Monetary and fiscal institutional designs

Two investment decisions in economic institutions are feasible; investments in monetary institutions in the form of delegation of monetary policy to a more conservative or independent central bank, and investments in fiscal capacity, in the form of combating bureaucratic corruption and its consequent fiscal revenue leakages. Within this framework, we investigate the interactions among those two institutional decisions and the obtained institutional structure. The findings provide support of strategic complementarities; investments in monetary and fiscal institutions reinforce each other. In addition, we identify a set of determinants that impact on the government’s decisions to improve economic institutions, particularly, the structure and intensity of the initial corruption level, the amount of distortions caused by taxation and the policymaker’s goals and preferences across its objectives.     

John Stuart Mill's Theories of Wealth and Income Distribution

Although he was much influenced by David Ricardo when he wrote the classical part of his Principles , John Stuart Mill was not a Ricardian when he penned his theories of wealth and distribution. They are based on a triple foundation. First, a belief that economics is a moral discipline. Second a theory of custom-driven human behavior. Third, an empirically formed conviction that the institutions of state, education and business cooperate to structure the distribution of income. On the basis of these presuppositions, Mill formulated 1) an institutional theory of the formation of human and non-human wealth and 2) an even more institutional theory of distribution demonstrating how the aforementioned institutions malignantly skew the distribution of income to the advantage of the propertied classes and to the extreme disadvantage of the working class. As a social economist, Mill recommended institutional reforms designed to eradicate the poverty of the working class.     

Keynes,the socialisation of trade,and international monetary institutions

While Keynes began formulating his ideas concerning the post-WWII international financial system in the early 1940s, the genesis of these ideas can be traced to his earlier work. The Keynes Plan represents the culmination of his search for adequate institutions that guide economic activity for the public good. The reasons given by Keynes for the establishment of an International Clearing Bank are relevant in the modern international economy, given the current imbalances in international trade. As Keynes argued for the socialisation of investment as a method to achieve full-employment in the domestic economy, he argued for the “socialisation of trade” as a method to achieve international economic balance among nations.     

Is institutional improvement possible?

A substantial literature shows that economic prosperity is dependent on the quality of economic institutions. Countries with low-quality institutions remain poor while countries with high-quality institutions prosper. Improvement in institutional quality brings with it economic growth. Poor countries must improve their economic institutions to escape poverty; so, if a poor country’s institutional structure is unlikely to improve, that suggests dismal prospects for economic growth and an escape from poverty. An examination of institutional quality over 30 years indicates that countries with low-quality institutions have improved their institutional quality, which demonstrates that poor countries are not stuck with low-quality institutions. They can improve their institutions, and consequently, can generate economic growth and escape poverty.     

Institutional Usury and the Banks

Although usury is no longer widely discussed in economic discourse, the concept of usury is useful in explaining financial upheavals such as the recent and on-going crisis. The Scholastics began the study of interest with their teachings on usury, and Keynes brought the usury debate back into the discussions during the period around the Great Depression. Bernard Dempsey, a Jesuit economist, wrote a definitive assessment of scholastic theory in the early 1940s under the direction of Schumpeter. Dempsey developed his own theory of financial crises which he attributed to the presence of what he termed “institutional usury.” The recently implemented policy by the Federal Reserve of paying banks interest on reserves is examined in light of Dempsey's concept of institutional usury. The scholastic concept of the just price is used to analyze market power wielded by large financial institutions in the modern economy.     

双边投资协定、制度环境和企业对外直接投资区位选择

双边投资协定是两国政府为了促进和保护双边投资签署的协议。作为特定的联系两国的双边制度因素,双边投资协定给企业提供了不同于国家制度环境的保护,因而对企业的投资区位决策产生影响。本文建立了关于双边投资协定、东道国制度环境与母国制度对发展中国家企业对外投资区位选择作用的研究框架。基于中国上市公司2003年至2009年对外直接投资的数据,本文有三点发现:首先,双边投资协定能够促进企业到签约国投资;其次,双边投资协定能够替补东道国制度的缺位,对于促进企业到制度环境较差的签约国投资的作用更大;此外,双边投资协定还能够弥补母国制度支持的不均衡性,对于帮助非国有企业到签约国投资有着显著的积极作用。     

中国的政府公共支出与减贫政策

在中国 ,尽管农村经济增长和贫困减少取得了长足进展 ,但很少有研究对农村经济的动力源进行分析 ,而把公共投资作为农村发展和消除贫困的直接动力源的研究尤其缺乏。本文旨在弥补以前研究的空白 ,并指出各类公共投资对农村经济增长、贫困减少和地区不均等的边际效应在各地区和各时期差别很大。根据实证结果和对历史上公共支出方式的分析可知 ,农村公共支出再分配可以带来很大的潜在收益。     

Education, corruption, and the distribution of income

We examine how the interaction between education and corruption affects institutional reform and economic development. While corruption reduces average income and education, education increases not only output and hence potential corruption rents, but also produces more informed electorates that better monitor government actions. We find that economies with intermediate levels of education remain in a poverty trap since the level of skills creates sufficient corruption rents but not enough monitoring. Economies with low or high levels of education can escape the poverty trap, and inequality plays a key role in determining whether this occurs through a change in institutions or an expansion of education.     

Hayek and the Great Depression of 1929: Did he really change his mind?

The aim of this research is to establish whether, and if so in what way, Hayek changed his mind about the Great Depression of 1929.The work is divided into two parts. In the first part, I present the ‘early’ Hayek of the 1930s. Hayek was the great rival of Keynes. Both explained the Great Depression, applying opposing business cycle theories. For Keynes, the crisis was caused by an excess of saving over investment; for Hayek, on the contrary, by an excess of investment over saving. In the early 1930s, Röpke attempted a synthesis, positing that a recession due to overinvestment can degenerate, as in 1929, into a depression caused by oversaving. Hayek examined and rejected Röpke's theory. In the second part, I present the ‘later’ Hayek of the 1970s. After years of silence and solitude, Hayek was unexpectedly awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, precisely for the contribution he made in the 1930s to the theory of the business cycle. Hayek returned to his pursuit of the ghost of Keynes, debated with his friend and rival Friedman, re-examined Röpke's special case and, according to Haberler, changed his mind. In my conclusion, I attempt to resolve the dilemma.     

创业企业高管团队特征对风投机构投资策略的影响——制度环境与机构专长的双重调节效应

高管团队作为创业企业的掌舵者，是风投机构制定投资策略的重要信号机制。因此，基于高阶理论，探究创业企业高管团队特征对风投机构投资策略的影响机制，进而剖析制度环境与风投机构行业专长对上述影响的调节机制，得出以下结论：①对于平均年龄较低、受教育水平较高、政治关系较强以及社会关系较强的创业企业高管团队而言，风投机构倾向于采取分阶段投资与联合投资策略；②良好的制度环境能够降低投资成本，帮助风投机构优化价值服务质量，弱化创业企业高管团队特征对风投机构分阶段投资与联合投资的影响；③较高的行业专长意味风投具有较完善的监督机制与丰富的资源网络，能够降低创业企业高管团队特征对风投机构分阶段投资与联合投资的影响。     

创业企业高管团队特征对风投机构投资策略的影响——制度环境与机构专长的双重调节效应

高管团队作为创业企业的掌舵者,是风投机构制定投资策略的重要信号机制。因此,基于高阶理论,探究创业企业高管团队特征对风投机构投资策略的影响机制,进而剖析制度环境与风投机构行业专长对上述影响的调节机制,得出以下结论：①对于平均年龄较低、受教育水平较高、政治关系较强以及社会关系较强的创业企业高管团队而言,风投机构倾向于采取分阶段投资与联合投资策略;②良好的制度环境能够降低投资成本,帮助风投机构优化价值服务质量,弱化创业企业高管团队特征对风投机构分阶段投资与联合投资的影响;③较高的行业专长意味风投具有较完善的监督机制与丰富的资源网络,能够降低创业企业高管团队特征对风投机构分阶段投资与联合投资的影响。     

On re-reading Joan Robinson's ‘On re-reading Marx’

This paper offers some reflections inspired by a re-reading of Joan Robinson's On Re-reading Marx on the 50th anniversary of its initial publication. Robinson wrote the pamphlet in the light of Sraffa's Introduction to Ricardo's Works and Correspondence, which suggested to her that the concept of the rate of profit was essentially the same in Ricardo, Marx, Marshall and Keynes. In addition to the connections among Ricardo, Marx, Marshall and Keynes, Robinson also addresses the issues of equilibrium and time, and the dogmatism of Marxism.     

Foreign direct investment and institutional reform: evidence and an application to Portugal

We examine the role of geographic, economic, and institutional factors in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Europe, using a cross-section of inward bilateral investments. We estimate and assess the expected benefits, the required reform efforts, and the efficiency of reform options corresponding to a convergence of Portuguese institutions to EU standards. We conclude that improving home institutions is likely to have a quantitatively very significant role in attracting FDI. Geographical and market size factors also play a role. Reforms promoting the independence of financial institutions and a leaner bureaucracy, lowering political risk and corruption, and improving the investment code may significantly affect the amount of bilateral inward FDI that is targeted to Portugal.     

Hayek and Keynes: From a common critique of economic method to different theories of expectations

The methodological positions of Hayek and Keynes contain striking similarities. Both authors opposed empiricist approaches to economics that assign priority to mere observation as the source of knowledge. Both emphasised intentionality, motivation and human agency. Notwithstanding this common ground, they had different conceptions of how beliefs are formed and had different explanations of thought and action in economics. Hayek grounded his explanation on an evolutionary theory of the mind, i.e. on psychological premises, whereas Keynes based his view of belief formation on probable reasoning, where probability is a logical concept. Starting from psychological premises Hayek maintained that individuals act rationally only by following rules. As a consequence, he considered conventional expectations to be the primary guide for agents in economic life. Keynes agreed that conventional expectations actually guide economic behaviour, but he maintained that they are justified only in situations of total ignorance. In conditions of limited knowledge, agents can base their action on reasonable expectations, independently of conventions. Moreover, agents?particularly those institutions responsible for economic policy?ought to shun conventional behaviour in order to counteract its negative social consequences. We argue that Keynes's theory of expectations is well grounded upon his theory of logical probability. Hence his advocacy of discretionary policy is rationally justified.     

Usury,Market Power and Poverty Traps: A Study of Rural Credit in 1930s’ China

This paper studies the cross-regional variation of interest rates in China in the 1930s. Based on county-level data from the Buck (1941) rural surveys, we examine factors that may have influenced rural interest rates in pre-1949 China. Since the quality of institutions that define property rights and facilitate contract enforcement is important for such transactions as land tenancy arrangements, we treat land tenancy rate (or percentage of owner-farmers) as a proxy for institutional quality. Contrary to the popular belief among historians and economists that usury or high interest rates caused persistent poverty, we find that while the monopoly-exploitation hypothesis has little explanatory power, a region’s institutional quality and income level are persistent and significant determinants of interest rates. Thus, poverty is a key driver of high rates of interest. Economic growth and the development of market institutions are crucial for lowering high interest rates and combating usury.     

Keynes' theory of money and his attack on the classical model

This paper centers on Keynes' theory of money and his attack on the classical model. Keynes criticized the self-correcting model of the British orthodoxy along two separate lines. In the first, in which Keynes' theory of money was crucial, he took the institutional variables as given and examined the functional relationships. Keynes' burden was to undermine what he termed the "classical dichotomy," where money was a veil, playing no role in determining output and employment. Two key features of the orthodox model were loanable funds and quantity theories, and Keynes' theory of money emerged from the rejection of these theories. The key to his attack on the classical dichotomy was the speculative demand for money, which he presented as an indirect, unstable function of the interest rate. Hence, Keynes linked money demand to the interest rate. The interest rate was thus determined by monetary variables rather than real factors, contrary to British orthodox opinion. Keynes then demonstrated that intended investment and saving need not be equal at a full employment equilibrium.A previous version of this paper was presented at the Fiftieth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 15–18, 2000, Charleston, South Carolina. The authors are grateful to participants for their helpful suggestions. The authors are responsible for any remaining errors.     

Boosting tourism's contribution to growth and development: Analysis of the evidence

The tourism sector's contribution to economic development depends upon complex and dynamic socioeconomic, environmental, and institutional factors. Policymakers require objective evidence to base decisions on which public policies or investments to pursue. In this paper we develop an economy‐wide approach to assessing public investments in tourism. The approach is powerful in that it considers all inter‐sectoral linkages that are critical for tourism‐sector analysis. This framework is linked to a microsimulation module that enables estimation of household‐level and destination‐specific impacts and the distribution of benefits. To illustrate the framework and the insights it can generate, we apply it to a public investment in Belize's Cayo District. Our findings show that the overall level of economic activity increases while an appreciation of the real regional exchange rate results in slower growth in traditional nontourism exports. Greater availability of capital and labor to meet increased demand would reduce this effect. The investment results in a reduction in the poverty headcount on the order of 0.7 percentage points, though there is a small increase in inequality that is a function of the skill requirements of the new positions created as a result of the investment.     

"The Reality of the Present and the Challenge of the Future": J. Fagg Foster for the Twenty-First Century

This paper revisits J. Fagg Foster’s early assessment of the relevance of John Maynard Keynes’s theory of institutional economics. In his view, neither institutionalists nor most of Keynes’s followers really recognized the importance of Keynes’s theoretical insights. I examine Foster’s views on economic theory, with a particular focus on monetary theory. I apply Foster’s approach to what is now called modern money theory, an approach developed by heterodox economists working in the institutionalist and post-Keynesian traditions. I argue that this approach is consistent with Foster’s, and it offers a way forward to policy formation for the twenty-first century.     

Do the poor benefit from globalization regardless of institutional quality?

Despite significant progress towards the Millennium goals, more than one billion people live on less than 1.25 US dollars per day. Previous research suggests that globalization stimulates poverty reduction, but does not investigate what role institutions play in this relationship. Theoretically, globalization could act as either a complement or a substitute to institutional quality in reducing poverty. We find that the poverty-reducing effect of globalization is stronger when institutions are weak. In particular, increasing social globalization reduces poverty more when corruption is high and democratic accountability is low. Thus, globalization has the power to reduce poverty even in countries with low institutional quality.     

The contribution of Gerald Shove to the development of Cambridge Economics

Frank Gerald Shove was a close friend of Keynes and the other protagonists of the economic debates in Cambridge during the 1920s and 1930s. Shove's influence on those debates is not well documented because he published little and had all his notes destroyed after his death. This paper looks at Shove's most significant contributions to the debates of the 1930s. Attention is concentrated on the debates over increasing returns and imperfect competition. Shove emphasized the complexity of economic phenomena and the need to develop tools to deal with it. He found his analytical and methodological inspiration in Marshall's work. This position led him to clash with younger economists, in particular Joan Robinson, whose work on imperfect competition and whose efforts to achieve rigorous and ‘precise’ results failed, in his view, to capture the working of actual markets. The final section of the paper discusses the similarity of Shove's methodological outlook to that of Keynes. Both were well aware of the need to go beyond Marshall, but they wanted to retain the richness, complexity and realism of Marshall's approach.