CAPABILITIES AS FUNDAMENTAL ENTITLEMENTS: SEN AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Amartya Sen has made a major contribution to the theory of social justice, and of gender justice, by arguing that capabilities are the relevant space of comparison when justice-related issues are considered. This article supports Sen's idea, arguing that capabilities supply guidance superior to that of utility and resources (the view's familiar opponents), but also to that of the social contract tradition, and at least some accounts of human rights. But I argue that capabilities can help us to construct a normative conception of social justice, with critical potential for gender issues, only if we specify a definite set of capabilities as the most important ones to protect. Sen's "perspective of freedom" is too vague. Some freedoms limit others; some freedoms are important, some trivial, some good, and some positively bad. Before the approach can offer a valuable normative gender perspective, we must make commitments about substance.     

A Methodological Reflection on the “Thick Socialism” of Socialism after Hayek

This article discusses the valuable contribution that Ted Burczak's Socialism After Hayek makes to the Marxist theory of socialism by drawing on the Hayekian appreciation of markets as processes of discovery. But the article also critiques the book's acceptance of Hayek's exclusive reliance on markets as a mode of economic organisation. The article reflects on the methodological conditions that might have led the book down a path of market essentialism.     

Degrees of Connection: A Critique of Rawls’s Theory of Mutual Disinterest

John Rawls's solution to the problem of justice between generations is premised on the idea that “a generation cares for its immediate descendants, as fathers say care for their sons” (John Rawls 1971: 288, emphasis added). This paper brings mothers into the Rawlsian social contract. I argue that, when children have more than one parent, there is a contradiction between the assumption of concern for descendants, which underpins Rawls's account of justice between generations, and the mutual disinterest assumption, which characterizes parties negotiating in the “original position.” Concern for descendants creates connections within generations as well as across generations. The critique is internal and nonradical, but its implications are subversive. It demonstrates that an “add women and stir” liberal feminist reworking of Rawls's theory cannot be successful; bringing sexual reproduction out of the realm of nature and into the social contract necessitates a radical reconstruction of Rawls's theory.     

Of clouds and clocks and Keynes: conceptions of reality and the growth of knowledge function of money ∗

In this paper, John Maynard Keynes' General theoryand the concept of money are given an evolutionary interpretation. This interpretation is based on Karl Popper's delightful essay ‘Of clouds and clocks: an approach to the problem of rationality and the freedom of man’. The essay presents two things: Popper's conception of indeterminism and his general theory of abstractions. Popper's general theory concerns the role of abstractions and rule-governed, hierarchical systems of abstractions in structuring an indeterministic and uncertain world. He applies his general theory to science.Popper maintains that science is an abstract, rule-governed, linguistic process that facilitates criticism as a way of learning about our world. Popper calls this the growth of knowledge function of science. Popper's general theory can be applied to Keynes' General theory. Following Popper, I argue for a conception of the economy as a rule-governed, monetary language of commerce that facilitates critically minded inquiry in the domain of ordinary economic transactions. A monetary system facilitates the growth of commonsense knowledge in the economy. I call this the growth of knowledge function of money. An awareness of indeterminism and a growth of knowledge like function of money seem to pervade Keynes' General theory.     

Confidence in Keynes and Hayek: Reply to Burczak

We agree with Burczak's identification of the crucial issues. We disagree with his interpretation of them. We expand our defense of the claim that Keynes was a rationalist. We introduce the "horizon principle" to critize Keynes' dichotomy between short-term and long-term expectations. We question the statistical simile guiding some Post Keynesian dsiscussions of uncertainty. We point to the role of evolution in shaping conventions that fit the economic environment in a world with novel events. We think the evidence favors our view over Burczak's. Finally, we put in a plea for framing the issues in a way that facilitates empirical testing.     

Money and the emergence of knowledge in society

This paper deals with money’s epistemic relevance in society. Money presents theoretical difficulties for neoclassical economics, which treats it as a cost-reducing tool, leading to a socially neutral, aseptic view on money. Drawing from complexity and social theory I provide a socio-epistemic rationalization for money’s irreplaceable role. Building upon Ingham’s Money Is a Social Relation, I argue that money generates a new orderly system of complex social relations that in turn engenders knowledge as an emergent social and ontological phenomenon irreducible to the fragmented knowledge held by members of society. I show that ultimately money cannot be separated from economic knowledge and market rationality. This paper provides sociological and ontological accounts for the emergence of knowledge crucial to coordinate societies, thus extending recent explorations of the ontology of money.     

Sen is not a capability theorist†

This paper aims to clarify the status of capability in Sen’s idea of justice. Sen’s name is so widely associated with the concept of capability that commentators often assume that his contribution to the study of justice amounts to a capability theory, albeit underdeveloped. We argue that such a reading is misleading. Taking Sen’s reticence about operationalization seriously, we show that his contribution is inconsistent with a capability theory. Instead, we defend the idea that the capability approach plays a heuristic role: capability is a step in his argument against alternative materials, but is not meant as a definitive end. Sen defends a critical perspective primarily to encourage public reasoning and respect for agency as regards the definition of what should count in the evaluation of social states.     

Contrived desires,affluence, and welfare: J.K. Galbraith's Pigovian redistribution argument reconsidered

I argue that John Kenneth Galbraith's theory of the “dependence effect” in The Affluent Society provides a way to rescue A.C. Pigou's argument for wealth redistribution from a powerful objection. The objection is based on the unprovability of statements making interpersonal comparisons of utility. Galbraith's dependence effect theory allows him to present a version of the Pigovian argument that requires no such statements to be made. I argue that Galbraith's main piece of advocacy in The Affluent Society was for income redistribution, despite the fact that he claimed to be in favour of greater spending in the public sector rather than redistribution as such. I then show how my reading of the dependence effect theory helps to defend it against objections from Hayek and Rothbard. I end by discussing what improvements in economics a proper test of the theory would require and showing how my reading of it helps to reveal the ongoing importance of The Affluent Society to the understanding of political economy.     

CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS AND THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKET: AN EXAMINATION OF NHS FOUNDATION TRUST CLASSIFICATION IN THE UK

ABSTRACT: In this paper we argue that national accounting categories provide an inadequate basis for evaluating differences between public and private sector services. This is because accounting categories rely on economic concepts such as market price but do not take account of substantive public policy goals such as universality. The argument has important consequences for the structures and systems of delivery especially where nonprofit providers and social enterprise models are substituted for public bodies formerly integrated into the government's delivery system. Using an example taken from the UK's National Health Service, we show that the mechanisms for ensuring universality through redistribution are not sufficiently taken into account for classification purposes.     

Vernon Smith's Explanation of Moral Sentiments

This paper is a comment on Vernon Smith's paper, Adam Smith: from propriety and sentiments to property and wealth. This paper argues that while Vernon Smith is correct in his analysis that Adam Smith's theory of human nature, as expressed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, provides a much more accurate model of behavior than does that of utility maximization, Vernon Smith's analysis can be much enriched by including a more complete explanation of Adam Smith's model of human behavior to include an analysis of prudence, justice, beneficence, and self-command.     

Feminist economics as a Postmodern Moment

Wicksell saw economics as a way to effect social change. In addition to academic writings, he produced a steady stream of pamphlets, newspaper editorials, and public lectures that brought theoretical economics to bear on social policy. In this paper, consideration is given to this wider variety of Wicksell's writings, and his unanimity rule for public goods decision making is examined within the context of his social philosophy. We argue that the unanimity rule, rather than being narrowly focused on efficiency concerns, operated as a practical mechanism to achieve Wicksell's larger goal of social justice. This stands in contrast to the interpretation of Wicksell commonly presented in the public choice literature.     

A Dynamic Characterization of Rawls's Maximin Principle: Theory and Implications

The purpose of this paper is to provide a reinterpretation of the maximin principle in Rawls's theory of justice. As we discuss the issue of social justice, we differentiate the point in time at which rectifying practices are discussed and the time intervals in which these practices are implemented; we explore the information content for people behind the veil of ignorance; and we distinguish the means and ends for social justice. With these points clarified, we interpret the veil of ignorance in Rawls's theory as a form of Knightian uncertainty, and show that Rawls's maximin criterion would be chosen by rational individuals behind the veil of ignorance.     

JAMES WATT AS INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLIST: COMMENT ON BOLDRIN AND LEVINE*

In their 2003 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture, Michele Boldrin and David Levine argue that intellectual property rights may be damaging to social welfare. As empirical evidence for their theory they offer James Watt's steam engine patent, claiming that it delayed the Industrial Revolution by as much as two decades. We show that this claim, as well as the more general claim that Watt's story supports Boldrin and Levine's theory, rests upon a distorted summary of the historical record.     

Ivan Kinkel's (1883–1945) theory of economic development

Abstract

This paper presents and discusses the “Attempt at Constructing a New Theory of Economic Development and Cultural Cycles”, published by the Bulgarian economist and sociologist of Russian origin, Ivan Kinkel (1883–1945) in 1921. Kinkel's theory, although unknown outside Bulgarian academic circles, carries a range of original ideas and new insights within the frame of Schmollerprogramm. It emphasises the importance of studying economic development as sociocultural evolutionary change, focuses on the role of unity in social life and the plurality of human motives and attempts to methodologically link theory and history into a multidisciplinary approach. Kinkel's work in general, and his theory of cyclical development in particular, can not only be of value for the study of economic thought and the diffusion of ideas, but can also offer insights into the forces underlying the profound changes that we have been witnessing recently.     

The Social Cost of Environmental Solutions

This article assesses the social consequences of efforts by multinational corporations to capture business value through recycling, reusing materials and reducing waste. Synthesising evidence from the global environmental justice and feminist and international political economy (IPE) literatures, it analyses the changing social property relations of global recycling chains. The authors argue that, although recycling more would seem to make good ecological sense, corporate programmes can rely on and further ingrain social patterns of harm and exploitation, particularly for the burgeoning labour force that depends on recyclables for subsistence living. Turning the waste stream into a profit stream also relies on prison labour in some places, such as in the United States where the federal government operates one of the country's largest electronics recycling programmes. The ongoing corporatisation of recycling, the authors argue further, is devaluing already marginalised populations within the global economy. Highlighting the need to account for the dynamism between social and environmental change within IPE scholarship, the article concludes by underlining the ways in which ‘green commerce’ programmes can shift capital's contradictions from nature onto labour.     

Yet another look at Léon Walras's theory of tâtonnement

Starting with a detailed discussion of the theorem of equivalent redistributions, Part 1 examines the central role played by the distributional neutrality of tâtonnement in Walras's pure theory of exchange. Part 2 extends this discussion to Walras's attempts at reaching a similar result when dealing with the successive versions of his theory of production before 1900. Part 3 contrasts Walras's and Edgeworth's respective technologies of exchange in order to demonstrate that a distributionally neutral tâtonnement is an intrinsic part of Walras's theory of exchange. Finally, and besides briefly summarizing the results, the conclusion develops the crucial connection between the necessity of a converging and distributionally neutral tâtonnement in pure economics with Walras's theories of property and justice.     

Out of a slave contract: the analysis of pre-Hobbesian anarchists in the Old Testament

Buchanan’s constitutional economics takes social conflict (the ‘Hobbesian jungle’, ‘Hobbesian anarchy’) as the starting point for the analysis of social contract. Buchanan argues that in the presence of social conflict either some social contract (e.g. some system of formal laws) or some generally shared moral precepts are needed to resolve the predicament that social conflict presents. The present paper argues that a social conflict model also served the Old Testament as an analytical starting point. However, contrary to both standard theological interpretation and Buchanan’s explicit claims, I argue that the Old Testament had already made an attempt to model ‘Hobbesian anarchy’ in order to approach social conflict in an essentially modern, non-metaphysical manner. I argue that figures like Adam and Eve or Jacob, in the tradition of Hobbesian anarchists, questioned godly authority and the associated imposed, authoritarian, metaphysical social contract. In this way, one can detect a modern, contractarian constitutional economics in pre-Enlightenment literature (and in Genesis, specifically) in direct contrast to Buchanan’s claims.     

GENDER AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE: THE ROLE OF SITUATED AGENCY

Amartya Sen defends a rich conception of social choice theory against tendencies to limit social choice theory to the formal investigation of rules of collective decision-making. His understanding of social choice theory makes the field a natural candidate for exploring gender issues in the evaluation of democratic policy. Not surprisingly, Sen has applied the insights he developed from his study of social choice to the evaluation of gender inequality, in particular to women's well-being in the context of the family. I focus on Sen's distinction between well-being and agency, and argue that from the perspective of women's movements and related social movements, the role of agency has so far been unduly neglected in social choice theory.     

Is social justice for or against liberty? The philosophical foundations of Mill and Hayek’s theory of liberty

By comparing the philosophical foundations of Mill and Hayek’s theory of liberty, this paper shows that some similarities in the economic theories of Mill and Hayek are actually based on different rationales. It follows that any attempt to find a common thread in Mill and Hayek to provide reasonable guidance for social policy can be promising only if we can find the common ground from their social philosophy. While analyzing the rationales behind their opinions regarding the role of government and taxation policies, this paper will focus on exploring the role of two philosophical ideas, liberty, and justice. This will clarify the relationship between social justice and liberty as well as their status in relation to the ultimate principle of rules in the philosophy of Mill and Hayek. This paper will offer an explanation why, in Mill’s utilitarian philosophy, the pursuit of social justice aligns with the real freedom of everyone, but in Hayek’s philosophy, it is a hindrance.     

Why rationality may be a consequence of Hume's theory of choice

Facing R. Sugden's criticism of our interpretation, it is shown in this paper that rationality appears as a possible consequence of Hume's theory of choice. We first argue that Sugden's dismissal of the preference relation from the type of rationality through which Hume's theory is apprehended, is highly disputable, from the point of view of both standard choice theory and Hume's theory of passions. Nonetheless, Sugden's criterion of rationality might be restated in Humean terms as a condition of non-revision of preferences in the dynamics of passions. But, since the process of choice that we have described explicitly takes into account the revision of preferences, and shows that, when this last is no longer required, rationality occurs as an outcome of this process, it is not really concerned by Sugden's criticism.