Are hedge funds' charitable donations strategic?

We study whether hedge funds make charitable donations to further their business interests. We find that donations are driven by poor fund flows and performance. Post-donation, donor funds experience lower outflows compared to matched non-donors. One-off donations and donations to charities which hold fundraising events catering to the hedge fund community are more likely to mitigate outflows after poor performance. These findings are consistent with strategic motivations driving at least some donations. While the economics of donations initially appear quite favorable to the hedge funds, the benefits from donations are not scalable. Moreover, investors punish donors through greater redemptions if poor performance persists post-donation.     

Do oil futures prices predict stock returns?

This paper explores stock return predictability by exploiting the cross-section of oil futures prices. Motivated by the principal component analysis, we find the curvature factor of the oil futures curve predicts monthly stock returns: a 1% per month increase in the curvature factor predicts 0.4% per month decrease in stock market index return. This predictive pattern is prevailing in non-oil industry portfolios, but is absent for oil-related portfolios. The in- and out-of-sample predictive power of the curvature factor for non-oil stocks is robust and outperforms many other predictors, including oil spot prices. The predictive power of the curvature factor comes from its ability to forecast supply-side oil shocks, which only affect non-oil stocks and are hedged by oil-related stocks.     

Do fear indices help predict stock returns?

This study investigates the forecasting power of implied volatility indices on forward looking returns. Prior studies document that negative innovations to returns are associated with increasing implied volatility of the underlying indices; thus, suggesting a possible relationship between extremely high levels of implied volatility and positive short term returns. We investigate this issue by examining the predictive power of three implied volatility indices, VIX, VXN and VDAX, on the underlying index returns. We extend previous research by also focusing on characterised selected stocks and examine the relationship between implied volatility indices and future returns across different sectors and classified portfolios. Our findings suggest that implied volatility indices are good predictors of 20-days and 60-days forward looking returns and illustrate insignificant predictive power for very short term (1-day and 5-days) returns.     

Do hedge funds dynamically manage systematic risk?

Defining systematic risk management (SRM) skill as persistently low fund systematic risk, we find evidence of time varying allocation of hedge fund management effort across the business cycle. In weak market states, skilled managers focus on minimization of systematic risk via dynamic reallocations across asset classes at the cost of fund alpha and foregoing market timing opportunities. As markets strengthen, attention shifts to asset selection within consistent asset classes. The superior performance of low systematic risk funds previously documented arises due to the superior asset selection ability of managers in strong market states. Incremental allocations by investors arise due to this superior performance and not due to recognition of SRM skill.     

Does long-term disequilibrium in stock price predict future returns?

We propose a trading strategy based on error correction term (ECT), the residuals from the cointegration relation between the levels of security and the market portfolio. We find that buying stocks in the top 10 % ECT and selling stocks in the bottom 10 % ECT generates 1.09 % a month for 6-month holding period over 1965–2005. The monthly return increases to 1.57 % when the above trading strategy is applied to stocks with insignificant cointegration with the market portfolio. This profit is robust to three and four factor models. Moreover, this profit is neither driven by small and illiquid stocks nor is the result of any inherent positive serial correlation.     

Can margin traders predict future stock returns in Japan?

A growing body of literature suggests that investor sentiment affects stock prices both at the firm level and at the market level. This study examines the relationship between investor behavior and stock returns focusing on Japanese margin transactions using weekly data from 1994 to 2003. Margin trading is dominated by individual investors in Japan. In analysis at the firm level, we find a significant cross-sectional relationship between margin buying and stock returns. Both market-level and firm-level analyses show that margin buying traders follow herding behavior. They seem to follow positive feedback trading behavior for small-firm stocks and negative feedback trading behavior for large firm stocks. Our results show that information about margin buying helps predict future stock returns, especially for small-firm stocks at short horizons. The predictive power does not diminish even after controlling for firm size and liquidity.     

Do option open-interest changes foreshadow future equity returns?

Recent work considers whether information is simultaneously reflected in both option and equity markets. We provide new evidence supporting Black’s (Financ. Anal. J. 31:36–72, 1975) conjecture that information is first revealed in option markets. Specifically, changes in call and put open-interest levels have predictive power for future equity returns. Large increases in call open interest are followed by significantly increased equity returns. Put open-interest increases precede weaker future returns, but the relationship is considerably less pronounced in the presence of certain controls. The recent change in the call-to-put open-interest ratio has predictive power as to equity returns over the following week, even after controlling for numerous factors.     

Do risk management practices work? Evidence from hedge funds

We examine hedge fund risk management practices and their association with left-tail risk during the 2008 financial crisis. Consistent with risk management practices reducing left-tail risk, funds in our sample that use formal risk models performed significantly better in the extreme down months of 2008. We find no evidence that having either position limits or a dedicated head of risk management is associated with reduced left-tail risk. Funds employing value at risk models had more accurate expectations of how they would perform in a short-term equity bear market.     

The output gap and stock returns: Do cyclical fluctuations predict portfolio returns?

This study examines whether the output gap leads portfolio stock returns. The paper conducts in-sample and out-of-sample forecasting of US stock portfolios formed on the basis of size and value. First, the paper finds cross-sectional portfolios are predictable in-sample by the output gap. Out-of-sample evidence is weaker but still generally supports the finding that the historical average benchmark can be beaten. Secondly and most importantly, we find mixed evidence that the Fama–French factor mimicking portfolios can be forecasted by the output gap. In particular, there is some out-of-sample predictability of the size effect (SMB) suggesting this lags the output gap. However, the output gap, a key business cycle indicator, cannot predict the value effect (HML) either in-sample or out-of-sample. Our results add to the prior literature which finds that the factor mimicking returns are related contemporaneously (Petkova and Zhang, 2005) or lead (Liew and Vassalou, 2000) economic indicators.     

Do political factors affect stock returns during presidential elections?

This study investigates whether or not political factors such as government policy and political connections affected stock returns during the 2008 Taiwanese presidential election. We find that firms that benefitted from (were threatened by) the proposed Three-Links policy of the winning party experienced positive (negative) stock returns during the election. We use the sensitivities of firms’ returns to bilateral trade flows between Taiwan and China to measure the government-policy effect. Our results show that the effects of political connections weakly exist, but they become more significant when the support ratio of the winning party increased in polling data. We also find that only the government-policy effect holds for different crash-risk and corporate-governance levels. Finally, investment strategies based on both political factors can generate positive abnormal returns with respect to the Fama-French Three-factor Model.     

Do emerging markets with consistent returns have better future performance?

Using monthly data for 25 emerging markets around the world, it is found that emerging markets with recently consistent stock returns tend to have future returns that continue in the same direction. The effects are long-lived for negative consistency, and imply that capital flows are much more sensitive to market downturns than market upturns. Additionally, the longer a market has had consistently negative (positive) stock returns, the more negative (positive) are future returns. These results serve as confirmation that the consistency effects of Grinblatt and Moskowitz [J. Finan. Econ., 2004 Grinblatt, M and Moskowitz, T. 2004. Predicting stock price movements from the pattern of past returns. J. Finan. Econ., 71: 541–579. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], forthcoming] and Watkins [J. Behav. Finan., 2003 Watkins, B. 2003. Riding the wave of investor sentiment: an analysis of consistency as a predictor of future stock returns. J. Behav. Finan., 4: 1–32.  [Google Scholar], 4, 1–32] exist in emerging markets around the world.     

Does cash flow predict returns?

In this paper, we propose the hypothesis that cash flow and cash flow volatility predict returns. We categorize firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange into sectors, and apply tests for both in-sample and out-of-sample predictability. While we find strong evidence that cash flow volatility predicts returns for all sectors, the evidence obtained when using cash flow as a predictor is relatively weak. Estimated profits and utility gains also suggest that it is cash flow volatility that is more relevant as a source of information than cash flow.     

Do dividend changes predict the future profitability of firms?

Many previous studies have been conducted to test whether corporate dividend changes predict the future profitability of firms. While the debate continues, we assess the information content of dividends (ICD) hypothesis in the Korean market as it provides an interesting experimental setting for testing the hypothesis in the context of corporate governance. We find that it is difficult to support the ICD hypothesis if one accepts nonlinear patterns in earnings. However, when we divide the sample in terms of Chaebol vs. non‐Chaebol and high‐growth vs. low‐growth firms, we find that the ICD hypothesis becomes valid, especially for non‐Chaebol firms and for low‐growth firms. Therefore, we suggest that the validity of the ICD hypothesis may be dependent on firm characteristics such as the corporate governance structure and growth stage.     

Should hedge funds be cautious reporting high returns?

In a recent article, Schuster and Auer (2012) show that fund managers with a certain positive performance need to be aware of the fact that too high prospective excess returns can lower the empirical Sharpe ratio of their funds. In this note, we investigate the empirical relevance of this effect. We analyse whether hedge funds being evaluated on the basis of the Sharpe ratio negatively influence their performance by reporting too high returns. Our results show that a economically significant number of hedge funds listed in the CISDM hedge fund database has at least once reported a high return causing this effect.     

Does investor recognition predict returns?

Merton [1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42, 483–510] shows that stocks about which not all investors are informed should yield a return premium. This premium depends on the shadow cost of incomplete information which in turn depends on the shareholder base, relative market size, and idiosyncratic risk. Utilizing a comprehensive database of Swedish shareholdings, we demonstrate that stock returns are positively related to the shadow cost. We also find that the shareholder base is negatively related to returns when controlling for size and idiosyncratic risk. Zero-cost portfolios based on the shadow cost/shareholder base yield substantial trading profits that are never positively correlated with the market and are only modestly explained by the four-factor model.     

Do risk exposures explain accounting anomalies? A new testing method

I quantitatively evaluate how much of the cross-sectional return predictive ability of a range of accounting anomalies can be attributed to firm-specific stock return covariances with market risk factors. Using a novel two-step regression-based testing method, I find robust evidence that the risk factor exposures do not explain a meaningful fraction of the time-series variations in the return predictive coefficients of the anomaly variables. Out-of-sample tests further confirm that it is the mispricing component of the accounting anomalies that is mainly responsible for the return predictability.     

When does investor sentiment predict stock returns?

We examine the asymmetry in the predictive power of investor sentiment in the cross-section of stock returns across economic expansion and recession states. We test the implication of behavioral theories and evidence that the return predictability of sentiment should be most pronounced in an expansion state when investors' optimism increases. We segregate economic states according to the NBER business cycles and further implement a multivariate Markov-switching model to capture the unobservable dynamics of the changes in the economic regime. The evidence suggests that only in the expansion state does sentiment perform both in-sample and out-of-sample predictive power for the returns of portfolio formed on size, book-to-market equity ratio, dividend yield, earnings-to-price ratio, age, return volatility, asset tangibility, growth opportunities, and 11 widely documented anomalies. In a recession state, however, the predictive power of sentiment is generally insignificant.     

Do firms lease to hedge? CEO risk-taking and operating lease intensity

Operating leases are used extensively for financing, but their ability to separate ownership and use also creates hedging opportunities. We investigate whether firms recognize such opportunities by examining the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) risk-taking incentives and the use of operating leases. Consistent with firms using operating leases to hedge, we find higher CEO risk-taking incentives lower operating lease intensity. To address endogeneity, we use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R as an exogenous shock to option compensation, dynamic panel generalized method of moments, simultaneous equations, and change regressions. Our results are robust to placebo and alternative tests.     

Does acquirer cash level predict post-acquisition returns?

This paper investigates whether an acquirer’s pre-announcement cash level can predict post-acquisition returns. Harford (1999, Journal of Finance, 54, 1969–1997) shows that some cash-rich acquirers have lower announcement period returns than other acquirers, suggesting the market partially anticipates poor future performance. This paper shows that the acquirer’s cash level is also strongly and negatively predictive of post-acquisition returns, indicating that the announcement response is incomplete. Post-acquisition return on net operating assets (RNOA) is significantly decreasing in acquirer cash, suggesting that the market responds to subsequent poor operating performance as it is reported. Overall, these results are consistent with the market’s inattention to a less prominent accounting signal (acquirer cash) but attentiveness to a more prominent accounting signal (RNOA), as proposed by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003, Journal of Accounting Economics, 36, 337–386).