Optimal contest design: volume and timing of rent seeking in contests

This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of rent-seeking contests in terms of the amount and the timing of effort they elicit from the participants. The optimal contest structure—the one that maximizes the discounted sum of efforts—is found to hinge on the degree of impatience of the contest organizers, the more patient of whom prefer longer contests consisting of pairwise matches among the contestants. Heterogeneity of the contestants' quality also turns out to play an important role in the comparison.     

The social cost of rent seeking in Europe

Direct measurement of the social cost of rent seeking is impeded by non-observable and non-reported activities. We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to compute the social cost of rent seeking in Europe. Our estimate is based on competition among interest groups for privileges provided by governments, including income transfers, subsidies, and preferential tax treatment. The model, which is calibrated to the euro area as a whole and also to individual euro member countries for 1980–2003, performs well vis-à-vis the data. We find that significant proportions of GDP are extracted as rents available to be sought by rent seekers.     

Policies to Reduce Rent Seeking in Controlled Markets

Abstract

We analyze the effects of various policies to reduce rent seeking in the controlled market in which buyers have heterogeneous valuation regarding the coveted good. The good is allocated according to the buyer-specific signal (‘test score’), which is determined by the quantity of wasteful ‘rent seeking’ exerted by the buyer. We consider three common forms of market control: minimum qualification score, quota, and price ceiling. The potential buyers with higher valuations are more likely to receive the good in equilibrium, while they exert more rent-seeking efforts. Marginally relaxing market control does not necessarily decrease the aggregated amount of rent-seeking activities, and the effectiveness of policy measures usually depends on the current degree of competitiveness in the market.     

The allocation of entrepreneurial efforts in a rent-seeking society: Evidence from China

This paper considers four types of entrepreneurial efforts: productive activities, aggressive rent seeking, defense against rent extraction, and leisure. It examines how entrepreneurs allocate efforts when facing dual-dealing relationships with politicians in a rent-seeking society: entrepreneurs not only pursue additional benefits through rent seeking, but also try to avoid extortions by politicians. Using unique city-level and firm-level data across China, we demonstrate that Chinese entrepreneurs survive in a twisted world: ordinary entrepreneurs would desire better institutional environment, but if institutional improvement is not available, they would prefer political connections which are often preoccupied by special interest groups and/or large-sized firms.     

Collective rent seeking and division of labor

The article analyzes division of labor within multiple groups engaged in collective rent seeking through time. Each agent seeks membership in one of two subgroups within each group, conveniently labelled a leader-subgroup and a follower-subgroup. The within-group generated payoffs are used as input in the between-group competition for the other groups' payoffs and an external rent. Within-group egalitarian allocation, but not relative-effort allocation, alleviates leadership struggle if the rent is large or the group is moderately more decisive than the other groups. The group employing a more egalitarian sharing rule than the other groups alleviates its leadership struggle more successfully. The Folk theorem is used to show the conditions under which leadership struggle gets intensified or alleviated.     

The immiseration of the landlords: rent in a Kaldorian theory of income distribution

This paper incorporates rent within a Kaldorian model of distributionwhere income shares depend on aggregate investment and the propensitiesto save out of profits, rents and wages. The model is used tointerpret the significance of the secular decline in rents asa share of national income and to specify the circumstancesunder which both the capital/output ratio and the wage shareof national income may rise. The author pursues Keynes's suggestiveremarks about land's liquidity value and shows how an increasein the demand for land, by producers, consumers or wealthholdersreduces the rate of profit and therewith the inducement to invest.     

Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers

This paper incorporates rent seeking from state coffers into a general equilibrium model of economic growth and endogenous policy. Self-interested individuals try to extract, for personal benefit, part of tax revenues that could be used to finance public investment. We solve for a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in individual agents' behavior. The determinants of rent seeking in general equilibrium are identified and we consider the efficient size of public sector given the rent-seeking activity. Cross-country data from 108 rich and developing countries provide support for our predictions.     

近15年国家科技进步奖获奖成果科研合作分析

以2000-2014年国家科技进步奖获奖成果为数据源,对获奖成果完成人员之间以及完成机构之间的科研合作状况进行了分析。结果表明,96%的获奖成果是通过人员间合作完成的,并以10人合作完成的成果最多; 76%的获奖成果是通过机构间合作完成的,且合作机构数量越多,获奖成果数越少;随着年代的推移,跨机构科研合作的趋势日益明显;以清华大学和浙江大学为代表的一流高校,是高水平科研合作网络的核心节点。     

Collective rent seeking and division of labor

The article analyzes division of labor within multiple groups engaged in collective rent seeking through time. Each agent seeks membership in one of two subgroups within each group, conveniently labelled a leader-subgroup and a follower-subgroup. The within-group generated payoffs are used as input in the between-group competition for the other groups' payoffs and an external rent. Within-group egalitarian allocation, but not relative-effort allocation, alleviates leadership struggle if the rent is large or the group is moderately more decisive than the other groups. The group employing a more egalitarian sharing rule than the other groups alleviates its leadership struggle more successfully. The Folk theorem is used to show the conditions under which leadership struggle gets intensified or alleviated.     

公租房租金分析

公租房租金标准的核定体现了其住房保障性质,并影响保障效果。成本法与社会平均负担法是两种不同的租金核定办法,并有不同效果。通过对比,后者更有助于达到保障目标,并能通过租金标准的动态调整实现与其他保障方式的对接。无论如何核定,都需要政府强大的执行力来支持。     

Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game

The aim of this paper is to analyze if cooperation can be the product of cultural evolution in a two-stage coordination game, consisting of a production stage followed by a negotiation phase. We present an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of preferences where the distribution of preferences in the population and the strategies are determined endogenously and simultaneously. There are several groups in the society; some of them play cooperatively and others do not. Socialization takes place inside the group, but there is a positive rate of migration among groups which parents anticipate. Our main result shows that all groups converge to the cooperative equilibrium.     

扶贫信贷中“寻租”行为的模型分析

本文通过建立不完全信息的动态博弈模型，对农村扶贫信贷中贷方负责人的行为进行分析，找出“寻租”行为的存在原因，从而探讨防范农村扶贫信贷中“寻租”行为的有效模式。     

基于创新过程观的产学研合作技术创新模式研究

从创新过程观的角度切入,论述学研方如何从创新源和创新过程两个方面支持企业技术创新活动,对遵循单向线性创新过程观的科技成果转化模式的局限性和不适用性进行剖析,分析循环互动创新过程观中科学研究与技术创新的关系,并基于此归纳和划分出适用于我国企业的三大类典型产学研合作技术创新模式。最后基于实证研究,与国外相关研究结果进行比较,分析两者在产学研合作技术创新模式应用上存在差异的具体原因。     

产学研隐性知识转移的RMT模式研究

借用费斯克的关系模式理论,归纳分析产学研主体间的关系,剖析产学研主体间关系对隐性知识转移的影响,并由此从关系层面构建产学研隐性知识的关系式转移模式。研究发现,产学研隐性知识的关系式转移存在交易式转移、互惠式转移以及信任式转移3种模式。     

Cooperation and discrimination within and across language borders: Evidence from children in a bilingual city

We present experimental evidence from a bilingual city in Northern Italy on whether the affiliation to a specific language group affects behavior in a prisoner׳s dilemma game and leads to discrimination. Running a framed field experiment with 828 six- to eleven-year old primary school children in the city of Meran, we find that cooperation generally increases with age, but that the gap between cooperation among in-group members and cooperation towards children speaking another language is considerable and develops with age. This gap is due to both in-group favoritism and language group discrimination. While the former is persistent across all age groups and both language groups and accounts for most of the discrimination observed, the latter only emerges in later years of primary school among children belonging to the German language group.     

Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment

In a public goods experiment with the opportunity to vote to expel members of a group, we found that contributions rose to nearly 100% of endowments with significantly higher efficiency compared with a no-expulsion baseline. Our findings support the intuition that the threat of expulsion or ostracism is a device that helps some groups to provide public goods.     

江苏校企专利合作网络演化研究

高校与企业合作申请发明专利是区域协同创新的重要实现途径之一。基于国家知识产权局公开的1985-2015年江苏省校企合作申请发明专利数据,运用社会网络分析方法,分析专利合作网络结构及空间分布演化路径。研究发现,1985-2015年间江苏校企专利合作网络演化呈现明显的三阶段特征,各区域内部、外部校企专利合作的规模、频次、密度越来越大,网络集聚程度越来越高,苏南、苏北、苏中地区的发展差距逐渐缩小。在此基础上,对江苏校企合作申请发明专利的区域协同创新模式进行了探讨。     

联产品协同生产的成本驱动实证研究

实证研究证明，联产品生产的协同作用也是产品成本的驱动因素。协同成本的动因在于联产品的组成变量。在联产品协同生产过程中，所采取的基于非线性成本函数的边际成本计算法，应该是数理依据严谨、实务应用可行的方法。