How do passive funds act as active owners? Evidence from mutual fund voting records

The rise of passive institutional investors in the U.S. stock market raises questions about the governance implications to their portfolio firms. While the existing literature documents positive governance changes when passive institutional ownership displaces retail ownership, it remains unclear how passive institutional ownership approaches corporate governance differently than their active peers. This paper compares the proxy voting behaviors between same-family passive and active mutual funds with identical investment styles. We find that passive funds are not more likely to vote in favor of governance reforms than active funds. We also provide suggestive evidence that besides voting, the influence of passive funds on corporate governance also operates through a “behind the scenes” channel.     

Do mutual fund managers time market liquidity?

This paper examines mutual fund managers' ability to time market-wide liquidity. Using the CRSP mutual fund database, we find strong evidence that over the 1974–2009 period, mutual fund managers demonstrate the ability to time market liquidity at both the portfolio level and the individual fund level. Liquidity timing predicts future fund performance and the difference in the risk-adjusted returns between top and bottom liquidity-timing funds is approximately 2% per year. Funds exhibiting liquidity-timing ability tend to have longer histories, higher expense ratios, and higher turnover rates.     

What determines mutual fund trading in foreign stocks?

We examine the portfolio rebalancing, measured by the equity churn rate, of mutual funds from 29 countries based on annual stockholdings over the 1999–2006 period. We find that funds more often trade the stocks of companies located in countries with higher degree of information asymmetry and are less familiar to fund managers, after we control for the effects of stock market development and investor protection. Consistent with the behavioral bias, fund managers more often rebalance stocks in foreign markets that perform well. This bias is exacerbated when fund managers are less familiar with and less informed about those markets.     

Informativeness of mutual fund advertisements: Does advertising communicate fund quality to investors?

We uncover a positive relation between advertising expenditures and skill in the mutual fund industry. Motivated by economic signaling models, we find that funds advertising in magazines outperform their peers by 83 basis points in the subsequent year. We determine that the performance differential between advertising and nonadvertising funds is largest when investment opportunities are high and persists for 36 months. Generally, the positive relation between advertising expenditures and future fund flows is not sensitive to the content of the advertisements and is strongest when investor attention is high.     

What impact does a change of fund manager have on mutual fund performance?

Using a unique database of UK fund manager changes over the period from 1997 to 2011, we examine the impact of such changes on fund performance. We find clear evidence to suggest that a manager change does affect the benchmark-adjusted performance of UK mutual funds. In particular we find a significant deterioration in the benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were top performers before the manager exit and, conversely, a significant improvement in the average benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were poor performers before the manager exit. Our use of the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model reveals that the improvement in average post manager exit performance is accompanied by a reduction in market risk, a slight reduction in exposure to small cap stocks, and an increase in exposure to value and momentum stocks. Overall, our results suggest that UK fund management companies have been relatively successful in replacing bad managers with better managers, but relatively unsuccessful at finding equivalent replacements for their top performing managers. We believe that regulators should therefore try to ensure that all efforts are made by fund management companies to inform all of their investors about a change in management.     

Does advertising strategy matter in influencing mutual fund purchase?

This study explores the role of advertising strategies (informational versus transformational) in consumers’ purchase intentions related to mutual funds. Moreover, this study investigates the possible moderating role of gender and financial literacy in advertising strategy. Findings of the experimental approach applied in this study suggest that advertisement strategy does influence investment intention related to the mutual funds. We also found that females are less likely to purchase mutual funds when exposed to transformational advertisements. Moreover, investors with higher financial literacy prefer informational advertisements. The results also indicate that the informational advertisements are more useful and increase awareness levels among investors.     

Asset sales in the mutual fund industry: Who gains?

We analyze gains from intercorporate sales of mutual fund subsidiaries, using mandated SEC disclosures to assess the performance of mutual funds transferred by these transactions. Sellers are financial conglomerates (banks) using equity-based deals to transfer poorly performing funds to highly focused asset management companies. The transferred funds experience significant improvements in risk-adjusted returns, efficiency, and asset growth. These improvements are closely correlated with the gains in wealth to buyers and sellers at deal announcements, indicating the market efficiently capitalizes expected performance improvements. Our results provide evidence that these transactions transfer assets to acquirers better able to manage them, generating gains for fund holders and buyer and seller shareholders.     

In which financial markets do mutual fund theorems hold true?

The mutual fund theorem (MFT) is considered in a general semimartingale financial market S with a finite time horizon T, where agents maximize expected utility of terminal wealth. The main results are:

What style-timing skills do mutual fund “stars” possess?

Recent studies suggest that certain growth-oriented fund managers have substantial skill but do not stipulate the particular skills that they possess. We examine in detail the style-timing abilities of growth-oriented equity mutual funds over the period from 1993 to 2006. We find that an important contributor to the persistent abnormal returns is growth timing, i.e., switching stocks along the value/growth continuum, and that this explains at least 45% of the abnormal returns reported. No other style-timing skills are observed. Our results also demonstrate that it is easy to misidentify growth timing as market timing.     

Changes to mutual fund risk: Intentional or mean reverting?

An empirical issue is whether a mutual fund’s change in intertemporal risk is intentional or arises from risk mean reversion. Our methodology uses actual fund trades to identify funds that actively change risk. Funds that are statistically identified as trading to change return variance or tracking error variance do not exhibit risk mean reversion. Mostly, funds trade to reduce risk and, in particular, tracking error variance. This is most evident for funds that previously attained a low tracking error variance. We find no evidence of a relation between past performance and intended changes to return variance or tracking error variance.     

Do machines beat humans? Evidence from mutual fund performance persistence

We study the performance persistence of quantitative actively managed US equity funds. We show that the persistence of quantitative funds originates from poor performers and that there are reversals at the top of the performance scale, which is no different from the widely accepted evidence in the mutual fund literature. When testing for differences in performance persistence between quantitative and non–quantitative funds, we find no differences for poorly performing funds, but we observe significantly more reversals for quantitative funds at the top of the performance distribution. We also find that the differences in performance persistence are not explained by differences in flow–induced incentives to generate alpha, as there is no heterogeneity in investors preferences when allocating capital to these funds. Overall our results are consistent with machines having less skill than their human counterparts.     

Does corporate social responsibility affect mutual fund performance and flows?

We use an asset-weighted composite corporate social responsibility (CSR) fund score to study the effects of CSR on fund performance and flows. Compared to low-CSR funds, high-CSR funds display poorer performance, stronger performance persistence, a weaker performance-flow relationship, and comparable persistence in flows. These findings are consistent with investors in high-CSR funds deriving utility from non-performance attributes.     

Do investors show an attentional bias toward past performance? An eye-tracking experiment on visual attention to mutual fund disclosures in simplified fund prospectuses

This study examines the cognitive processes underlying investors’ extrapolations of past fund performance and whether investors’ attention patterns may explain their return-chasing behaviors. We measured the attention that investors paid to mutual fund disclosures in a simplified fund prospectus using unobtrusive infrared eye tracking. Results suggest that prior fund performance, which is normatively irrelevant information and not useful in predicting future performance, received considerable attention from investors. More interestingly, the impact of prior fund performance on investors’ purchasing intentions was fully mediated through expected returns and attention paid to past performance information. The results indicate that investors apparently believe in performance persistence or in a ‘hot hand’ effect, and that mutual fund purchases are driven by salient information such as superior performance. Moreover, we tested the disclaimer mandated by regulatory bodies, which warns that past performance does not guarantee future results. We found that the disclaimer was ineffective in reducing investors’ extrapolation biases, despite the fact that the disclaimer was attended to and properly encoded by investors.     

Who incentivizes the mutual fund manager,new or old shareholders?

This study tests whether mutual fund shareholders continue to trade in response to fund returns after they make their initial investment in fund shares. It decomposes the relationship between fund returns and shareholder flow in a large, proprietary panel of all shareholder transactions in one midsize no-load mutual fund family. Results show that both new and old shareholders buy shares during periods of good returns; however, shareholder outflow is essentially unrelated to fund returns. This lack of a return-sell relationship is not driven by locked-in pension assets, shareholders’ ignorance of ongoing fund returns, or embedded capital gains. However, there is evidence that exchanges between equity funds in the family are related more strongly to returns of the destination fund than to returns of the origination fund. This may indicate that flow between equity mutual funds is driven by shareholders buying new funds rather than selling old funds. Supermarket shareholders are smart insofar as they exchange into funds that subsequently outperform their prior funds during their individual holding periods.     

Does mutual fund ownership affect financial reporting quality for Chinese privately-owned enterprises?

This paper examines the role of mutual funds in enhancing financial reporting quality in China. Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors. Therefore, they are expected to be more effective at preventing executives from expropriating investors and manipulating earnings as a cover-up, which in turn would reduce the incidence of modified audit opinions (MAOs). Our results, based on the Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2008, confirm this prediction. More importantly, the effects of mutual fund ownership in reducing the incidence of MAOs are greater among privately owned enterprises (POEs), and especially those with higher growth. This is because POEs rely more heavily on the capital market for financing than do state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and because growth opportunities need to be funded by additional external capital. This finding implies that mutual funds form an important part of the external governance mechanism in emerging countries, but this effect is moderated by state control and ownership.     

Foreign institutional investment: Is governance quality at home important?

This paper examines the investment preferences of foreign institutional investors investing in the U.S. market. We analyse both firm and country-level determinants that influence the foreign institutional investors' allocation choices. At the country level, we find that the governance quality in a foreign institutional investor's home country is a determinant of their decision to invest in the U.S. market. Our findings indicate that investors who come from countries with governance setups similar to that of the U.S. invest more in the United States. The investment levels though, are more pronounced for countries with governance setups just below that of the U.S. Our results are consistent with both the ‘flight to quality’ and ‘familiarity’ arguments, and help reconcile prior contradictory empirical evidence. At the firm level, we present unequivocal evidence in favour of the familiarity argument. Foreign institutional investors domiciled in countries with high governance quality prefer to invest in U.S. firms with high corporate governance quality. This effect is primarily driven by grey (non-monitoring) institutional investors.     

Actively managed mutual funds holding passive investments: What do ETF positions tell us about mutual fund ability?

We provide the first in-depth examination of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) within actively managed mutual fund (AMMF) portfolios to better understand why AMMFs make substantial investments in passive ETFs. We examine the association between holding ETF positions and AMMF performance, as well as indirect measures of performance, including market timing, flow management, and cash holdings. We find that over one-third of AMMFs take an ETF position between 2004 and 2015. Our results indicate that AMMFs allocating large portions of their portfolio to ETFs perform worse, by between 0.41% and 1.63% annually using various performance measures. These AMMFs also exhibit worse market timing and hold more cash. In contrast, AMMFs that hold ETFs in small amounts have similar characteristics to non-user AMMFs. Therefore, the act of holding an ETF does not signal inferior ability, however, taking large ETF positions does.     

Is silence killing your company?

Many times, often with the best of intentions, people at work decide it's more productive to remain silent about their differences than to air them. There's no time, they think, or no point in going against what the boss says. But as new research by the authors shows, silencing doesn't smooth things over or make people more productive. It merely pushes differences beneath the surface and can set in motion powerfully destructive forces. When people stay silent about important disagreements, they can begin to fill with anxiety, anger, and resentment. As long as the conflict is unresolved, their repressed feelings remain potent, making them increasingly distrustful, self-protective, and all the more fearful that if they speak up they will be embarrassed or rejected. Their sense of insecurity grows, leading to further acts of silence, more defensiveness, and more distrust, thereby setting into motion a destructive "spiral of silence." Sooner or later, they mentally opt out--sometimes merely doing what they're told but contributing nothing of their own, sometimes spreading discontent and frustration throughout the workplace that can lead them, and others, to leave without thinking it through. These vicious spirals of silence can be replaced with virtuous spirals of communication, but that requires individuals to find the courage to act differently and executives to create the conditions in which people will value the expression of differences. All too often, behind failed products, broken processes, and mistaken career decisions are people who chose to hold their tongues. Breaking the silence can bring an outpouring of fresh ideas from all levels of an organization--ideas that might just raise the organization's performance to a whole new level.     

What do mutual fund managers’ private portfolios tell us about their skills?

I study a registry-based dataset of Swedish mutual fund managers’ personal portfolios. The majority of managers do not invest personal wealth into the very same funds they professionally manage. The managers who do invest personal money into their funds subsequently outperform the managers who do not. The results suggest that fund managers, in contrast to regular investors, are certain about their ability to generate an abnormal return, or lack thereof, and invest their personal wealth accordingly.     

Endogeneity in the mutual fund flow–performance relationship: An instrumental variables solution

We use an instrumental variables (IV) approach to examine the effects of dynamic endogeneity when estimating the relationship between mutual fund flows and performance. Unlike the one-stage estimation approach commonly used in prior research, the IV approach allows us to address reverse causality between flow and performance. Through rigorous exclusion tests, we conclude that fund media coverage, risk ranking, and management structure win in a horse race as exogenous instruments for fund flow, while the fund turnover ratio and institutional share perform best as instruments for fund performance. We then demonstrate that endogeneity bias leads to inaccurate inferences in one-stage estimates, as evidenced by the reversals of the signs of flow and performance coefficient estimates when we switch to the IV approach. We find that careful attention to model specification allows us to resolve several widespread inconsistencies in the literature that were likely driven by model misspecification.