差异化产品价格战的产生与扩散机制分析

本文基于消费者的"0-1"购买特征和产品的纵向差异化特征,建立了一个新的价格战模型。通过应用数学证明和数值模拟的方法发现:(1)合谋体系、背叛体系以及价格战体系的均衡结果均与需求冲击无关;(2)差异化产品厂商的背叛动机以及产品链条的合谋稳定性也与需求冲击无关;(3)产品的差异化程度是影响合谋稳定性的重要因素,差异化程度越大,合谋越稳定;(4)合谋集团对背叛厂商的惩罚策略存在着"误伤效应",这种效应在一定条件下能够自我抑制,表现为产品链条上的价格战和合谋共存,在其他条件下,这种效应不能自我抑制,价格战一旦发动就会迅速扩散到整个产品链条。     

差异化、成本领先和价值创新——企业竞争优势的一个经济学解释

差异化战略和成本领先战略并不是两个相互排斥的战略,二者可以被一个企业同时采用以获取竞争优势.本文运用产品差异化模型考察成本相同和成本不同两种情况下企业的竞争行为,证明差异化战略和成本领先战略并不矛盾,指出差异化有利于企业避免恶性竞争,获取市场势力,而且当成本不同时,具有成本优势的企业能够获得更大的竞争优势并具有进一步成本领先的动机,具有成本劣势的企业则具有降低成本的动机和更强的差异化动机.本文讨论了价值创新是企业同时采用差异化和低成本以获取竞争优势的战略逻辑,并提出企业价值创新的风险和对策,从而给出了企业竞争优势的一个经济学解释.     

基于顾客价值的企业差异化战略路径探析

差异化可分为有形差异化和无形差异化,其核心是给顾客提供有独特价值的东西.当一个企业从差异化获得的利益大于差异化的成本时,就获得了差异化优势.实践表明,持续的高利润或竞争优势主要来自差异化,而非低成本.那些长期具有高投资回报率的企业都是追求产品特色、质量、品牌、服务差异化的企业.差异化能提高顾客支付高价的意愿,增加顾客的需求,带来更多的新用户.同时,差异化带来的市场扩大有利于利用规模经济,新的制造技术和互联网的使用也在一定程度上化解r差异化的成本.分析顾客需求可采用顾客价值链方法,根据顾客价值链,差异化战略路径主要包括产品差异化、服务差异化、品牌差异化、形象差异化和企业文化差异化.     

产品差异化战略的缺陷与选择--基于霍特林模型的分析

一般认为产品差异化战略能给企业带来额外的竞争优势,但产品差异化并非差异化战略的唯一选择。文章结合霍特林模型,阐释了产品差异化战略潜在缺陷,并进一步指出在宣传成本相对较高的情况下,产品差异化战略更重要的方面可能不在于产品本身,而在于产品的定价策略,这也将有助于理解我国部分行业中小厂商的山寨行为。总之,企业无需将产品的差异化视作差异化战略的必要条件,除了定价差异化之外,市场环境的微观区分因素如消费者感知情绪、宏观区分因素如企业社会责任导向,都可以是企业采取差异化战略获取竞争优势的有效途径。     

纵向差异产品下价格领导制对默契合谋的影响

价格领导制对合谋的作用机理一直是产业组织理论关注和争议的焦点.本文以纵向差异产品模型为基础,构建一个扩展的双寡头无限期重复博弈模型,首先求出竞争状态下价格领导制的均衡利润,其次利用纳什讨价还价解求出合谋下的企业利润,最后通过比较同时定价和价格领导制两种情形下企业维持合谋的激励,重点考察纵向差异产品下价格领导行为对默契合谋的作用机理.研究发现,如果企业可以采用价格领导制进行价格合谋,则无论是哪家企业作为价格领导者,价格领导制都极大降低了领导者背叛合谋的激励,增强了合谋的稳定性,尤其是在高质量产品企业作为合谋的价格领导者之时.对此,笔者建议反垄断执法机构关注企业的序贯提价行为,发现潜藏在其中的合谋行为.     

物流企业发展的定位选择

物流企业实施科学而独特的市场定位,不仅是为了更好地满足市场和顾客的差异化需要,更是提高企业自身竞争实力的重要途径。具有差异化定位的企业,在为各自不同的顾客群体提供差异化服务的同时,也通过与客户的长期合作,形成竞争对手无法模仿、学习和替代的竞争优势,构筑自己的客户资源网络,从而提高服务水平,降低单位服务成本。     

成本领先战略与差异化战略融合的实例分析——以日本QB HOUSRE为例

随着现代生产管理模式的革命和信息经济时代信息网络的发展,成本领先战略和差异化战略日渐呈现融合之势.在现实生活中,在大多数行业里,如果一个企业既能做到有效的差别,又能保持低康的价格,那么它就可能市场的领导者.而日本的QB HOUSRE(十分钟理发店)以其快速、廉价、相对优质的特点成功实现了成本领先战略和差异化战略的融合.     

基于产品差异理论的差异化古诺竞争模型

文章通过对古诺模型进行差异化处理,讨论同一行业中两个具有一定替代性的差异化产品在竞争时的市场均衡结果,并将之推广到N个企业.得出产品与产品之间的替代程度、成本差异会影响最终的市场竞争格局的结论.     

消费者寻求多样化与企业定价竞争

消费者寻求多样化的购买行为会对寡头企业之间的价格竞争和经济效率产生重要影响。文章研究发现,针对消费者寻求多样化的购买行为,企业会对忠诚的消费者给予价格优惠,而对新顾客索取高价;消费者寻求多样化购买行为弱化了企业两期价格竞争,导致"默契合谋";而以两期统一定价为基准的经济效率分析显示,歧视定价机制促进了企业间竞争,导致消费者剩余增加,企业利润减少。     

论差异化策略构建企业竞争优势

在当前全球经济一体化的新经济形势下 ,企业面临着越来越激烈的市场竞争 ,那么企业应如何在这种严峻的形势下生存与发展呢 ?文章认为 :企业应努力构建自己的竞争优势。采用差异化营销策略 ,从创新产品特征、塑造不同的品牌形象以及销售和服务等方面的差异化形成与竞争对手相区别的 ,并为消费者所接受的独特性 ,即与众不同 ,别具一格的特征 ,从而确立企业的竞争优势。     

Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion

The objective of this paper is two-fold: to contribute to the analysis of tacit collusion in Bertrand supergames with (asymmetric) capacity constraints and, from a more applied perspective, to bring a new light on merger analysis and provide useful guidelines for competition policy, taking into account dynamic aspects of competition. It is well-known that capacity constraints affect tacit collusion, as they limit both incentives to deviate (e.g., to undercut rivals) and retaliation possibilities. However, most studies have so far focused on symmetric situations, where all firms have the same capacity, which leads to ambiguous and unintuitive results and also considerably limits the scope of application. Studying asymmetric situations makes it possible to analyse the impact of changes in the distribution of these capacities (expansions, but also mergers, split-offs, transfers, etc.) and to provide guidelines for competition policy and particularly for merger policy. These guidelines, which differ substantially from those inspired by more static analyses, such as the Herfindahl or other standard concentration tests, are applied to a famous merger that took place in the French bottled water market, the Nestlé-Perrier merger case.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

Debt as a collusive device in an oligopoly supergame

This paper explores the impact of debt holdings on the output decisions of firms in an oligopoly supergame with stochastic demand fluctuations. It is demonstrated that when perfect collusion is not feasible then there exist circumstances in which increased debt holdings may facilitate tacit collusion. This occurs because higher debt levels act as a credible commitment device which lowers the payoffs accruing to a firm when it defects from the tacitly collusive equilibrium. It is further shown that in these circumstances firms may have an incentive to hold debt for strategic purposes which promote collusion.     

Real business cycles with Cournot competition and endogenous entry

We introduce strategic interactions with quantity competition a` la Cournot and endogenous entry in an RBC model with homogenous goods. In the long run, the steady state mark up is decreasing in the capital share, in the discount factor and in the level of technology, while it is increasing in the rate of bankruptcy and in the entry cost. In the short run, a competition effect amplifies the propagation of the shocks and generates procyclical profits and countercyclical mark ups. We extend the model to different forms of competition (as imperfect collusion and Stackelberg competition). The analysis of technology and preference shocks and of the second moments suggests that the model outperforms the RBC in terms of variability of output, labor and, of course, profits and mark ups.     

The Impact of a Goods and Services Tax on Product Market Competition

This paper explores the effects of a goods and services tax on the degree of competition in an oligopolistic industry and identifies a new mechanism through which the tax influences product market competition. The analysis focuses upon the effects of the tax in a concentrated industry and it is demonstrated that there exist circumstances under which the tax may promote competition by rendering tacit collusion more difficult.     

The impact of experience on prices and profits in experimental duopoly markets

Experimental posted price duopoly markets, wherein differentiated products were sold under conditions of incomplete information, were designed to explore the impact of experience on prices and profits. Two types of markets were run simultaneously. One type involved participants with previous experience in similar markets, while the other involved inexperienced subjects facing the same pricing decisions as their experienced counterparts. Probit analysis of the resulting data indicated significant relationships between experience and achieving equilibria predicted by tacit collusion. The results reinforce the growing realization that experience may be an important consideration in experimental tests of static market equilibria models.     

Tacit Collusion and Non–uniform Prices

This article examines the possibility of building a tacit agreement between price–setters that yields non–uniform pricing. It is shown that firms with market power may restrict competition not only by alternating between periods of high prices and low prices (Green and Porter (1984), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)), but also by always charging different prices and taking turns in being the monopolist. In contrast with the existing literature, price variability is not due to imperfect monitoring, stochastic demand or short–run pricing rigidity but it is a pure supply side effect. The author provides the necessary conditions to have collusion with non–uniform pricing, and shows that the latter dominates a fixed price solution. In terms of competition policy this result confirms that no price parallelism is not, per se , a signal of no collusion.     

Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in experimental markets. For Bertrand oligopolies with various numbers of firms, we compare pricing behavior with and without the possibility to communicate among firms. We find strong evidence that talking helps to obtain higher profits for any number of firms, however, the gain from communicating is non-monotonic in the number of firms, with medium-sized industries having the largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is disabled. Communication supports firms in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation.     

Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion

In this paper, we show that loopholes in EU emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product markets. The abuses originate from the covert misuse of EU emissions trading institutions, such as pooling or project-based mechanisms. We analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish output restrictions, even if those firms are price takers on the~permit market (which might actually be the case for the majority of obligated firms in the EU). The identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms’ profits, decreases the consumers’ surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges. Consequently, public authorities should not allow emissions trading’s overall good reputation—based upon its efficient abatement of pollution—to blind them to options in European emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition.