Do hedge funds dynamically manage systematic risk?

Defining systematic risk management (SRM) skill as persistently low fund systematic risk, we find evidence of time varying allocation of hedge fund management effort across the business cycle. In weak market states, skilled managers focus on minimization of systematic risk via dynamic reallocations across asset classes at the cost of fund alpha and foregoing market timing opportunities. As markets strengthen, attention shifts to asset selection within consistent asset classes. The superior performance of low systematic risk funds previously documented arises due to the superior asset selection ability of managers in strong market states. Incremental allocations by investors arise due to this superior performance and not due to recognition of SRM skill.     

Political connection and leverage: Some Malaysian evidence

This paper extends prior work on the linkage between politically connected (PCON) firms and capital structure in developing countries. Specifically, this paper focuses on the association between Malaysian PCON firms and leverage, and is motivated by the results of Fraser et al. (2006) who report a positive association between leverage and political patronage. Controlling for a potential misspecification in that paper, this study documents that a significant proportion (almost 12%) of the Malaysian PCON firms have negative equity, and builds on the previous paper by providing fresh evidence that market to book ratio is positively associated with leverage, and that borrowing PCON firms have significantly lower ROA compared to non-PCON firms.     

Are Islamic stock indexes exposed to systemic risk? Multivariate GARCH estimation of CoVaR

The main objective of this paper is to assess the exposure of Islamic stock indexes to systemic tail events. We use Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) and Delta CoVaR measures as developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and a sample of Islamic and conventional stock indexes, from various developed and emerging markets, during the period September 2005 to March 2015. The empirical results reveal that the systemic risk has a moderate adverse effect on Islamic indexes, with a lower level in Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC hereafter). The findings also show the Asian stock indexes can be considered as effective hedge assets, after the global financial crisis (GFC hereafter). Furthermore, the empirical reveal that portfolio including Islamic stock indexes performs better than a benchmark portfolio in turmoil periods. These findings have several implications in financial decisions including the strategy of stability and asset allocation.     

Historical market-to-book in a partial adjustment model of leverage

Historical market-to-book has been shown to explain current leverage. Prior studies attribute the evidence to market timing. This study shows that with the presence of time-varying targets and adjustment costs, historical market-to-book has a significant impact on leverage even when firms do not time the market. The historical values of alternative market timing proxies, such as insider sales and the market sentiment index, are shown to have no effects on leverage while the historical values of alternative growth-option proxies do have effects. Overall, the evidence is largely consistent with a partial adjustment model of leverage.     

Gold loans in the Australian gold mining industry: Do gold loans allow gold producers to increase leverage?

This paper tests the hypothesis that gold producers exhibit greater leverage where gold loans are used. As the choice of gold producers and the study period essentially avoids debt tax shield effects, the paper focuses on information asymmetry and agency costs explanations for leverage. Theory suggests hedging can reduce the cost of debt but it has little impact if management is not committed to adopting the promised hedging policy. The implicit hedge in gold loans commits management to hedging and so greater leverage is expected for producers adopting gold loans. Results from the analysis are consistent with this hypothesis.     

Informational leverage: the problem of noise traders

The literature suggests that security design can be used to manipulate the information content of securities prices [what is referred to as the “informational leverage effect” in Boot and Thakor (J Finance 48, 1349–1378, 1993)]. The informational leverage effect arises in this literature in a market microstructure environment in which noise trade is exogenous, which is a fairly standard assumption dating back to the framework developed in Grossman and Stiglitz (Am Econ Rev 70, 393–408, 1980). This assumption is relaxed in our paper, and we show that the informational effects described in the related literature become less clear cut when noise trading activity is endogenous. We find that the intensity and direction of these effects depends crucially on the parameters describing the modeling environment. The elegant point of the informational leverage literature is that these effects arise largely independently of such parameters, but with endogenous noise trading that is no longer true. This literature may, therefore, lead to too strong conclusions being drawn about the relationship between information revelation and security design. We are very grateful for the helpful comments made by an anonymous referee.     

Employee representation and financial leverage

We analyze how direct employee voice affects financial leverage. German law mandates that firms’ supervisory boards consist of an equal number of employees’ and owners’ representatives. This requirement, however, applies only to firms with more than two thousand domestic employees. We exploit this discontinuity and the law’s introduction in 1976 for identification and find that direct employee power increases financial leverage. This is explained by a supply side effect: as banks’ interests are similar to those of employees, higher employee power reduces agency conflicts with debt providers, leading to better financing conditions. These findings reveal a novel mechanism of direct employee influence.     

The impact of imposing capital requirements on systemic risk

This paper examines the impact of imposing capital requirements on systemic risk. We use a static model on financial institutions’ risk-taking behavior to quantify the systemic risk in the cross-sectional dimension in both regulated and unregulated systems. Although imposing a capital requirement can lower individual risk, it simultaneously enhances systemic linkage within the system. By using a proper systemic risk measure combining both individual risk and systemic linkage, we show that systemic risk in a regulated system can be higher than that in an unregulated system. In addition, we analyze a sufficient condition under which the systemic risk in a regulated system is always lower.     

Hedge funds and financial stability: Regulating prime brokers will mitigate systemic risks

We review key characteristics of the hedge fund industry, and identify conditions under which this sector can pose a threat to financial stability. Direct regulation of hedge funds that increases transparency does not appear feasible, may create a moral-hazard problem, and may reduce market liquidity. Indirect regulation by prime brokers and market discipline by creditors, counterparties, and investors have been effective in limiting the risks from the hedge fund sector. To reduce systemic risks, more regulation of prime brokers is warranted to avoid competitive dynamics from undermining counterparty risk management practices.     

On the relation between the market-to-book ratio, growth opportunity, and leverage ratio

The negative relation between the market-to-book ratio and leverage ratio is one of the most widely documented empirical regularities in the capital structure literature. Most related studies take this negative relation as given and debate about its economic interpretation. We show that firms with higher market-to-book ratios face lower debt financing costs and borrow more. The relation between the market-to-book ratio and leverage ratio is not monotonic and is positive for most firms (more than 88% of COMPUSTAT firms and more than 95% of total market capitalization). The previously documented negative relation is driven by a subset of firms with high market-to-book ratios.     

A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation

Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a bank’s own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Prudential regulation is shown to operate at a collective level, regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-specific) risk.     

Private benefits of control and firm leverage: An analysis of Korean firms

This paper investigates the leverage choices of an entrenched controlling party. If debt effectively curbs the private benefits of control, the controlling shareholder is given incentives to avoid debt. Using estimates of the private benefits of control and financial statement data from selected Korean firms, we find that a controlling party with large private benefits tends to lower debt. This relationship was concentrated after the Asian financial crisis. However, before the crisis, firms that affiliated with Korean conglomerates, chaebols, used more debt as private benefits increased. A financial reform program triggered by the crisis seems to have actuated the disciplining role of debt. JEL Classification G32, G34     

CEO Ownership and Discretionary Investments

Abstract:  This study investigates empirically the relationship between CEO ownership and discretionary investments such as R&D and capital expenditures. We assert that the under-investment problem is high for R&D-intensive projects, while the over-investment problem is high for capital expenditures because of differences in risk between the two types of investments. Building on the linkages between investments and investment-related agency problems, we hypothesize that the relationship between CEO ownership and investments depends on whether increasing ownership mitigates or exacerbates the under- or over-investment problem. We find a non-linear association between CEO stock ownership and R&D investments; R&D investments increase and then decline across increasing levels of ownership. Further, we find that R&D investments and CEO stock options are positively associated at high levels of option holdings. In contrast, capital expenditures do not vary with CEO ownership (stock or options). Finally, consistent with our underlying assumption, we find that the influence of R&D investments on future firm risk is significantly larger than that of capital expenditures. Our findings indicate that managerial risk aversion affects discretionary investments.     

Recent Developments in Credit Markets

We summarize recent developments in the credit derivative markets. We show the role of dependence between individual debtors in portfolio derivatives in a study of implied correlation. The risk of changing dependence structures between stock and bond markets becomes evident in an example of capital structure arbitrage. How credit derivatives can introduce new risks is illustrated by the example of “overlay” in basket derivatives.     

Capital and resolution policies: The US interbank market

We develop an empirically based simulation study to test two types of policies designed to control systemic risk: preventive policies targeting capital requirements and mitigation policies targeting default resolution. We find that capital buffers reduce both the number of defaults and the resulting losses. The loss reduction benefit increases as the magnitude of adverse shocks becomes higher. We find that a simple branch-breakup resolution strategy reduces the loss borne by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The mitigation effect becomes higher as the fraction of assets resolved through auctions and auction competitiveness increase.     

Leverage, imports, profitability, exchange rates, and capital investment: a panel data study of the textile and apparel industries 1974-1987

This paper explores the relationship between capital structure and import competition for the textile and apparel industries from 1974-1987. The level of import penetration should have an important effect on business risk and hence on financial leverage. We also examine the response of leverage to the interrelationships that may exist between import competition and three other factors: firm profitability, strength of the dollar, and investment in capital equipment.The evidence suggests that leverage for the textile firms increases with rising imports but that the effect is less marked if the imports are the result of a strengthening dollar. The textile firms also seem to have inaugurated a capital investment campaign in reaction to import competition. For apparel firms, the interrelationship between profitability and import penetration seems to have been the primary determinant of leverage.