基于职业化培养模式的法学本科课程体系二元结构

我国的高等教育已进入大众教育阶段,然而当前法学本科教育所处的窘境决定了法学教育却仍需保持精英教育,法律精英人才的培养须采职业化培养模式。法律作为渊博的社会之学,须与其他学科通融;法律精英人才的职业化培养须加强法律技能训练。针对这些特点设计出法学本科课程的二元结构体系,以满足法学职业教育的需要。     

基于职业能力培养的文科高职实训课程建设——以《社会工作法律实务》课程为例

现代社会的发展对高职课程建设提出了新的要求。与理工科一样,文科高职实训课程的建设也应该关注学生就业岗位所要求的职业能力,应该以职业能力为目标设计课程,开发课程。《社会工作法律实务》课程的设计和开发,证明了这种思路的正确性和可行性。     

Extendable Cooperative Games

A (TU) cooperative game is extendable if every core allocation of each subgame can be extended to a core allocation of the game. It is strongly extendable if any minimal vector in the upper core of any of its subgames can be extended to a core allocation. We prove that strong extendability is equivalent to largeness of the core. Further, we characterize extendability in terms of an extension of the balanced cover of the game. It is also shown how this extension can unify the analysis of many families of games under one roof.     

Cooperative economic growth

We comparatively study optimal economic growth in a simple endogenous growth model and under two different games, i.e., dynamic sequential game and cooperative stochastic differential game, between a representative household and a typical self-interested politician. Sequential equilibrium solution is derived by applying Backward Induction Principle and corresponding optimal economic growth rate is endogenously determined. Moreover, cooperative equilibrium solution is established with group rationality, individual rationality and sub-game consistency requirements fulfilled, and it is further confirmed that the representative household will save more, and the self-interested politician will tax less, thereby leading to much faster economic growth, when compared to those of the sequential equilibrium solution.     

Cooperative oligopolistic pricing

The main purpose of the present paper is to show that the equilibrium price in an oligopolistic market with cooperative pricing but noncooperative production as a rule approaches neither the monopoly price (when there are few firms) nor the competitive price (when there are many firms). Instead it is equal to that price which maximizes collective sales revenues if the industry's demand curve is inelastic, while it is “almost” competitive if demand is elastic.     

Cooperative oligopoly equilibrium

Oligopoly cooperation is investigated in an industry with N firms: each firm selects its own output. We show that such oligopoly problems have the same structure as problems of allocating public goods since each firm views its own output as a private good while viewing the outputs of others as public bads. This leads to ‘cooperative oligopoly equilibria’ which are the Lindahl equilibria of the oligopoly model. Agreements are modeled by the selection of a mechanism or ‘game form’ which obeys certain axioms. Under the postulated axioms we show the equivalence of agreed allocations with the set of oligopoly equilibria.It is argued that the principle of ‘Lindahl agreements’ may have wider applications.     

基于合作博弈的订单农业合作组织发展研究

运用合作博弈模型,在深入分析建立农业合作组织内在机制运行的基础上,试图构建一种新型的订单农业发展模式,实现和维护订单农业的良好运行,其目的对发展我国现代农业和社会主义新农村建设能起到积极的作用。     

Cooperative Design for Central Banks versus Cooperative Implementation of Monetary Policy

The game-theoretic literature on monetary policy in open economies has traditionally concluded that central banks should implement monetary policy in a cooperative fashion. This paper considers an alternative mechanism for internalizing the external effects: in the first stage, governments cooperatively design central banks' objective functions; in the second stage, central banks implement monetary policy without cooperation. Although this regime lacks flexibility to deal with asymmetric shocks, it presents important advantages in relation to the former scenario: first, it enjoys more credibility; second, it entails lower coordination and information costs; and finally, it hampers unilateral manipulation of central banks' objectives.     

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games

A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71     

集体所有制、合作制和股份合作制的比较研究

集体所有制是一种无法与市场经济相兼容的所有制形式,而合作制和股份合作制则几私人股份制裼一种过渡性所有制形式。但与集体所有制相比,合作和股份合作制是两种更不规范的所有制形式肉某种角度看,经们甚至表现出了某些比集体所有制更大的缺点。     

考核中的合作性分析

员工和主管在考核中是否合作对考核结果的准确有重大影响 ,文章从博弈论的角度对考核中主管与员工的合作性问题 ,以及员工与组织的合作性问题进行了分析 ,提出解决考核中合作性问题的基本思路。     

农民合作的经济学分析

本文利用现代西方经济学的厂商理论、蛛网理论，从理论上重点探讨了农民合作的内在经济动因，并通过典型案例进行了实证分析，认为提高市场谈判力和减低市场经营风险是农民组织出现的主要原因。发展农民合作组织对于改善农民在市场交易中的不利地位，提高农民收入具有很大的作用，政府应鼓励其发展。     

Application of Teachers' Behavior in English Classroom Management

In the practical teaching process, the teacher is not only a guide to teach students how to learn but also take a role as a classroom manager. A good classroom manager could give a lot of benefits for students. Approaches to behavior and classroom management focuses on helping teachers to use a variety of approaches in behavior and classroom management in order to make good decisions when they face with the challenge of creating positive classroom communities, to create a positive classroom atmosphere, to improve the teaching competences of teachers and to update the concept of classroom management constantly.     

Cooperative games in permutational structure

Summary. By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard cooperative non-transferable utility game described by a set of payoffs for each coalition being a nonempty subset of the grand coalition of all players. It is well-known that balancedness is a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core of such a cooperative non-transferable utility game. In this paper we consider non-transferable utility games in which for any coalition the set of payoffs depends on a permutation or ordering upon any partition of the coalition into subcoalitions. We call such a game a cooperative game in permutational structure or shortly permutational game. Doing so we extend the scope of the standard cooperative game theory in dealing with economic or political problems. Next we define the concept of core for such games. By introducing balancedness for ordered partitions of coalitions, we prove the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced non-transferable utility permutational game. Moreover we show that the core of a permutational game coincides with the core of an induced game in coalitional structure, but that balancedness of the permutational game need not imply balancedness of the corresponding coalitional game. This leads to a weakening of the conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a game in coalitional structure, induced by a game in permutational structure. Furthermore, we refine the concept of core for the class of permutational games. We call this refinement the balanced-core of the game and show that the balanced-core of a balanced permutational game is a nonempty subset of the core. The proof of the nonemptiness of the core of a permutational game is based on a new intersection theorem on the unit simplex, which generalizes the well-known intersection theorem of Shapley. Received: October 31, 1995; revised version: February 5, 1997     

Cooperative research and the firm

This paper models cooperative R & D involving the university, the government, and the firm, using a linear programming format to determine the optimal cooperative structure or, “Who does what?” Both prime and dual are discussed. Sensitivity and simulation techniques are discussed as analytical tools to evaluate the effect of uncertainty and returns to scale on the optimal mix or structure of cooperative R & D. The value of the approach is both heuristic and analytical. Some problems and limitations of the approach are discussed briefly.     

网络时代的合作性竞争

20世纪90年代以来,随着计算机、通讯技术被整合到“互联网”中,社会经济的各个方面出现了根本性变革,传统经济中企业之间的“对抗性竞争”正在向网络时代的“合作性竞争”转化。 竞争是双方或多方为取得并非各方都能得到的利益而进行的较量。按照战略管理专家迈克尔·波特的观点,一个企业在市     

Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games

This paper shows the equivalence between the stable solution set of any cooperative game in characteristic form (G1) and the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies of a certain noncooperative game (G2). Players of G1 are named "agents." G2 is played by different players ("principals") who compete in wages to attract agents. The equivalence result holds when there are enough principals (if the game is superadditive, two principals suffice). Finally, another related cooperative game (G3) is constructed with both principals and agents as players. For G2 and G3 the same result is then proven, for any number of principals. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71 and C72.