Recovering Hicksian Consumer Surplus within a Collective Model: Hausman's Method for the Household

The purpose of this paper is to describe the implications of the collective model of household behavior for the methods used to estimate the economic value of non-marketed environmental resources. After demonstrating how the separability restrictions inherent in the collective model allow individual preference and household income allocation choices to be distinguished, the paper demonstrates how the framework can be used to recover Hicksian consumer surplus. An algebraic example is used to illustrate how the framework can be used in valuing environmental resources.     

品牌的经济学分析:一个比较静态模型

现有的经济学理论和模型中缺少全面针对品牌的分析,导致品牌理论与实践的双重混乱.在选择爆炸式增长的经济条件下,品牌对消费者的选择行为产生了巨大影响,因此对品牌选择的经济学分析显得更为迫切.品牌的经济学本质是降低消费者的选择成本,进而影响消费者对品牌的选择,而消费者选择又决定了厂商的销售量和利润.我们在经济学的框架下,以品牌为研究对象,建立起一个比较静态模型,对品牌进行经济学分析,得出消费者均衡和厂商均衡的条件.     

Network effects and the choice of mobile phone operator

This paper explores the role of network effects in the consumer’s choice of mobile phone operators in the UK. It contributes to the existing literature by taking a new approach to testing for direct network effects and by using individual-level data, which allows to analyse the impact that the immediate social network has on consumer choice in network markets. For our empirical analysis we use two sources of data: market-level data from the British telecommunications regulator OFCOM and micro-level data on consumers’ usage of mobile telephones from the survey, Home OnLine. We estimate two classes of models which illustrate the role of network effects. The first is an aggregate model of the comparative volume of on-net and off-net calls. This finds that the proportion of off-net calls falls as mobile operators charge a premium for off-net calls, but even in the absence of any price differential between on-net and off-net, there is still a form of pure network effect, where a disproportionate number of calls are on-net. The second is a model of the individual consumer’s choice of operator. This finds that individual choice shows considerable inertia, as expected, but is heavily influenced by the choices of others in the same household. There is some evidence that individual choice of operator is influenced by the total number of subscribers for each operator, but a much stronger effect is the operator choice of other household members.     

基于偏好分层理论的个体行为选择分析框架

传统经济理论假定个体服从理性判断,遵循选择逻辑,并据此演绎出个体行为选择分析的两种方法.但无论是基于偏好法的效用理论还是反其道而行的显示偏好理论,本质上均无法解释清楚现实中的个体选择何以是丰富多彩的.本文引入偏好分层理论,构建“偏好-行为”分析框架,认为个体偏好可以分为内核层、基本层、表象层和行为层四个层次,该分层的偏好体系决定了个体的知识结构,而特定的知识结构将对个体行为进行损益分析,促使个体做出策略选择并付诸行动.这一理论重新解释微观行动主体在不同场景下的行为选择问题,能够较好地解释现实经济活动中个体的目标驱动行为和规则遵循行为,从而避免新古典经济学效用分析法和显示偏好法在解释个体行为上的局限.     

Demand for carbonated soft drinks: implications for obesity policy

This article examines consumer choices of Carbonated Soft Drinks (CSDs) and their implications for obesity policy. Demand in relation to product and consumer heterogeneity is estimated via a random coefficients logit model (Berry et al., 1995) applied to quarterly scanner data for 26 brands in 20 US cities, involving 40?000 consumers. Counterfactual experiments show that caloric taxes could be effective in decreasing caloric CSD consumption though having little impact on obesity incidence.     

Consumer flexibility,data quality and location choice

We analyze firms’ location choices in a Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity, along addresses and transport cost parameters (flexibility). Firms can price discriminate based on perfect data on consumer addresses and (possibly) imperfect data on consumer flexibility. We show that firms’ location choices depend on how strongly consumers differ in flexibility. Precisely, when consumers are relatively homogeneous, equilibrium locations are socially optimal regardless of the quality of customer flexibility data. However, when consumers are relatively differentiated, firms make socially optimal location choices only when customer flexibility data becomes perfect. These results are driven by the optimal strategy of a firm on its turf, monopolization or market-sharing, which in turn depends on consumer heterogeneity in flexibility. Our analysis is motivated by the availability of customer data, which allows firms to practice third-degree price discrimination based on both consumer characteristics relevant in spatial competition, addresses and transport cost parameters.     

ENDOGENOUS BUSINESS CYCLES: THE INFLUENCE OF CHARACTER TRAITS*

This article deals with how business cycles can occur, in light of character traits which influence individual behaviour in an economy. We assume an overlapping generations model in which every consumer has identical instantaneous utility which is additively separable with respect to time. The parameters of utility here include character traits which influence the choice between consumption and savings. In this situation, young individuals choose between current consumption and current savings which lead to future consumption in their old age. Individual character traits, which appear both in the shape of utility functions and in evaluations about utility in the future, affect these choices. And since these choices determine savings, individual character traits can eventually determine how our economy moves. Focusing on the relationship between individual character traits and savings formation, we demonstrate that endogenous business cycles with two periods can occur, in an economy comprised of individuals who opt for current consumption and who are careless in relation to future events, like Aesopian grasshoppers, and in other cases they do not.     

PowerPlay: Exploring decision making behaviors in energy efficiency markets

Computer models are widely used to analyze decisions about energy efficiency improvements in the residential and commercial sectors. Few models exist that can actually be run interactively by decision makers to play out alternative future scenarios. None are available that interactively capture the dynamics, subtleties and complexities of interdependent decisions by utilities, households and firms in an ever-changing technological and economic environment.This paper presents the features and experiences of PowerPlay, a computer-facilitated game which fills that gap and does more: it is a game to be played by at least a dozen player groups who interact with each other, make deals (or break them), plan for the future and revise decisions. The computer model functions like a game board to trace actions and offer choices. The observed behaviors can be analyzed to advance understanding of investment strategies and consumer choices; to generate experimentally-based data on energy efficiency changes; and to provide the basis for analyses that can substantiate or complement historical, time-series driven specifications of energy models.     

Transaction costs,collective action and adaptation in managing complex social–ecological systems

With the escalating uncertainties and surprises faced in responding to environmental and natural resource challenges has come growing recognition of the need to manage such issues as social–ecological systems and value the capacities that enable adaptation to these changes. Adaptations in environmental management often involve complex, including wicked, problems of collective action. Institutions introduced to reduce the transaction costs of solving these problems do not come for free.A cost effectiveness framework designed to provide a comprehensive and logical structure for economic evaluation of path dependent institutional choices in this context, and a procedure for boundedly rational empirical application of the framework, are proposed and illustrated in this article — including for the choice between water buy-back and infrastructure upgrade programmes for accumulating the ‘environmental water’ needed to sustain the ecosystems of Australia's Murray–Darling Basin. Also outlined is a research strategy designed to help identify the heuristics needed for application of this procedure.     

马克思阶级理论的方法论归属探究

笔者分析了马克思的个人观念和阶级观念,认为马克思眼中的个人是自利和理性的,并结成相互依赖、相互制约的社会关系;他眼中的阶级是阶级成员间关系的总和,是阶级关系的承担者.马克思强调阶级成员间的关系及阶级关系产生自个人行为选择,个人利益和个人行为是阶级利益和阶级行为的基础,他是从个人入手构建阶级理论的.如果除去西方主流思想孤立的个人观念的教条,把方法论个人主义理解为从个人入手解释经济现象的原则,那么马克思阶级理论,符合方法论个人主义原则的本意.     

A framework for estimating willingness-to-pay to avoid endogenous environmental risks

This paper proposes a general empirical strategy to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP) for exogenous risk mitigation when environmental risks are endogenous in protective actions and consumers are imperfectly informed about the ambient risk levels. The strategy consists of a set of survey techniques and the dummy endogenous variable model (Heckman, 1978) to control for correlation in unobserved errors that enter the WTP equation and the protection-decision equation. The method is applied to the non-market valuation survey data on arsenic contamination in drinking water. Our results indicate that the estimated WTPs are significantly higher for households without self-protective action. Our approach thus offers not only the correct welfare estimate for exogenous reduction of environmental risks, but also yields policy implications qualitatively much different from the conventional approach. We also estimate the welfare value of the policy to inform and educate the public about the arsenic risk simultaneously with public risk mitigation. The estimated welfare value is similar to, though slightly higher than, that of risk mitigation without information component. This occurs due to the competing effects of information dissemination and risk mitigation efforts.     

Price Competition and Product Differentiation When Consumers Care for the Environment

Increasing environmental awareness may affect the pleasure of consuming a good for which an environment friendly substitute is available. In this paper, we investigate the market implication of product differentiation when customers are concerned about environmental aspects of the good. We use the spatial duopoly model to determine how environmental concern affects prices, product characteristics and market shares of the competing firms. Our analysis is based on a two-stage game, where at the first stage each firm chooses the characteristic of its product. At the second stage, each firm chooses its price. Equilibrium prices and market shares are affected by consumer awareness of the environment and by the higher costs for producing those goods. As for the Nash equilibria in the characteristics, we find three equilibria depending on the parameter constellation. In order to find out whether the market functions in an optimal way, we determine the choice of environmental characteristics by a welfare maximizing authority. The objective of the paper is to understand the environmental quality choices facing firms and to provide policies that would align private choices with the social optimum.JEL classifications: L11, Q38, H23     

Conditional-logit Bayes estimators for consumer valuation of electric vehicle driving range

Range anxiety – consumers’ concerns about limited driving range – is generally considered an important barrier to the adoption of electric vehicles. If consumers cannot overcome these fears it is unlikely that they will consider purchasing an electric car. Hence, a successful introduction of low emission vehicles in the market requires a full understanding of consumer valuation of driving range. By analyzing experimental data on vehicle purchase decisions in California, I derive and study the statistical behavior of Bayes estimates that summarize consumer concerns toward limited driving range. These estimates are superior to marginal utilities as parameters of interest in a discrete demand model of vehicle choice. One of the empirical results is the posterior distribution of the willingness to pay for electric vehicles with improved batteries offering better driving range. Credible intervals for this willingness to pay, as well as both parametric and nonparametric heterogeneity distributions, are also analyzed.     

Delegation to a possibly ignorant agent

In a delegation problem, an uninformed principal delegates decision‐making powers to a biased and possibly ignorant agent. The principal cannot use monetary payments but can restrict the set of the agent's choices. I show that in the general case, the principal may offer a disconnected set of choices. In a setting with arbitrary bias the uncertainty principle holds—the principal benefits as the likelihood that the agent is informed increases. When the bias is constant, I show that the ally principle holds—the principal benefits as the bias becomes smaller. Finally, when the likelihood of the agent being informed is determined by the agent's effort, then for small biases the principal benefits from limiting the agent's choice. When the agent is sufficiently biased, the principal gives more choice to the agent, so as to to improve incentives for information acquisition.     

Revealed preferences in macroeconomic policy decisions

This paper extends the usual instrument-target framework by directly estimating macroeconomic policy preferences over a number of policy targets using a derived reduced form and then solving the nonlinear optimality conditions for optimal instrument choice. Solving the optimality equations using observations on predetermined variables yields the implicit set of preference weights which induced the observed choices. The derivation format parallels the integrability discussions about consumer preferences implicitly expressed through demand functions. The approach is applied to a simple macro model estimated over the period from 1955 through 1972.     

Firm's objective function and product and process R&D

Firms undertake different kinds of R&D activities. They do product R&D (R&D aimed at improving the quality of existing products, and creating new products). They also do process R&D (R&D aimed at lowering the cost of making existing and new products). Moreover, firms often do both product and process R&D simultaneously. As far as the objective of firms is concerned, this need not be limited to profit-maximization only. Rather, firms may have a broader objective, where they care about profits as well as consumer surplus. This paper studies effects of a firm having a general objective function (that takes into consideration both profits and consumer surplus) on its product and process R&D choices, and corresponding implications.I consider product and process R&D choices of firms in an infinite horizon set-up with discrete time. Firms in my framework can simultaneously do both product and process R&D in every period, face a discrete-choice model of consumer demand with vertical product differentiation, and maximize a discounted, weighted sum of their profits and consumer surplus over the infinite time horizon.I show how process and product R&D differ from each other in my framework, and the role of a firm's objective function in this regard. I compare process and product R&D choices across firms that differ in their objective function, and illustrate effects of providing general R&D subsidies (subsidies given for any R&D, regardless of whether it is product or process R&D) to firms. I also characterize how in my framework, the choice of process R&D in total R&D — R&D composition — by an individual firm varies over time, and how process and product R&D choices, process and product R&D productivity, and the choice of R&D composition vary across firms that differ in size but are otherwise similar.     

我国食品企业的选择：“一体化”还是“外包”*——基于消费者食品质量关注视角

本文构建了一个包含消费者、食品终端企业、食品加工企业的不完全契约模型,以分析消费者食品质量关注对我国食品终端企业组织结构选择的影响。研究结果表明：消费者对食品质量越关注,终端企业越可能选择一体化生产。此外,终端企业与加工企业的技术、终端企业一体化生产所需的固定资本、终端企业对中间投入品的质量认知以及加工企业在交易中的收益比例,均会影响终端企业的组织结构选择。     

Diligence and laziness in the Chinese countryside revisited

A game-theoretic model is used to asses the impact of changing disutility of labour and distribution schemes on labour supply in Chinese agricultural product teams. It is argued that a previous analysis of the problem by chinn (1980) overlooks some inherent complications. It is shown that application of the symmetric, pure strategy Nash equilibrium concept yields no equilibria over a significant range of values for relevant variables. Asymmetric, pure strategy equilibria are shown to exist over this range. Allowing production teams continuous choice of labour inputs restores symmetric equilibrium.