Keynesian uncertainty and the instability of beliefs

In an influential critique, Coddington (1982) argues that Keynes uses the theme of uncertainty in an opportunistic way in the General theory emphasizing it when it suits his purposes and ignoring it when it does not. This reading is examined in the light of Keynes's earlier Treatise on probability. The first part of the paper argues that Keynes's epistemology differs in important respects from the one Coddington is attacking, and in particular, that Keynes's account contains conceptions of uncertainty not considered by Coddington. The two premises of Coddington's argument are then assessed. These are: 1) that Keynes provides no account of the relative impact of uncertainty in different decision-making contexts; and 2) that uncertainty is not a sufficient condition for unstable beliefs about future outcomes of current (investment) decisions. It is argued that Coddington is mistaken in asserting 1) and, although 2) is correct in principle, that there is nevertheless a strong presumption that uncertainty does lead to unstable beliefs in the particular situations Keynes describes. The conclusion is that the connection between uncertainty and unstable beliefs cannot be regarded as either analytically destructive or somehow beside the point, even on Coddington's terms.     

Keynes,Ricardo and the classical theory of interest

Keynes made harsh and repeated attacks on the work of Ricardo, blaming him particulary for what Keynes called the ‘classical theory’ of interest. Garegnani and others argue that Keynes' criticisms of the classical theory of interest apply to later neoclassical writers, but not to Ricardo. This paper re-examines Keynes' criticisms. It argues that Keynes attacked Ricardoapos;s theory of interest despite his awareness that Ricardo did not hold the ‘classical theory’. Moreover, Keynes not only expressed sympathy for Ricardo's understanding of interest, but his criticisms which do apply to Ricardo do not address Ricardo's theory of interest.     

A tale of two traditions: Pierre Force's Self-interest before Adam Smith

Abstract

The paper compares different strands of New Keynesian Economics with regard to Keynes' original work. Two issues are analysed in detail. First, the explanations provided by Keynes and New Keynesians of nominal and real wage behaviour. Second, the different theories concerning the ability of flexible nominal wages in assuring full employment. It is argued that, although involuntary unemployment is a central problem both in Keynes' and New Keynesians' views, referring to the role of nominal and real wages in explaining unemployment, New Keynesians theories present important features that differ, sometimes substantially, from the concepts developed by Keynes in his General Theory.     

Was Keynes a Realist?

Lawson (1989a) has interpreted Keynes as a philosophical realist, adhering to the view that the economy has a constant inner structure. Against this it is claimed below that, although Keynes speaks about realism, it is not in this sense, but in the common sense way of referring to actually observable entities of an economic model. In addition, it can be shown that Keynes's views can be interpreted as instrumentalist—he emphasises characteristics such as usefulness and convenience, besides and instead of truth. Thus, truth and truthlike concepts do not, in Keynes's thinking, have the paramount position that they have in realist philosophy.     

The logic of Keynes' criticism of the Classical model

The Classics' remedy for unemployment was to lower money wages. Keynes opposes this remedy. Therefore, in The General Theory, he aims at building a model in which a fall in money wages may not cause an increase in employment. Most of the interpretations of Keynes identified this aim, but did not attach enough importance to it. Reading The General Theory in the light of this aim, we discover what Keynes' logic of elaboration is, then what Keynes' ideas about voluntary or involuntary unemployment are.     

Keynes and probability: An assessment

Abstract

Most interpreters agree that Keynes had a wide-ranging, complex, ‘vision of the world’, which underlies his theoretical contributions. Whenever this is forgotten, as happens in the so-called neoclassical synthesis, not only the original Keynesian spirit goes lost but also, and especially, we lose substantive bricks for our theoretical constructions. The paper considers an important instance of this general rule; namely Keynes's views on the logic of probability, meant as the field concerning human behaviour in an uncertain world (hence connected to, but distinct from, the pure theory of probability, meant as a field of mathematics). The paper begins by recalling the main aspects of the classical and frequentist approaches to probability and the main criticisms they received, pertaining among other things to the limits of their applicability. We then consider Keynes's own views, stressing three aspects: the definition of probability as pertaining to the field of logic, the notion of uncertainty and of the ‘weight of the argument’, the ‘theory of groups’. We then discuss the subjective approach of de Finetti, Ramsey and Savage, and contrast it with Keynes's own views. Finally, we consider the implications of our analysis for the interpretation of Keynes's General Theory, and of his attitude towards econometrics.     

KEYNES ON WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND THE AUSTRALIAN WAGES SYSTEM*

Keynes' General Theory briefly discusses the Australian wages system, as an example of a system in which an attempt was made to fix real wages by law. Keynes argues that such a system, strictly enforced, generates an unstable unemployment equilibrium or highly volatile money wages and prices. This paper clarifies Keynes' views on the Australian system, with a view to their wider relevance for the significance of real and money wage flexibility and inflexibility in Keynes' economics. The most striking finding is that money wage stickiness is a conclusion, not an assumption, of Keynes' theory of employment.     

Is ex‐ante ex‐post analysis irrelevant to Keynes's theory of employment?

Ex‐ante ex‐post analysis has become a standard tool in macroeconomics. Yet Keynes dismissed it. We argue that Keynes's dismissal of ex‐ante ex‐post analysis is not an oddity but an indication of the originality of his theory of employment compared to standard macroeconomics. First, the principle of effective demand does not amount to a process that determines employment and income at the point of intersection of the traditionally defined ex ante supply and demand functions. Second, the finance motive allowed Keynes to confirm the identity of aggregate supply and demand already asserted in The General Theory. This latter conclusion is puzzling, however, since the principle of effective demand presupposes the possibility of a discrepancy between supply and demand. We suggest that Keynes's theory of employment is linked to a theory of income distribution whereby profits are a redistributed share of factor income which is transferred to firms when prices exceed factor costs. The identity and the equilibrium condition then relate to separate measurements of income and output, factor cost and prices.     

The Fault Line between Keynes and the Cambridge Keynesians: A Review Essay

This essay reviews Michael Ambrosi's important but neglected book on the formative period of Keynesian economics. The book traces the evolution of a Cambridge macroeconomic tradition running from Marshall and Pigou to Keynes, and interprets The General Theory as a response to Pigou's analysis of unemployment. Ambrosi also argues that Keynes's disciples, Richard Kahn, Nicholas Kaldor and Joan Robinson, were, in the 1930s, wedded to a Pigovian methodology and did not immediately recognise that Keynes had redefined the meaning of equilibrium in The General Theory. Keynes's attempt to redefine the analytical basis of neoclassical economics was thwarted, not merely by the neoclassical synthesis, but by those who claimed to be the inheritors and guardians of his vision.     

Permanent On-The-Spot Job Creation—The Missing Keynes Plan for Full Employment and Economic Transformation

The paper rejects the conventional view that Keynes had an aggregate demand approach to full employment. Instead, it proposes that he advocated a very specific labor demand targeting approach that would be implemented both in recessions and expansions. Modern policies, which aim to “close the demand gap” between current and potential output are inconsistent with Keynes's work on theoretical and methodological grounds. There is considerable evidence to suggest that a permanent program for direct or (in his words) “on-the-spot” job creation is the missing Keynes Plan for full employment and economic transformation. The current crisis presents the social economist with a unique opportunity to set fiscal policy straight along the original Keynesian lines. The paper suggests what specific form such a policy might take.     

Keynes and a post-Keynesian controversy over the effect of debt on income expansion

The paper considers arguments of Robertson (1938) and Asimakopulos (1983) that the Keynesian multiplier expansion of output may be constrained by debt implicitly incurred in the financing of autonomous investment necessary to start the multiplier process. The task of this essay is to show that within the ‘short-period’ and static analytical framework of Keynes, this line of reasoning regarding the adverse effects of debt on multiplier-induced expansions of output is unwarranted. Nevertheless it is concluded that if the Keynesian framework is abandoned in favour of a dynamic framework in the manner of a steady trend rate of growth - a choice dependent on how one conceives of the economy, as inherently static or dynamic - then such arguments have troubling implications. In particular, the dependence of Keynes's approach on credit and hence debt forges links between ‘short-periods' whose distinctness from one another is crucial to Keynes's result.     

Beauty contested: how much of Keynes' remains in behavioural economics' beauty contests?

Abstract

In one of the most famous passages of the economic literature, John Maynard Keynes likens the stock market to a beauty contest (BC), in which the winners are those who anticipate the average opinion. In behavioural economics there have recently been attempts at investigating the BC experimentally. We argue that there exist important differences between Keynes' and behavioural economics' BCs. We identify several types of BCs and propose a taxonomy. We also suggest that, in spite of these differences, Keynes' theory of decision under uncertainty is central to understanding the actual behaviour observed in experimental BCs.     

Keynes's realisms

Abstract

Some authors pointed to a realist orientation in Keynes's thought. However, since ‘realism’ is a wide and sometimes equivocal term, one may ask what kind of realism Keynes's realism is. This paper argues that Keynes held to an ontological, logical–semantic and epistemic realism. Whereas ontological realism has metaphysical connections, logical–semantic realism involves a notion of truth, and epistemological realism presupposes a theory of knowledge. The character of the subject matter circumscribes the scope of this last kind of realism. Epistemological realism is related to the role of intuition and convention in Keynes's thought, the meaning and evolution of which is explained.     

Friedman and Keynes: divergences and convergences *

Milton Friedman claims to have succeeded the Keynesian revolution with a counter-revolution which, incorporating certain features of Keynes's thought, triumphed at the end of the 1960s. This paper presents a general assessment of the relationship between these thinkers, in the domain of politics, methodology and economics, the emphasis being put on Friedman's reading of Keynes. In many places, Friedman stresses the convergences between his vision and Keynes's, as against the latter's Walrasian disciples. However, despite certain points of agreement at the methodological level, the two authors are radically opposed in terms of political vision and economic analysis.     

The Point of Effective Demand

Abstract

Keynes's principle of effective demand conceives competitive equilibrium in terms of the choices of entrepreneurs, investors and consumers, rather than of the optimal allocation of factors of production. In The General Theory, effective demand is distinguished from aggregate demand and from income, expected or realised, and there is no suggestion that equilibrium means the convergence of expectations. Reconsideration of Keynes's use of time and equilibrium periods leads to the conclusion that he treats employment as in continuous equilibrium, at the point of effective demand, determined by the state of expectation, the correctness of which is strictly irrelevant. The nature of the equilibrium represented by the point of effective demand is here described, not in terms of the multiplier, but in terms of the continuous equilibrium of supply and demand in short-term forward markets. This reading is faithful to Keynes's conception of aggregate demand as dependent upon the expectations of entrepreneurs, and it resolves the meaning of his ‘long-period employment.’ Formal appendices identify the differences between Keynes and Walras and the nature of the multiplier. The paper concludes that the Keynesian cross and ‘Swedish’ analysis should be abandoned, and the Walrasian conception recognised as only the limiting case of general competitive equilibrium in a monetary economy.     

Involuntary unemployment: the missing piece in Keynes's General Theory *

Using a retrospective methodology, my paper examines critically the insights on involuntary unemployment offered by Keynes in his General Theory. Keynes, it is argued, gave involuntary unemployment a modern micro-founded definition yet — quite opportunely, in view of the difficulty of the task—did not attempt to provide a direct microeconomic explanation of it Rather, his claim to the demonstration of its existence rests on an indirect argument, where involuntary unemployment emerges at the corollary of effective demand falling short of its full employment level. This justification is based on the more or less tacit assumption that involuntary unemployment and effective demand-deficiency are equivalent. This claim of equivalence, it will be argued, is wanting. Hence the view that involuntary unemployment may have been demonstrated through the proxy of demand-deficiency falls. My paper evaluates whether Keynes's other arguments in favour of involuntary unemployment are robust. Several alternative interpretations of his General TheoryChapter Two ‘fundamental observation’, focusing respectively on money illusion, adjustment flaws, and resistance to cuts in nominal wages, are discussed. Here also the verdict will be negative. The general conclusion then follows that no solid explanation for the existence of involuntary unemployment is to be found in theGeneral Theory.     

Sraffa,Keynes and 'The Years of High Theory'

This paper argues that Shackle's interpretation of 'the years of high theory' is flawed. Shackle (1967) sees Sraffa's critique of the Marshallian theory of value only as a step in the development of the theory of imperfect competition. In the same vein, Shackle reduces the message of Keynes's General Theory to the claim that unemployment results from the existence of uncertainty and irrational expectations. Thus, Shackle leaves open the possibility that both Sraffa's critique of Marshall and Keynes's theory of effective demand do not question the internal coherence of neoclassical theory, but instead merely assert that market imperfections render it irrelevant for the analysis of the real world. This paper argues, in contrast, that the theories of Sraffa and Keynes should be interpreted as radical departures from marginalism, and represent a return to the surplus approach of classical political economy.     

Joan Robinson and the three cambridge revolutions

Joan Robinson's association with three Cambridge ‘revolutions’—imperfect competition, effective demand and capital theory—is examined in the context of her personal and intellectual partnership with Richard Kahn, John Maynard Keynes and Piero Sraffa. Initially, imperfect competition appeared to have successfully extended marginal analysis to all market forms. It also allowed Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson to persuade Keynes to present the main argument of The General Theory in terms of aggregate demand and aggregate supply. By the early 1950s, however, Joan Robinson had rejected the Marshallian methodology and had become a strenuous censor of neoclassical theory. In this paper the origin of her critique is traced to her reading of Sraffa's Introduction to Ricardo's Principles.     

The Role of credit in a Keynesian monetary economy

Abstract

This paper describes the features of a monetary economy on the basis of Keynes's distinction between a real exchange economy and a monetary economy. In The General Theory, Keynes identifies the reasons for the non-neutrality of money by highlighting the store of wealth function of money; this approach has been adopted by most Keynesian economists. The aim of this paper is to show that such an approach only partially explains the reasons for money non-neutrality and that important elements which demonstrate the relevance of monetary variables emerge when the means of payment function of money is considered. Investigating the role of this function requires that we deal explicitly with how spending decisions are financed. The paper argues that the market for credit must be considered separately from the market for money, and that a viable credit theory can be built from Keynes's post-General Theory writings.     

Confidence in Keynes and Hayek: Reply to Burczak

We agree with Burczak's identification of the crucial issues. We disagree with his interpretation of them. We expand our defense of the claim that Keynes was a rationalist. We introduce the "horizon principle" to critize Keynes' dichotomy between short-term and long-term expectations. We question the statistical simile guiding some Post Keynesian dsiscussions of uncertainty. We point to the role of evolution in shaping conventions that fit the economic environment in a world with novel events. We think the evidence favors our view over Burczak's. Finally, we put in a plea for framing the issues in a way that facilitates empirical testing.