The social cost problem,rights, and the (non)empty core

We revisit the “Coase theorem” through the lens of a cooperative game model which takes into account the assignment of rights among agents involved in a problem of social cost. We consider the case where one polluter interacts with many potential victims. Given an assignment or a mapping of rights, we represent a social cost problem by a cooperative game. A solution consists in a payoff vector. We introduce three properties for a mapping of rights. First, core compatibility indicates that the core of the associated cooperative games is nonempty. Second, Kaldor‐Hicks core compatibility indicates that there is a payoff vector in the core where victims are fully compensated for the damage once the negotiations are completed. Third, no veto power for a victim says that no victim has the power to veto an agreement signed by the rest of the society. We then demonstrate two main results. First, core compatibility is satisfied if and only if the rights are assigned either to the polluter or to the entire set of victims. Second, there is no mapping of rights satisfying Kaldor‐Hicks core compatibility and no veto power for a victim.     

Classifying the degree of cooperative multinationality: Case study of a French multinational cooperative

In recent decades, the largest European worker cooperatives, and those that are the most emblematic in their countries, have been transformed into multinational companies. This article examines workers’-cooperative multinationality by providing a classifying tool based on the interaction between control rights and return rights held by foreign employees in the subsidiaries of multinational cooperatives. We illustrate our matrix of cooperative multinationality by classifying an internationalized historical cooperative, Up Group (formerly Chèque Déjeuner, SCOP). In the last few decades, the French cooperative Up has become a hybrid multinational player in the employee benefits industry by setting up capitalist subsidiaries both in France and overseas. The case study also reports on Up's innovative attempt to produce a global cooperative or a more democratic multinational enterprise through converting subsidiaries’ employees into associates.     

FARMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO INVEST IN NEW COOPERATIVE INSTRUMENTS: A CHOICE EXPERIMENT

Globalization of agricultural markets put pressures on producer cooperatives to invest in expansion and growth to safeguard their competitiveness. Availability of capital is limited if farmers do not have incentives to increase their capital contribution. Cooperative literature recognizes the residual rights, transferability, and the appreciation potential of the investment as the potential solutions for the problems that may impede cooperative investments. The objective of this study is to understand farmer preferences regarding investment attributes and the potential for attracting investment capital from members and non‐members. We employ a choice experiment method to test new cooperative investment instruments. The data consist of a questionnaire conducted with 406 Finnish dairy farmers. Random parameter latent class logit model is used in the estimation of the data. The results indicate that most of the respondents regard the new investment instruments positively. However, farmers prefer restricting ownership rights to members. Incentives for members to participate in financing cooperative growth could be designed with capital‐based residual rights, mechanisms for transferability and for the appreciation of firm value. Estimation that considered choice difficulty improved model fit, which highlights the need to address respondent burden also in future studies of hypothetical investments in order to produce unbiased estimates.     

初次分配公平原则的理论基础

确立初次分配公平原则需要在理论上明确:企业是平等的生产要素的集合,集合于企业的各生产要素处于平等的地位,拥有平等的参与收入分配的权利;生产要素的贡献是生产要素参与收入分配的依据,科学确定各生产要素的贡献才能确保其获得公平的报酬;社会主义制度下的劳动与资本关系是平等的合作关系,而不是不平等的隶属关系,二者拥有平等的企业剩余索取权;初次分配公平是基于效率原则基础上的公平。     

论构建和谐社会的博弈论基础

将和谐社会置于组织理论框架中,运用博弈论的分析方法,研究和谐社会的理论内涵、实现目标及其途径.在组织理论框架中,运用博弈论的方法将法律、政治、经济、文化(意识形态)等整合为一个完整的理论框架,寻求集体理性下的纳什均衡;纳什均衡体现了公平正义、激励及秩序,它要求以民主法制为前提,诚信友爱,产权明晰,人与自然和谐.和谐社会的构建目标应该致力于组织合作制度的建立,努力达成博弈的合作均衡,其途径包括民主与法制建设、建立完善的产权制度、健全社会保障制度、教育的普及与深化以及文化建设.     

Labor relations and productivity growth in advanced capitalist economies

In this paper, we claim that worker rights (including collective bargaining rights, employment protection, and income security) promote productivity growth. We argue that cooperative labor-management relations encourage workers to make positive contributions to technical and organizational innovations that raise labor productivity, and that an industrial relations system that secures strong worker rights fosters cooperative labor-management relations. These arguments are supported by an empirical analysis of long-run productivity growth in 15 advanced capitalist countries. We first develop an index of worker rights and show its positive effect on several indicators of labor-management cooperation. We then develop an index combining measures of worker rights and labor-management cooperation and show its positive effect on the rate of growth of labor productivity.     

试论我国农民专业合作社成员权救济制度的构建

农民专业合作社是我国目前提高农民收入,实现农业专业化、产业化、规模化生产经营,解决"三农"问题,建设社会主义新农村的重要途径。2005年通过的《中华人民共和国农民专业合作社法》为我国农民专业合作社的发展提供了重要的法律保障。但合作社成员权救济制度的缺失,使得不能实质实现对合作社成员权利的保障,同时也制约了农民专业合作社的发展。我国应逐步建立健全农民专业合作社成员权救济制度,保护农民合作社成员合法权益,为我国农民专业合作社的健康发展保驾护航。     

股金合作制和股份合作制的比较与选择--集体企业典型形式探索

与我国股份合作制企业相比,西方股金合作制企业的产权安排更为规范、稳定、可行,其弊端可以在保持劳动合作基本特征的前提下加以校正。股份合作制“瞬时效应”明显,根源在于资本权利与劳动权利在企业内部的冲突以及产权安排的不确定性。这一制度缺陷难以在坚持劳动合作为核心的前提下进行校正。在我国发展股金合作制企业具有理论和现实依据,但必须结合实际对其制度缺陷进行校正。股金合作制独特的产权制度和经济社会功能,更适合作为集体所有制企业的典型形式。     

Growth of Investor Owned and Cooperative Firms in Greek Dairy Industry

This paper examines the factors that affect the annual growth of cooperatives and investor owned firms (IOF) in Greek diary industry over the period 1990–94. A comparison based on both cooperative principals and property rights theory is made between IOFs and cooperatives to study their characteristics. However an empirical work is required to explain differences, if any, in the growth of the two types of firms within the same market. The work examines the determinants of the annual growth and it tests whether significant differences between IOFs and cooperatives exist. Ordinary least squares results show that both diversification and advertising strategies are important determinants for IOF growth, while the cooperative growth depends on capital structure and intensity and these organizations do not effectively apply competitive strategies.     

农村合作组织的制度安排：一个基本框架

农村合作组织制度嵌入受到小农经济和村社文化的约束,农村合作组织的制度构架主要由产权制度、分配制度、治理结构制度以及责任制度等构成,农村合作组织的制度演进呈现农村经济合作联社一农民协会一专业合作一股份合作四个阶段,传统制度阴影、现有制度缺陷以及制度变迁成本较高成为农村合作组织的制度演进障碍,促进农村合作组织制度演进的主要措施有：加大对农村合作组织的制度供给的力度;走强制性和诱致性相结合的制度道路;营造制度环境并提供政府援助;以及通过体制创新,构建农村“2＋1”新模式;等等。     

政府责任视角商业保险参与新农合的前世今生——我国农村合作医疗保险制度变迁的视角

基于我国农村医疗保障制度的变迁,对我国新型农村医疗保险最终选择以政府责任为主导的商业化运作模式,从农村医疗保障＂公共品视角＂、农村合作医疗制度变迁路径依赖、商业保险参与新农合运行缺陷,以及国际上现有医疗保障模式比较等方面进行释疑。同时,指出新农合的商业化运作模式发展过程中,政府责任应包括制订相关政策法规、确保管理费的足额到位、加强对农民的宣传教育以及合理的制度设计,明确各方权利义务。     

Drivers of participation in collective arrangements in the agri‐food supply chain. Evidence from Italy using a transaction costs economics perspective

The analysis of institutions in the agro‐food sector is gaining momentum since it represents a complex and relevant area of study as concerns intermediate‐product markets. Traditionally there has been a problem of organization among farmers mainly due to the reluctance to pool decisional and property rights on input and/or output. Following the Transaction Costs Economics framework, the paper aims to investigate which are the main drivers of the collective forms of organization in the Italian agro‐food system, paying particular attention to transaction costs’ attributes and to the increasing role played by the institutional environment as well. The choice to join a cooperative or producer organization is therefore conceptualized as a governance structure choice. In this regard, based on the Italian version of the Farm Accountancy Data Network, econometric models are estimated in order to account for the two organizational alternatives under investigation.     

我国科技型小微企业合作研发现状实证研究

科技型小微企业以新技术为成长核心，由于自身资源不足，合作研发是其技术创新的重要选择。通过对全国范围内 351个科技型小微企业有效样本的问卷调查，并结合深度访谈，分析我国科技型小微企业合作研发现状，探索其面临的障碍和成因，提出开辟多元化资金来源渠道、提升参与合作研发内生能力、搭建开放式科技中介服务生态平台、健全知识产权长效保护机制以及畅通有效的沟通协调渠道等对策建议。     

PPP项目控制权转移机制研究*——基于探索性多案例的分析

提高民营企业参与PPP项目的控制权是激发民营企业创新活力、降低运营成本的重要举措。民营企业参与PPP项目的过程，实质是政府让渡控制权与企业获取控制权的动态博弈过程。本文从合作治理的视角，以同一家民营企业参与的两个城市公用事业PPP项目为研究对象，提炼影响城市公用事业PPP项目控制权转移的关键要素，采用探索性多案例研究方法，挖掘民营企业参与PPP项目的控制权转移机制，发现政府制度能力、企业动态能力、市场竞争强度是影响控制权转移的关键要素，政企关系对上述三类影响路径起到积极的调节作用。相应的，民营企业参与PPP项目的控制权转移存在三条基本路径，即能力转移、关系转移和市场转移。本研究不仅丰富了PPP项目控制权的研究成果，还可以为提高民营企业参与PPP项目的控制权提供指导与借鉴。     

企业会计契约:动态过程与效率

企业是利益相关者之间相互缔约形成的利益共同体 ,企业会计契约是企业契约的主要组成部分。利益相关者之间的利益冲突与协调是通过会计契约来实现的 ,而企业契约的执行所需要的计量与监督功能则具体落实在会计契约的动态运行与优化上。优化会计契约机制的经济途径是从决策行为的角度 ,将其剩余控制权配置给决策效率最大的参与者 ;而法律途径则是运用格式化方法将经过长期实践检验、对促使会计契约机制运行有效的惯例加以总结 ,以此节约会计契约结构的规范成本     

A Coalition-Form Analysis Of The “One Country - One Vote” Rule In The Governing Council Of The European Central Bank *

This paper analyses the “one country—one vote” rule for monetary policy decision

making of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank in a framework of cooperative game theory. The Shapley value is used as a solution concept. In contrast to former papers analysing the allocation of abstract "voting power" in committees of international organisations, preferences for monetary policy are modelled to obtain a prediction about potential transfers implied by an equal allocation of voting rights when countries are of different size. It is shown that if the number of countries participating to a currency union grows and the weight of the largest country within the currency union becomes small, the allocation of voting rights becomes irrelevant in the sense that transfers per country tend in any case to zero. [C71, E5, F02]     

PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORT FOR AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS APPROACH

This paper addresses the issue of whether nontraditional agricultural cooperatives should be eligible for receiving public policy support. We adopt an organizational economics approach that appears to better inform policy design and suggest critical questions that both policy makers and regulators need to address before introducing measures and sanctions. After discussing the introduction of innovative cooperative models characterized by a whole new set of ownership and control rights, we recast vaguely defined property rights problems as attempts to maximize efficiency and avoid organizational decline rather than to take advantage of excessive market power in highly concentrated oligopsonistic/oligopolistic markets.     

THE EXTENDED GOVERNANCE OF COOPERATIVE FIRMS: INTER‐FIRM COORDINATION AND CONSISTENCY OF VALUES

This work aims at providing a framework for the analysis of governance in networks of cooperative firms. It builds on four bodies of literature: cooperation, transaction costs, monopoly capitalism, production networks. The framework associates the specific principles that define the identity of cooperative organizations (self‐help, member ownership, democratic control, financial participation, limited capital remuneration) alongside more general governance levels (embodied values, property rights, control, resource allocation). We then apply the same dimensions to production networks and propose a stylized networking model for cooperatives. We introduce market power, and identify two polarized types of networks: (1) heterarchical forms of coordination based on cooperation and mutual help, (2) hierarchical coordination based on exclusive direction. We compare both types with our normative framework providing examples and brief case studies for each network type. Recommendations to scholars and practitioners point at the opportunity to discriminate inter‐firm relations and production development strategy in terms of the values of cooperation, at all governance levels.     

Fishing Revenue, Productivity and Product Choice in the Alaskan Pollock Fishery

A key element in evaluating fishery management strategies is examining their effects on the economic performance of fishery participants, yet nearly all empirical studies of fisheries focus exclusively on the amount of fish harvested. The economic benefits derived from fish stocks involve the amount of revenue generated from fish processing, which is linked to both the way fish are harvested and the products produced from the fish. In this study we econometrically estimate a flexible revenue function for catcher-processor vessels operating in the Alaskan pollock fishery, recognizing potential endogeneity and a variety of fishing inputs and conditions. We find significant own-price supply responses and product substitutability, and enhanced revenues from increased fishing days and tow duration after a regulatory change introduced property rights through a new fishing cooperative. We also find significant growth in economic productivity, or higher revenues over time after controlling for observed productive factors and price changes, which exceeds that attributable to increased harvest. These patterns suggest that the move to rights-based management has contributed significantly to economic performance in the pollock fishery.     

协同创新科技管理体制机制设计

科技体制机制关系到协同创新主体参与协同创新的积极性,以及协同创新要素能否顺畅地进行集聚和合作,从而影响协同创新绩效。宁波创新资源基础薄弱,产业转型升级亟需依赖区域协同创新推动。在分析协同创新政府科技管理作用的基础上,提出协同创新科技体制机制框架设计,并从协同创新人才支撑、创新组织建设、科技服务平台支持、创新成果转化交易服务体系、知识产权保护等方面提出了相关对策与建议。