企业年金基金管理费模型的优化选择

在分析现有模型基础上研究并设计适合企业年金的管理费优化模型,该模型更加注重基金资产的安全性,解决了目前企业年金基金管理中的风险不对等问题,基金管理人将更加注重企业年金追求本金安全及长期稳健增值的目标,使企业年金资产的安全性得到较大保障,该模型亦可推广到所有追求长期安全增值以绝对收益为目标的基金使用。     

我国企业年金投资管理现状及对策分析

随着人口老龄化程度的提高,企业年金制度在多层次养老保障体系中的重要作用日益突显.目前我国企业年金发展迅速,基金规模不断扩大,如何使之进入资本市场,进行投资管理、保值增值是迫切需要解决的问题.本文分析了我国企业年金投资运营的现状.并就加强投资管理,提高企业年金运营效率提出了相关建议.     

新准则下我国企业年金基金问题研究

企业年金基金与基本养老保险、个人储蓄性养老保险、并称城镇职工养老保险体系三大支柱。我国新会计准则要求企业年金基金实行缴费确定型模式和市场化投资运营,并对企业年金基金的确认、计量和列报作了规定,因此企业年金的管理和会计处理问题成为我国会计实务中非常重要的内容。自《企业年金试行办法》试行两年来的实践证明,我国企业年金制度正在逐渐发展和完善中。     

我国企业年金的发展及投资管理研究

寻求企业年金资产的有效投资,无论是对于企业年金计划参加者的利益,还是对企业年金的可持续发展都有十分重要的意义。本文通过对我国企业年金的发展现状的分析,进而对企业年金基金投资管理进行研究,并对促进我国企业年金更好更快地发展和完善企业年金基金的投资管理提出了相关建议。     

产业基金费用提取与业绩报酬分配机制研究

在产业投资基金的建立过程中,基金费用提取与业绩报酬分配机制的设计非常重要.产业基金通过基金管理公司的管理获取收益,同时支付管理费,并将收益的一部分作为业绩报酬分配给基金管理公司.该机制能够对基金管理人起到激励作用.但这种激励作用有多大,能否有效,就要看这种机制的设计能否最大化基金持有人的利益,同时又能满足基金管理人的利润要求.文章研究了将一个投资公司改制成产业投资基金管理公司后,比照投资公司原有的奖励政策所制定的费用提取和业绩分配方案的合理设计过程.该方案能较好地解决基金管理人的激励问题.     

企业年金基金财务风险的度量与监管

企业年金基金是指根据依法制定的企业年金计划筹集的资金及其投资运营收益形成的企业补充养老保险基金.它在保障雇员退休待遇,解决社会老龄化问题,减轻政府财政负担等方面发挥了积极作用.2004年下半年以来,随着我国《企业年金基金管理试行办法》、《企业年金基金管理机构资格认定暂行办法》等规定的陆续出台,企业年金投资证券市场的规模将越来越大,年金基金财务风险的度量与控制成为年金计划发起人、年金计划受益人、年金基金管理人及政府监管机构等多个主体日益重视的现实问题.本文对此问题进行初步的探索.     

企业建立年金制度初探

在建立了基本养老保险制度的国家,企业年金属于第二支柱,企业建立年金制度符合社会、企业和职工三方面的利益。企业应根据自身条件灵活设计年金方案,对年金实行专业化管理,通过市场化的投资运作以实现年金基金的保值增值。     

论基金管理费的法律规制

现今随着我国对外开放和金融政策的不断深化,证券市场向着国际化方向发展已成为必然,而证券投资基金的建立与发展无疑起到了推动作用。证券投资基金中的投资人保护问题是证券投资基金事业中的重点问题,其中基金管理费是对基金投资人保护的一环,对投资基金事业的健康发展十分重要。我国的基金管理费制度缺乏足够的激励机制,并容易引发基金管理人的违规操作。笔者认为应当借鉴国外的绩效费用制度,采用高比例绩效费用加低比例固定费用的做法,并在立法中完善基金管理费的监督体系。因此本文对基金管理费的法律规制问题作些探讨,并提出笔者的建议和一些完善立法的措施,以期能对我国的基金立法有所帮助。     

对完善企业年金信托监管制度的思考

企业年金是现代养老社会保障制度的第二支柱,是我国养老社会保障体系的重要组成部分.随着<企业年金试行办法>和<企业年金基金管理试行办法>的颁布,我国企业年金运作的主流模式被定格在信托方式上,本文就是在此背景下研究我国信托型企业年金监管制度.文章从企业年金信托的基本特征入手,分析了目前我国监管制度存在的缺陷,提出了我国监管的目标和原则,并提出了完善的建议.     

对完善企业年金信托监管制度的思考

企业年金是现代养老社会保障制度的第二支柱,是我国养老社会保障体系的重要组成部分.随着<企业年金试行办法>和<企业年金基金管理试行办法>的颁布,我国企业年金运作的主流模式被定格在信托方式上,本文就是在此背景下研究我国信托型企业年金监管制度.文章从企业年金信托的基本特征入手,分析了目前我国监管制度存在的缺陷,提出了我国监管的目标和原则,并提出了完善的建议.     

我国社保基金委托投资管理费率研究

本文针对目前我国社保基金委托投资管理费率结构单一,不利于激励基金公司朝着投资者收益最大化的方向努力运作的问题,提出将费率划分为固定的和与业绩挂钩的两部分。同时,为了防止基金公司为获取更高的绩效管理费而吸收过度的积极风险,在费率设计的过程国引入了风险预算,结合我国证券市场的特点,提出了基于风险预算的我国社保基金投资管理费率设计方案。     

“费改税”的目标及思路

“费改税”是针对目前中国“费大于税”的不规范的政府收入格局而提出的一项改革任务和政策主张。如果对“费改税”这种改革作更全面、更准确的称呼,实际上指的是以清理整顿预算外、制度外资金和各种收费为前提,使政府税收、使用费和非政府预算的商业性收费分流归位的一种综合性税费改革,从而形成不同性质、不同形式资金的较规范的分流归位。     

挪威主权财富基金——政府全球养老基金的投资模式

挪威的主权财富基金成立较早，其投资运作堪称业内的典范。全面地分析总结了挪威主权财富基金一政府全球养老基金的投资模式。挪威政府全球养老基金在建立投资管理框架，注重公司治理制度的改进，适度放松对单一公司持有的最高股权比例，构建基金基准组合，进行全球范围的资产配置，将指数化管理与积极管理相结合，由内外部经理共同管理基金，完善基金的再平衡机制，定期公布投资绩效等方面的经验，值得中国中投公司学习借鉴。     

Pension Fund Herding and the Influence of Management Style

In this article, we study the herding phenomenon in Spanish equity pension funds with European investment locations from 2002 to 2012, considering whether the development of different investment strategies by the managers results in herding. In addition, we analyze the performance-herding relationship, observing whether pension fund performance decreases or increases when pension funds herd. Using the herding measure of Lakonishok et al. [1992], we do not find strong imitation behavior, although herding in the market and book-to-market styles are higher. Those pension funds that do not herd or that follow distinctive strategies do not present significant differences in performance with respect to herding funds.     

不同监督情境下政府创新支持对企业研发投入的影响——基于农业上市公司的实证研究

近年来,“三农”问题受到极大关注。为了应对外部资源、环境、科学技术等多重压力对农业升级与发展的影响,政府出台了诸多政策支持农业企业的技术研发与创新。本文从政府干预视角分析政府补助和税费返还两种形式的政府创新支持政策对农业企业研发投入的影响,重点分析机构投资者与大股东参与公司内部治理以及社会审计事务机构参与公司外部治理这两者所发挥的不同监督作用。研究发现：第一,不同形式的政府创新支持（政府补助和税费返还）对农业企业研发投入的影响并不一致。政府补助产生替代效应,税费返还则产生互补效应。第二,持股监督（机构投资者和大股东的持股比例上升）能增强政府补助对农业企业研发投入的替代效应,也能增强税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。第三,审计监督（社会审计事务机构的审计意见）会减弱政府补助支持对农业企业研发投入的替代效应,也会减弱税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。本文的研究发现为政府制定适宜的创新支持政策,以及合理发挥持股监督与审计监督的内外部治理作用,提供一定的决策依据和理论支持。     

The Influence of Gender on the Perception and Response to Investment Risk: The Case of Professional Investors

In a previous issue of this journal, O'Barr and Conley, noted that cultural differences caused public pension fund managers to invest differently and more conservatively than their private fund counterparts. An additional insight to is that cultural factors have a non-trivial affect on how assets are managed. This article continues with this theme and suggests that, even with equivalent training, experience and information, investment managers make different decisions based on identifiable cultural differences. This study focuses on professional men and women investment managers who perceive and respond to risk differently. This supports O'Barr and Conley, suggesting cultural factors may be responsible for this risk related gender effect.

There is extensive evidence that when faced with social and technological hazards, women are more risk averse than men. This appears to be so even when decision-makers of both genders have the same level of expertise and experience. In the investment realm, non-professional women investors also appear to accept less risk than their male counterparts, after controlling for factors such as age, education, wealth and experience. Although the precise reason for this gender difference in risk taking is unknown, it appears to be related to evolutionary and social factors.

This paper is unique in that it investigates the risk/gender difference for professionally trained investors. It is found that women investors weight risk attributes, such as possibility of loss and ambiguity, more heavily than their male colleagues. In addition, women tend to emphasize risk reduction more than men in portfolio construction. While gender differences appear to influence perceptions of risk and recommendations to clients, these differences tend to be the most significant for assets and portfolios at risk extremes.     

PERFORMANCE‐BASED FEE CONTRACT AND RISK‐TAKING STRATEGY IN ASSET MANAGEMENT TOURNAMENT

This paper investigates how performance‐based fee (PBF) contracts affect strategic risk‐taking behaviours of fund managers in an asset management tournament. In the perfect equilibrium, managers with better mid‐year performance will hold the risky asset with a higher probability in the remaining of the year, compared to managers with poorer mid‐year performance. If the volume of the cash flow into the winner fund is contingent on its level of success, the winning fund will take a more aggressive approach. When the PBF contract pays more heed to relative performance against the benchmark, managers are more likely to adopt aggressive strategies.     

审计收费与审计质量的关系研究——基于第一大股东不同持股比例的视角

以2002—2009年度因财务舞弊受到中国证监会处罚的上市公司为样本,分析在第一大股东不同持股比例下,审计收费与审计质量的关系,在控制了审计意见的相关影响因素后发现:在上市公司第一大股东持股比例较高时,审计收费与审计质量呈负相关;第一大股东持股比例较低时,审计收费与审计质量正相关。     

Determinants of pension plan fees in Spain

Pension plans and funds represent a substantial part of the welfare systems in both Europe and Spain. One of the most important factors in the choice of a plan or fund is the performance it obtains. In view of the influence that fees have on performance, the objective of this study is to analyse the variables that determine the management and custodial fees of individual pension plans. The Spanish market for pension plans and funds sets legal caps on these fees, and at the same time the majority of them are commercialized and managed by financial institutions, which can in turn generate a conflict of interests. In this article, we estimate models with censured variables and our findings show how the average investment per plan, the legal status and the size of the management company to which the plan belongs, and the style of the plan are all relevant determinants of the management fee. In turn, the custodial fee is determined by the legal status of the custodial company, the size, the return and the type of plan.     

Advance disposal fee vs. disposal fee: A monopolistic producer’s durability choice model

This study examines how the timing of waste disposal fee collection affects the producer’s choice of built-in product durability and social welfare in a durable-goods monopoly model. We categorize the waste disposal fee policies into two: advance disposal fee (ADF) policy and disposal fee (DF) policy. We show that a DF policy has two opposing effects on durability. Firstly, a DF policy gives the producer an incentive to increase durability in order to delay the households’ waste disposal and to discount future payments of the disposal fee (the payment-discounting effect). Secondly, a DF policy creates an incentive for consumers to dump waste illegally in order to mitigate the payment of the disposal fee, and gives the producer an incentive to reduce durability in order to avoid market saturation and the associated future price cuts (the illegal-dumping effect). When the disposal fee is low, the payment-discounting effect dominates the illegal-dumping effect under a DF policy, leading to the enhancement of durability. In this case, from a social welfare viewpoint, a DF policy may be more desirable than an ADF policy if the environmental damage associated with illegal dumping is not serious. However, when the disposal fee is high, a DF policy induces more illegal dumping, reduces durability, and inflicts more environmental damage. Therefore, an ADF policy is more socially desirable than a DF policy when the disposal fee is high. Moreover, we consider an oligopoly case and find that an ADF policy is more socially desirable in an industry with smaller market power.