Credit Ratings and Earnings Management around IPOs

This study examines the impact of having a credit rating on earnings management (EM) through accruals and real activities manipulation by initial public offering (IPO) firms. We find that firms going public with a credit rating are less likely to engage in income‐enhancing accrual‐based and real EM in the offering year. The monitoring by a credit rating agency (CRA) and the reduced information asymmetry due to the provision of a credit rating disincentivise rated issuers from managing earnings. We also suggest that the participation of a reputable auditing firm is crucial for CRAs to effectively restrain EM. Moreover, we document that for unrated issuers, at‐issue income‐increasing EM is not linked to future earnings and is negatively related to post‐issue long‐run stock performance. However, for rated issuers, at‐issue income‐increasing EM is positively associated with subsequent accounting performance and is unrelated to long‐run stock performance following the offering. The evidence indicates that managers in unrated firms generally manipulate earnings to mislead investors, while managers in rated firms tend to exercise their accounting and operating discretion for informative purposes.     

More than meets the eye: Convertible bond issuers' concurrent transactions

We document that, in recent years, over 60% of convertible bond issuers conduct concurrent transactions including share repurchases, call option purchases, warrant sales, seasoned equity offerings, and stock lending program initiations. We investigate the determinants of issuers' choice of concurrent transactions and find that a proxy for capital supply (flows to convertible bond arbitrage hedge funds) is a significant determinant. Option purchases are more likely when capital supply is low and the convertible is dilutive to earnings. SEOs are more likely when firms have valuable growth opportunities and capital supply is low. Convertible issuers establish lending programs when arbitrageurs likely encounter difficulty shorting their stock, suggesting that these firms facilitate short selling in their own stock. These results suggest that, in the convertible bond market, the influence of capital supply extends beyond the issuance decision to the use of concurrent transactions and that these transactions offer important flexibility to issuers. We find that average equity market announcement effects differ when issuers conduct concurrent transactions. Consistent with models of adverse selection, concurrent transactions that reduce the dilutive impact on earnings, thereby making the design more debt-like, are associated with less negative announcement effects. Conversely, concurrent transactions that increase the dilutive impact on earnings, thereby making the design more equity-like, are associated with more negative announcement effects.     

Flexibility in share repurchases: Evidence from UK

Although firms cite flexibility as important when repurchasing shares, we know little about how or why firms vary repurchases. We use an extensive sample of daily repurchase transactions from the United Kingdom to investigate how the number of repurchase days and volumes of shares repurchased change based on several known motivations. We find that stock price changes, liquidity, leverage, takeover activity and earnings per share targets impact share repurchasing patterns. Further, we compare actual repurchases to alternative share accumulation strategies and find that firms utilize flexibility without paying higher costs.     

Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? Evidence from debt–equity choice

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt–equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms’ debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers’ aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making.     

Cost Structure and Payout Policy

I investigate the effects of firms’ proportion of fixed and variable costs on their payout policy and find that firms with higher fixed costs have significantly higher volatility in their future cash flows and more variable future operating incomes. These firms pay a lower fraction of their operating income in dividends and share repurchases. Finally, these firms return higher fractions of their payouts via share repurchases because this method offers greater flexibility. The results are robust to several alternate specifications and firm‐level controls, and show that firms’ cost structures play a significant role in payout policy choices.     

The Sale of Assets to Manage Earnings in Japan

In this article we investigate Japanese managers' use of income from the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities to manage earnings. The earnings management target examined is Japanese managers' forecasts of current–year earnings. We find a negative relation between income from asset sales and management forecast error. When current reported operating income is below (above) management's forecast of operating income, firms increase (decrease) earnings through the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities. The results hold after controlling for expected future performance, debt–to–equity ratio, size, growth, and last year's income from asset sales.     

Fixed income conference calls

We study the determinants and the informational role of firms' fixed income conference calls, a unique form of voluntary disclosure that deviates from the traditional multi-purpose firm disclosures intended for all stakeholders. We find that fixed income calls are more likely to be held by firms that have more debt, lack credit ratings or have publicly traded equity, are foreign, or are experiencing losses. In a content analysis using a sample of public firms, we find that these calls discuss debt-equity conflict events, such as share repurchases, to a greater degree relative to a matched sample of earnings conference calls. Finally, we document that credit markets react to these calls, consistent with the calls providing investors new information. Overall, these results are consistent with fixed income calls meeting the differential informational demands of debt versus equity investors.     

Earnings Management through Transaction Structuring: Contingent Convertible Debt and Diluted Earnings per Share

In this article we examine whether firms structure their convertible bond transactions to manage diluted earnings per share (EPS). We find that the likelihood of firms issuing contingent convertible bonds (COCOs), which are often excluded from diluted EPS calculations under Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 128, is significantly associated with the reduction that would occur in diluted EPS if the bonds were traditionally structured. We also document that firms' use of EPS‐based compensation contracts significantly affects the likelihood of COCO issuance and find weak evidence that reputation costs, measured using earnings restatement data, play a role in the structuring decision. These results are robust to controlling for alternative motivations for issuing COCOs, including tax and dilution arguments. In addition, an examination of announcement returns reveals that investors view the net benefits and costs of COCOs as offsetting one another. Our results contribute to the literature on earnings management, diluted EPS, financial reporting costs, and financial innovation.     

The effect of capital market pressures on the association between R&;D spending and CEO option compensation

We examine the effect of capital market pressures for meeting earnings benchmarks on the relationship between R&D spending and CEO option compensation. We consider a particular scenario when firms face small earnings declines but could opportunistically reduce R&D spending to increase reported earnings. We find that firms with income reporting concerns punish their CEOs with lower option compensation when R&D spending increases but reported earnings decreases. Further, for firms with income reporting concerns, we find that the penalty for increasing R&D is greater when the firms frequently miss quarterly earnings benchmarks in the year. Overall, our findings suggest that the adverse consequence on CEO options encourages short-run compensation-motivated actions to eliminate or postpone R&D projects with positive net present values.     

Earnings management induced by tax planning: The case of Portuguese private firms

In Portugal, a concept of taxable income associated closely with reported accounting income is used to determine the tax liability of firms. Recently, the Portuguese government legislated to introduce a system of “special payment on account” (SPA). Firms were required to pay an amount of income tax in advance that varied between a promulgated minimum and maximum. Although such a tax is unique to Portugal, other countries have tax arrangements that are similar in intent. Thus, Portugal's experience with the introduction of a SPA regime is likely to be instructive in fiscal policy deliberations in other settings.We assess the extent to which the SPA tax policy measure encouraged private Portuguese companies to manipulate earnings. We find that earnings manipulation appears to have been motivated by desire to minimize SPA. Firms whose estimate of SPA liability fell within the range of minimum and maximum limits of the SPA had higher levels of discretionary accruals than firms whose estimate was (equal to or) above the ceiling imposed by the new legislation. Firms with higher rates of income tax were found to reduce earnings to near zero. Firms with higher average income tax rates were more likely to manipulate their earnings than other firms.Our results reinforce the importance for auditors, stakeholders, and tax policy advisors to be alert to the close association between tax planning considerations and reported earnings in their monitoring, analysis, and policy advising activities.     

The Treatment of Non-Recurring Items in the Income Statement and their Consistency with FASB Concept Statements

This study provides evidence on the consistency of Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 30 (APB, 1973) classification criteria with the objectives of the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Concept Statements Nos 1 and 2 (FASB, 1978, 1980). It is hypothesized that the current APB 30 requirement to classify items of a non-recurring nature in the operating section of the income statement decreases the predictive ability of income before extraordinary items. A random sample of 50 firms with non-recurring adjustments to income, which were included in the operating section of the income statement, was selected from Standard and Poor's Corporation Records. Naive models were used to generate earnings per share forecasts for the year in which the adjustment to income occurred, the prior year and subsequent year.
The results indicate a statistically significant decrease in the predictive ability of earnings per share before extraordinary items associated with the year that the adjustment occurred and a significant increase in the variability of earnings per share. Also, differences in predictive ability were noted between small and large firms and firms with positive and negative adjustments to income.
The results of this study also imply that the managers of most firms with negative adjustments to income are not using the adjustments to smooth income for either the purpose of decreasing the variability of earnings or increasing predictability. The results are more consistent with the 'big bath' theory. These conclusions appear to be more relevant for smaller firms than larger firms.     

Earnings management surrounding M&A: Role of economic development and investor protection

We examine accruals based earnings management by acquiring firms surrounding merger and acquisition events from thirty countries for the period 2004–2015. We find that the acquiring firms do manage earnings surrounding mergers when the method of payment is acquirer's stock, but there is no such evidence when the method of payment is cash. We also examine whether level of economic development and country-specific institutional characteristics play any role in acquiring firms' earnings manipulation. Using two groups of countries based on the level of economic development and nine different institutional variables we find evidence that acquirers' accrual manipulation differs based on such characteristics.     

Do investors overreact to earnings warnings?

This study shows that contrary to what many managers argue, there is no overreaction to earnings warnings. Our sample consists of 986 firms that had significantly lower fourth-quarter earnings than analysts' forecasts during the period of 1983 to 1998. About 9% of these firms released quantitative earnings information while 6.5% of the firms disclosed qualitative earnings information prior to the formal earnings report dates. We find that although these firms experience significant stock price declines during the warning period, their share prices are still higher than the economic values, calculated using Ohlson's residual income model. Further, long-run operating and stock performance of these firms are not more positive than the performance of firms that do not warn. We also find that investor reaction to both warning and non-warning firms is positively related to the firms' long-run stock and operating performance. These findings support the argument that investors do not overreact to the warnings but base their reaction on anticipated long-term performance of the firms.     

The outperformance of family firms: the role of variance in earnings per share and analyst forecast dispersion on the Swiss market

Recent studies provide empirical evidence that family firms are outperforming their non-family counterparts in terms of stock market performance. For the Swiss stock market we find that family firms indeed outperform their non-family counterparts after controlling for firm size and beta. In addition, our data shows that family firms display more stable earnings per share in contrast to their non-family counterparts. Furthermore we find that the variance of earnings per share positively affects analyst forecast dispersion. According to anomaly literature, lower analyst forecast dispersion has been found to induce higher excess return, which our data supports for the Swiss stock market. By linking variance of earnings per share, analyst forecast dispersion and stock performance we provide an insightful explanation for the excess stock market returns of family firms. In addition, our text extends the theory of dispersion effect with an additional empirical element, the variance of earnings per share.      

Do firms follow GAAP when they record share repurchases?

This paper examines U.S. firms' accounting for share repurchases and the accounting choice provided to Delaware-incorporated firms between the treasury and retirement methods. This accounting choice does not affect income, cash flows, or net assets, but it nevertheless affects financial reporting transparency and the allocation of equity between retained earnings and contributed capital. According to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), the accounting choice to record share repurchases should reflect management's intended disposition of the repurchased shares. We compare characteristics of Delaware-incorporated treasury and retirement firms and find that the choice between the two accounting methods is not always consistent with GAAP, but neither is it random; rather, this choice is related to a number of firm characteristics including firm growth, industry membership, trading exchange, and price–earnings ratio. We also find that a firm's accounting method for share repurchases is associated with a firm's propensity to make future share repurchases.     

Evidence on the Usefulness of Capital Expenditures as an Alternative Measure of Depreciation

Investment professionals often suggest that accounting earnings is a more useful indicator of share value if adjusted by substituting current capital expenditures for reported depreciation. We investigate the usefulness of this alternative depreciation measure by comparing the ability of reported earnings and adjusted earnings to explain the cross-sectional distribution of stock prices for a large sample of manufacturing firms. We find that adjusted earnings explains a much smaller fraction of the variation in share prices than earnings based on reported depreciation, and provide evidence on the reasons for this difference.     

Accruals Management to Avoid Losses

This study examines whether firms engage in accruals management to beat the zero earnings benchmark from the perspective of earnings per share (EPS). Based on net income scaled by lagged market value of equity (E/MV) to define just‐miss and just‐beat test bins, previous studies provide no or inconclusive evidence of accruals management to beat the zero earnings benchmark. I conjecture that because managers focus on shares scaled earnings performance rather than market value scaled earnings performance, forming test bins based on EPS instead of E/MV is a better approach to detect accruals management. As expected, I find evidence of accruals management to beat the zero EPS benchmark. I also find that firms are more likely to manipulate accruals when managers have stronger incentives to beat the zero EPS benchmark. In addition, accruals of firms just beating the zero EPS benchmark are more likely to reverse the next year, resulting in relatively lower future earnings for firms just beating the benchmark compared with firms just missing the benchmark.     

Earnings management and the allocation of net periodic pension costs to interim periods

We examine the pattern of reported quarterly net periodic pension costs. Quarterly pension costs are one of the largest single expense items for firms with pension plans (around 15% of income before extraordinary items in our sample). Under ASC 270, net pension costs should be recognized as incurred, or as the benefit provided by the expense is realized. We find that over the period of 2004–2010, there is significant variation in the amount of quarterly pension cost firms report. In addition, we find that income-increasing changes in pension costs are significantly associated with meeting or beating analysts' forecasts in a given quarter. We also show that income-decreasing changes to net periodic pension costs that would cause a firm to miss its earnings forecast are extremely rare. Finally, we find evidence that income-increasing and income-decreasing changes in quarterly pension costs are “settled up” in the fourth quarter (e.g., they are reversed).     

Where do firms manage earnings?

Despite decades of research on how, why, and when companies manage earnings, there is a paucity of evidence about the geographic location of earnings management within multinational firms. In this study, we examine where companies manage earnings using a sample of 2,067 U.S. multinational firms from 1994 to 2009. We predict and find that firms with extensive foreign operations in weak rule of law countries have more foreign earnings management than companies with subsidiaries in locations where the rule of law is strong. We also find some evidence that profitable firms with extensive tax haven subsidiaries manage earnings more than other firms and that the earnings management is concentrated in foreign income. Apart from these results, we find that most earnings management takes place in domestic income, not foreign income.     

Cash-settled convertible bonds and the value relevance of their accounting treatment

Cash settlements became a popular design feature in convertible securities once they obtained favorable accounting treatment for diluted earnings per share in 2002. The unexpected proliferation of cash settlements provoked the FASB to eliminate their favorable accounting treatment in 2008. We find that shareholders of firms that use cash-settled convertibles react negatively to the announcement of these recent changes. Firms that issued cash-settled convertible debt to avoid earnings dilution no longer have an incentive to keep them on their balance sheets. Consistent with this observation, we find that investors respond more favorably if the cash-settled convertibles of these firms include call features. We conclude that call features can be valuable in times of uncertainty related to possible accounting changes as they allow the firm to efficiently mitigate the effects of the accounting changes on their financial reporting.