The Risk-Return Relationship of Pension Funds With Investments in Hedge Funds

This article investigates if investing in local hedge funds improves the risk-return relationship of Brazilian pension funds. Investment in hedge funds by pension funds is growing elsewhere, with an increasing utilization of a multiplicity of hedge funds specialized in specific strategies or niches. We analyzed the performance of a typical pension fund allocation in Brazil as well as alternate allocations that included hedge funds. We used robust estimates of the covariance matrix to mitigate the errors in variables that are problematic in the inputs of the optimization. The results show that hedge funds improve the risk-return relationship of the typical pension fund allocation, contribute to a higher accumulated return at the end of a one-year period, and reduce portfolio rebalancing. Investments in hedge funds ease reaching the typical 6% annual return target with less risk exposure.     

企业年金基金投资:基于理论模型和实践经验的研究

本文回顾了西方养老基金投资领域的研究文献。国际经验研究说明企业年金的投资组合和发起企业的经营活动现金收益率有密切关系。本文提出了一个考虑发起企业的经营活动现金回报率之后的年金组合理论模型,分析了当前我国三类企业年金的投资组合现实,提出了相应政策建议。     

Stochastic Dominance of Pension Plans

We compare different possibilities to reform a funded pension plan, whose balance is threatened by a decrease in mortality rates. Since the plan is mandatory, the welfare of employees might be reduced if contributions increase or if the retirement age is raised. An empirical study of Israeli data shows that a reform which decreases the pension benefits is the optimal strategy, compared with the options of increasing the retirement age or increasing pension fund contributions. We also show that giving employees freedom to choose their retirement age and induced pension benefits is the optimal policy and increases the welfare of employees.     

The Drivers of Responsible Investment: The Case of European Pension Funds

We investigate what drives responsible investment of European pension funds. Pension funds are institutional investors who assure the income of part of the population for a long period of time. Increasingly, stakeholders hold pension funds accountable for the non-financial consequences of their investments and many funds have engaged in responsible investing. However, it appears that there is a wide difference between pension funds in this respect. We investigate what determines pension funds’ responsible investments on the basis of a survey of more than 250 pension funds in 15 European countries in 2010. We use multinomial logistic regression and find that especially legal origin of the country, ownership of the pension fund and fund size-related variables are to be associated with pension funds′ responsible investment. For fund size, we establish a curvilinear relationship; especially the smallest and largest pension funds in the sample tend to engage with responsible investing.     

中国养老保险制度的困境与发展对策

中国养老保险制度的改革滞后于经济与政治体制改革。主要体现在保险的覆盖面 ,基金的征集、管理、运营等方面 ,对养老保险的可持续发展构成了严重的障碍。根据我国的国情及经济发展状况 ,在廓清理论框架的前提下 ,加大个人帐户的比重 ,提高养老基金的运作效率 ,在此基础上扩大养老保险的覆盖范围 ,使养老保险系统在我国经济与政治生活中发挥其应有作用     

通过债转股解决养老保险基金隐性债务

深入分析了养老保险基金隐性债务的成因、国有股减持与养老保险基金入市的关系 ,提出了债转股的方法。通过该方法 ,不仅可以解决养老金隐性债务问题 ,同时也能达到国有股减持的其他主要目的。     

合理财政投入于养老基金的优化模型探讨

对养老基金的政府财政投入会影响短期和长期的社会福利。首先是确定合理财政投入的两个准则,在描述基金收支核心机制后刻画了财政投入对经济发展的负面影响,在此基础上建立了合理财政投入的目标约束模型,在理论上做出探索。     

The Economic Inefficiency of Secrecy: Pension Fund Investors’ Corporate Transparency Concerns

In the wake of recent corporate scandals, this paper traces the growing power of pension funds to provide managerial oversight of the firms they hold in their investment portfolios. Increasingly pension funds are exercising their legitimate rights as owners to raise the corporate governance standards of the firms they invest in. Within corporate governance generally, pension funds are shifting their attention away from managerial accountability and toward measures that increase transparency in firm-level decision-making. Pension funds use transparency to ensure that shareholders are the primary interest being served by the firm. Transparency not only aligns managers and owners, it also raises issues of firm behaviour that allow other stakeholders to engage the corporation more broadly. I contend that secrecy is economically inefficient. When organizations are opaque and interests are secret, decision-making can and does distort efficiency. I examine recent pension fund corporate governance campaigns with particular reference to the California Public Employees Retirement System. Dr. Hebb is a senior research associate at the Labor and Worklife Program, Harvard University and the Oxford University Centre for the Environment. She is researching the role of US public sector pension funds and urban revitalization as lead investigator on a two-year Rockefeller and Ford Foundation grant. Her doctoral work at Oxford University examined the impact of pension fund corporate engagement on the corporate governance, social and environmental standards of firm behaviour. She was a Clarendon Scholar at Oxford University and was awarded the prestigious William E. Taylor Fellowship (2003) from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Government of Canada. Dr. Hebb is also a recipient of the York University Schulich School of Business National Research in Financial Services and Public Policy Scholarship (Canada). Dr. Hebb is also the Director of the Capital Strategies Program at the Carleton Centre for Community Innovation (3ci), Carleton University, Canada. Here her work focuses on the financial and non-financial impact of pension fund economically targeted investment in Canada as part of a three-year SSHRC Initiatives in the New Economy grant.     

Effects of pension fund freezing on firm performance and risk

This study considers the effect of freezing defined benefit pension funds on shareholder risk and returns. The conditional models used in this study directly assess the effects of a pension fund freeze on returns and on systematic and residual risk. While pension fund freezes do not significantly affect performance or systematic risk, they do significantly reduce short‐term residual risk. Pension fund freezes therefore do not generally present significant financial advantages to shareholders. Only shareholders of firms with pension funds in crisis would benefit from significant systematic risk reductions. Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Les effets du gel d'une caisse de retraite sur la performance et le risque des entreprises

This study considers the effect of freezing defined benefit pension funds on shareholder risk and returns. The conditional models used in this study directly assess the effects of a pension fund freeze on returns and on systematic and residual risk. While pension fund freezes do not significantly affect performance or systematic risk, they do significantly reduce short‐term residual risk. Pension fund freezes therefore do not generally present significant financial advantages to shareholders. Only shareholders of funds in crisis would benefit from significant systematic risk reductions. Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

新型农村社会养老保险制度可持续发展探析

新型农村社会养老保险从2009年末开始在全国范围内进行试点,现已取得了可喜的成绩,但新农保制度在实施过程中存在的基金筹集困难、养老保险替代率过低及政策宣传不力等问题不容忽视,必须从新农保制度的可持续发展着眼,从社会养老保险的城乡统筹出发,建立新农保制度的长效机制。     

基金投资组合风险评价中VaR的应用研究

近年来我国基金业发展迅猛,其所倡导的价值投资理念获得市场的巨大认同。与此同时,社会上对基金投资风险进行评价的需求日益强烈。如何量化基金投资组合的风险,已成为金融机构及投资者共同关注的问题。利用风险度量的VaR方法,对基金投资股票组合的风险进行实证研究,探讨其在组合风险评价中的应用。     

Ability parity model for optimal fund allocation: Evidence from China's mutual fund markets

We propose in this article a novel ability parity model for optimal fund allocation. Compared with the traditional portfolio selection methods which directly work on asset returns and/or risk (volatility), the proposed ability parity method focuses mainly on the allocation between the stock selection ability and market timing ability of fund managers, which essentially determines fund performance (Fama, 1972). Using the data of China's mutual fund markets, we find strong and robust evidence that the proposed ability parity model delivers significantly higher return, skewness, and Sharpe ratio than traditional models and the benchmark index, while having volatilities comparable with traditional models.     

The case against active pension funds: Evidence from the Turkish Private Pension System

Using data on private Turkish pension funds we show that most active managers are not able to provide performance beyond what could be achieved by passive indexing. The average fund beats its benchmark by only 26 basis points, before fees. We also observe herding behavior among managers' asset allocation decisions which can potentially explain their lack of overperformance. Our results strongly support the need for low-cost index funds in emerging market countries that are reforming their pension schemes. We further recommend regulatory oversight on the “activeness” of funds and introduction of default plans with more balanced asset allocations.     

A Dynamic Investment Model with Control on the Portfolio's Worst Case Outcome

This paper considers a portfolio problem with control on downside losses. Incorporating the worst-case portfolio outcome in the objective function, the optimal policy is equivalent to the hedging portfolio of a European option on a dynamic mutual fund that can be replicated by market primary assets. Applying the Black-Scholes formula, a closed-form solution is obtained when the utility function is HARA and asset prices follow a multivariate geometric Brownian motion. The analysis provides a useful method of converting an investment problem to an option pricing model.     

Liability driven investment with alternative assets: Evidence from Brazil

We study the portfolio choice problem for an asset-liability investor who invests in stocks, equity mutual funds, government bonds, short term interest, hedge funds, listed real estate, and commodities futures available in Brazil. Inflation and real interest play as important risk sources. We estimate the asset classes and liabilities time-varying conditional covariance structure using an asymmetric multivariate dynamic conditional correlation GARCH model and compare the asset-liability portfolio's global minimum variance allocation with Brazilian pension funds' market portfolio. The conditional covariance structure provides insights about the complex dynamic relationships between the asset classes and liabilities. We find that some (though not all) Brazilian alternative assets render strong diversification and liabilities hedging benefits for asset-liability investors. There are significant strategic asset allocation differences between the market portfolio and the liability driven portfolio as given by our model. We, therefore, question the Brazilian pension funds' allocation.     

Institutional ownership and technological relatedness: A test of endogeneity

Building on the previous literature on corporate diversification, institutional ownership and firm innovation, this study proposes an endogenous relationship between institutional ownership and corporate technological relatedness. Technological relatedness is the degree to which a set of industries in which a firm operates its businesses demand similar technological knowledge. A Vector Autoregressive analysis of data from U.S. manufacturing firms shows that firms enhancing technological relatedness attract more institutional investors and as predicted, this pattern is particularly strong for pension fund ownership. In contrast, the analysis fails to show that institutional investors cause a firm's business portfolio to increase in technological relatedness.     

STATIC FUND SEPARATION OF LONG‐TERM INVESTMENTS

This paper proves a class of static fund separation theorems, valid for investors with a long horizon and constant relative risk aversion, and with stochastic investment opportunities. An optimal portfolio decomposes as a constant mix of a few preference‐free funds, which are common to all investors. The weight in each fund is a constant that may depend on an investor's risk aversion, but not on the state variable, which changes over time. Vice versa, the composition of each fund may depend on the state, but not on the risk aversion, since a fund appears in the portfolios of different investors. We prove these results for two classes of models with a single state variable, and several assets with constant correlations with the state. In the linear class, the state is an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process, risk premia are affine in the state, while volatilities and the interest rate are constant. In the square root class, the state follows a square root diffusion, expected returns and the interest rate are affine in the state, while volatilities are linear in the square root of the state.     

Managerial Sharing,Mutual Fund Connections,and Performance

In this study, we examine the effect of mutual fund connections, through managerial sharing, on performance and stock holding commonalities. Our analysis of return correlations and portfolio holdings indicates that more interconnected funds tend to buy and sell similar stocks, hence increasing the similarity of portfolio holdings and undermining the distinctiveness of their investment strategy. Our results also indicate that highly connected funds significantly underperform weakly connected funds by about 1.4% on a yearly risk‐adjusted basis. We show that fund family performance is unaffected by the intensity of fund connections, and that greater fund connections could significantly enhance family‐level profit margins.     

Crisis,internal governance mechanisms and pension fund performance: Evidence from Poland

This study provides new insight on the impact of supervisory board structure as an internal governance mechanism on privately defined contribution pension fund performance in Poland. Using a hand-collected data set, we find evidence that the chairman, as a motivated insider, plays an important role in determining fund performance. The results also show, although with weaker evidence, that outsiders may positively impact fund performance. During the 2007–2008 crisis, however, the insider professional knowledge outweighed the benefits of having motivated outsiders on the supervisory board. Consequently, the results show that both the composition of the supervisory board and the motivation and knowledge of its members are important in explaining pension fund performance. We also find that other governance factors have no impact on fund performance. The results are a relevant contribution to the current regulatory debate on reforms of the pension fund industry in Poland, arguing that modifying the supervisory board structure and electing outsiders with professional knowledge may significantly improve its performance.