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1.
The empirical literature provides conflicting assessments about how firms choose their capital structures. Distinguishing among the three main hypotheses (“tradeoff”, pecking order, and market timing) requires that we know whether firms have long-run leverage targets and (if so) how quickly they adjust toward them. Yet many previous researchers have applied empirical specifications that fail to recognize the potential for incomplete adjustment. A more general, partial-adjustment model of firm leverage indicates that firms do have target capital structures. The typical firm closes about one-third of the gap between its actual and its target debt ratios each year. 相似文献
2.
Many authors relate a firm's performance to legal and political features and the regulatory environment in which it operates. This article compares firms' capital structure adjustments across countries and investigates whether institutional differences help explain the variance in estimated adjustment speeds. We find that legal and financial traditions significantly correlate with firm adjustment speeds. More narrowly, institutional features also relate to adjustment speeds, consistent with the hypothesis that better institutions lower the transaction costs associated with adjusting a firm's leverage. Such associations between institutional arrangements and leverage adjustment speeds are consistent with the dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure choice. 相似文献
3.
We investigate the equity market timing hypothesis of capital structure in major industrialized (G-7) countries. As claimed by its proponents, we find that leverage of firms is negatively related to the historical market-to-book ratio in all G-7 countries. However, this negative relationship cannot be attributed to equity market timing. We find no association between equity issues and market-to-book ratios at the time of equity financing decisions by Japanese firms. Firms in all G-7 countries, except Japan, undo the effect of equity issuance and the impact of equity market timing attempts on leverage is short lived. This is inconsistent with the prediction of the equity market timing hypothesis and more in line with dynamic trade-off model. 相似文献
4.
Prior literature provides support both for the existence of target capital structures and internal capital markets (ICM). The issue of whether firms use internal capital markets to reduce deviations from target capital structures, however, has yet to be examined. We provide the first empirical evidence of a link between deviations from target leverage and ICM activity. Based on data that allow us to trace intra-group capital market transactions for property–casualty insurers, our findings provide the first joint evidence that affiliated insurance companies have target leverage ratios and that ICM activity is used to manage deviations from target leverage. 相似文献
5.
We test the predictions of Titman (1984) and Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010) by examining the effect of leverage on labor costs. Leverage has a significantly positive impact on cash, equity-based, and total compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs). Compensation of new CEOs hired from outside the firm is positively related to prior-year firm leverage. In addition, leverage has a positive and significant impact on average employee pay. The incremental total labor expenses associated with an increase in leverage are large enough to offset the incremental tax benefits of debt. The empirical evidence supports the theoretical prediction that labor costs limit the use of debt. 相似文献
6.
We investigate the stakeholder theory of capital structure from the perspective of a firm’s relations with its employees. We find that firms that treat their employees fairly (as measured by high employee‐friendly ratings) maintain low debt ratios. This result is robust to a variety of model specifications and endogeneity issues. The negative relation between leverage and a firm’s ability to treat employees fairly is also evident when we measure its ability by whether it is included in the Fortune magazine list, “100 Best Companies to Work For.” These results suggest that a firm’s incentive or ability to offer fair employee treatment is an important determinant of its financing policy. 相似文献
7.
Vahap B. Uysal 《Journal of Financial Economics》2011,102(3):602-620
This study finds that managers take deviations from their target capital structures into account when planning and structuring acquisitions. Specifically, firms that are overleveraged relative to their target debt ratios are less likely to make acquisitions and are less likely to use cash in their offers. Furthermore, they acquire smaller targets and pay lower premiums. Managers of overleveraged firms also actively rebalance their capital structures when they anticipate a high likelihood of making an acquisition. Finally, they pursue the most value-enhancing acquisitions. Collectively, these findings improve understanding of how firms choose their capital structures and shed light on the interdependence of capital structure and investment decisions in the presence of financial frictions. 相似文献
8.
Hierarchical determinants of capital structure 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We analyze the influence of time-, firm-, industry- and country-level determinants of capital structure. First, we apply hierarchical linear modeling in order to assess the relative importance of those levels. We find that time and firm levels explain 78% of firm leverage. Second, we include random intercepts and random coefficients in order to analyze the direct and indirect influences of firm/industry/country characteristics on firm leverage. We document several important indirect influences of variables at industry and country-levels on firm determinants of leverage, as well as several structural differences in the financial behavior between firms of developed and emerging countries. 相似文献
9.
We find that growth type (identified by a two-way sort on firm initial market-to-book ratio and asset tangibility) can parsimoniously predict significantly dispersed and persistently distinct future leverage ratios. Growth type is persistent; growth-type-sorted cross-sections of corporate fundamental variables (such as tangible versus intangible investment style) are also meaningfully persistent. As economic and market conditions improve, low growth type firms are keener to issue new debt than equity, whereas high growth type firms are least likely to issue debt and keenest to issue equity. These findings demonstrate that firms rationally invest and seek financing in a manner compatible with their growth types. Consistent with a generalized Myers–Majluf framework, growth type compatibility enables distinct growth types and hence specifications of market imperfection or informational environments to persist. Growth type is apparently a fundamental factor for capital structure persistence. 相似文献
10.
The conventional partial adjustment model, which focuses on leverage evolution, has difficulty identifying deliberate capital structure adjustments as it confounds financing decisions with the mechanical autocorrelation of leverage. We propose and estimate a financing-based partial adjustment model that separates the effects of financing decisions on leverage evolution from mechanical evolution. The speed of adjustment (SOA) is firm-specific and stochastic, and active targeting of capital structure has a multiplier effect that depends on the size of financial deficit. Overall, we find expected SOA from active rebalancing (30%) more than doubles what is expected from mechanical mean reversion alone (13%). 相似文献
11.
We present an overview of the literature that links capital structure and factor-product markets. These studies relate some elements of the modern financial theory to the stakeholder theory, industrial organization, and firms' strategic management. Three main points are highlighted. First, the relevant role of non-financial stakeholders in capital structure design. Second, the interactions between capital structure and market structure. Third, the two-direction effect between the firm's capital structure and its strategic behavior in product markets. Our study aims to build an index for the existing works to guide researchers for new ideas and possible advances. 相似文献
12.
Consistent with a life-cycle theory of dividends, the fraction of publicly traded industrial firms that pay dividends is high when retained earnings are a large portion of total equity (and of total assets) and falls to near zero when most equity is contributed rather than earned. We observe a highly significant relation between the decision to pay dividends and the earned/contributed capital mix, controlling for profitability, growth, firm size, total equity, cash balances, and dividend history, a relation that also holds for dividend initiations and omissions. In our regressions, the mix of earned/contributed capital has a quantitatively greater impact than measures of profitability and growth opportunities. We document a massive increase in firms with negative retained earnings (from 11.8% of industrials in 1978 to 50.2% in 2002). Controlling for the earned/contributed capital mix, firms with negative retained earnings show virtually no change in their propensity to pay dividends from the mid-1970s to 2002, while those whose earned equity makes them reasonable candidates to pay dividends have a propensity reduction that is twice the overall reduction in Fama and French [2000, Journal of Financial Economics 76, 549–582]. Finally, our simulations show that, if well-established firms had not paid dividends, their cash balances would be enormous and their long-term debt trivial, thus granting extreme discretion to managers of these mature firms. 相似文献
13.
Hao Wang 《Journal of Banking & Finance》2011,35(1):36-50
I develop a contingent claims model to examine the impacts of managerial entrenchment on capital structure and security valuation. The analysis shows that managers’ self-interested leverage choices deviate significantly from the optimal leverages that maximize firm values, partially explaining the suboptimal leverage ratios observed empirically (Graham, 2000). Both the extent and sensitivity of the deviations are affected by firm characteristics, debt features and default solutions. The shareholder-manager conflicts over risk level and cash payout vary dynamically with a firm’s financial health. Managerial entrenchment does not mitigate the agency problems of debt since managers’ discretionary decisions on milking properties or asset substitution could be driven by incentives to increase their own utility. 相似文献
14.
I study external debt issued by operating subsidiaries of diversified firms. Consistent with Kahn and Winton's [2004. Moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions. Journal of Finance 59, 2537–2575] model, where subsidiary debt mitigates asset substitution, I find firms are more likely to use subsidiary debt when their divisions vary more in risk. Consistent with subsidiary debt mitigating the free cash flow problem, I find that subsidiaries are more likely to have their own external debt when they have fewer growth options and higher cash flow than the rest of the firm. Finally, I find that subsidiary debt mitigates the “corporate socialism” and “poaching” problems modeled in theories of internal capital markets. 相似文献
15.
Amnon Levy 《Journal of Monetary Economics》2007,54(6):1545-1564
We develop a computable general equilibrium model explaining financing over the business cycle. To avert agency conflicts, managers must hold a high percentage of their firm's equity. During contractions, firms substitute debt for equity in order to maintain managerial equity shares. During expansions, risk-sharing improves, with increases in managerial wealth facilitating substitution of equity for debt. In calibrated simulations, (counter) cyclical variation in leverage is only exhibited by less constrained firms. All firms exhibit financial accelerator effects. However, the effect is decreasing in financial flexibility. The model's predictions regarding financing and investment are consistent with empirical evidence. 相似文献
16.
US manufacturing firms incorporated in states with stronger payout restrictions use less debt, while antitakeover statutes do not significantly reduce long-run leverage. Correcting for the endogenously determined choice of where to incorporate, we find that firms sort themselves according to state laws and capital structure needs. After accounting for self-selection, state antitakeover laws are positively associated with debt as a fraction of market value, possibly due to lower market values for these firms. Payout restrictions appear to reduce leverage for firms that have not reincorporated outside their home states. These constraints explain part of the negative relation between profitability and leverage. 相似文献
17.
Firms experiencing increases in import competition significantly reduce their leverage ratios by issuing equity and selling assets to repay debt. Using import tariffs and foreign exchange rates as instrumental variables for import penetration, I show that these results are not manifestations of endogenous relations between import competition and leverage. The results are consistent with traditional trade-off models of capital structure that predict a positive relation between book leverage and expected future profitability. Further evidence suggests that import competition affects leverage through changes in the trade-off between the tax benefits of debt and the costs of financial distress. 相似文献
18.
We develop a dynamic model of investment, capital structure, leasing, and risk management based on firms' need to collateralize promises to pay with tangible assets. Both financing and risk management involve promises to pay subject to collateral constraints. Leasing is strongly collateralized costly financing and permits greater leverage. More constrained firms hedge less and lease more, both cross-sectionally and dynamically. Mature firms suffering adverse cash flow shocks may cut risk management and sell and lease back assets. Persistence of productivity reduces the benefits to hedging low cash flows and can lead firms not to hedge at all. 相似文献
19.
In this paper, I analyze the motives moving founders and their families to influence the capital structure decision. For this, I complement detailed corporate governance information for Germany with data from other countries. The results for the German bank-based financial system contradict prior findings for other institutional environments. According to these results, family firms in Germany rely less heavily on debt than non-family firms. Less surprisingly, the opposite holds true for the international dataset. Different empirical tests indicate that this puzzling result can be explained by control considerations. Founders and their families use the capital structure to optimize their control over the firm. However, whether family firms rely more or less on debt depends on the level of creditor monitoring in an institutional environment. These findings emphasize that control considerations of major shareholders are important—although often overlooked—determinants of the capital structure. 相似文献
20.
Christian Bayer 《Journal of Monetary Economics》2006,53(8):1909-1947
This paper examines the implications of financing frictions on capital stocks and on capital accumulation in the presence of non-convex costs of adjusting the capital stock. In this setup finance has an influence on both, the level of capital and the timing of investment. Finance and productivity are complements and finance influences investment the strongest when firms wish to significantly adjust capital for fundamental reasons. These theoretical considerations are confronted with UK data. While finance is mostly irrelevant for long-term capital decision, the short-run investment function shows a significant impact of finance, which is also strongest for strong fundamental investment incentives. 相似文献