Endowment effect theory,prediction bias and publicly provided goods: an experimental study

Many studies report on a systematic disparity between the willingness to pay for a certain good (WTP) and the willingness to accept retribution payments in exchange for giving up this good (WTA). Thaler [Thaler RH (1980) J Econ Behav Organ 1:39–60] employs prospect theory to explain this disparity. The literature contains two different interpretations of his endowment effect theory. Accordingly, the disparity is caused either by the disutility from parting with one’s endowment and/or by an extra utility from ownership which is not anticipated by individuals who are not endowed with the good. So far, the empirical evidence on the applicability of endowment effect theory is limited to private goods. This paper reports on an experiment which finds a significant ownership utility effect for a publicly provided good. This result indicates that prospect theory applies to publicly provided goods even though consumers do not have exclusive property rights.      

The Emergence of “Modern” Ownership Rights Rather than Property Rights

There are a number of analytical conundrums in the neo-classical theory of the emergence of private ownership rights, which is closely associated with Demsetz’s works. Reconsidering the internal logic of private ownership rights, the paper argues that, first, the emergence of “modern” private ownership rights should be the subject of analysis rather than ownership rights per se. Second, at least for some latecomer countries, modern ownership rights typically emerge when feudalistic multi-layered proprietary rights over land are abolished and replaced by ownership rights for the purpose of ensuring tax revenue, prompted by pressure from and/or the intrusion of a colonial power, rather than as an efficient response to changes in resource prices. Third, the socio-economic aspect of ownership rights that related to the manner of social formation tended to be concealed in the universal aspect of private property rights that focuses on the materialistic relation between a person and a thing. These arguments urge the bringing of social relations into the basic layer of analysis of ownership rights theory, as the original institutional economists such as Ely and Commons considered.     

社会功能工资模型的构建

马克思经济学的劳动力价值工资理论、新古典经济学的边际生产力工资理论和利润分享工资理论等,在解释私有制经济中的劳动者报酬方面,都具有一定的优势,同时又都有一定的局限性。以劳动者报酬社会功能工资理论为标准,以马克思经济学的劳动力价值工资理论为起点,综合新古典经济学的边际生产力工资理论和利润分享工资理论,构建劳动者报酬社会功能工资模型,能为提高我国私有制经济中的劳动者报酬提供理论基础。     

中小企业减贫效应的地区差异及其所有制基础

采用SYS-GMM方法对中国省际面板数据进行估计,实证检验了中小企业的减贫效应,从中小企业所有制的角度考察该地区差异的成因。结果显示:中小企业的减贫效应存在明显的地区差异;中小企业初始国有资本比重对地区长期贫困减缓具有显著的负面影响;以中小企业私人资本比重的提高为特征的中小企业所有制结构变化对贫困减缓的积极作用最为显著,外商资本次之,国有资本对贫困减缓具有消极作用。指出:政府应进一步促进中小企业所有制改革,采取差异化政策,积极引导私人资本和外商资本向中西部地区流动,充分发挥中小企业的减贫作用。     

Value and Exploitation: A counterfactual approach

A deconstruction of the Marxian theories of value and exploitation is attempted by arguing, first, that the labour theory of value is logically and methodologically inconsistent as a basis for a theory of capitalist exploitation and, second, that it is founded on an ontology of the social being which is not plausibly justified. A counterfactual model economy is then built, called Utopia, in which the workers receive the whole net output while commodities exchange at labour values. This model is used as a benchmark to evaluate a capitalist economy where commodities exchange at production prices and workers are exploited. It is shown that the factor of exploitation can be expressed as a ratio between the labour commanded by, and the labour contained in, the net output, or between the value added produced in a capitalist economy and that produced in Utopia. The resulting theory of exploitation entails a weak ontology of the social being, expressing a worker's point of view.     

Quid pro quo

This paper attempts to shed some new light on two puzzles about Chinese economy: Rapid economic growth despite pandemic corruption; dramatic development of the private sector despite ‘ownership discrimination' in financial resource allocation. In our model, the productive bribe facilitates the more efficient private firm to obtain the scarce financial resource, either from the bank or from the state-owned enterprise, and corrects the initial allocation distortion. Meanwhile, our model also generates the distortionary and the predatory bribes which hurt the economy.     

Contemporary China’s Rural Landownership with Reference to Antony M. Honoré’s Concept of Ownership

This article analyses the property rights that Chinese peasants have under the present Household Responsibility System (HRS) using Antony M. Honoré’s work on ownership, especially his analysis of eleven standard incidents of the full liberal concept of ownership. It confirms Honoré’s insight that these standard incidents can be divided among two or more persons, and thus there are different types of property rights which are variants and alternatives to the liberal type of property rights. This article also confirms that the Chinese land system is a real alternative to the full liberal concept of ownership. The current Chinese land system is alleged to be “unclear and insecure” because it is not the kind of private ownership that neoliberals champion. In the tradition of the “bundle of rights” theory, it is helpful to use Honoré’s concept of ownership, rather than Harold Demsetz’s type of property rights, to understand the current Chinese system.     

经济共和主义视角下的地权改革—以林权改革为例

林权改革尝试始于20世纪80年代,于2003年加快了改革的步伐,具有了某种激进的色彩。本文认为,这种改革受到效率优先、市场至上、产权私有、强制变迁等信条的影响,有可能使公平和效率出现张力。作者认为在中央政府的改革思想进一步成熟的背景下,林权改革的指导理论需要实现经济共和主义的转向,并提出了四项替代性原则,即处境公平原则、产权有限原则、民主治理原则和法律平衡原则。经济共和主义并不一般地反对私有林权,也不一般地主张公有林权,而是依据具体条件和上述四项原则来形成不同的权利安排。     

私营经济是一种富有经济效率的产权制度

私营经济作为一种存在着雇佣劳动关系的经济成份,为什么会在中国大地上承认它的合法存在,本文撇开了传统的从生产力决定生产关系这一原理出发,而是将私营经济放在社会主义市场经济的视野中,来寻找合理的答案。因为市场经济是一种明确财产所有者的产权经济,私营经济又是市场经济天然合格的主体。同时,私营经济与传统体制中的国有企业相比,是一种富有经济效率的产权制度。     

马克思和罗宾逊的剥削理论范式比较研究

马克思和罗宾逊的剥削理论范式在某些方面有一定的共同之处,但从本质和总体上来看,两者有本质和深刻的区别。两种剥削理论范式在立论基础、研究方法、剥削产生的原因和解决的途径等问题上产生了一系列的观点分歧,甚至是相反的结论。罗宾逊的剥削理论以要素分配论为基础,马克思的剥削理论是以劳动价值论和剩余价值论为基础。建立在劳动价值理论基础上的马克思主义关于剥削的理论,是对我国是否存在剥削问题进行解释的基础。由于各有侧重点,他们对经济发展和建设的指导意义是不同的。     

国有企业双重效率损失研究

本文基于企业效率最大化要求剩余索取权与剩余控制权相对应这一企业理论分析了国有企业的生产效率损失和创新效率损失问题。国有企业的公有产权属性决定了国有企业中存在着生产效率和创新效率的双重损失。国有企业改革通过监督和激励机制设计在一定程度上实现了生产中的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的匹配,从而提高了国有企业的生产效率。然而,由于创新具有不同于一般生产的特殊属性,已有国有企业改革措施并不能实现创新中的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的匹配,因而无法改善国有企业的创新效率。由此,本文提出了国有企业的创新效率损失大于生产效率损失的理论假说。基于中国省级国有企业和民营企业的工业行业数据,统计分析和计量模型估计结果都稳健地支持了该假说。     

Vernon Smith's Explanation of Moral Sentiments

This paper is a comment on Vernon Smith's paper, Adam Smith: from propriety and sentiments to property and wealth. This paper argues that while Vernon Smith is correct in his analysis that Adam Smith's theory of human nature, as expressed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, provides a much more accurate model of behavior than does that of utility maximization, Vernon Smith's analysis can be much enriched by including a more complete explanation of Adam Smith's model of human behavior to include an analysis of prudence, justice, beneficence, and self-command.     

论社会主义社会的劳动和劳动价值

本文探讨了社会主义社会劳动和劳动价值理论。文中指出 ,必须全面、准确地把握马克思关于价值创造的理论与方法 ;澄清传统政治经济学中一系列并不完全符合马克思原意、更脱离现实经济生活的观念 ;发展马克思主义的劳动价值理论 ,扩展价值创造和生产性劳动的领域     

Reexamination of Economic Growth, Tax Policy, and Distributive Politics

The paper examines the relationship between economic growth, tax policy, and distribution of capital and labor ownership in a one‐sector political‐economy model of endogenous growth with productive government spending financed by a proportional tax on capital income. The analysis shows that inequality in wealth and income can be positively or negatively related to the optimal tax rate. In either environment, higher inequality leads to a lower after‐tax return to capital, thereby reducing the economy's growth rate.     

John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism and the social ethics of sustainable development

This paper considers the writings of John Stuart Mill in political philosophy and political economy as a prototype for ideals of a 'sustainable development' grounded in a norm of justice and social solidarity. Mill's conception of a just 'stationary state* of society is examined alongside his attempts to reconcile precepts of non-interference (individual freedom) and private property, with the constraints and obligations of social, economic, and ecological coexistence. It is shown that notwithstanding vaccillations, Mill ends up espousing an ethical norm of reciprocity and solidarity that is quite different from the premise of self-interest axiomatized in most economic models of competitive market economies. These intuitions about a duty of care complementary to the non-interference principle, when systematized, are shown to find a new contemporary application to questions of economic justice and environmental sustainability.     

The influence of ownership on the cost of bus service provision in Switzerland - an empirical illustration

In deregulated transport markets, a firm's ownership status and management system represent an important issue. Property right theory suggests that productivity and performance are higher in the private than in the public sector. In Switzerland, providers of bus transportation are traditionally corporations, though a large part of their equity shares are still held by the public sector (federal government, cantons, municipalities). This paper examines the potential impact of ownership on the cost of bus service provision for a sample of private, public and mixed bus companies in Switzerland. The estimation of a translog cost model has been considered for 34 bus transit companies observed over 5 years (1991–1995). The results only partially confirm that if the private sector holds shares in the company's capital, efficiency is enhanced. In addition, measures of economies of scale and density are derived and discussed within the actual public transport policy.     

Economic Calculation: Private Property or Several Control?

Abstract

As the centenary of the 1917 Russian revolution approaches, it is worth reviewing the past 100 years’ discussion amongst economists on the possibility—or otherwise—of economic planning under socialism. The socialist calculation debate is of fundamental importance, not merely as a specialist application of economic ideas, but as an investigation of the foundations of economic activity. Every economic action is premised upon calculation, every choice depends upon an assessment of the costs and benefits of each alternative between which the agent must choose. The view of that choice and its attendant calculation is constitutive of the schools of thought—Marxian, neoclassical and Austrian—which have contributed to the debate. An understanding of the calculation debate is therefore required to understand how these paradigms stand in relation to each other. This article addresses one aspect of that debate—the claim by Austrian economists that socialism is impossible because the absence of private property in the means of production precludes economic calculation. The article suggests that several control rather than private property is required for economic calculation, and that several control is consistent with public ownership of the means of production. The Austrian argument on this point, therefore, is without force.     

On Marxian value,exploitation, and the transformation problem: A geometric approach

For a simple Ricardo-Austrian two-sector model, the structure of Marxian value and exploitation theory as well as the transformation problem of Marxian values into prices of production can be shown using a simple four-quadrant diagram. The sensitivity of Marxian conclusions to the assumption of a perfect elasticity of labor supply is easily demonstrated in this framework.     

Trade,Power, and Political Economy: Reason vs. Ideology in Edward Stringham’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Private Governance</Emphasis>

In Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life, Edward Stringham explains that private ordering is sufficient to secure full exploitation of gains from trade within a society. After describing the logic of Stringham’s claim on behalf of private ordering, the remainder of this essay examines an enigma that Stringham’s argument entails: private ordering is sufficient for social coordination and yet public ordering is ubiquitous. The exploitation of gains from trade might offer a useful ideology, but this provides but an incomplete basis for a theory of society. In this respect, societies are rife with antagonism and envy, though these often manifest themselves ideologically as claims about justice and fairness. Politics goes where the money is; private ordering reveals targets that public ordering subsequently exploits. The challenge for political economy is to integrate the autonomy of economizing action with the autonomy of political action, for these dual autonomies provide the crucible out of which emerges the material of political economy. Stringham has deepened our appreciation of what private governance can accomplish, but much unfinished analytical work confronts theorists of political economy.     

PROFIT MARGINS INQUIRY: Note on alternative hypotheses as to the determination of Profit Margins

This paper surveys the various accounts offered by Marxian economists for the ending of the long postwar boom. All focus on the decline in profitability, but they offer different expalanations. Three principal categories of crisis theory are distinguished: underconsumption; Marx's ‘Volume III’ falling rate of profit analysis; and several versions of overaccumulation theory, in particular the French regulation school and the North American discussion of the social structure of accumulation. A separate section deals with the relationship between the capitalist state and the crisis. Some general conclusions are drawn concerning the current nature of Marxian economic theory.