浅谈证券投资顾问业务

对于证券公司来说,作为其主要收入来源的经纪业务,佣金价格竞争已经到了白热化程度,因此,发展证券投资顾问业务、提升服务质量成为生存和发展的必由之路.本文介绍了证券投资顾问业务的含义及其在国外的形态,分析了这项业务在我国发展的现状,提出存在的问题及建议.     

保险资金入市的投资风险及监管

本文分析了保险资金在证券市场投资风险的一般性和目前保险公司存在的投资风险,并从宏观和微观两个方面提出了相应的监管措施。     

论计算智能在证券投资组合中的作用

首先介绍了Markowitz的证券组合理论，其次，介绍了计算智能的主要研究对象，包括人工神经网络、遗传算法、模糊逻辑的特点及在证券投资组合中的应用，提出来将三者结合起来，从而实现优势互补。     

保险资金在证券市场中的投资风险与监管

风险管理是保险公司经营管理中的重要组成部分。文章分析了保险资金在证券市场中的投资风险 ,提出了对保险资金风险的监管对策。     

浅析企业投资风险的防范

市场经济是风险经济,企业的生产和经营活动存在着风险,投资活动也不例外。企业投资是以预期收益为目的的,所以回避风险、趋利避害是必然之行为。文章主要从生产性投资风险和证券投资风险入手,就其防范方法进行了分析。     

论证券投资风险

本文明确了证券投资风险的涵义及其特征,阐述了证券投资面临的主要风险;并剖析了导致证券投资风险的诸多因素,提出了防范证券投资风险的具体措施。     

欧盟反倾销对中国欧盟市场投资准入的意义

欧盟对华商品持续反倾销表明,劳动密集型的输欧产品在体现中国出口贸易比较优势的同时,并未反映出中欧要素禀赋差异。欧盟利用其单方面的“定价”机制,自由裁定中国企业的倾销问题,进而以此阻止后者对工多盟市场的准入。中欧反倾销之争说明,变商品准入为投资准入已是中国企业进军欧盟市场不可回避的新课题。     

公司证券投资总风险的分析

公司证券投资的总风险，是公司特别风险和市场风险的组合。总风险并不是市场风险和个别股票风险的简单叠加，而是依据几何定理计算得出的综合数。在市场风险一定的情况下，通过购买多种股票进行分散投资，可降低公司总风险。在公司特别风险一定的情况下，可以优选组合降低公司所承受的市场风险，达到降低公司总风险的目的。     

中国与中亚五国双边投资条约准入规则研究——以中国的立场为出发点

在国际投资条约中,投资准入规则是平衡国家经济监管权和开放投资义务之间最重要的砝码,核心内容是准入阶段的外资待遇标准。中国与中亚五国双边投资条约准入规则,在"符合东道国法律"要求的基础上,经历了从准入阶段给予外资公平待遇到最惠国待遇的发展。从中国的立场出发,中国与中亚五国未来准入规则的选择,将主要取决于双方的投资经贸关系,中国经济现状和发展预期,以及中国在该区域经济政策的取向三大因素。     

Access Pricing under Rate-of-Return Regulation

Third-party access to major infrastructure facilities is a key component of National Competition Policy. In many situations, both through state regimes and access undertakings under the new part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act, access will be governed by explicit or implicit rate-of-return procedures. Infrastructure assets will be valued and translated into an allowable return for the owners. However, setting allowed returns is only the first part of the regulatory process. This paper uses a simple model to evaluate the 'second-best' access prices under rate-of-return regulation. We show that optimal access prices will depend on the degree of downstream competition. With imperfect price competition and fixed numbers of firms downstream, optimal access prices will 'mimic' downstream competition and reduce downstream profits. With free entry downstream, optimal access pricing should determine an optimal level of downstream participation. We also show that the access provider's incentives to introduce optimal access prices will depend on the degree of vertical integration.     

论瓶颈垄断下的接入规制

自然垄断产业引入竞争后,瓶颈垄断厂商的拒绝接入是一种典型的策略性行为,它意在维护纵向一体化垄断、限制下游市场竞争.而行政垄断势力对瓶颈垄断的支持,则会使拒绝接入进一步固化.理论分析表明,拒绝接入会导致自然垄断产业下游竞争性市场关闭和市场化改革倒退,因此需要以接入规制来促进竞争.由于转型期的瓶颈垄断还具有深厚的行政垄断体制基础,因此接入规制的有效性还仰仗于打破政企不分式的行政垄断.     

Access Regulation and the Timing of Infrastructure Investment

This paper examines infrastructure investment incentives under a system of 'regulation by negotiation'. We demonstrate that an appropriately specified access pricing rule can induce private firms to choose to invest at a socially optimal time. The optimal regulatory regime allocates investment costs to the access provider and seeker based on their relative use-values of the facility. It is superior to an unregulated environment because it commits firms ex ante to an access charge that allows for sunk cost recovery. In addition, we show that when the time that access is sought is flexible both replacement- and historical-cost asset valuation methodologies can lead to optimal investment incentives. However, when seeker timing is restricted, historical cost can give rise to distorted incentives.     

Regulation and Access Pricing: Comparison of Regulated Regimes

The statutory duties of regulators of British utilities include both the encouragement of competition and protection of consumers (through price caps). Competition depends on the terms on which new entrants can gain access to the monopolist's network. Where the incumbent in the retail market also owns the network, the regulator may determine prices in the capped and access markets separately or may make the price cap explicitly dependent on entry in the uncapped market. Contrary to the received wisdom that access charges should be separately regulated we show that higher welfare can be obtained in some circumstances by allowing the incumbent to determine access charges. This is achieved by permitting the incumbent to choose from a menu of retail prices which the regulator makes conditional on the extent of entry in the retail market.     

Asymmetric Regulation of Access and Price Discrimination in Telecommunications*

Suppose that a strong and a weak operator compete in a telecommunications market. To terminate a call operators need access to the competitor’s network if the call is off-net. Operators set two-part tariffs and price-discriminate according to termination of a call. Suppose as a benchmark that access prices are regulated at costs. I show that the weak operator’s profit and consumer welfare increase if the regulator sets a higher price to access the weak operator’s network. However, total surplus decreases even locally. *I received helpful comments from Mark Armstrong, Toker Doganoglu, Tommaso Valletti, Julian Wright, and, in particular, two referees and the editor Michael Crew. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Heisenberg Fellowship).     

自然垄断产业的网络瓶颈与接入管制政策

自然垄断产业的市场结构重组和民营化改革凸现了网络瓶颈的接入问题,它已成为自然垄断产业改革中最重要的理论和实践问题之一,也是促进自然垄断产业实现有效竞争的关键.本文以讨论网络瓶颈作为切入口,分析了拥有网络瓶颈资源的主导性企业的策略性行为,并提出相应的以促进竞争为导向的接入管制政策.     

电信企业基于价格行为的纵向市场圈定与接入规制

电信企业能否达到纵向市场圈定目的,与实施市场圈定的企业和被圈定企业在下游市场的成本差异有关。本文通过构建一个两阶段博弈模型,分析了电信企业基于价格行为的纵向市场圈定与接入规制问题。研究发现,当主导企业的下游附属企业具有成本优势时,则其通过实施价格策略性行为能够达到纵向市场圈定目的;当其处于成本劣势时,则不能通过价格行为实现纵向市场圈定。因此,规制机构在制定接入规制政策时,应根据下游市场两个企业的成本差异选择合理的接入规制方法。当新进入企业成本较低时,可采取有效成分接入定价法和由市场决定接入价格的两种接入规制方法;当两者成本相同时,可采取激励性接入规制方法;当新进入企业成本较高时,可对两者实行不对称接入规制。     

Implementing Market Access

This paper examines ex post subsidies as a means of enforcing market share targets. Subsidies set after firms make their strategic decisions are shown to create powerful incentives for firms to raise prices. These effects are stronger when targets, and hence subsidies, are specified on a firm-specific rather than industry-wide basis. This occurs because firms perceive themselves as subject to more competition (i.e., more elastic demand) in the latter case.     

Optimal Time-of-use Access Charges

This paper examines the setting of optimal time-of-use access charges in a deregulated network industry environment. Firms, which may include the incumbent, compete in the final retail market. The regulator sets an access fee for use of the essential facility, allowing the incumbent to recover fixed costs. If the retail market is perfectly competitive the optimal access charge varies with time-of-use according to the Ramsey–Boiteux elasticity rule. However, with downstream market power the regulator needs to correct retail price distortion, as well as recover fixed costs efficiently. As a result, the regulators initial impulse to set higher access charges during peak periods may be reinforced, moderated or even reversed — and optimal access charges diverge from a Ramsey–Boiteux pattern.I would like to thank John Panzar and Julian Wright for helpful comments. The helpful and detailed remarks of an anonymous referee have greatly improved this paper and are gratefully acknowledged.