CEO power,product market competition and the acquisition motive for going public

This study finds that CEO power and product market competition differentially influence post‐IPO growth strategy and its economic consequences. Powerful CEOs are more likely to prefer acquisition growth over internal investment. Further, while CEO power is positively related to the likelihood, frequency and size of post‐IPO acquisitions, it is unrelated to the post‐IPO performance of acquisitive firms. In contrast, product market rivalry does not increase post‐IPO acquisitiveness but is positively related to the performance of acquirers. Finally, CEO power enhances the performance of acquisitive IPO firms only when faced with intense competitive rivalry.     

Strategic IPOs and product market competition

We examine firms' incentives to go public in the presence of product market competition. As a result of their greater ability to diversify idiosyncratic risk in the capital market, public firms' owners tolerate higher profit variability than owners of private firms. Consequently, public firms adopt riskier and more aggressive output market strategies than private firms, which improves the competitive position of the former vis-à-vis the latter. This strategic benefit of being public, and thus, the proportion of public firms in an industry, is shown to be positively related to the degree of competitive interaction among firms in the output market, to demand uncertainty, and to the idiosyncratic portion of this uncertainty. Additional empirical predictions concern the effect of a firm's initial public offering on its market share and on its rivals' valuations. We test the model's predictions and find empirical support for most of them.     

Product market competition and analyst forecasting activity: International evidence

In this study, we investigate how product market competition affects the extent of analyst following and the properties of analyst forecasts. Using a broad sample of firms from 37 countries over the 1990–2008 period, we find that firms that operate in more concentrated industries and with stronger pricing power are associated with greater analyst following, higher forecast accuracy, and lower forecast dispersion. Moreover, the effect of product market power on analyst following and forecast properties is more pronounced in countries with less effective competition laws and higher entry costs. These findings suggest that high industry concentration and a dominant market position enhance the earnings predictability of firms and lower their information uncertainty, and that country-level institutions that promote competition effectively constrain the power in product markets.     

Agency problems,product market competition and dividend policies in Japan

This study investigates whether product market competition reduces agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in Japan. In particular, we examine firms’ dividend policies in competitive versus concentrated industries. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that firms in more competitive industries pay more dividends, are more likely to increase dividends and are less likely to omit dividends. Furthermore, the impact of firm‐level agency problems on dividend payouts is weaker in highly competitive industries. The results suggest that product market competition can be an effective industry‐level governance mechanism that can force managers to disgorge cash to outside investors.     

Unionization,product market competition,and strategic disclosure

We examine the disclosure policies of non-unionized firms operating in unionized industries. We test the hypothesis that non-unionized firms have an incentive to disclose more information when their unionized rivals are engaged in labor renegotiations; that is, to weaken them. We find that non-unionized firms disclose more information and more good news when renegotiations are ongoing. This behavior is stronger for larger firms, firms with fewer peers in the industry, and firms more similar to their renegotiating rivals. We also find some evidence that unionized firms are harmed by this behavior and that non-unionized firms benefit from their increased disclosures.     

Product market competition and corporate advertising expenditure: Evidence from a natural experiment

Using the implementation of “Catalogue for the Guidance of Industries for Foreign Investment” in China in 2015 as an exogenous shock, we adopt the difference-in-differences (DIDs) method to explore the relationship between product market competition and corporate advertising expenditure. The result shows that product market competition significantly promotes corporate advertising expenditure, and the result is robust after conducting a series of robustness tests. In addition, we further examine the effects of product market competition on corporate advertising expenditure in firms with different characteristics. The results show that the effect is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises, small-scale firms, and high-tech firms. Overall, this paper supports that product market competition plays a vital role in promoting corporate advertising expenditure.     

Product market competition and the disclosure of supply chain information

We investigate how product market competition affects corporate voluntary disclosure decisions, specifically regarding supply-chain information. Our results, based on a sample of manufacturing companies listed in China from 2010 to 2016, show that companies in more competitive industries disclose less customer/supplier information. The main results stand through several robustness tests. Further analyses show that the negative relationship between product market competitiveness and supply-chain information disclosure is stronger when the disclosure contains more incremental information and when competitors are more capable of gaining competitive advantage using the disclosed information. Our study contributes to the understanding of both the relationship between product market competition and voluntary disclosure decisions and the regulation of information disclosure to build a transparent capital market.     

The impact of product market competition on earnings quality

The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of product market competition on earnings quality. Based on a sample from the US manufacturing sector for the period 1996–2005, we find consistent evidence showing a positive relation between product market competition and earnings quality. Additional tests also confirm a positive relation between product market competition and the precision of public and private information held by investors and analysts. We also provide evidence that firms competing in concentrated and heterogeneous industries are associated with a number of earnings attributes and information quality not shared by those competing in concentrated but homogeneous industries. These findings are consistent with the intuition that firms enjoying a monopolistic advantage tend to avoid the attention of their competitors and politicians by creating a more opaque information environment.     

Executive risk incentives,product market competition,and R&D

Prior studies have examined the relation between product market competition (PMC) and research and development (R&D) investments, while the impact of executive risk incentives on this relation remains unexplored. In this study, we find that Vega (the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock return volatility) weakens the negative relation between PMC and R&D. We also find that Vega strengthens the negative relation between PMC and firm performance when R&D investments grow higher. In sum, our results suggest that high‐Vega compensation portfolios in competitive environments may induce executives to overinvest in R&D projects, therefore hurting firm performance.     

The IPO market as a screening device and the going public decision: evidence from acquisitions of privately and publicly held firms

The main purpose of this paper is using a unique data set from IPO filings to study the IPO market as a screening device and the going public decision. We find that private firms that are less likely to have the option to access public equity markets receive 54 cents for each dollar they expected to raise in an IPO, whereas firms that are more likely to have the option to go public but sell privately sell at $1.11 for each dollar they expected to receive at the IPO. This result suggests that the lower valuation for firms sold in private markets compared to firms sold in public markets can be at least partially explained by the lower relative bargaining power of private firms. However, owners that took their firms public before selling received, on average, 40% larger payoffs than owners that had the option to go public but decided to sell privately. The results in this study indicate that these differences in valuation are not fully explained by existing theoretical models on the decision to sell privately or in two stages.     

Product market competition and earnings management: Evidence from discretionary accruals and real activity manipulation

We examine the association between product market competition and earnings management activities. We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a widely used measure for market concentration, as a proxy for product market competition. We examine two forms of earnings management: accrual-based and real activity-based. Our results are mixed, but generally suggest that both income-increasing accrual manipulation and real activity-based manipulation are more prevalent among firms in low competition industries than those in high competition industries. Our findings are robust to various measures of earnings management, alternative measures of product market competitions, and different subsamples. We further explore the reasons why firms in low competition industries are more inclined to manage earnings and find that the market consequences of missing important earnings targets are more severe among firms in low competition industries than those in high competition industries.     

Governance,product market competition and cash management in IPO firms

This study evaluates the link between CEO governance heterogeneity, power structure of the firm, and product market competition on various facets of post-IPO cash policy. Our results suggest that post-IPO cash holdings as well as marginal value of cash reserves are higher under a founder CEO governance regime relative to non-founder CEOs. Concentrating board power in the hands of founder CEOs however, reduces their ability to maintain higher post-IPO cash reserves. Our results also suggest that product market competition influences both the level and marginal value of cash reserves in the hands of founder CEOs. Further, we find that stronger internal governance reduces the tendency of IPO firms to deploy excess cash reserves to fund internal investments in excess of industry rivals. Finally, our results suggest that excess cash reserves in competitive industry environments lead to superior post-IPO operating performance.     

Employee‐friendly practices,product market competition and firm value

In this paper, we examine whether employee‐friendly practices are associated with product market competition, and whether firm value is related to employee‐friendly practices and product market competition. Using a large sample of US firms, we find positive and significant associations between employee friendliness and product market competition, and between firm value and employee friendliness when product market competition is high, consistent with the value creation theory. Both positive relations hold when we account for corporate governance. In addition, using the list of Fortune's ‘100 Best Companies to Work For’ as an alternative measure of employee‐friendly policies, we find firms in more competitive industries are more likely to treat their workers favourably. Furthermore, we find that the market reaction is more positive when firms in more competitive industries are selected for the Fortune list.     

Tax competition, excludable public goods, and user charges

This paper provides an explanation for the increasing reliance on revenue from user charges on excludable public goods. We develop a model with many identical countries. The government of each country imposes a source-based tax on capital and supplies an excludable public good to heterogeneous households. Without tax competition, the price on the public good is zero. Tax competition induces each country to choose a positive price. The reliance on user charges turns out to be increasing in the intensity of tax competition measured by the number of countries. A coordinated decrease in user charges is shown to raise welfare in all countries.      

Stock market restrictions and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from IPO suspension in China

Improving corporate social responsibility (CSR) requires not only the efforts of firms themselves but also the support of the appropriate institutional environment. This paper assesses whether access to the stock market can promote firms’ CSR. Using China’s suspension of IPOs in 2012–2014, we find that firms affected by the suspension show lower CSR in their listing year. The later listing after the suspension ends, the greater reduction in CSR. Moreover, the effect of the IPO suspension is more serious for firms with financial constraints than for non-financially constrained firms. Furthermore, we show that the IPO suspension has an adverse impact on firms’ liquidity and profitability. When this suspension ends, firms’ CSR activities recover within 1–2 years. Overall, our conclusion enriches the literature on the factors influencing CSR and provides firm-level evidence of the adverse impact of an IPO suspension.     

Impact of product market competition on real activity manipulation: Moderating role of managerial ability

In this study, we examine whether managerial ability moderates the association between product market competition and real earnings management. Prior literature largely supports the disciplinary effect of competition, suggesting that competition reduces real activity manipulation. We argue that this association is different depending on the level of managerial ability. Based on the reputation hypothesis, we argue that able managers negatively moderate the association between competition and real activity manipulation. Using a sample of US listed companies from 1997 to 2016, we find evidence to support our moderating assertion. A battery of robustness tests validates our original findings.     

Going public in the 1980s: Evidence from Sweden

The paper explores the going public decision in a sample of family-owned corporations in Sweden, 1970–1991. the issuers' motivations for going public are documented and contrasted with economic theory. We find that the average firm is old, that a significant portion of the shares are sold by existing shareholders, that most going public activity took place after an exceptionally sharp stock price increase, and that going public activity is not related to the business cycle. the findings suggest that firms were taken public by their owners who wanted to liquidate their investment to finance consumption or portfolio diversification. the findings strike the common view that firms go public to finance growth. Data from other European countries exhibit similar patterns and suggest that our findings for Sweden may extend to other markets as well.     

Product market threats and tax avoidance

In this paper, we find that product market threats increase firms’ tax avoidance. This association is especially observed for firms that pursue tax avoidance more than their optimal target level (i.e., actively tax-avoiding firms). In addition, among these firms with active tax avoidance practices, firms with weaker corporate governance structure, lower financial flexibility, and greater predation risk are more likely to experience the positive relationship between product market threats and tax avoidance. Further evidence suggests that higher levels of tax avoidance driven by product market threats do not come with higher levels of tax uncertainty and rather positively affect firms’ profitability. This result highlights the decoupling relationship between tax avoidance and tax uncertainty.     

Venture capital funds and the public equity market

This paper considers the relationship between the public equity market and the returns to venture investing using a dataset which is derived from the records of two large limited partners who have been investing in venture capital for almost 30 years. Evidence is found to suggest that market conditions over the investment cycle, and exit conditions at the time of exit in particular, are an important determinant. This paper also investigates whether any other aspects of the venture investment process respond to events in the broader market. While general trends are evident in the venture investment cycle, only the intensity of the investment process is found to respond to events in the public equity market.