Urban development,excessive entry of firms and wage inequality in developing countries

This paper examines the short and long-term effects of urbanisation, via favourable urban development policies, on income distribution and social welfare for a developing country, in which the urban manufacturing sector is characterised by imperfect competition and free entry. Urbanisation shifts rural workers to the highly productive urban sector, while causing production in urban firms to expand because of scale economies. However, urbanisation may worsen wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour in the short term. In the long term, urbanisation can attract new firms to the urban sector and favourable urban development policies may result in excessive entry of firms, which can amplify wage inequality in the economy. This entry-amplifying effect is confirmed empirically, especially for low and lower-middle-income countries. If the entry effect is not considered, the impact of urbanisation on wage inequality could be understated by 13% for low and lower-middle-income countries.     

External Economies of Scale and Insufficient Entry

Empirical evidence suggests that many industries are characterized by external economies of scale, yet the literature on the welfare effects of entry has ignored this aspect. We show that entry can be insufficient instead of excessive in the presence of external economies of scale. Using an example with specific demand and cost functions and Cournot competition, we show that insufficient entry occurs for any positive cost of entry and the possibility of insufficient entry increases with a higher cost of entry. Hence, anti-competitive entry regulation may not be justified in industries with strong external economies of scale, which may occur due to knowledge spillover.     

Applying the Theory of Small Economies and Competition Policy: The Case of Switzerland

The question whether optimal competition policy depends on the size of an economy has recently received considerable attention. In particular it has been argued that markets in small economies are often highly concentrated and protected by substantial entry barriers. Market forces may therefore not be strong enough to correct inefficient economic behaviour, i.e. inefficiencies may endure in small economies. This paper applies the theory of small economies and competition policy to the case of Switzerland. It finds that Switzerland cannot be rated as the prototype of a small economy as pertaining to competition policy. It further assesses whether the Swiss Cartel Act accounts for the potential efficiency problems of small economies and reveals that there is scope for a more efficiency enhancing legal competition framework within Switzerland.     

Endogenous market structure and the growth and welfare effects of economic integration

This paper studies the growth and welfare effects of integration in a world economy populated by global oligopolists. In economies that move from autarky to trade, growth and welfare rise because exit of domestic firms is more than compensated by entry of foreign firms so that integration generates a larger, more competitive market where firms have access to a larger body of technological spillovers that support faster growth. The effects of a gradual reduction of tariffs are different because economies start out from a situation where all firms already serve all markets. In this case, the global number of firms falls so that the variety of consumption goods and the diversity of innovation paths fall. The surviving firms, on the other hand, are larger and exploit static and dynamic economies of scale to a larger degree. These homogenization and rationalization effects work in opposite directions. Under plausible conditions, the rationalization effect dominates and growth and welfare rise.     

Managerial Firms,Entry, and Switching Costs

Empirical evidence shows that switching costs are important in many industries. We analyze the welfare effects of entry into markets with switching costs when firms can be run by managers and the entrant may be partially foreign-owned. We find that with profit-maximizing firms, the welfare effect of entry depends crucially on the ownership of the entrant firm. We also show that entry is less likely with managerial firms than it is with profit-maximizing firms. In the latter case, entry always reduces welfare if the share of the entrant firm owned by foreign investors is high. However, with managerial firms, entry always increases welfare.     

Effects of Joint Outsourcing on Consumer Welfare

This work models outsourcing under oligopolistic competition with nonlinear costs. I show that in a covered market, if each firm’s marginal cost before outsourcing is lower than the industry’s average cost, outsourcing leads to increased prices and decreased consumer welfare. Joint outsourcing is more profitable if the firms’ equilibrium quantity produced is in the economies of scale part of their cost curve.     

Geography,knowledge spillovers and small firms’ exports: an empirical examination for The Netherlands

This study examines the impact of external and internal scale economies on the decision to start exporting and the level of exports of innovating firms. Based on new trade theory, increasing returns to scale—both internal and external scale economies—are considered an important source of comparative and competitive advantage. The empirical analysis of (small) innovating firms in The Netherlands leads to two main findings. First, firms that are located in technical Marshallian clusters seem less inclined to become exporters. Availability of technical knowledge alone does not help to reduce entry costs that come with the decision to export and/or marketing and sales costs in order to achieve a higher export performance. Second, firms that experience difficulties in appropriating innovation rents due to labour poaching also seem to be less inclined to become exporters. The explanation for this second finding is the importance of outgoing knowledge spillovers, which is particularly relevant for small, product innovating firms. This reduces their probability to export. However, if firms export, the knowledge leaking argument is not valid for the export performance of the firm.     

Welfare-optimal trade and competition policies in small open oligopolistic economies

Standard trade theory claims that free trade is welfare-enhancing. We show that this is not the case if at least one sector of the economy is a Cournot oligopoly. In a simple small open economy with one oligopolistic and one competitive sector, welfare is an inverted U-shaped function of tariffs. Hence, an optimal tariff rate can be determined. The optimal rate depends on the number of firms in the oligopolistic sector. Below the optimal level, the competitive sector overproduces, i.e. oligopolistic good have a higher marginal effect on welfare. Increasing tariff rates stimulate the production of the oligopolistic sector by dampening imports. Under balanced trade, this reduces exports and production in the competitive sector, thus shifting resources to oligopolistic goods production. We also find that given certain levels of protection, perfect competition is not welfare maximal and, hence, not desirable. The finding explains why developing economies with imperfect competition are often reluctant to embrace trade liberalization and why, conversely, countries with high levels of external protection may be unenthusiastic about competition theory.     

Marketing cost differentials,economics of scale,and the competitiveness of small-country producers

The paper examines the effect of marketing cost differentials on the ability of small countries to compete with large-country producers in goods manufactured under economies of scale. It is shown that the mere presence of scale economies does not necessarily retard the performance of small-country producers unless export marketing costs exceed domestic marketing costs. When economies of scale and positive differences between export and domestic marketing costs are simultaneously present, small countries with potentially more efficient producers may be unable to export to large countries served by less efficient local producers. Furthermore, the latter may end up exporting to the former. The policy implications is that subsidization of exports in conjunction with restrictions on domestic prices enhances national welfare.     

Is Cost-of-Service Regulation Worth the Cost?

Cost-of-service regulation that reduces prices will also reduce incentives to control cost. Increased output counteracts this trend when there are economies of scale. We derive closed-form approximations for the maximum cost increase that leaves a positive welfare gain when regulation reduces price by some percentage. To be useful to regulators, these approximations depend only on demand elasticity and the ratio of fixed to total cost. For low demand elasticities typical of regulated industries, price must fall by half to outweigh cost increases of as little as 2%. Cost-of-service regulation appears to reduce welfare unless economies of scale are strong. These conclusions may be reversed if regulators favor consumers, but only a slight bias in favor of the firm exacerbates them. Regulatory methods that preserve incentives to be efficient by divorcing price from cost become more appealing.     

Market Structures with Multi-product Firms: Welfare Analysis and Policy Implications

In the real world firms operate in more than one market and consequently can exploit scope economies and/or demand complementarities. Introducing multi-product firms in the picture makes the standard assumption that more competition is always beneficial for social welfare less clear-cut. In this paper we show that a concentrated structure can be socially preferable in the presence of scope economies, whereas a fragmented structure has to be preferred when products are close substitutes. We also identify either analytically or numerically the socially optimal market structure when aggregate output (and then consumer surplus) or total welfare are used as ranking criteria. The analysis is useful for discussing which market structure should be favored by policy makers aimed at introducing competition in sectors which were previously monopolized by state-owned firms. To that respect, our findings point out that not only the level (number of firms) but also the form (type of firms) of competition matters.     

The Property Rights Theory of the Firm and Mixed Competition: A Counter-Example in the US Health Care Industry

We present a counter-example to the conventional property rights theory of the firm, which indicates that not-for-profit firms are incapable of directly competing against strictly profit-maximizing firms without the presence of barriers to entry, outside assistance, changing profit status or economies of scale and scope. We employ a modified Bertrand duopoly model of mixed competition in the health care industry to show that, even when these four conditions do not hold, not-for-profit firms may still be able to compete and possibly dominate the market. Consequently, market fundamentals, rather than market intervention, regulation or uncertainty, determine a not-for-profit provider's success or failure in the market. A necessary requirement is that the not-for-profit manager must care about non-pecuniary benefits but be willing to accept lower than normal returns. Moreover, under specific cost and demand conditions, a not-for-profit's ability to compete may actually be enhanced by increasing its production of non-pecuniary benefits.     

Accounting for Net Entry into Greek Manufacturing by Establishments of Varying Size

Adopting the view that size matters in understanding entry (exit) patterns, this research explores the nature and causes of net entry patterns of various size-defined groups of establishments in the case of a less industrialised country – Greece. The hypothesis to be tested is that the determinants of entry are not independent of firm size. Throughout this paper the analysis has had to confront difficulties arising from the use of net entry rates defined at the size class level. The degree of size disaggregation used in this paper is considerably finer than used before. Five employment-defined size classes have been used instead of sliding cut-off points discriminating between small and large firms. Unlike other research using pooled models to explain variation in entry (exit) rates across industries, the data used here are characterised by the absence of significant industry-specific systematic variation. Overall, the results obtained in this paper indicate that there is a gradation in the responses of different size classes to stimuli defined at the industry level. Evidence is offered that small firms are different in that they manage to overcome entry barriers, perhaps adopting different survival strategies, and that large firms are well aware of market conditions and are in an advantageous position to overcome many of the problems imposed by entry barriers. Size classes in the middle of the size class distribution offer a rather mixed result due to size-related advantages and disadvantages.     

Competing with multinational enterprises’ entry: Search strategy,environmental complexity,and survival of local firms

This study examines the competitive dynamics between foreign and local firms. We posit that multinational enterprises (MNEs)’s entry in foreign markets significantly reduces the survival rate of local firms in the short term, but that this effect gradually diminishes over time. The proposed conceptual framework is operationalized through the combination of the widely used agent-based model and the economic model of competition. The agent-based model allows us to study the behavior of firms under the context of different markets and the environmental complexity while the competition model determines the competition between firms as well as the entry and exit of firms. Our results obtained from the simulation study reveal that the negative effect of foreign entry is heightened as environmental complexity increases. However, local firms with a broader knowledge search are better able to confront the negative impact of foreign entry over time. We also find that the negative effect of foreign entry on the survival of local firms is weaker for local firms with a strong retrieval capacity.     

Group Affiliation and Entry Barriers: The Dark Side Of Business Groups In Emerging Markets

Business groups dominate the economic landscape in many economies around the world. While business groups overcome the institutional voids arising due to inefficiencies of external markets, they also possess market power, which could be economically and socially counterproductive, especially for unaffiliated firms. Drawing on the transaction cost and industrial organization economics, we examine whether the presence of business group affiliated firms in industries restricts the entry of unaffiliated firms or firms affiliated with small- and medium-size business groups. Findings based on Indian firms suggest that investments by business group affiliated firms in an industry have an inverted U-shaped relationship with the investment by unaffiliated firms. However, investments by firms affiliated with large-sized business groups have a U-shaped relationship with the investment by affiliates of small and medium business groups. These findings suggest that the market power of business groups and entry barrier relationship is contingent on the size of the business groups.     

产品市场竞争与资本结构的战略决策

“有限负债效应”理论指出,企业提高财务杠杆导致了产出的增加,但很多实证研究却难以支持这一结论。本文分析了在上游企业外部规模效应较强的情况下,企业债务融资战略效应为负的理由,证明了不存在外部规模效应是债务融资战略的重要条件。企业的融资行为深受财务危机的影响,其中企业规模、产业集中度、产品专用性、R&D支出和行业前景是决定财务危机成本大小的关键变量,因此,以财务危机成本为依据进行决策,企业会自我限制债务水平。由此,企业资本结构的决策应从产品市场竞争状况去考虑,这对我国企业融资决策有重要意义。     

Business Dynamics and Efficiency in Industries and Regions: The Case of Spain

High rates of firm births and deaths are a pervasive phenomenon across industries and territories. Most studies have related the great turbulence at the fringe of practically all manufacturing industries to positive effects on the long-run performance of industries. According to these views business turbulence, although it has a relatively small incidence on net entry, leads to allocative improvement and stimulates innovation. The existing set of empirical studies does not reach clear conclusions, however, and many questions are still open. Our contribution analyses the relationship between business dynamics in manufacturing and the growth of total factor productivity in industries and regions. After a review of current literature on entry and exit it is argued that most models are tailored to suit the processes observed in industries and regions that are near the technological frontier, and we propose an approach that could be more representative of middle range economies such as Spain. According to this approach new firms are seen more as users of innovations than producers of innovations. We adopt a model based on a vintage capital framework in which new entrants embody the edge technologies available and exiting businesses are supposed to represent the most marginal obsolete plants. Both industries and regions are represented by a Hall's type production function which controls for imperfect competition and economies of scale. The results show that both entry and exit rates contribute positively to the growth of total factor productivity in industries and in regions.     

A comparative analysis of the role of national culture on foreign market acquisitions by U.S. firms and firms from emerging countries

Do firms from emerging economies differ from U.S. firms in their foreign market acquisition strategies? A comparison of cross-border acquisitions by firms from the United States and 18 emerging countries shows that (1) firms from both the United States and emerging countries target countries that are culturally closer to their home countries, (2) a strong interaction effect occurs between market potential and cultural distance for emerging country firms as the market potential increases (i.e., at high market potential, firms from emerging economies are willing to overlook cultural distance), (3) no interaction effect occurs between market potential and cultural distance for U.S. firms, and (4) different cultural dimensions affect the market entry strategies of U.S. firms and firms from emerging countries.     

Small Firms and the Strategy of the First Mover

Timing of entry and the decision to be a leader or follower in products or markets is a complex decision and empirical evidence suggests that first movers do not always 'capture' all the potential benefits from being first. Small firms in particular are faced with problems when deciding on whether to be a first or later mover. Their strategies were examined using a sample of 264 firms in chosen industry sectors and specific external and internal factors were found to explain much of the variation in timing of entry strategies by these firms. In particular a composite measure of the technological turbulence that firms faced in their supply chain was seen as a crucial determinant of early entry whilst uncertainty as to general business conditions explained much of the late and non pioneering strategies. Even within this group of small firms, size also played an important role with the smallest companies tending to be the most pioneering     

Small businesses and liquidity constraints in financing business investment: Evidence from shanghai's manufacturing sector

When firms experience financial hierarchy, external finance, if at all available, is substantially more expensive than internal finance. Factors such as transaction costs, agency problem, and asymmetric information have created such a hierarchy. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that asymmetric information between firms and potential suppliers of external finance creates adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the credit market in developed market economies. This problem of a higher cost of external finance is commonly thought to be more serious for small firms because they are more disadvantaged than their larger counterparts in accessing external finance due to several factors: (1) Public information on small firms is generally not available and leads to the even greater problem of asymmetric information, i.e., more severe adverse selection and moral hazard problems. These information problems have excluded small firms from bond and share markets. (2) Due to the lack of available means of external finance, small firms rely more heavily on bank loans than their larger counterparts. In addition, as small firms are more interested in cultivating stable relationships with a few banks in order to secure a stable supply of credit, these banks become virtual monopolies by lending to small businesses and exercise their market power in lending to small firms.Most of existing research considers only small firms in market economies; little research has been done to understand the relationship between firm size and investment financing in any economy in transition. This paper makes a contribution to the literature by studying the relationship between firm size and liquidity constraints by using a firm level data of manufacturing enterprises in Shanghai during the period of 1989–1992. We consider whether small manufacturing firms in Shanghai are constrained by the availability of liquidity compared with their larger counterparts when they are financing their fixed investment. In a transforming economy such as China (or other similar transition economies), external finance relies heavily on loans from banks that are fully owned by the state. Due to historical reasons, allocations of credit are always biased in favor of state-owned enterprises. Such a `lending bias' imposes an extra cost on small Chinese enterprises in financing investment as the majority of them are not state-owned.In such an environment, our empirical results show that small manufacturing firms in Shanghai are actually less liquidity-constrained than their larger counterparts in financing their fixed investment. This surprising result is rather different from what people normally predict based on the experience in market economies. We suggest three possible explanations for this peculiar finding: (1) The composition of various firm size classes plays an important role in explaining the result: Non-state enterprises which are fast growing and efficient dominate the small firm classes. Their successes in the markets helps them to generate enough internal funds to smooth their investment over time. (2) The presence of heavy indebtedness of large state-owned enterprises may deprive them of sufficient cash available for investment decision. Given that state-owned enterprises have been making heavy losses, the central and regional governments have a liquidity problem in satisfying their huge liquidity demands. (3) Small enterprises in non-state sectors can rely on the informal credit market to obtain funds for investment although they are excluded from the state banking system.However, the further trade liberalization in terms of eliminating tariffs and quotas caused by China's bid of joining the WTO will erode the profits of these small enterprises as imported goods will be supplied at lower prices. In addition, further reforms in financial sectors may also affect the supply of external finance to small enterprises in nonstate sectors. The consequence may lead to a tight liquidity constraint for small enterprises in China.