新制度主义中国家理论的争论与发展

新制度主义内部有关国家理论的分化是相当明显的,不能一概而论。文章区分了历史制度主义、理性选择制度主义和社会学制度主义中国家理论的异同,分析了经济利益、社会风俗习惯、文化意识等因素对国家起源和发展的影响,并对政府经济制度的改革和变迁提供了更多的途径和方法。     

新制度主义中国家理论的争论与发展

谈到新制度主义的国家理论时 ,理论界往往会一概而论 ,但新制度主义内部的分化还是相当明显的 ,历史制度主义、理性选择制度主义和社会学制度主义中的国家理论既有共同之处 ,也有不同之处。独树一帜的理论家奥尔森的国家理论与理性制度主义的代表人物诺思的国家理论都有各自的贡献和不足。经济利益、社会风俗习惯、文化意识等因素对国家起源和发展都具有重要的影响。     

政治科学与三个新制度主义

“新制度主义”这个词在政治科学中的出现频率已经越来越高。然而，对于什么是“新制度主义”，它与其他分析途径之间的区别在哪里，对于它做出了哪种承诺或者说要揭示什么的问题等，却仍然存在着相当大的混淆。本文拟通过检视新近文献，对上述问题做出初步回答。事实上，在过去的十五年中，至少有三种不同的“新制度主义”分析途径。即历史制度主义、理性选择制度主义和社会学制度主义。本文简要描述了每一个流派的起源，指出它们在分析社会和政治问题时的独到视角。从而寻求每一个流派是否有向其他两个流派学习的可能，并在结论部分讨论这三种视角的整合潜力。     

新制度主义的制度分析范式:一个归纳性述评

制度分析是当代社会科学领域一个重要的理论分析工具。20世纪70年代以来,经济学、政治学等重新发现了制度对解释现实问题的重要性,形成了新制度主义的制度分析范式。基于共同的逻辑起点、行为假设和理论工具,制度分析范式形成了不同的制度分析途径,如嵌入性制度分析、立宪制度分析、比较制度分析、历史制度分析和多中心制度分析等。制度分析拓展了社会科学的研究对象,增强了社会科学解释和解决现实问题的能力,越来越多的领域被囊括到制度分析中。     

新制度学派与新制度主义经济学的比较与评析

文章在简单介绍新制度学派和新制度主义经济学的基础上,在理论渊源、制度分析方法、市场和政府的作用、研究方法四个方面对这两个流派的差异进行比较论述,并对两个流派的理论进行简单的评述,从而对这两个流派之间的区别与联系有一个比较全面的了解,从而对制度经济学的理解更为客观准确。     

历史制度分析:经济学与政治学中制度研究的新进展

历史制度分析不仅仅是新制度经济学的最新理论进展,也是政治学中"新制度主义"的前沿领域,同时,它还是社会科学领域新兴的一种研究方法.其方法论特征主要包括四个方面:制度作为分析的逻辑起点;演化博弈观;"历史是重要的";制度统合性.     

新制度经济学派与新制度学派的比较

制度经济学的发展和兴起是当今从事西方经济学研究人员的热门话题,它之所以在全世界倍受关注,说明该经济理论在解决现实经济问题中已爆发出明显的潜力。而当今西方经济学发展流派中存在着的“新制度经济学派”和“新制度学派”两种理论却有着许多的不同之处,作者在此作了一个简要的表象比较,以便让更多的人在研究“制度”问题时更能抓住本质。     

新制度经济学对传统学术理论的冲击

新制度经济学兴起于20世纪70-80年代,通过对制度展开经济分析,逐步发展了产权理论、组织理论学等多个分支学科对正统的新古典经济学、传统的社会学、传统的经济历史学等学术理论产生了巨大的冲击,具有里程碑式的重要意义。     

新制度经济学的理论范式为什么是适用的

论文在对新制度经济学的研究纲领进行简要概括的基础上,分析了这一理论范式固有的局限性即其只适用于小范围短时间的微观制度分析,而不适于研究宏观视野的制度变迁历史过程。文章还讨论了新制度经济学理论范式适用于我国经济体制改革的原因1.在市场经济的限度之内,“个人理性主义”的假设前提有暂时的合理性;2.边际分析方法适于渐进式改革的特征;3.中国经济改革的后发性特征的影响。     

新制度经济学的分析方法与中国经济研究

新制度经济学是目前经济学领域最前沿的研究方向之一，日渐受到社会各界尤其是经济学界的密切关注。本文详细论述了新制度经济学的产生、分析方法、与制度学派的区别、新制度经济学的贡献与局限以及新制度经济学的最新发展，并以新制度经济学的观点评析中国制度现况，以期能更全面地认识新制度经济学。     

Planning and Urban Growth: An Anglo-American Comparison

Understanding the complexity of institutional change is a necessary step in gaining deeper knowledge of economic performance over time, and it is one of the main challenges in the research agenda of institutionalism. Institutional change can be studied using a variety of theoretical approaches. We study some of the main approaches to institutional change in original economic institutionalism and new institutional economics. First, after comparing the approaches of Émile Durkheim and Thorstein Veblen, we focus on the contributions of the instrumental value theory and other original institutional traditions in the study of institutional change. Second, new institutional economics improved on the weak points of rational choice institutionalism regarding institutional change and incorporated the “institutions-as-rules” approach (Douglass North) and the “institutions-as-equilibria” approach (Avner Greif, Masahiko Aoki). We analyze both approaches to institutional change. Furthermore, we present an updated nonintegral overview of approaches to institutional change, show several interconnections between original and new institutionalisms, and conclude that the dialogue between the different theories of institutional change is relevant and beneficial.     

Theoretical Issues of Gender in the Transition from Socialist Regimes

Institutional economics is often presented by its critics as a tradition in political economy purporting a mechanistic, robot-like, view of the human agent. In this paper this portrayal of institutional economics is rejected and choice is reclaimed for institutionalism. In fact, institutional economics is not committed to an understanding of behavior as mere stimulus-response. Notwithstanding the fact that institutionalism places great emphasis on habit in human conduct, this does not mean that it excludes autonomy, volition or rationality.

The paper addresses the notion of habit within the pragmatist-institutionalist tradition with the aim of clarifying this concept, disentangling it from current misconceptions. With the intention of contributing to the development of a theory of choice in institutionalism, it then deals with deliberation and choice in the pragmatist literature, namely in John Dewey's Human Action and Conduct. Finally, the implications of deliberation thus conceived, namely in respect to collective action and institutional change, are highlighted.     

发展中国家经济安全问题的制度分析

在市场经济全球化迅速发展的背景下,制度因素已成为影响发展中国家经济安全的最大瓶颈.因此,拟从新制度主义的视角,从制度结构和制度供求两个维度对发展中国家经济安全的影响机制进行深入系统的阐释,在此基础之上,提出应对经济安全问题的具体对策和措施.     

Property and Economic Power as Issues in Institutional Economics

In the first part of this two-part paper, I presented an "irenic" reconciliation of the three apparently contradictory definitions of "institution" within original institutional economics (OIE), employing the methodology of critical institutionalism. The critical institutionalist reconciliation of these definitions conceptualizes institutions as an emergent process by which the internal and necessary relations of social structure as collective action, mediated through agency, results in the control, expansion, and liberation of the individual action of social actors in transactions. In short, an institution is the emergent process of social structure actualized in transactions (social action). Institutions, therefore, not only have a structural existence, but also an actual existence as they are the process of the emergence of the actual (in transactions) from the structural. Institutions are multi-level processes and cannot be reduced to structures, actions, behaviors, or patterns of behaviors. In this part, I demonstrate the significance of this reconciliation in two areas. The first is its ability to further differentiate the institutional definition of economics as "the science of social provisioning" from the mainstream definition of economics as "a relationship between ends and scarce means" by decomposing the institutional definition into its productive and distributive processes. The second is its usefulness in modeling the interaction of non-economic social institutions with economic institutions at varying levels of detail. I also introduce critical institutional analysis, and use as a method, for model-building and use it to build models of communal, feudal, and industrial capitalist economies.     

Democracy Evolving: A Diversity of Institutional Contradictions Transforming Political Economy

I analyze democracy as an evolving socio-historical process of autonomy, participative governance, social learning, and institutionalization. I discuss a variety of institutional contradictions, ranging from protective versus developmental democracy, socialist versus capitalist democracy, transcendental versus comparative institutionalism, and utilitarian versus pragmatist democracy. I argue that these contradictions are inherent in the agonistic nature of democracy that is transforming political economy along with the antagonistic interests of its members and institutions. I also present a basic synthesis of some dynamic aspects of democracy that enable and enhance social emancipation and transformation.     

International Monetary Reform: A Review Article

Original institutional economics (OIE) has three significant, but apparently contradictory, definitions of institution(s) stemming from Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and J. Fagg Foster. In this first installment of a two-part paper I address this apparent contradiction by developing an "irenic reconciliation" of these definitions using a methodological approach I call "critical institutionalism"— a synthesis of the OIE in the tradition of the Veblen, Commons, and Foster, the pragmatism theory of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, the critical realist methodology of Margaret Archer, and the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar. In so doing, I provide an alternative discussion to that of some current institutionalists who propose to replace the existing OIE definitions of institution(s) with "consensual definitions" developed in the discourse with non-OIE traditions. I propose that there is still considerable analytical value in the OIE definitions, and that replacing them with non-OIE-originating concepts would unnecessarily carry OIE away from its methodological and philosophical roots. In the second installment of this paper (yet to be published), I proceed to demonstrate the analytical value these "reconciled" definitions have for the OIE project.     

Economic Theory and the Problem of Translation

Institutionalism was the dominant approach to public finance prior to WWII, after which it was eclipsed by Pigouvianism and Keynesianism. This transition defined the career of Wisconsin’s Harold M. Groves (1897–1969). Groves was a notable public finance economist, leading textbook author, and drafter of significant tax and labor legislation. He represented the culmination of a multigenerational institutionalist tradition. In this paper, I examine Groves and postwar public finance as a test case for the legacy of Wisconsin institutionalism. To that end, I consider Groves’s contributions to postwar tax policy, his interactions with Henry C. Simons and Richard M. Musgrave, and his view on Keynesian public finance. I identify some Wisconsin institutionalist contributions to modern public finance and offer an explanation for the postwar decline in institutional public finance.     

Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order: An Advance Sketch

Classical liberalism is presented as an alternative to the two established approaches to liberal international political economy, rational choice and neoliberal institutionalism. Classical liberalism diverges from rational choice by eschewing the assumption of rational utility-maximisation in perfectly competitive markets. Contrary to neoliberal institutionalism, it underlines the domestic or national preconditions of international order, with a policy emphasis on unilateral trade liberalisation in the context of market-like institutional [or intergovernmental] competition. This contrasts sharply with neoliberal institutionalism's preference for contingent or reciprocal trade liberalisation within the complex organisational machinery and cartel-like tendencies of intergovernmental negotiated cooperation.     

Towards a History of American Institutional Economics

This paper focuses on a number of issues that have arisen in my efforts to deal with the history of American institutional economics in the interwar period. The specific issues addressed here are (1) the choice of time frame; (2) the definition of institutionalism in terms of its commonly held ideas; (3) the treatment of the network of personal contacts that make up the institutional movement; (4) the treatment of certain institutional and cross-disciplinary connections and supports; and (5) the variety of reasons lying behind the relative decline in the position of institutional economics after World War II. Each of these issues is discussed in light of historical material and examples and with a view to detailing the specific challenges and possible solutions involved.     

The institutional ideas virus: the case of Johan Åkerman

Swedish economists have received impulses from historical or institutuionalist sources on many occasions. A couple of these economists, Gunnar Myrdal and Johan Åkerman, received obvious impulses from American institutionalism. This article deals with the case of Åkerman. To attempt a wall-to-wall chart of institutional influences on an economist is hardly possible. But what is possible is to examine occasions when he was exposed to powerful ‘jolts’, viz in conjunction with studies at an American university. Johan åkerman studied at Harvard in Cambridge in 1919–20. he evetually became – alongside Myrdal – the leading institutional economist.