论社会主义市场经济与社会主义和谐社会的构建

社会和谐是中国特色社会主义的本质属性,反映了建设富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家的内在要求。胡锦涛同志在党的十七大报告中郑重地提出促进社会和谐、建设和谐社会的任务。按照党的十六届六中全会精神,社会主义和谐社会的构建必须继续坚持社会主义市场经济的改革方向,不断完善市场经济体制。本文从经济学的角度就市场经济对社会主义和谐社会的构建作用谈一点认识。     

Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies

We prove that every compactly generated non-transferable utility (NTU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. The set of Walrasian payoff vectors for our induced coalition production economy coincides with the inner core of the balanced cover of the original game. This equivalence depends heavily on our representation. We exemplify that this equivalence need not hold in other representations. We also give a sufficient condition for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium for our induced coalition production economy.     

On the robustness of the competitive equilibrium: Utility-improvements and equilibrium points

We show that the set of competitive equilibrium points of a pure exchange economy are the equilibrium points of a broader class of better-response demands than the usual utility-maximizing demand functions. The better-response demands are derived from assigning weights to all commodity bundles with higher utility than the current commodity bundle, with the greatest weights being placed on the commodity bundles with the highest utility gain. The usual utility-maximizing demand functions are then those in which the weight on the utility-maximizing bundle is one. We also show that these better-response demands belong to a large class of response maps that are generated by monotonic transformations of the utility functions and/or monotonic transformations of the weights assigned to the commodity bundles.     

Endowment-regarding preferences

We consider a general equilibrium model of pure exchange economies with endowment externalities. Consumers’ behaviors depend not only on their own consumption but also on the endowments of the other consumers. Applying the same method of analysis in Balasko (2015) about wealth concerns, we first show that almost all properties of equilibrium, including smooth equilibrium manifold and genericity of regular economies, can be directly extended to the economy where the demand function depends on the endowments of others and wealth of only one consumer. Next, we clarify the sufficient conditions under which those properties remain true in the economy with the most general form of endowment externalities. Finally, we generalize the above sufficient conditions to derive generic regularity results in the economy with both consumption and endowment externalities.     

Perturbed utility and general equilibrium analysis

We study general equilibrium theory of complete markets in an otherwise standard economy with each household having an additive perturbed utility function. Since this function represents a type of stochastic choice theory, the equilibrium of the corresponding economy is defined to be a price vector that makes its mean expected demand equal its mean endowment. We begin with a study of the economic meaning of this notion, by showing that at any given price vector, there always exists an economy with deterministic utilities whose mean demand is just the mean expected demand of our economy with additive perturbed utilities. We then show the existence of equilibrium, its Pareto inefficiency, and the upper hemi-continuity of the equilibrium set correspondence. Specializing to the case of regular economies, we finally demonstrate that almost every economy is regular and the equilibrium set correspondence in this regular case is continuous and locally constant.     

Core and competitive equilibria of a coalitional exchange economy with infinite time horizon

The core and competitive equilibria of a large exchange economy on the commodity space ?^∞${?}^{\infty }$ will be discussed. We define the economy as a measure on the space of consumers’ characteristics following Hart and Kohlberg (1974), and prove the existence of competitive equilibria and their equivalence with the core without assuming the convexity of preferences.     

Replica core equivalence theorem: An extension of the Debreu–Scarf limit theorem to double infinity monetary economies

An overlapping generations model with the double infinity of commodities and agents is the most fundamental framework to introduce outside money into a static economic model. In this model, competitive equilibria may not necessarily be Pareto-optimal. Although Samuelson (1958) emphasized the role of fiat money as a certain kind of social contract, we cannot characterize it as a cooperative game-theoretic solution like the core. In this paper, we obtained a finite replica core characterization of Walrasian equilibrium allocations under non-negative wealth transfer and a core-limit characterization of Samuelson’s social contrivance of money. Preferences are not necessarily assumed to be ordered.     

Representation of transferable utility games by coalition production economies

We prove that, by the method of construction of a coalition production economy due to Sun et al. [Sun, N., Trockel, W., Yang, Z., 2008. Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n$n$-person game. Journal of Mathematical Economics 44, 853–860], every transferable utility (TU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. Namely, for every TU game, we can construct a coalition production economy that generates the given game. We briefly discuss the relationship between the core of a given TU game and the set of Walrasian payoff vectors for the induced coalition production economy.     

THE FUTURE OF MARKETS

In the 2009 Wincott Lecture, the author argues that in their approach to markets, economic researchers and policy-makers have focused too much on the role of prices as signals to guide resource allocation, at the expense of two possibly more important elements – markets as a process of discovery and markets as a mechanism for the diffusion of political and economic power. Government policies should support the market rather than particular industries, promote competition not concentration, and facilitate entry, not confer advantages on existing firms.     

The political economy of environmental and social security policies: the role of environmental lobbying

Social security provides retirement benefits to the old at the expense of the working young, while environmental investment benefits the future of the young at the expense of the old. This paper presents a model incorporating this intergenerational conflict on public spending and considers the political determination of environmental investment and social security by focusing on the Markovian political equilibria. It is shown that (1) the political equilibria are generally inefficient, and (2) the introduction of environmental lobbying into politics may improve environmental quality but degrade lifetime utility in the long run.      

Chamberlinian Spatial Computable General Equilibrium Modelling: A Theoretical Framework

In this paper, a multi-regional multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium model is developed by bringing together different strands of theoretical reasoning. These are as follows: input–output analysis, gravity modelling, the theory of intra-industry trade and the theory of general equilibrium under conditions of monopolistic competition. The innovation in this approach is the assumption that, within each sector, a large number of different brands of output are produced. Households like diversity of consumption and diversity of inputs is a productive factor for firms. The number of brands produced in each sector and region is endogenous. A certain amount of fixed costs per brand imposes an upper bound on the number of available brands. Factor markets are perfectly competitive, while monopolistic competition prevails on goods markets. The equilibrium solution of the model closely resembles models which have been applied on an ad hoc basis in regional science before, but it is well founded in modern economic theory now. In particular, trade flows obey a gravity law in equilibrium.     

审计风险的博弈论模型

关于审计风险存在两种传统的理论:“风险分析理论”与“审计建模理论”,这两种理论都局限于静态分析,这种静态分析存在明显的理论缺陷。本文试图从博弈论的角度,通过分析审计师与经理层两者的互动结构,构建更为全面的审计风险分析模型,丰富和完善审计风险理论,为审计理论与实践提供更为新颖的视角。     

Large economies and two-player games

We characterize the core and the competitive allocations of a continuum economy as strong Nash equilibria of an associated game with only two players.     

Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

This paper makes the observation that a finite Bayesian game with diffused and disparate private information can be conceived of as a large game with a non-atomic continuum of players. By using this observation as its methodological point of departure, it shows that (i) a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE) exists in a finite Bayesian game with private information if and only if a Nash equilibrium exists in the induced large game, and (ii) both Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal BNE exist in finite Bayesian games with private information. In particular, it shows these results to be a direct consequence of results for a version of a large game re-modeled for situations where different players may have different action sets.     

基于博弈论的供应链价格与质量决策问题研究

文章建立了一个由单制造商与单零售商组成的两级供应链模型。在完全信息静态博弈、完全信息动态博弈与供应链协同合作三种情况下,分析了供应链的价格一质量均衡：研究发现,在非合作博弈下,制造商与零售商更倾向于完全信息动态博弈：在协同合作情况下．供应链能取得比非合作情况下更大的利润。文章使用Rubinstein讨价还价模型对增加的利润进行了分配。     

瓶颈道路使用收费理论及模型

拥挤道路使用收费作为现代城市交通需求管理的有效措施在理论上和实践上都具有十分重要的意义。文中以经典瓶颈模型为基础,首先在固定用户情况下讨论了不收费平衡;进而讨论了用户有需求,容量任意情况下的不收费平衡和收费平衡;最后讨论了用户有需求,容量最优情况下的收费平衡和不收费平衡,这对进一步研究道路使用收费有一定的借鉴意义。     

城市经济发展中特色经济与集群经济的关系--兼论城市园区经济建设

特色经济与集群经济现在是城市经济发展过程中两个彰显的概念,二者从不同角度阐释了城市经济发展的基本要求.特色经济反映的是城市经济的质,而集群经济反映的是城市经济的量.没有特色的城市经济缺乏活力和竞争力,没有集群的特色经济则对城市经济的带动作用就微乎其微.二者的有机统一才是最具活力和竞争力的城市经济单元.