产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策——基于古诺双寡头垄断模型的分析

20世纪60年代以后,学者研究发现,传统的贸易理论无法解释大量工业化国家之间的贸易,从而使产业内贸易的研究成为国际贸易的核心问题之一。本文建立古诺双寡头垄断模型对同质产品产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策进行了博弈分析,通过研究发现：寡头垄断企业之间即使在比较优势和报酬递增都不存在的条件下也会互相向对方市场销售商品;追求社会福利最大化的政府很容易陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境,从而导致双方社会福利恶化。本文认为,政府之间应该加强交往,深化合作,通过谈判解决贸易争端,避免陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境。     

Proto-coalition bargaining and the core

In the proto-coalition model of government formation, formateur F appoints a proto-coalition and asks its members whether to start negotiating a coalition contract. If all accept, then the proto-coalition forms and starts negotiating; otherwise, a caretaker government assumes office. I extend this model by allowing F to revise the chosen proto-coalition after rejections, that he states pre-conditions for the subsequent negotiations, and that F??s opponents may publicly pre-commit to accept/reject certain proposals. The set of equilibrium outcomes is identified as the core if F??s opponents can pre-commit and as the convex hull of the core if they cannot pre-commit credibly. This extended model eliminates two flaws of the standard model: it explains why F cannot always install his favored coalition (whatever the status quo) and why ??important?? coalition members may have more bargaining power in the subsequent negotiations than others.     

“快速通关”贸易促进效应的实证分析

在低关税的时代,快速通关很可能是打破贸易壁垒,推动国际贸易发展的重要手段。文章从四个方面总结了快速通关对国际贸易的影响机制,并基于2008-2010年113个国家相互之间的出口数据,使用 Heckman两步选择模型进行了实证研究。结果显示,快速通关对贸易参与和贸易规模都有着显著的促进作用,从多个角度进行稳健性检验后,该结论依然成立。快速通关可以通过需求偏好效应、成本效应与全球化生产网络效应和遏制日益强化的非关税贸易壁垒的负面效应,使得多边谈判所形成的关税降低的效应得以真正发挥。此外,文章还发现,自由贸易协定的建立,提升了通关效率与边境管理的透明度,进而提高了国家间的贸易量。文章的研究结论对于理解目前中国建立自由贸易区以及实施在贸易谈判中主导快速通关的措施或建立条款,打破技术贸易壁垒具有重要的意义。     

“GATT‐think” with Asymmetric Countries*

We argue that a trade agreement which conforms to GATT’s reciprocity rule benefits the (stronger) less trade‐dependent country at the expense of the (weaker) more trade‐dependent country. Reciprocity is so unfavorable to the weaker country that it may be worse off under reciprocity than under the Nash‐ bargaining solution, a “power‐based” approach to trade negotiations that reflects power asymmetries among trading partners. Our results question Bagwell and Staiger’s (1999 , 2000 ) view of reciprocity as a rule that “serves to mitigate the influence of power asymmetries on negotiated outcomes.”     

International trade and competitiveness

We analyze the role of international market size differences in determining the investment in process R&D (and thus firms?? competitiveness) in a trade model with oligopolistic market structure, non-homothetic production technology and costly trade. We show that the R&D effort is higher (or even disproportionately so) for firms in the larger market, which causes endogenous asymmetries across countries. As a result, firms in the larger market have higher competitiveness, which increases their market shares in international markets. Furthermore, and contrary to what is predicted by Krugman (Am Econ Rev 70:950?C959, 1980) ??home market effect??, in equilibrium the larger country does not need to host a disproportionately higher share of the world??s industry than of the world??s demand. Despite this, the larger country can still continue to run a trade surplus in the oligopolistic sector, since it hosts firms with higher competitiveness than firms in the smaller country.     

The domestic politics of financial regulation: Informal ratification games and the EU capital requirement negotiations

This paper contributes to our understanding of post-crisis financial regulation by reasserting the centrality of domestic politics in defining government preferences and explaining regulatory outcomes. It draws on Robert Putnam's two-level game approach and Foreign Policy Analysis to develop a model of a three-level informal ratification game. This adds value to existing approaches by capturing the contested nature of government preferences and delineating the causal mechanisms through which domestic groups shape international negotiations. The model is used to explain the UK's pivotal role in the reform of bank capital requirements in the European Union (EU). It demonstrates that governments are able to take advantage of a narrowing domestic ‘win-set’ by marginalising the influence of industry and building political momentum for regulatory reform. In particular, the paper shows how UK negotiators were able to exploit the increased domestic costs of agreement and synergistic strategies between negotiations to successfully oppose the maximum harmonisation of capital rules across the EU.     

Heterogeneous trade agreements,WTO membership and international trade: an analysis using matching econometrics

This article explores the heterogeneous effects of trade agreements (TAs) and World Trade Organization (WTO) membership on the volume of international trade. We extend Baier and Bergstrand’s (2009a) application of matching econometrics by distinguishing between different types of TAs and WTO participation and account for the endogenous nature of trade policy. For a panel data set covering 1960–2005 and 187 countries, we find that the treatment effect on international trade systematically varies with the type of TA and WTO membership.     

Abenomics and Japan's Trade Policy in a New Era

Trade policy, in particular, the Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), has been a centerpiece of the Abe administration's economic strategy. The TPP's contributions to Japan's growth strategy include: (i) creating trade and investment opportunities abroad for Japanese companies through ambitious liberalization targets; (ii) advancing domestic reforms – with the largest service and agricultural liberalization commitments to date; and (iii) increasing bargaining leverage in other trade negotiations. But the domestic reform goals of Abenomics in agriculture have come up short due to opposition from domestic lobbies. American trade politics – which culminated in the US withdrawal from the TPP – have upended the goals of trade policy under Abenomics. Japan's best option in this new environment is to deliver on high quality, multi‐party trade agreements: concluding negotiations with Europe; scaling up the ambition of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership; and salvaging a TPP 11. The merits of a bilateral free trade agreement with the USA will depend on how the Trump administration operationalizes its America First policy.     

Why is China a Reluctant Leader of the World Trade Organization?

ABSTRACT

China has drawn massive benefits via expanded trade since it acceded to the WTO in 2001. We might therefore reasonably expect it to have taken a more assertive lead in trying to rectify the travails in which the organisation finds itself mired, attendant with its rising power status, its active trade diplomacy elsewhere, the high levels of relative gains it has enjoyed since becoming a member, and its broader trade dependency. That China has not done so represents a puzzle, which is usually answered with reference to the international picture: i.e. that global trade has appeared to be holding up reasonably well throughout and beyond the global crisis, and, despite some inchoate protectionism, there generally exists a broad commitment to an open trading regime. Yet this only tells part of the story: China’s approach cannot simply be ‘read off’ from the structural context and there are, in fact, a series of interesting domestic explanations for why China has remained a ‘reluctant leader’ of the WTO too. On the basis of a series of interviews with Chinese experts, we offer a more complete account of these processes that better recognises patterns of agency, and how China navigates a contingent international order.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Regulation on International Transportation

Incorporating pollution emissions from international transportation into a model of strategic trade and environmental policies, we investigate the effect of trade liberalization and environmental regulation on national welfare and the environment. Our model includes imperfectly competitive markets for international transportation and final products. We find that trade liberalization may reduce each country's welfare unless some level of environmental regulation on international transportation is in place. When international trade is liberalized initially, a mutual increase in the common emission tax rates may improve each country's welfare. However, when international trade is highly protected initially, imposing an emission tax may reduce welfare.     

State Trading Enterprises as an Impediment to Improved Market Access: The Case of the Korean Rice Market

The trade and welfare effects of tariffs are well known. Less well known, and more difficult to analyze, are the economic effects of state trading enterprises (STEs). Despite STEs in importing countries having the potential to limit market access, they are no longer on the agriculture agenda in the Doha Round Negotiations in the WTO, because some Members have asserted that importing STEs do not distort international trade. We evaluate this assertion through the use of a theoretical model of an STE, which is calibrated to data for the Korean rice market. We show that this STE does distort international trade by restricting market access relative to a Cournot benchmark, and that it affects the domestic and international distribution of social welfare. This finding permits the conclusion that an important opportunity is being missed in the negotiations to improve market access, because importing STEs are not on the agenda.     

Schelling's spatial proximity model of segregation revisited

Schelling [Schelling, T.C., 1969. Models of Segregation. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 59, 488-493, Schelling, T.C., 1971a. Dynamic Models of Segregation. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 1 (2), 143–186, Schelling, T.C., 1971b. On the Ecology of Micromotives. The Public Interest, 25, 61–98, Schelling, T.C., 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton.] presented a microeconomic model showing how an integrated city could unravel to a rather segregated city, notwithstanding relatively mild assumptions concerning the individual agents' preferences, i.e., no agent preferring the resulting segregation. We examine the robustness of Schelling's model, focusing in particular on its driving force: the individual preferences. We show that even if all individual agents have a strict preference for perfect integration, best-response dynamics may lead to segregation. This raises some doubts on the ability of public policies to generate integration through the promotion of openness and tolerance with respect to diversity. We also argue that the one-dimensional and two-dimensional versions of Schelling's spatial proximity model are in fact two qualitatively very different models of segregation.     

Modeling Distribution Services and Assessing Their Welfare Effects in a General Equilibrium Framework

Most international trade models fail to account for the fact that almost all goods must pass through the distribution sector. The authors compare different approaches to modeling distribution within an Applied General Equilibrium framework and find that such modeling may significantly affect trade opening simulations. They also predict large potential gains from streamlining distribution. For instance, a 10% reduction in Japan's final goods distribution margins would benefit it as much as worldwide free trade would. They also find that, compared to trade opening, reducing margins leads to smaller inter‐sectoral production shifts and thus may engender less political opposition.     

Preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy

In this paper we analyze the effect of the freedom to pursue preferential trade liberalization, permitted by Article XXIV of the GATT, on country׳s incentives to participate in multilateral negotiations and on feasibility of global free trade. We present a model, in which countries choose whether to participate in preferential or multilateral trade agreements under political pressures from domestic special interest groups. We show that heterogeneity in political preferences across countries plays an important role in determining the relative merits of preferential and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization. On one hand, the opportunity to liberalize preferentially may be necessary to induce countries with strong political motivations to participate in multilateral free trade negotiations. On the other hand, when countries share similar political preferences, multilateral free trade that would have been politically supported otherwise becomes unattainable if countries can pursue preferential liberalization.     

Trade Distorting Private Restraints and Market Access: Learning to Walk Before We Run

The absence of domestic competition laws in some nations, the weak enforcement of existing competition laws in other nations, and the inability of competition lawenforcement authorities to exchange confidential information, collectively permit the continued existence of private restraints which have the potential to seriously undermine the trade liberalization gains that have been achieved through successive rounds of GATT negotiations. This paper advocates a two-track approach to addressing this problem, by (i) pursuing practical results through increased bilateral cooperation and the promotion of minimum standards in the short to mid-term, while, at the same time, (ii) continuing to pursue a second track of attempting, over the mid to long-term, to achieve a multilateral dispute settlement mechanism, and perhaps even a multilateral code for private restraints which have an international dimension. In the authors' view, pursuit of the more modest initiatives contemplated by the first track should have a boot-strapping effect on the second track, in terms of substantially moving forward the time at which an international dispute settlement mechanism and an international competition law code for cross-border restraints may become politically possible, and ultimately, a reality. The paper further suggests that a multilateral framework for addressing anti-competitive restraints is preferable to (i) the piece-meal approach that is likely to develop in the absence of such a framework, and (ii) the use of negative-sum unilateral tools such as trade sanctions or the extra-territorial exercise of domestic competition laws.     

Trade in Environmental Goods: Evidences from an Analysis Using Elasticities of Trade Costs

Negotiations on the liberalization of environmental goods (EGs) and services within the WTO Doha Round (mandated in November 2001) are facing specific challenges. Conflicting interests and differing perceptions of the benefits of increased trade in EGs were reflected in different approaches proposed for determining EGs. Using import data of 34 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries and from a sample of 167 countries, from 1995 to 2012, we discuss the trade effect of reducing barriers on EGs. We analyze the lists of EGs proposed by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and OECD using a Translog gravity model. We found that removing tariff barriers for EGs will have a modest impact because for the biggest importers and exporters, elasticities of trade costs are very low while for most trading relationships they are very high, making it difficult for exporters to maintain their markets. Overall, our results suggest that, because of their substantial effect on international trade, future negotiations on EGs should also address the issues of standards and nontariff barriers.     

The state's role and position in international trade: A complex network perspective

Based on statistical physics and graph theory, the research paradigm of a complex network, which has sprung up in the last decade, provides us with new global perspective to discuss the topic of international trade. In this paper, we engage in the issue of countries' roles and positions in international trade using the latest complex network theories. On a mid-level structure, countries are classified into three communities that reflect the structure of the “core/periphery” using the weighted extremal optimisation algorithm and the coarse graining process. On a micro-level, countries' rankings are provided with the aid of network's node centralities, which presents world trade as a closed, imbalanced, diversified and multi-polar development. Further, we firstly introduce the improved bootstrap percolation to simulate cascading influences following the breaking down of bilateral trade relations. We find that the breakdown of EU's export relations can more easily form a cascading reaction, which would result in a global collapse of world trade. All the results highlight the important positions of the EU, USA and Japan in the international trade system, which plays a positive role in promoting the world economy.     

The effects of tariffs on coalition formation in a dynamic global warming game

The prospects for cooperation on climate protection beyond 2012 are currently uncertain. Thus policy instruments which foster participation in International Environmental Agreements (IEA) are in demand. Among the instruments under discussion are trade sanctions. Multi-region optimal growth models are a state of the art tool for integrated assessment, but introducing trade sanctions distorts the competitive equilibrium, making it difficult to compute numerically. We introduce trade and trade sanctions into a model of coalition stability to assess the potential of trade sanctions to support an IEA. Trade is modeled by having all countries produce a generic output good, but adopting national product differentiation (Armington assumption). Coalitions are free to impose tariffs on imports from non-cooperating countries. We solve the model numerically using a refined version of Negishi's [Negishi, T., 1960. Welfare economics and existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Metroeconomica 12, 92–97] basic algorithm. We then apply the model to analyze the influence of tariffs on international cooperation. The model suggests that there is indeed a significant potential to raise participation through trade sanctions, even when goods from different countries are nearly perfect substitutes. Furthermore we investigate the effect of trade sanctions on global welfare, environmental effectiveness, and the credibility of the tariff mechanism.     

The incidence of,and returns to overeducation in the UK

Drawing on German data we look for evidence of a supply-side political business cycle. The hypothesis suggests that centralized trade unions with political interests and some degree of monopoly power may fine-tune their collective wage bargaining strategies so as to help preferred or to harm rejected parties in power. The regression results confirm that between 1960 and 1988 German trade unions exercised additional wage pressure before general elections under a Christian Democratic incumbent drew closer, trade unions pursued a restrictive wage policy to promote the government' chances for re-election.     

Human Capital,Technology, and Specialization: A Comparison of Developed and Developing Countries

GDP GDP function framework, and apply it to panel data. We find that factor supplies and openness to trade are important factors influencing the structure of production, but we also uncover interesting differences in results across output sectors and groups of countries. In addition, we find evidence that Hicks-neutral technological differences do not affect specialization. Finally, our results on the effect of openness highlight the sources of conflicts between developed and developing countries in multilateral trade negotiations. Received April 18, 2000; revised version received January 8, 2001