参与式预算的经济学分析

参与式预算改革不仅彰显了民主的价值,而且还蕴含了深刻的经济学意义。参与式预算有助于实现公众偏好的表达、协调和统一,使公共资金的使用满足公众的真实需求,提高公共预算的效率。参与式预算提高了公共预算的透明度,矫正了社会公众和政府之间的信息不对称,降低了公众的信息搜寻成本和政府的道德风险。我国参与式预算的改革模式契合了我国的改革路径,即地方探索和创新、中央认可和支持,体现了中央和地方之间的合作博弈;参与式预算推动了地方政府间的竞争博弈,地方政府间的竞争博弈又促进了参与式预算的纵深发展。2014年8月31日通过的预算法修正案也为参与式预算的推进提供了相关的制度支持。     

欧盟“地平线2020”计划资金管理经验及启示

本文对欧盟"地平线2020"计划的项目资金管理进行了系统介绍,从对申请人的财务能力审查、申报预算、预算管理、资金拨付、资金监督和评估等资金管理全流程,对欧盟的做法进行了分析总结,凝练出欧盟科研项目在资金分配、资金使用和风险控制方面的模式和特点,并结合当前中国科研资金管理存在的相关问题,提出了一些改进建议。     

让公共预算中的政府问责制运转起来——对印度公民预算组织的考察

在贫富差距极度悬殊、种族和教派冲突频繁发生、政府效率低下的环境中,印度的公民预算组织积极投:身社会变革,促进公共参与和政府创新.他们创造出"公民报告卡"、"预算分析"、"预算跟踪"等公民参与预算的方法,以强化内在于公共预算中的政府问责制.他们的思想、观点以及一些具体做法对我国的公共预算制度创新具有一定的借鉴意义.     

论预算绩效问责机制建构

我国现行预算体制中,各级政府部门在编制预算和分配资金时,对资金使用效益重视不够,致使浪费和闲置了大量财政资金。要从根本上改变财政资源配置低效率的现状,必须建立预算绩效问责机制,从源头控制预算;加强预算法制建设,维护预算权威性;发挥多元主体监督作用;完善预算绩效评价,落实问责措施,确保公共资金使用安全,最大化实现公共目的。     

完善我国预算决策与管理制度的基本构想

1.从公共预算的完整性入手,取消非预算资金,配合税费改革的进程,将非预算资金中有合理存在依据的收费首先纳入预算外资金管理,将没有合理依据的收费一律取消,逐渐将预算外资金全部纳入预算内管理,最终形成完整统一的公共预算。     

中国政府预算管理的环境特点及其改革取向

中国社会经济转型的独特路径选择决定了中国政府预算管理在政体组织构架、预算管理水平与技术手段、经济发展阶段、社会结构变迁等诸多外部环境方面，都存在着与成熟市场经济国家不同的特异性。与之相应，社会转型期的中国政府预算管理改革也应相机选择强调古典预算原则、突出监督制衡方的作用、重塑预算资金自由裁量权的分布结构、在资金需求方引入竞争机制等具有自身特色的改革路径。     

我国财政转移支付制度存在的问题与完善对策

我国以公共服务均等化为主要目标设计的转移支付制度,相对于协调地区经济发展、缩小地区经济差距的需要来说所起作用有限。地方政府争夺转移支付资金的博弈,导致财政资金紧缺与使用效率低下并存。财政转移支付作为协调政府间财政关系和地区利益的手段,其制度建设须以协调地区经济发展、缩小地区差距为目标,从转移支付模式、转移支付形式、转移支付资金分配办法等方面进行系统性的规划和设计。     

基于不同属性的农业科技服务供给博弈研究

基于农业科技服务具有的公共物品、私人物品和准公共物品等不同属性,从博弈的视角分析了不同属性的农业科技服务体系中,各利益主体之间的博弈过程及策略选择,提出了提高农业科技服务供给效率的有关对策与建议。     

我国推行财政支出绩效考评研究

从20世纪90年代后期开始,我国分步设计、推行了一系列预算制度改革,内容包括部门预算、国库集中收付、收支“两条线”等。这些改革虽然未在各级政府同步推行,但对各级政府的资金管理理念和制度变革选择产生了指导作用。预算制度改革尽管事前畏难情绪较高、执行中也暴露出了一些问题,但客观看,取得的效果非常明显,突出体现在政府行为日趋规范化和预算资金分配日趋合理化。国内外经验表明,预算制度改革是一个不断深化的过程,在中国尤其如此,现实已经表明如果我们就此止步,改革已取得的成果最后也就成为形式上的胜利。党的十六届三中全会提出要…     

绩效导向预算中政府预算机构的角色转变

绩效导向预算是建立在计量经济学基础上的一种公共财政管理工具,随着绩效预算在我国公共预算管理中的推广应用,政府预算机构在角色转变的过程中必须注意一些问题,并采取相应的对策措施.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING FOR TRADE LIBERALIZATION: POLITICS OF AGRICULTURE RELATED GOVERNMENT SPENDING FOR THE URUGUAY ROUND IN JAPAN

This paper investigates the effect of political factors on the interregional allocation of the budget to assist farmers in coping with agricultural trade liberalization in Japan. We present a simple model to show the relationship between political factors and interregional budget allocation and empirically examine whether political factors played a key role in the interregional allocation of Japanese government spending for the Uruguay Round agricultural trade liberalization. Our findings show that this allocation was distorted due to political reasons, which was problematic from the standpoints of fairness and social efficiency.     

Endogenous determination of public budget allocation across education stages

This paper studies the endogenous determination of public budget allocation across hierarchical education stages. In less developed economies, the top class has dominant political power to implement its most preferred policy, which is characterized by exclusive participation and large schooling expenditure at higher education at the expense of basic education. In developed economies, the budget allocation is more balanced; under certain parameters, it leads to expanded participation of the middle class in higher education. The model offers an explanation to the observed cross-country policy difference and is broadly consistent with historical evidence.     

The impact of fiscal and political decentralization on local public investment in Indonesia

We investigate the effects of the fiscal, administrative and political decentralization process in Indonesia on budget allocation at the sub-national level. We find that after the large-scale expenditure decentralization of 2001, districts with relatively lower levels of public infrastructure started to invest significantly more in health and physical infrastructure, although not in education infrastructure. At the same time, we also see a tightening of the budget constraint in districts where the democratically elected government heads took over already before gaining fiscal powers. Finally, our results document decreases in public investments under directly elected district heads, showing no beneficial effects of direct elections on investment targeting.     

Ethnic identities,public spending and political regimes

Do democracies discriminate less against minorities as compared to non-democracies? How does the dominance of an ethnic group affect discrimination under various political regimes? We build a theory to analyse such questions. In our model, political leaders (democratically elected or not) decide on the allocation of spending on different types of public goods: a general public good and an ethnically-targetable public good which benefits the majority ethnic group while imposing a cost on the other minorities. We show that, under democracy, lower ethnic dominance leads to greater provision of the general public good while higher dominance implies higher provision of the ethnically-targetable good. Interestingly, the opposite relation obtains under dictatorship. This implies that political regime changes can favour or disfavour minorities based on the ambient level of ethnic dominance. Several historical events involving regime changes can be analysed within our framework and are consistent with our results.     

The economic effects of constitutions: do budget institutions make forms of government more alike?

According to an influential theoretical argument, presidential systems tend to present smaller governments relative to parliamentary countries because the separation between those who decide the size of the fiscal purse and those who allocate it creates incentives for lower public expenditures. In practice, however, presidential and parliamentary countries come in many forms. In particular, variation in procedural rules that assign budget prerogatives across the popular branches of government may affect the underlying incentives that differentiate these types of regimes in terms of fiscal outcomes. More specifically, we argue that more hierarchical rules that concentrate budgetary power in the executive relative to the legislature do not only reduce the extent of the common pool problem but also limit the degree of separation of powers, which may have a countervailing effect. Consequently, the effect of the form of government on public expenditures is conditional on specific procedural rules. We test this hypothesis on a broad cross-section of countries and find that presidentialism has a negative impact on government size only when executive discretion in the budget process is low (that is, in a context of separation of powers). However, the negative effect of presidentialism on expenditures vanishes when the executive’s discretion over the budget process is higher. This result, in addition to highlighting that not all budget institutions have the same effect on incentives and outcomes, points out how important it is to go beyond broad characterizations of political institutions for explaining policy outcomes, and more generally, for moving forward the research agenda in constitutional political economy.     

决策系统的有效整合与降低摩擦成本的关系--对我国公立大学决策机制的分析

社会主义国家的公立大学,需要承担政党政治方面的社会功能。但大学是一个十分特殊的学术机构,其决策机制又不同于政权机关,为了使学校的党政决策系统有效地融为一体,从而降低摩擦成本,就需要用理智对决策机构进行有效整合。用法定制度清晰地界定大学党政机构的权力域,是降低决策成本非常重要的前提条件。在公立大学管理体制给定的情况下,降低决策成本还依赖于操作层面的制度供给。     

城乡税制统一:基于公共财政的分析视角

城乡分割的二元税制加重了农民负担,降低了我国农产品的国际竞争力,也有悖于市场经济的公平原则;在农村公共产品供给上,政府存在着职能缺位,这些都不利于建立城乡统一的公共财政。当前统一城乡税制面临着财政资金压力、税收征管能力、二元经济结构等方面因素的限制。统一城乡税制需要逐步完善城乡税收体系、加大政府对农村公共品投入以及深化基层人事制度改革和促进农业产业化等方面的配套改革。     

公共选择视角下的公共预算理念

绩效预算是20世纪公共预算管理的重大改革,是政府公共管理理念的重大转变。作为公共预算理性主义理念的应用,绩效预算对于提高政府预算决策的科学性和预算支出效率发挥了重要作用。然而,理性主义与现实主义的预算理念并不是完全矛盾的,在公共选择的视角下分析两种预算理念实际上是将公共预算作为政治程序的一部分,以经济的视角去分析其决策机制和最终要达到的绩效目标。同时,两种预算理念对于我国目前的预算改革也具有重要的借鉴意义。     

UNIVERSALISM AND THE VALUE OF POLITICAL POWER

Although legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation, unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive. I develop a game‐theoretic model where members strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations, with noncooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation. To quantify the effects of political power on the agreed‐upon allocation, I structurally estimate the model using the “Bridge Bill Capital Budget” in 1992. I find that 16.73% of the budget would be allocated differently if allocations were determined only based on actual needs.     

中国公共预算研究的财政学视角考察

中国财政学对公共预算问题的研究,未能融合经济学的分析范式,也未实现必要的＂市场细分＂.近期的研究取向可以从以下方面加以谋划：组建＂中国公共预算研究会＂;尽快完成中国近代预算史的抢救性研究与实现预算术语统一化;按照正确的顺序继续推进＂三部曲＂的预算规范化进程.