize health investments, can be used to restore the social optimum. Finally, our model is consistent with the existence of regional asymmetries regarding the prevalence of obesity and NCDs.  相似文献   

15.
We estimate a linear and a piecewise linear Phillips curve model with regional labor market data for West German and Neue L?nder. Employing regional observations allows us to country difference the data. This eliminates, under the assumption of homogeneous L?nder, supply shocks and changes in the formation of expectations as possible identification failures. With seemingly unrelated regressions we find a flat Phillips curve in the Neue L?nder. For the West German L?nder a piecewise linear model with a higher inflation-unemployment tradeoff for the regime of low unemployment rates fits the data very well. The results hold true if we control for endogeneity of the unemployment rate. With a kinked but upward sloping aggregate supply curve there seems to be room for stabilization policies, at least in the range of aggregate demand shifts that our data covers. First version received: December 2000/Final version accepted: Jan. 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  An earlier version of this paper was written while the second author was at Universidad Carlos III in Madrid. He thanks Juan Dolado and is grateful for financial support by the TMR Program on New Approaches for the Study of Economic Fluctuations. He would also like to thank Bertrand Koebel for his critique on that earlier version. Both authors are grateful to an editor and three anonymous referees for very helpful comments. Moreover, we wish to thank participants of the seminar on Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung by Jürgen Wolters and Peter Kuhbier, Freie Universit?t Berlin. Finally we profited from discussions with participants at the conferences of the European Economic Association in Lausanne and the Verein für Socialpolitik in Magdeburg where the paper was presented. Of course, all errors are to our sole responsibility.  相似文献   

16.
It has been known for a long time that many binary voting rules can select a Pareto dominated outcome, that is an outcome such that there exists some other alternative which is preferred by every voter. In this paper, we show that some of these rules can select an outcome Pareto dominated in a much stronger sense. Furthermore, our main results are concerned with the evaluation of the likelihood of Pareto dominated outcomes under four social choice rules commonly used in Parliaments or in committees. Given a set of four alternatives and a set of n individuals, we assume anonymous profiles and using analytical methods we compute the proportion of profiles at which the Pareto criterion is violated. Our results show that one should not be especially worried about the existence of the possibility as such. We are grateful to two anonymous referees for very helpful remarks and suggestions.  相似文献   

17.
To analyze the private provision of a public good in the presence of private information, we explore the connections between two frameworks: the binary public good model with threshold uncertainty and the standard continuous model à la Bergstrom et al. Linearity of best responses in others' contributions is key to matching the two frameworks. We identify all utility functions that display this linearity, and we provide conditions ensuring that the minimal properties that Bergstrom et al. require for utilities are satisfied. Using techniques developed in the threshold uncertainty framework, we show existence and uniqueness of the Bayes‐Nash equilibrium—thus generalizing existing results—and we analyze its comparative statics properties. In particular, under the reasonable assumption that agents' income is stochastic and private information, we complement the full‐information crowding‐out and redistribution results of Bergstrom et al. If the government taxes agents' income proportionally and redistributes (expected) revenues lump sum, equilibrium public good provision can increase or decrease, even if the set of contributors is unchanged. Similarly, we show that crowding‐out can be one‐for‐one, less than one‐for‐one, or more than one‐for‐one. Finally, we extend our results to a multidimensional framework in which agents' unit costs of contributions are also private information.  相似文献   

18.
根据社会燃烧理论,区域创新系统助燃剂是区域创新系统衰退的催化剂,其直观反映为区域创新系统的心理水平。基于社会燃烧理论设计了区域创新系统心理水平测度指标,依据基尼系数构建了系统心理水平测度模型。运用该模型测度了2014年中国内地31个省市自治区的区域创新系统心理水平,并将其划分为心理水平良好区、稳定区和劣化区。研究结果表明:RIS心理水平值存在且不同区域心理水平值不尽相同;RIS心理水平值越低,对RIS衰退的催化作用越强;不同的RIS发展阶段引起心理水平变化的原因不同。在此基础上,给出了提升区域心理水平的对策建议。  相似文献   

19.
The Stern Review added balanced growth equivalents (BGE) to the economic climate change research agenda. We first propose rigorous definitions of the BGE for multiple regions and under uncertainty. We show that the change in the BGE is independent of the assumed scenario of per capita income. For comparable welfare economic assumptions as the Stern Review, we calculate lower changes in BGE between a business as usual scenario and one without climate impacts with the model FUND than the Stern Review found with the model PAGE. We find that mitigation policies give even lower changes in BGE and argue that those policy choices should be the focus of the research effort rather than total damage estimates. According to our results, the current carbon tax should be below $55/tC. Sensitivity analyses show that the Stern Review chose parameters that imply high impact estimates. However, for regionally disaggregated welfare functions, we find changes in BGE that are significantly higher than the results from the Stern Review both for total damage as for policy analysis. With regional disaggregation and high risk aversion, we observe fat tails and with that very high welfare losses.   相似文献   

20.
Using a simple model with interdependent utilities, we study how social networks influence individual voluntary contributions to the provision of a public good. Departing from the standard model of public good provision, we assume that an agent’s utility has two terms: (a) ‘ego’-utility derived from the agent’s consumption of public and private goods, and (b) a social utility which is the sum of utility spillovers from other agents with whom the agent has social relationships. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique interior Nash equilibrium and describe the equilibrium in terms of network characteristics. We show that social network always has a positive effect on the provision of the public good. We also find that, in networks with “small world”-like modular structures, ‘bridging’ ties connecting distant parts of social network play an important role inducing an agent’s contribution to public good. Assumptions and results of the model are discussed in relation to the role of social capital in community-level development projects and to the effect of innovation networks on firms’ R&D investments.  相似文献   

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