中国拍卖业遭遇“生死劫”？

我国拍卖业已于2004年12月11日对外开放。外商投资拍卖企业的政策“门槛”已然清除，对中国庞大的资产拍卖市场垂涎三尺的外资拍卖巨头将加快进入中国的脚步，中国拍卖业面临重新洗牌!     

浙江拍卖业何处落槌

自1989年9月我省在温州诞生第一家拍卖行以来，拍卖业坚持“公开、公平、公正和诚实信用”原则，积极开展拍卖活动，截至2008年底，拍卖成交额累计已达2500余亿元。拍卖业在促进商品流通、加速司法结案、盘活存量资产、加强廉政建设、推进国企改革、活跃文化市场等方面发挥了积极作用。     

关于拍卖市场的非诚信行为研究——以文物艺术品为例

自1986年中国拍卖业恢复发展以来,拍卖业已在市场经济的活动中发挥了特有的功能和作用,成为社会主义市场经济的一个组成部分。然而,由于拍卖市场中的非诚信行为,使拍卖行业的可持续发展面临挑战。目前,我们应该加强立法,加强法律的保障和制约功能;积极发挥行业协会的自律职能和作用;建立有效可行的文物艺术品鉴定管理体系;做好我国文物艺术品拍卖行业从业人员素质及职业道德教育,从而保证拍卖行业健康、良性发展。     

对房地产拍卖市场管理的思考

房地产拍卖在我国作为一个新兴的行业，其发展依然处于起步阶段，在有关的管理方面还有很多不完善的地方，需要我们对有关的房地产拍卖管理进行深入思考，认真研究，逐步找到一条适合于自身的发展之路。文章从我国房地产拍卖市场的管理现状、存在问题等方面入手，提出了有关加强和完善房地产拍卖管理的几点建议。     

投标与拍卖的决策理论方法

本文介绍国内很少涉及的国际投标和拍卖中的一些重要概念和基本问题，重点综述国际投标与拍卖的决策理论模型与方法的发展历史与现状。     

拍卖机制在不良资产处置中的应用研究

以合理的价格化解不良资产是长期以来我国金融界面临的重要问题。目前拍卖已经成为不良资产处置的重要手段。文章分析了运用拍卖机制处置不良资产的有利之处，并进一步研究了组合拍卖理论在不良资产打包拍卖中的应用。同时，针对目前不良资产的拍卖机制还不够完善的问题给出了相应的建议。     

我国拍卖业方兴未艾

我国拍卖业方兴未艾拍卖行业又重新走上我国经济舞台，并由沿海向内地发展，从大城市向小城市发展，日益走向红火。我国拍卖行业的复出，主要是借鉴外国罚没公物上市公开拍卖的做法，以纠正在处理国家公物上的不正之风。同时，为适应群众更新生活用品的需要，多余的物件作...     

拍卖经济理论综述

近 2 0年来 ,拍卖理论已经迅速发展成为经济学中最成功也最活跃的重要分支之一。在国内 ,政府与私人部门正与日俱增地通过拍卖机制采购或销售商品与权利。但拍卖从业界和经济学界对拍卖理论仍然相当陌生。为此 ,本文以基准拍卖模型和收入等价定理为起点 ,紧密围绕拍卖机制的绩效比较与最优拍卖机制设计问题 ,系统地介绍了近半个世纪以来国际拍卖理论的主要进展 ,同时展望其未来的发展轮廓并对这一前沿理论予以简要评述。①     

碳配额拍卖机制设计:基于多主体模型的研究

本文在回顾欧盟碳市场拍卖机制的基础上,建立了基于多主体的碳配额拍卖模型(CAAM),讨论拍卖出清价格是应该采取统一价格拍卖还是歧视性价格拍卖这个问题。研究结果对中国在未来设计碳市场相关机制有一定的参考意义。     

对网络拍卖方式的思考

拍卖如何做到“公开、公平、公正”,尽量降低甚至杜绝可能出现的徇私腐败现象,是一个值得探讨的课题.纯网络拍卖有效地解决了这一问题,但也存在一些弊端.网络拍卖与现场同步拍卖有效地解决了这一难题,值得坚持和推广.     

基于粗糙集的在线拍卖网站灰色评价方法研究

随着在线拍卖的不断发展,在线拍卖网站投资者和参与拍卖商品的竞拍者都十分关注在线拍卖网站的运营状况,因此,客观合理的在线拍卖网站的综合评价方法对在线拍卖网站的建设与发展具有重要的意义,在一定程度上促进了人们在线拍卖活动的意愿。本文通过对在线拍卖网站进行分析,建立了在线拍卖网站评价指标体系,提出了一种基于粗糙集的在线拍卖网站灰色评价方法。该方法先基于粗糙集并结合专家的意见,建立信息系统,进而确定各层指标的权重,然后根据灰色统计的方法建立评价权矩阵,最后基于指标权重信息和评价权矩阵,利用模糊方法进行综合评价。以14家在线拍卖网站进行了实证计算分析,结果表明,该方法具有较好的客观性和实用性,解决了传统在线拍卖网站评价中存在的问题,提高了评价结论的正确性和有效性。     

On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets

It is well known that selling licenses for the use of a cost-reducing innovation by auction yields a higher revenue compared to fixed fee in a symmetric Cournot industry. In this note we show that this result can be reversed in an asymmetric Cournot industry, i.e., the fixed fee policy can generate a strictly higher revenue than the auction policy in an industry where prior to the innovation firms are cost-asymmetric.     

Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values

Auctions are often used to sell idiosyncratic goods difficult for potential bidders to value ex ante. Laboratory auctions with uncertainty over final values in this experiment resulted in 18% and 27% of bids above the expected value of the item in private-value first-price and English auctions, respectively. Risk-seeking preferences as measured on an individual decision task cannot explain overbidding and the first-price auction results suggest that risk aversion may not be a good explanation for bidding behavior observed with certain values. Several candidate explanations fail to explain overbidding, rather it appears to stem from some bidders who are prone to overbidding. Relative to first-price auctions, the size and frequency of overbids are significantly larger in English auctions, while more English auctions are won by overbidders. Differences between the formats appear to be driven by the dynamic nature of English auctions which is consistent with popular notions of “auction fever.”     

Multiple bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations

Bidders may increase their bids over the course of a multi-period, second-price auction if (1) they become more certain about their valuations over time, and (2) they cannot bid in the final auction period with positive probability.     

A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis

In this paper, we examine which auction format, first-price or second-price, a seller will choose when he can profitably cheat in a second price auction by observing all bids by possible buyers and submitting a shill bid as pretending to be a buyer. We model this choice of auction format in seller cheating as a signaling game in which the buyers may regard the selection of a second price auction by the seller as a signal that he is a shill bidder. By introducing trembling-hand perfectness as a refinement of signaling equilibrium, we find two possible strictly perfect signaling equilibria. One is a separating equilibrium in which a noncheating honest seller selects a first price auction and a cheating seller does a second price auction. In another pooling equilibrium, however, both cheating and non-cheating sellers select a second price auction. The conclusion that a seller chooses a second price auction even if he cannot cheat is in contrast to the previous literature, which focused on the case of independent values. We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments that have improved the paper. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) 15310023 and (C) 18530139.     

Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences

In an auction with a buy price, the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price. This paper develops a model of an auction with a buy price in which bidders use the auction's reserve price and buy price to formulate a reference price. The model both explains why a revenue-maximizing seller would want to augment her auction with a buy price and demonstrates that the seller sets a higher reserve price when she can affect the bidders' reference price through the auction's reserve price and buy price than when she can affect the bidders' reference price through the auction's reserve price only. The comparative statics properties of bidding behavior are in sharp contrast to equilibrium behavior in other models where the existence and size of the auction's buy price have no effect on bidding behavior.     

多属性拍卖与研发竞赛的激励效应比较

采购方向两个潜在的供应商之一采购某种需要研发的创新性技术或产品,并采用多属性拍卖机制或研发竞赛机制来确定哪一个供应商最终能赢得合约。假设供应商是同质的和风险中性的、研发成本具有随机性,且采购方和供应商之间在研发成本上信息不对称,分别研究多属性拍卖机制和研发竞赛机制中供应商的质量决策,比较这两种机制的创新激励效应。结果发现:多属性拍卖机制中,理性的供应商都不会进行研发和参与投标;研发竞赛中奖励金额必须要足够大才能激发供应商的研发与竞赛参与意愿,此时研发竞赛机制要优于多属性拍卖机制。     

Auctions with a buy price

eBay and Yahoo allow sellers to list their auctions with a buy price at which a bidder may purchase the item immediately. On eBay, the buy-now option disappears once a bid is placed, while on Yahoo the buy-now option remains in effect throughout the auction. We show that when bidders are risk averse, both types of auctions raise seller revenue for a wide range of buy prices. The Yahoo format raises more revenue than the eBay format when bidders have either CARA or DARA. Bidders with DARA prefer the eBay auction, while bidders with CARA are indifferent between the two. Part of this work was completed while Reynolds was a visitor at Instituto de Analisys Economico in Barcelona and while Wooders was a visitor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. We are grateful to these institutions for their hospitality.     

Endogenous market power in an emissions trading scheme with auctioning

This paper contributes to the literature on market power in emissions permits markets, modeling an emissions trading scheme in which polluters differ with respect to their marginal abatement costs at the business-as-usual emissions. The polluters play a two-stage static complete information game in which their market power arises endogenously from their characteristics. In the first stage all polluters bid in an auction for the distribution of the fixed supply of permits issued by the regulator, and in the second stage they trade these permits in a secondary market. For compliance, they can also engage in abatement activity at a quadratic cost. Under the assumptions of the model, in equilibrium all polluters are successful in the auction. In the secondary market the low-cost emitters are net sellers and the high-cost emitters are net buyers. Moreover, the high-cost emitters are worse off as a result of the strategic behavior. In addition, the secondary market price is unambiguously above the auction clearing price. I find that the aggregate compliance cost when polluters act strategically increases in the heterogeneity of their marginal abatement costs at the business-as-usual emissions, but there exists a threshold of the fixed supply of permits above which strategic behavior is compliance cost-saving for the polluters. Finally, for a low enough variance of the marginal abatement cost at the business-as-usual emissions, strategic behavior is compliance cost-saving for the polluters, regardless of the level of the available supply of permits.     

Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats

The prevalent term “auction fever” visualizes that ascending auctions – inconsistent with theory – are likely to provoke higher bids than one-shot auctions. To explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally, we design four different strategy-proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo-endowment effect arguments (psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept). Observed revenues in the experiment in the four formats rank as expected if bidders have private uncertain values (the private information of a bidder is the distribution of her value). A control treatment supports our view that the traditional private certain values approach prevents auction fever in the laboratory. Another control treatment with a procurement auction relates the auction fever bids to bids in a one-shot auction with real endowments. We conclude that, when bidders are uncertain about their valuations, auctions that foster pseudo-endowment may raise bids and revenues.