Hostile–vs.–white‐knight bidders

We examine the hypothesis that white knights enter control contests to spend free cash flow instead of paying it out to shareholders. Tobin's q is used to measure management's inclination to invest in negative NPV investments. We find that historically, white knights have over‐invested and their acquisition of the target is one more negative NPV investment. Alternatively, hostile bidders’ past investment decisions have increased shareholder wealth. Furthermore, white knights’ returns upon the announcement of their bid have a significant negative relationship with free cash flow, implying that their bid reveals information about white knights management's investment decisions. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Discussion of paper by H. Li & G.S. Maddala

Some comments are made concerning variations on the bootstrap methods in the paper.     

Comments on “An analysis of the international tourism demand in Spain” by P. González and P. Moral

Although the state-space, unobserved component approach to forecasting has many advantages, it must be applied carefully in practice and should not be used in an uncritical, ‘black box’ fashion. In particular, such an approach to the modelling and forecasting of Spanish tourism data is inappropriate and leads to misleading conclusions, particularly in relation to the uncritical selection and use of explanatory regression variables.