我国货币政策传导过程中的“渗漏”效应

通过对 5年多来我国“积极”货币政策效果不尽如人意原因的研究 ,本文认为 :货币政策传导过程中有大量货币不是被传导并作用于生产、流通和消费等实体经济环节 ,而是“渗漏”到股票市场“漏斗”和银行体系“黑洞” ,其效应构成了实现货币政策目标的反制力量。公众心理预期变化、收入分配差距拉大和区域经济发展不平衡是“渗漏”效应产生的最直接、甚至是最重要的原因 ,它们交织在一起 ,共同驱动货币在货币政策传导过程中大量“渗漏” ,导致严重的“渗漏”效应。为提高我国货币政策的有效性 ,必须有效抑制“渗漏”效应。     

Environmental risk and welfare valuation under imperfect information

Consumers are often uninformed, or unsure, about the ambient level of environmental risk. An optimal policy must jointly determine efficient levels of self-protection, information provision, and public risk mitigation efforts. Unfortunately, conventional welfare measures are not amenable to welfare analysis in the presence of imperfect information. We develop a theoretical welfare measure, called quasi-compensating variation, that is a natural extension of compensating variation (CV). We show that this welfare measure offers not only a money metric of the “value of information,” but also a means to appropriately evaluate the welfare effects of various policies when consumers are imperfectly informed about ambient risk. This welfare measure allows us to obtain a number of results that the traditional CV measure fails to offer. In particular, we show that the consumer’s willingness to pay for a (small) environmental risk reduction is higher for those who underestimate ambient risk than for those who overestimate or are perfectly informed if the marginal return to self-protection increases with ambient risk.     

A Public Choice Approach to Strategic and Nonstrategic Environmental Policy

In this paper we take a public choice perspective on strategic environmental policy and international environmental agreements. We examine cooperative and noncooperative environmental policies under governments that are either welfare maximizers (“good dictators”) or tax revenue maximizers (“Leviathans”). We show that Leviathans can perform better in terms of welfare and that good dictators can set higher taxes. We then analyze international environmental agreements and show that the breakdown of environmental cooperation can indeed lead to a welfare gain for all signatory countries. Considering a delegation game between governments, we find that a Pareto‐superior Leviathan outcome can be the unique Nash equilibrium.     

Dualistic Discourse and Immigration Policy

Abstract:

The central question in immigration policy is whether to support less immigration through more “restrictive” laws and procedures or whether to support more immigration through a “relaxation” of existing laws. Recently, however, a second debate has arisen on one side of this debate regarding the appropriate types of arguments that may be used to support “restrictive” immigration. Ross Douthat refers to this dispute as the “race versus economics” question: using “race-based” arguments is not legitimate; while an “economic” or a “fact-based” argument is regarded as legitimate. We argue that this distinction in anti-immigration rhetoric is more apparent than real. Using the two most common historical “tropes” in immigration policy, “criminal” and “worker,” we find that racist, anti-ethnic, and classist assumptions pervade U.S. immigration law and policy and have been far more influential in formulating actual policy than either economic or “fact-based” analysis. The central problem with restrictive immigration policy is that its primary purpose is to determine who is eligible to be an American, and who is not; in other words, immigration policy is, by its fundamental intent, invidious. The question is whether it is possible to exclude individuals on these “legitimate” grounds without relying on “illegitimate” invidious distinctions?     

The Next Great Depression II: The Impending Financial Collapse

I seek to put social provisioning into perspective with regard to the financial instability issue in capitalism. My analysis rests on an institutionalist-Minskyian endogenous instability assumption and maintains that monetary/financial stability is a peculiar public good or specific commons since it concerns all of society and its viability in time, not individuals involved in private financial relations. Consequently, the provision of financial stability becomes essentially a matter of public policy and requires the intervention of public power in order to prevent finance from becoming a public “bad.” This result relies on the distinction between private “normal” goods and ambivalent/transversal money (and related financial relations). I point to the necessity of a public organization and tight regulation of finance and financial markets, when standard equilibrium models assume that social optimum and stability can be provided by private self-adjustment and market prices mechanisms.     

制造业绿色产品开发的风险识别研究

绿色和环保是当今社会的主题,世界各国也越来越重视环境和资源问题。开发制造业绿色产品可以使生态环境和社会经济连接为一个协调发展的有机整体,从根本上解决制造业的环境问题。然而,绿色产品开发是一项高风险性的复杂系统工程,受多种风险因素的综合影响,其中企业内部的技术风险以及企业外部市场和政策风险是主要风险,且对于每一类风险而言,具体哪些风险因素起主要作用还没有明确的结论。为此,系统地识别绿色产品开发的技术风险、市场风险和政策风险,利用因子分析方法,对上述三方面的风险分别进行信息的凝练和提取,共得到9个关键风险因子,并提出了防范制造业绿色产品开发关键风险的对策建议,以期降低绿色产品开发的风险,促进循环经济和低碳经济的发展。     

Inter‐regional competition,comparative advantage and environmental federalism

In this paper, we compare endogenous environmental policy setting with centralized and decentralized governments when regions have comparative advantages in different polluting goods. We develop a two‐region, two‐good model with inter‐regional environmental damages and perfect competition in product markets, where both regions produce both goods. Despite positive spillovers of pollution across regions, the model predicts that decentralization may lead to weaker or stricter environmental standards or taxes, depending on the degree of regional comparative advantage and the extent of transboundary pollution. This suggests that federalism can lead to either a “race to the bottom” or a “race to the top,” without relying on inefficient lobbying efforts or capital competition.     

The role of risk aversion in public goods dilemmas with environmental uncertainty: an experimental analysis

The purpose of this study is to extend earlier research on environmental uncertainty in public goods dilemmas. The present paper reports the results of an experiment designed to examine the effect of risk aversion on public goods provision. A von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function with constant coefficient of relative risk aversion is used to investigate the impact of risk attitudes within a threshold public goods environment. The outcome of the threshold public goods experiment shows that subjects are indifferent to the changes in environmental conditions. Additionally, the analysis indicates that risk aversion is a significant determinant of voluntary public goods contribution level.     

A survey of evolutionary policy: normative and positive dimensions

We explore public policy from the perspective of evolutionary analysis. Potential entry points for developing a normative evolutionary policy theory are examined, which involves a critical examination of the related idea of “evolutionary progress”. The meaning of evolutionary policy is next studied from two different, normative and positive angles: namely, policy design informed by evolutionary thinking; and policy-making and politics as an evolutionary process. Several examples are provided to discuss the value of evolutionary thinking for policy, including in the context of the current economic crisis. Next, evolutionary policy is compared with policy advice coming from two dominant schools of policy analysis, namely neoclassical economics and public choice theory. We conclude that evolutionary thinking offers a distinct and useful perspective on public policy change and design. Nevertheless, there is a need for more synthesis and coherence among different studies as well as for policy experiments and in-depth empirical studies.     

Uncertainty, human action and scenarios

The “scenario method,” “scenario building,” or “multiple futures analysis” emerged during the last decades as a premier instrument for strategic planning and decision making in conditions of uncertainty. This article demonstrates that there is an intrinsic link between the scenario method and Austrian theory not only at the level of basic epistemological principles but also at the methodological and applied levels. The article also argues that the scenario method could easily be embraced as a part of the Austrian family of ideas and more precisely as one of the key policy applications or decision support tools informed by that school of thought. Blending explicitly and systematically the scenario method with the Austrian ideas and forcefully making the case for the scenario approach as a policy and business administration tool, is thus one of the most effective ways of reasserting the importance of Austrian insights in areas such as business studies, public policy, and organizational theory, areas that currently have a limited exposure to Austrian ideas.     

Experimental evidence on the ‘insidious’ illiquidity risk

This paper introduces an experiment aiming to investigate the contribution of illiquidity risk to the total risk of a collective investment project. If implemented, the project succeeds with a known probability. Yet the project fails if the quota of investors is not reached in the first place. Hence strategic uncertainty compounds its effect with the “intrinsic risk” of the project. Results confirm the insidious nature of illiquidity: as long as a first collective default does not occur, investors accept high intrinsic risk projects. After a first default, they become extremely prudent and come back to market only gradually. After several defaults, private agents manage to coordinate on a relatively low intrinsic risk above which they refuse to participate in the project. Macroeconomic policy implications follow.     

Assessing the stochastic stability of public debt: the case of Austria

This paper characterizes the long-run distribution of Austrian public debt using a Markov chain model of the debt-GDP ratio and several key macroeconomic variables. We apply Bayesian techniques to estimate the transition probabilities of the model which allows to incorporate information from other countries. Based on the model, we argue that the historical record of Austrian fiscal policy is consistent with a stable long-run distribution of the debt-GDP ratio with an expected value close to the 60% threshold of the Maastricht treaty. Our results suggests that the strong increase in the debt-GDP ratio in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis should be seen as a transitory tail event rather than as a sign of long-run unsustainability. However, we also show that the existence of a stable long-run distribution depends on a continuing tendency of fiscal policy to “lean against debt” by reducing the primary deficit in face of rising debt. Finally we assess how exogenous shocks to the primary deficit and real GDP growth affect the model-implied distribution.     

“Haircuts” for the EMU periphery: virtue or vice?

We use a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study the impacts of an exogenous fall in aggregate demand, the resulting increase in public debt, and the consequences of a sovereign debt haircut for a member country or bloc of the union. Two different scenarios for such a haircut are assumed: an expected and an unexpected haircut. In the union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a “core” with lower initial public debt, and a “periphery” with higher initial public debt. The “periphery’’ may experience the haircut due to the high level of its sovereign debt. We calculate numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that a haircut as modeled in our study is disadvantageous for both the “core” and the “periphery” of the monetary union, both when expected and when unexpected.     

Fiscal space on the eurozone periphery and the use of the (partially) balanced-budget multiplier: The case of Spain

This article adopts the “functional finance” approach to consider the utilization of expansive fiscal policies in the members of the European Monetary Union most affected by high unemployment. As they do not have their own monetary policy, fiscal deficits require the issuing of public debt without the support of the central bank. The authors consequently incorporate the notion of a (partially) balanced-budget expansion to achieve the desired stimulus in gross domestic product (GDP) with the least possible effect on public debt. Their proposal is only a sort of “imperfect” balanced-budget expansion: It is based on the idea that simultaneous increases in public revenue and expenditure can boost GDP, but without any pretension of keeping public deficit unchanged. Specifically, the authors use the case of Spain to show that a more expansive fiscal policy is desirable on economic grounds, and that only institutional constraints prevent it. They do it presenting two alternative scenarios for the coming years and analyzing their different impact on unemployment and fiscal sustainability. The first represents a firm commitment to budget consolidation, whereas the second is based on this “imperfect” application of the balanced budget multiplier. The main conclusion is that a more expansive fiscal policy is perfectly compatible with finance sustainability.     

派驻督察、绩效考核转变与高质量发展*——基于土地派驻督察的经验证据

本文将派驻督察政策与绩效考核指标转变纳入统一分析框架内,利用多任务委托代理模型分析了“质量”任务和“数量”任务冲突情形下的最优策略选择,并以国家土地督察为例,采用双重差分的方法进行实证检验。研究结果表明：派驻督察政策有助于推动高质量发展,但其实施要充分考虑任务的相对冲突性;在双代理人模式下,土地派驻督察政策能够显著发挥其监督激励的作用,可以通过影响地方政府来推动高质量发展;转变绩效考核指标这类引导型激励方式发挥的效果开始初步显现。机制检验表明,督察政策推动高质量发展是通过促进法制规范性、发展集约性、环境可持续性和民生共享性等方面实现的。     

Credible communication in dynastic government

This paper studies information disclosure in a model of dynastic government. When information about past policy choices comes exclusively from the reports of previous administrations, each administration has an incentive to choose its (suboptimal) one-shot expenditure policy, and then misrepresent its choice to its successor. Consequently, it has been suggested that “horizontal accountability,” i.e., a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch, can ensure credible disclosure of a government's activities. This paper suggests a cautious approach to that view.The baseline model examines the reporting incentives of an external auditor who can independently verify the information each period. Even with auditing, credible disclosure is shown to be problematic. Various extensions to this baseline model are examined. In one extension, “liberal” (i.e., those prefering larger government expenditures) and “conservative” (those prefering smaller expenditures) regimes and auditors evolve over time. It is shown that “conservative” (“liberal”) auditors are not credible when the current regime is also “conservative” (“liberal”). Moreover, because information transmission stops when the auditor's and the regime's biases coincide, effective deterrents even in the “good” periods (when the auditor's and the administration's biases differ) are difficult to construct. In all periods the equilibrium requirement of auditor neutrality constrains the dynamic incentives for efficient policy choices. These constraints are shown to bind away from optimal policies in standard constructions of equilibrium. Various ways in which auditing protocols can overcome these problems are discussed.     

Spatial correlation effect of China's outward foreign direct investment in countries along the One Belt and One Road

Promoted by both the “going out” policy and the “One Belt and One Road” (OBOR) Initiative, China's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has grown rapidly in the past two decades. A spatial network has gradually formed that facilitates global production, sales, and innovation. This paper studies the spatial correlation of China's OFDI network along the OBOR and its determinants. The block model analysis suggests that China's OFDI spatial network comprises four gradient sections. In addition, the analyses of quadratic assignment procedure and exponential random graph models demonstrate a tendency of agglomeration of China's OFDI, which may hinder the further development of its spatial correlation networks. Finally, we present some policy suggestions stemming from the study in the hope of helping both the government and firms to optimize their OFDI spatial layout strategy along the OBOR.     

Permanent On-The-Spot Job Creation—The Missing Keynes Plan for Full Employment and Economic Transformation

The paper rejects the conventional view that Keynes had an aggregate demand approach to full employment. Instead, it proposes that he advocated a very specific labor demand targeting approach that would be implemented both in recessions and expansions. Modern policies, which aim to “close the demand gap” between current and potential output are inconsistent with Keynes's work on theoretical and methodological grounds. There is considerable evidence to suggest that a permanent program for direct or (in his words) “on-the-spot” job creation is the missing Keynes Plan for full employment and economic transformation. The current crisis presents the social economist with a unique opportunity to set fiscal policy straight along the original Keynesian lines. The paper suggests what specific form such a policy might take.     

Collective Risk Control and Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion

We provide an analysis of odds‐improving self‐protection for when it yields collective benefits to groups, such as alliances of nations, for whom risks of loss are public bads and prevention of loss is a public good. Our analysis of common risk reduction shows how diminishing returns in risk improvement can be folded into income effects. These income effects then imply that whether protection is inferior or normal depends on the risk aversion characteristics of underlying utility functions, and on the interaction between these, the level of risk, and marginal effectiveness of risk abatement. We demonstrate how public good inferiority is highly likely when the good is “group risk reduction.” In fact, we discover a natural or endogenous limit on the size of a group and of the amount of risk controlling outlay it will provide under Nash behavior. We call this limit an “Inferior Goods Barrier” to voluntary risk reduction. For the paradigm case of declining risk aversion, increases in group size(wealth) will cause provision of more safety to change from a normal to an inferior good thereby creating such a barrier.